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When I dated such a beautiful a young lass from Nova Scotia,  
I shared with you my dream of completing graduate school by the time I reached thirty.  
Little did I know then that graduate work is, in essence, the work of one’s entire life. In truth, 
every day is an opportunity to learn. And with each passing day, I find my love for you 
deepening in a miraculous way. You are no longer simply my lover and wife; you have become 
my most powerful memory of life. That first time we met at Toronto’s airport, I did not know 
you were my life’s consort; had I known then what I know now, the band would have played, 








































“Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with it is a toy and an amusement. 
Then it becomes a mistress, then it becomes a master, 
then it becomes a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled 
to your servitude, you kill the monster and fling him to the public.” 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Preface  
 
This is a study about the law’s accommodation of religious practice and the brewing 
revolution within the legal profession against that accommodation. The revolution is especially 
evident, though not exclusively so, in sexual equality claims vis-à-vis religion. Originally, the 
study asked, “Why has religion been given special status in the law?” and “Should that status 
continue?” As a result of intense, multiyear research, I have come to recognize that there is 
within the legal profession a strident movement to remove from the law the traditional 
accommodation of religion. To explain my findings, I have used the work of Thomas S. Kuhn1 as 
a theoretical framework.  
Freedom to practice religion has long been part of the legal order in liberal democracies. 
Indeed, even before Canada became a country in 1867, religion and religious practices were 
accommodated in the British colonies that now make up the country. Religion had a special 
legal status. In 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 confirmed the constitutional 
protection for freedom of religion. The Charter did not grant freedom of religion but rather 
respected a freedom that already existed. To a large extent, the Supreme Court of Canada3 
expanded that freedom in its early post-Charter jurisprudence,4 but has in recent years scaled 
back that protection.5  
In 1953 (31 years before the Charter) Justice Ivan Rand opined that freedom of religion 
was among the “original freedoms” that was a necessary attribute and mode of human self-
expression that forms the primary conditions of “community life within a legal order.”6 Under 
the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that “only beliefs, convictions and practices 
rooted in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held” 
are protected.7   
This study began with a simple question: Why? What is it about that category of beliefs 
and practises falling under the rubric “religion” that justifies differential treatment from “non-
religious” beliefs and practises? Why, for example, should the law require workplace 
                                                     
1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Foundations of Unity of Science (University of 
Chicago Press, 1970) at 93 [Revolutions]. 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11, which came into force on April 17, 1982 [Charter]. 
3 Hereinafter referred to from time to time as “SCC”. 
4 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 1985 CanLII 69 [Big M Drug Mart], gave a very broad 
definition of religious freedom. Then Chief Justice Brian Dickson stated at para 94-96, “The essence of the 
concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious 
belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that 
…What may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or to the state acting at their behest, may 
not, for religious reasons, be imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view. The Charter safeguards 
religious minorities from the threat of ‘the tyranny of the majority’.”  
5 For example, in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 [Hutterian 
Brethern], the SCC denied accommodation of a small religious sect’s opposition to having their photographs 
taken for their Alberta drivers’ licenses. The SCC was not at all phased by the fact that the government of 
Alberta had accommodated that religious concern for the previous 29 years. 
6 Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 330 [Saumur] 
7 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para 39 [Amselem]. 
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accommodation of holy day observance such that a day off for religious practise is protected8 
but a day off to attend a political rally is not? Another apt example is that of the young Sikh boy 
who was granted accommodation to wear his kirpan (a ceremonial dagger) to school because 
of its religious significance.9 While the kirpan could only be worn if certain conditions were met 
(it had to be on the inside of his clothing) it nevertheless raised questions as to why he should 
have that right but other students who simply wanted to bring a pocket knife to school would 
not be permitted. The SCC responded to such concerns of other students by saying, “Religious 
tolerance is a very important value of Canadian society,” and that “it is incumbent on the 
schools to discharge their obligation to instil in their students [that] this value … is … at the 
very foundation of our democracy.”10 
The premise that religious tolerance is at the very foundation of our democracy is now 
robustly challenged by legal academics. To be clear, the “religious tolerance” that the SCC spoke 
of, and to which this book is referencing, is the tolerance that classical liberal democracies have 
consistently given to the religious practices that are dissonant at times with the generally 
applicable law and customs. In other words, the law treats religion as special. It has given 
religious practices a pass even though to do so is an execption to the law. This is evident with 
the Sikh boy, as noted above, being allowed to take the kirpan to school; or the province of 
Alberta’s exemption given to Sikhs from having to wear a motorcycle helmet as noted below.  
The special status of religion in the law will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Legal scholars such as Yossi Nehushtan11 see no reason why “intolerant” religious 
practices ought to be tolerated. Others such as Brian Leiter12 maintain there is no moral reason 
to tolerate religion. Nehustan suggests that religion and religious people are intolerant and 
liberal democracies have no obligation to tolerate such intolerance.13 Leiter sees no moral 
reason for tolerating a system of religious beliefs and practices that demands absolute 
obedience and is not persuaded by scientific evidence.  
In light of these criticisms, this intellectual inquiry was started to discover what, if 
anything, was unique about religion qua religion that the law accommodated its practice. While 
a reasonable explanation was found to exist, as described below, there was a greater discovery 
that arose from the research: a discovery that makes sense of the growing opposition to 
religion’s legal status and merited further investigation. This study uncovered a strident 
pushback against religion’s special status. The pushback is justified as a sexual equality claim 
against the legal norm of religious accommodation and represents a seismic shift in legal 
doctrine that has now been legitimized by the SCC, as discussed below in the Trinity Western 
University (TWU) law school case.14   
                                                     
8 Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 [Simpson-Sears]. 
9 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite‑Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6 [Multani]. 
10 Ibid at para 76. 
11 Yossi Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Hart, 2015). 
12 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University Press, 2012) [Why Tolerate]. 
13 Nehushtan, supra note 11, argues at 96 that “religion is strongly and uniquely linked to unjustified 
infringements of others’ autonomy or to harming and offending others, not in accordance with the harm 
principle, and, accordingly, that religious people are more likely to unjustly infringe others’ autonomy or to 
harm or offend them, not in accordance with the harm principle.” 
14 The SCC made two decisions in the TWU law school case that is described in depth below: Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [LSBC v TWU 2018] and Trinity Western University 
v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33 [TWU v LSUC 2018].  
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To assist in understanding this shift, Thomas S. Kuhn’s analysis15 of scientific 
revolutions is used as a methodological and theoretical framework. Kuhn’s method, with minor 
adjustments to account for the obvious differences between science and law, worked well in 
accomplishing the goal of analysing what this study terms as the “legal revolution” against the 
law’s accommodation of religion. It is within this frame of reference that the literature on 
religion’s legal status is introduced and critically assessed.  
The ultimate philosophical question that has arisen from this study is whether we 
should accept an asymmetrical view of equality16 at the expense of religious freedom. 
Asymmetrical equality claims not only vanquish all other human rights that seek to occupy 
similar public space, but go even further to assault the private domain that liberal democracies 
have traditionally given to the practice of religion – individually and communally. By way of 
introduction, some thought is presented here to assist the reader in what to expect. 
All rights are inflationary in their incremental demands for greater recognition and 
accommodation. Sexual equality rights are no different than any other right in that respect.17 
Indeed, I have concluded that we are not simply living in a “Secular Age” as envisioned by 
Charles Taylor, but we are in a “Sexular Age.” I use this term, explained in depth below, to 
describe a socially complex convergence of sexual identity politics and radical individualism 
that demands societal approval and accommodation of sexual identity even at the expense of 
other identities such as religious identity. The Sexular Age suggests that there is a clash 
between sexual equality and religion. However, that is incorrect because religion is itself listed 
among the various heads of equality rights as in s. 15 of the Charter.18 Yet, given the recent 
scholarship,19 it would appear that equality rights (sexual equality rights in particular) are 
permitted to “cannibalize” or supersede other rights such as religious freedom. As former SCC 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé insisted, “I don’t believe that a fundamental right can be 
reasonable if it’s not compatible with the notion of equality.”20 
Fundamentally, it makes no sense to suggest that religious freedom, protected as it is in 
the Canadian Constitution, is to be marginalized by those who advocate equality at the expense 
of all other rights. As will be shown, the critics of religious accommodation are now suggesting 
that equality rights are the new paradigm and that the time of religious freedom dominating 
the discourse is over because we are in a new world of radical equality. We are, nevertheless, 
left with a serious question: have we thought through all the consequences of the emerging 
                                                     
15 Kuhn, Revolutions, supra note 1 at 93. 
16 This is a concept that is not new to me, but from Iain T. Benson, with whom I have had a long collegial 
friendship over the years.  
17 Barry W. Bussey, “Rights Inflation:  Attempts to Redefine Marriage and the Freedom of Religion:  The Case 
of Trinity Western University School of Law,” (2016-17) 29:2 Regent University L Rev [“Rights Inflation”]. 
18 Charter, supra note 2, s 15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability (emphasis added). 
19 See: Beverley Baines, “Equality’s Nemesis?” (2006) 5:1 J.L. & Equal., 57, 72−73. Noa Mendelsohn Aviv, 
“(When) Can Religious Freedom Justify Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation? – A Canadian 
Perspective” (2013-14) 22 J.L.& Pol’cy 613, at 670 states, “belief-based exemptions, if allowed at all, must be 
extremely rare and exceptional. None of the cases discussed in this Article presented a justified belief-based 
exemption. However, it is possible that such situations may occur.” 
20 Haroon Siddiqui, “Quebec Charter’s Authoritarian Streak: Siddiqui,” Toronto Star (28 September 2013), 
online: <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/09/28/quebec
_charters_authoritarian_streak_siddiqui.html>.  
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revolution against the accommodation of religion?  Will this bring about a utopia or is it a 
dystopian nightmare in the making? 
This study has discovered that claims of sexual equality are fast becoming the 
touchstone that takes precedence over religious equality. This dynamic is starkly apparent as 
we review the arguments concerning the Trinity Western University Law School Case below. 
Finding a proper balance of the interests at stake is going to take some ingenuity to alleviate 
the criticisms of such strongly held positions. Consider the following thought experiment. 
 Suppose “B” is convinced that heterosexual marriage is the only way to live out one’s 
sexuality. B considers homosexual sexual activities immoral, not as part of his religious beliefs 
but as his personal views. Can we say that B is allowed (or should he be allowed) to think this? 
Many will say: “Yes, of course, this is his freedom of thought. This freedom is enshrined in 
constitutions and in human rights legislation.” 
Now suppose B not only thinks this, but wants to talk about his ideas with others, both 
in private and in the public sphere. Is he allowed to do this? Here is where many people will 
have doubts: they will consider this “discrimination” or, at the very least, offensive. Now, 
“discrimination” can have at least two meanings. One, it can refer to unequal treatment that is 
justified – for example, an employment position that requires applicants to have a diploma in a 
certain field of study. Alternately, “discrimination” can be unjustified, such as prohibitting a 
person of a particular race from applying for a position. 
 Some view that there is a distinction between what is permissible in “private” versus in 
“public”. B may be able to express his convictions in private settings such as his home, but not 
in the public settings outside his home. However, what sense does it make to treat verbal 
expression as discriminatory? Should free and democratic societies be permitted not only to 
discuss the merits of Christianity, atheism, liberalism, conservatism, but also different styles of 
sexual behaviour?   
If some people are offended by public discussion about whether certain sexual 
behaviours are immoral, that is their right to be offended. But there is also a corresponding 
constitutional right to be offended by such behaviour. To date we do not have a right not to be 
offended. However, as we will see, there are some developments in the law, such as the SCC’s 
TWU 2018 decisions,21 that tend to be pushing toward that view.   
It is possible to criticize paedophilia and it is possible to criticize polygamy. It would be 
senseless to say that you cannot discuss these things for the only reason that a paedophile is 
something that people “are,” or that a polygamist is not one by choice but by nature. There is 
little use of these arguments in the case of paedophiles and polygamists, but they are very 
common within the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ)22 
context. Is there an inconsistency here? Of course, proponents of LGBTQ rights would reject 
any comparison as juxtaposed above since, in their view, paedophilia and polygamy are 
different in kind.23 
                                                     
21 The SCC referred to TWU’s Community Covenant as “degrading and disrespectful” (LSBC v TWU 2018, supra 
note 14 at para 101). Clearly, the court was emotive in its decision rather than dealing with the law. That is to 
say, the Court echoed the “offense” taken by LGBTQ+ individuals against TWU. 
22 Steven Petrow, “Civilities: What Does the Acronym LGBTQ Stand For?” (23 May 2014) The Washington Post 
Arts and Entertainment, online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2014/05/23/civilities-what-does-the-acronym-lgbtq-stand-for/> 
23 Erin Fowler, “A Queer Critique on the Polygamy Debate in Canada: Law, Culture, and Diversity” (2012) 21 
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 93; Dana Phillips, “The Prude in the Law: Why the Polygamy Reference Is 
All About Sex” (2014) 19-1 Appeal: Rev. of Current Law and Law Reform 151. 
  7  
To return to our thought experiment, if B is permitted to think and speak about his 
beliefs, is he permitted to act on his beliefs? For example, is he permitted to decline making a 
wedding cake for a homosexual wedding if asked at his bakery?24 Or, is a religious institution 
permitted to deny admission to students who will not accept that sexual intimacy be reserved 
only for heterosexual marriage?  
Liberal democracies have, over the last many decades, moved away from the dominant 
position that only government must not “discriminate” in the sense indicated, thereby allowing 
private enterprises and individuals to discriminate, as long as there were enough alternatives 
in the market. But even that former consensus is no longer viable. Private enterprises and 
individuals are now being viewed as being in the same position as government with respect to 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination.   
Notice this thought experiment has nothing to do with freedom of religion – it is all 
about human rights and civil liberties in general, although mainly about freedom of thought, 
freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech. However, this illustration shows that the 
principle of equality is inflationary. It continually advances forward, making greater claims vis-
à-vis other interests. It is an underlying theme in this work that the human right of equality can, 
if not guarded against, cannibalize all other human rights. This dissertation is but one example 
of how the claim for sexual equality rights has the capacity to erode and possibly even destroy 
freedom of religion. 
It behoves us, in light of the academic discussion about the place of religion in the law, 
to consider what evidence may exist that supports the long-held view that religion is special. If 
there is evidence of religious tolerance being at the “very foundation of our democracy,” what 
does that require of the law? Should liberal democracies continue to insist that religion be 
given special constitutional treatment in the current context? If so, why? And finally, what 
would be the possible consequences should the legal revolution succeed in overthrowing 
religion’s special status? 
To assist in the investigation of the legal revolution I use, as a case study, the case of the 
Trinity Western University law school proposal. This case is important because it involves a 
modern perplexity that is becoming acute: the clash between religious freedom and sexual 
equality that raises the whole question as to whether religion’s place in the law is justified in 
the light of contemporary realities of changing sexual norms. TWU, as a private, evangelical 
university in Langley, British Columbia, operates based on a Christian moral ethic that includes 
limiting sexual intimacy to the traditional marriage of one man and one woman. This ethic is 
codified in TWU’s “Community Covenant Agreement” that each student had to sign upon 
admission.25 In an earlier 2001 decision,26 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) supported 
TWU’s right to have a similar admissions policy. In that 2001 case the Court ordered the British 
Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) to accredit TWU’s education degree despite TWU’s 
admissions requirement. The BCCT argued that TWU’s admissions requirement was 
discriminatory against LGBTQ student applicants to TWU and asserted that TWU’s education 
graduates would likely discriminate against LGBTQ students under their care in the public-
school system. The SCC rejected those arguments. 
                                                     
24 Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s Creations Inc (Cal Sup Ct, Kern Cty; BCV-17-102855; 
Lampe J, 5 Feb 2018); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018). 
25 “Community Covenant Agreement,” Trinity Western University Student Handbook (accessed 7 September 
2018), online: https://www.twu.ca/student-handbook/university-policies/1.student-code-of-conduct-intro. 
26 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2001 SCC 31 [TWU 
2001]. 
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The recent challenge TWU faced was its law school proposal. It was thus the second 
time in less than two decades that TWU endured a legal protest to its religiously based 
admissions policy. This case clearly highlights this study’s finding of the emerging legal 
revolution on the place of religion in the law. As will be discussed below, the legal community 
maintains that changing social norms call for an overthrow of religion’s special legal status. The 
law societies of British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia rejected the view that they were 
bound by the 2001 SCC decision and refused to accept TWU’s law degree. They were found on 
June 15, 2018, to be correct in their view by the Supreme Court of Canada. In yet another twist 
of events in August 2018, TWU decided to remove the mandatory Covenant for its students but 
kept it mandatory for its faculty and staff.  
The conclusion I have come to is that the objections to TWU’s admissions criteria, 
having been legitimized by the SCC, are a rejection of the legal paradigm that once treated 
religion as special. Those objections go even further. They amount to a discriminatory 
conception of equality that preys upon all other human rights, including freedom of religion. It 
is an asymmetrical view of equality that eclipses all other rights leaving only equality as the 
primary right. Meanwhile TWU’s decision to comply with the SCC’s ruling does not change my 
conclusion, but is evidence of a religious community being browbeaten by the state after it had 
done nothing unlawful.  
This radical conception of equality is inherently contradictory because it discriminates 
– in this case – against evangelical Christians who want to have a law school. The radical 
conception of equality can be juxtaposed with a non-discriminatory conception of equality that 
recognizes that it is but one right among many, such as religious freedom, which must be 
properly balanced.  
The rejection of the legal paradigm that accommodated religion was reasoned as 
necessary because of the concept of “Charter values.”27 Three law societies, (being those in 
British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia) refused to accredit TWU because “Charter values” 
required that they not “condone” the discriminatory actions of TWU in the name of the “public 
interest”.  
Such administrative entities are designed to protect the “public interest” by ensuring 
that lawyers are competent to practice law. However, it does seem, at first blush, far afield for 
them to take on the role of enforcing sexual equality norms on a religious entity that has a 
constitutional right to reject those norms. The law societies’ attitude and actions against TWU, 
and the SCC’s June 15, 2018 decisions28 in favour of the law societies, is evidence of the legal 
revolution currently underway against the special legal significance of religion. The intricacies 
of this case make it possible to explore whether religious tolerance remains a foundational 
principle of our free and democratic society, in the same way the SCC conceived of it in the Sikh 
student case, referred to above, when faced with the challenges of sexual equality. It allows us 
to explore the legal status of religion in our liberal democracy. 
We begin with the question, “Does the practice of religion merit protection in the law?”  
This is a far deeper concept than it appears. How is it that an act motivated by a religious belief 
can be different from the non-religiously motivated act? What is the essence of religion that so 
colours an act of individual or collective behaviour that it is deemed necessary for the state to 
provide an exemption from generally applicable law to that act? What distinguishes religiously 
motivated behaviour from non-religiously motivated behaviour? What legal status does 
religion have in our society? What is the road to a proper balance between religion and secular 
                                                     
27 A concept that will be dealt with in depth below. 
28 TWU 2018, supra note 14. 
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interests? And, in light of the TWU case, to what extent are universities and educational 
institutions the forebearers of the future or the representations of the past? Should a voluntary 
community, where you apply for membership, be permitted to establish rules of conduct for 
that community? 
It has been said that one of the markers that distinguishes religious motivation is that 
religiously motivated people are willing to suffer great personal loss to maintain their faith 
commitment, such as losing a job, losing financial security, being imprisoned, or worse.  
 But is the willingness to pay such a high price the bar that must be met for state 
exemption? Does that willingness reflect a different kind of claim on the individual that a non-
religious person does not have? Is there, for example, a deep understanding of identity at play 
that would cause someone to be so committed that they are willing to lose everything? 
In fact, there are plenty of examples of people who have been willing to die for other 
deeply held political or economic views.29 So, mere commitment to the point of death does not, 
in and of itself, make religion different from other deeply cherished ethical commitments. To 
warrant an exemption from generally applicable law religious commitment must mean 
something more than a willingness to die for that commitment. There should be, by necessity, 
something else. 
Perhaps, that “something else” is the non-optional characteristic of the religious belief 
in question that comes from a divine command. In other words, it is not simply a matter of 
individual preference but of supernatural authority. Such a command may form part of a 
worldview or ontology of what “is,” as opposed to a question of personal autonomy or choice. It 
is an obligation. That does not mean that the believer eschews her rational, critical thought but 
rather, once she has become convicted of the truth after such thought, she is compelled to live 
out her obligations. Therefore, a religious person is not choosing to abide by a religious practice 
as much as she is following a divine command. To interfere with her practice would be to 
violate not simply her beliefs, but her very identity – her sense of who she is within the 
ontological understanding of the world that her religion teaches her.  
Can we expect the state to support the individual’s deeply held convictions of religious 
obligation by giving an exemption to general applicable law? And, can the state assess whether 
an individual’s religious practice is intimately tied to identity in determining whether he or she 
should be given an exemption? That would cause the state to become entangled in determining 
the intricacies of religious beliefs – which has never been the role of a liberal democracy. Yet 
perhaps that is what is required to do justice to the constitutional guarantee.  
Up until recently, for the most part, even among those who disagree with the idea that 
religion merits special legal status, there has been an acceptance that whenever possible 
religion is to be accommodated given the fact that it is constitutionally protected – even though 
society may be at a loss to explain the reason for the protection to begin with. No one alleges 
that discrimination based on religion is good. No one advocates the removal of religious 
freedom – although there are some who come very close to saying just that.30   
What academics are questioning is whether the special protection of religion is 
necessary, defensible and sustainable from a legal and political perspective. If there is no case 
to be made for such special protection, then it is reasonable to question how long that 
                                                     
29 Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
30 Mark Tushnet, “Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism” (6 May 2016), online (blog): 
Balkinization <https://balkin.blogspot.ca/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html> [“Defensive 
Crouch”].  
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dissonance can be maintained. If, as we will analyse, a sizable and influential opinion exists 
denying the legitimacy of religion’s star in the constitutional constellation, then it is surely only 
a matter of time before that star is removed by either judicial re-interpretation or 
constitutional amendment. After considerable research, and given the outcome of the TWU 
2018 SCC decisions, it indeed appears that the religious star is now losing its lustre. 
There remains a sizable group of religious citizens in liberal democracies for which the 
legal status of religion is a salient concern.31 They depend upon religious exemptions from 
generally applicable law to worship on their holy days, wear religious garb, eat particular diets, 
and live in conformity to religiously-based sexual norms. 
This study proposes, therefore, to get to the vital essence of religion’s special legal 
status in liberal democracies. I am trying to understand what it is about religion, if anything, 
which distinguishes it to justify the special legal protection. While this study touches on the 
scope of religious freedom; the proper relationship of the state to religion; and the value of 
religion in contemporary society; it is not tethered to those. Rather it is focused on whether we 
can provide an acceptable, reasonable justification for the legal protection of religion as special 
and worthy of accommodation. This search is primarily conducted within the law itself, 
although there are necessary forays into legal history and political theory. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada once stated that religious toleration is at 
the very foundation of our democracy. The questioning of that profound concept lies at the 
heart of this dissertation. This work is not meant to provide justification of the Court’s notion of 
religious tolerance as a foundational political/legal principle – though it may have that effect. 
The goal is to discover why that was the case and to consider whether religious 
accommodation ought to remain despite the growing chorus in the legal establishment for the 
diminution of religion’s special place in the law given sexual equality claims.  
In other words, the question to be answered by this book is: “If religious toleration is at 
the heart of democracy, what justified it; should it be maintained; and what is its status in the 
legal community?”  
The justification for religion’s special status, to be effective, must provide a reasonable 
explanation as to why TWU should be exempt from generally applicable legal norms. If there is 
no such reasonable explanation, then it will be safe to say that the special status of religion 
cannot long last in contemporary society. If there is a reasonable basis, then that will assist us 
in understanding why other conflicts involving non-religious deeply held convictions (such as 
politics and economics) are not accommodated while the religiously held conviction is.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
What characteristic(s) of religion, if any, justifies the law’s special protection of 
religious practice? What other historical, practical or philosophical factors justify the law’s 
special protection of religious practice? Do those characteristics and/or factors justify religion 
maintaining its legal status? What may we reasonably expect the consequences to be should the 
special status of religion be removed? What is the attitude of the legal profession to the 
accommodation of religion?  
 
 
                                                     
31 In Canada, for instance some 67% still self-identify as Christian. See: Brian Clarke & Stuart Macdonald, 
Leaving Christianity: Changing Allegiances in Canada since 1945 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2017), 7. 
  11  
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of this study becomes exceedingly evident considering the growing 
view among Canadian legal elites that religious tolerance and accommodation, as currently 
understood, must be curtailed in favour of sexual equality when religious communities engage 
in “public” endeavours such as running a law school. The importance of a law school, being an 
incubator of legal professionals whose careers could ascend the heights of liberal democratic 
law-making in the judiciary and the legislative bodies of the country, has raised the stakes in 
the discussion of religion’s place in the law.   
To begin, Thomas S. Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions is introduced along with 
his contribution of “paradigm shift.” Kuhn’s work forms the theoretical framework within 
which the legal revolution against the accommodation of religion is analyzed.  
The specific contribution of this study is that it provides a unique perspective on the 
special place of religion in the law. While the academic discussion has been robust, and 
increasingly so, this is the first attempt to step back and see the larger picture of what is 
developing. The “revolution” metaphor is unique for this context. There is no other study that 
has attempted to apply Thomas S. Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions to the revolutionary 
change being proposed by academics about the law’s treatment of religion. While there are 
several differences between the scientific and the legal contexts, nevertheless, there are 
considerable similarities that are worth a review and may well be subject to ongoing 
conversations. In that sense this dissertation makes a unique contribution to the academic 
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Revolution in the scientific field provides an apt comparative model to explain the legal 
revolution on religion. While there are significant differences between law and science, both 
have academic and professional communities with established norms. 
The scientific community has at least two distinct sub-communities: the theoretical and 
the experimental. The first works with abstract or “pure” scientific theory to understand 
nature. The other is a more practical scientific group – the applied scientists. They belong to the 
“technological” group. The practical fruits of science are often co-opted by business 
entrepreneurs who manufacture goods for public consumption. Thus, in many quarters there is 
a symbiotic relationship between science and business, which may lead to a number of 
conflicting interests, as can be seen in the ongoing debate about corporate support of 
universities. 
For our purposes, there are distinct characteristics in science that are essential: the 
community seeks the truth of the natural world.32 As mentioned, it has two groups, one I will 
call the “scientists” and the other I will call the practical “scientific engineers”. The scientists 
work with theory and experiential knowledge to determine what is true, while the scientific 
engineers apply the scientific findings to practical implications that impact society at large. The 
scientific enterprise relies on established paradigms to determine how best to address any 
anomaly that research may uncover. Such paradigms are based upon the researchers’ 
presuppositions and assumptions when they ask questions to determine what should or should 
not be done to address any new development. 
Like the scientific community, the legal community has at least two subgroups. One is 
comprised of those who spend a considerable part of their careers addressing the theoretical 
and social constructs of the law and who are often confined to academic pursuits at a 
university. Those I call the “legal scholars.” The other consists of the practitioners of law – the 
lawyers – who apply the principles they learned from their legal training to the problems faced 
by their clients in day-to-day living. The pursuit of law, at least in theory, has lofty aspirations 
such as justice, equality, human rights, free and democratic society, and the rule of law. These 
ideals, and more, are used in the law’s pursuit of making society a better place.33 Like the 
scientific community, the legal community has its own paradigms that provide its 
presuppositions and assumptions on how practical matters should be approached.  
Law is different from the scientific community in that it has a hierarchical structure that 
settles professional debate – at the top of which is the highest court in the respective 
jurisdiction. In Canada that is the Supreme Court of Canada. The scientific community has no 
such arbiter, although it does rely on its peer review as a means of ensuring accuracy and 
reliability, including conformity with appropriate scientific methods.  
                                                     
32 This would explain the use of the term “natural philosopher” to refer to those we now label “scientist”. 
33 There is an ongoing debate in law whether law “makes society” or whether law is the “result of society,” i.e. 
the product of the deeper societal forces. There are also the positivist vs. natural law theoretical 
understandings of the concept of “the law.”   
  14  
 Law, much more than science,34 is susceptible to being used by the power elite in 
imposing its will on society. In the field of law and religion in Canada, as we will discover, 
significant power is wielded by the legal academic community. It is their progressive positions 
on fundamental human life issues (FHLI), namely marriage, abortion, and end of life, that have 
captured the imagination of the legal elite. This is a reoccurring theme throughout this book 
and will be discussed in detail in the pages that follow.  
Both the scientific and legal communities are similar because each requires significant 
debate to establish a normative paradigm. Once that paradigm has gained recognition it is 
difficult to unseat it with a new theory or paradigm. This provides for continuity and a high bar 
of authenticity for the new to replace the old. But it also has an intuitive bias toward 
maintaining the status quo even in the face of reasonable criticism, based on evidence, that the 
old norms no longer describe what is true and/or in the best interest of the community. 
 
2.2 The Qualitative Difference: Law Settles Disputes, Science Seeks Truth 
 
The practice of law is not science. It does not seek to find the truth of the matter in the 
same way the scientific field seeks truth; rather, the law’s emphasis is on settling disputes. 
Law’s preoccupation with dispute resolution can create peculiar results such as inconsistent 
decisions on seemingly similar fact situations, which denies or diminishes one of the more 
fundamental principles in English common law – stare decisis. Stare decisis is a legal principle 
that maintains that previous decisions on similar facts and law will bind the court.35 However, 
that is becoming less a concern for the Supreme Court of Canada as it seeks the “rule of justice” 
rather than the “rule of law”.36 While the SCC interprets the Charter as a “purposive” 
document,37 the rights therein are nevertheless enshrined with a history and jurisprudence 
behind them.38 “Charter values”, like the “rule of justice” doctrine, are an increasingly 
                                                     
34 Of course, science is not immune from manipulation as we have seen in the sugar/fat debate. See Camila 
Domonoske, “50 Years Ago, Sugar Industry Quietly Paid Scientists To Point Blame At Fat” (13 September, 
2016), online: National Public Radio <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/09/13/493739074/50-years-ago-sugar-industry-quietly-paid-scientists-to-point-blame-at-fat>. 
35 See: Frederick Schauer, “Precedent” (1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571. 
36 Justice Rosalie Abella is perhaps the Court’s most outspoken proponent of favouring the concept of “Charter 
values” in the framework of the “rule of justice” rather than the “rule of law”. The rule of law, in her view, 
imposed discrimination such as apartheid, segregation and genocide. However, she maintains that “core 
democratic values” include “an independent bar and judiciary; protection for minorities; a free press; as well 
as rights of association, religion, and expression” and it is these that would make for a “better society than one 
whose greatest tolerance is for intolerance.” See: Hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella, “International Law and 
Human Rights: The Power and the Pity” (2010) 55 McGill LJ 871 at 877-878.  
37 “Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and 
freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for governmental action,” Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 
SCR 145, at 157 [Hunter]. 
38 There seems to be an increased willingness on part of the Court to “move with the times” as Chief Justice 
Wagner stated in his first news conference in June 2018.  It is worth observing that such decisions based on 
the “moral values that link the majority of Canadians” are in essence the “moral values” that a particular court 
thinks are the values of the majority. This is something that Justices Côté and Brown, in their dissent of the 
TWU 2018 decisions, pointed out were not necessarily so (see LSBC v TWU 2018, supra note 14, at para 308). 
Wagner CJC stated: “When you talk about interpretation, context is paramount. And when you are looking 
issues that come up long after the original text has been drafted, as in the Constitution for example, there are 
principles of interpretation that you apply. … Take the Carter case, for example, on assisted suicide. Many 
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controversial concept, as explained below, but they have no legal stature. They are not 
constitutionally entrenched terms but rather judge-made concepts that have yet to receive 
general acceptance in the Bar. A case can be made that they subvert the rule of law.39  
The legal practitioner is concerned about achieving the best possible result for his or 
her client. For good or for ill, the common law system is adversarial. Nevertheless, truth of a 
sort is a goal of the legal apparatus. The legal system as a whole is meant to decipher the truth 
(the “what happened?”) in any given case, provided all parties and systems are working as they 
should. If the judge, or jury, remains neutral to the outcome of the dispute and the advocates 
present their respective clients’ best positions in conformity with all the rules of procedure and 
the ethical standards of the profession, then we presume that truth will emerge. However, it is 
not science. It cannot be said with absolute certainty that the truth was established even when 
the legal system worked – that is to say, resolved the dispute.40 
To illustrate this peculiar nature of law (seeking a settlement within the established 
legal rules despite the “truth” of the matter), consider the fact that a lawyer will often have a 
personal opinion of justice that is different from his or her client’s opinion. The lawyer, in other 
words, is expected to advocate even for a position that he or she would not personally hold. It is 
the lawyer’s role to represent the client. The crown prosecutor must represent the state. Their 
respective clients’ interests take precedence over their personal judgements.41 
Science, at its best, however, would not condone this kind of behaviour. A scientist 
would not be expected to advocate for a position that he or she knows to be wrong ab initio. 
Rather, he or she would be expected to present his or her research as objectively as possible, 
recognizing that he or she does so within the scientific paradigm, as noted above. His or her 
research is to discover the universal, the necessary, and the certain by means of observation, 
explanation, prediction, and control. That does not mean there are no rogue scientists who 
would sacrifice professional opinion in favour of their pharmaceutical employer. Yet, hopefully 
that is rare, and such a scientist would not be applauded. 
                                                     
years earlier, when looking at the same facts, the same provision of the Criminal Code, under study led to a 
different decision. And yet it was the same provision of the Criminal Code. So interpretation is in context, and 
of course, the different decision would be based on different evidence being put before the Court. But, society 
has evolved, as has medicine. There are moral values that link the majority of Canadians. These are rulings 
that take context into account as a backdrop to the legal rulings that we arrive at.” See: “Richard Wagner 
Holds First News Conference as Canada’s Chief Justice,” Headline Politics (22 June 2018), online: cpac.ca 
http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/headline-politics/episodes/62857192 [“First News Conference”]. 
39 While I do not have the space to fully develop this line of thought it is worth recognizing when considering 
the SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions that relied upon “Charter values”. This concept must be analyzed keeping in 
mind that the use of “values” is a subjective exercise that seeks to achieve a purpose or end, making the 
Charter right a mere rule of thumb. “A rule of thumb is not a binding rule,” and that does not bode well for our 
democracy. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 229. 
40 In a world of “alternative facts,” this can be taken to troubling extremes; consider Rudy Guiliani, President 
Trump’s attorney, who argued “truth isn’t truth” during a television interview in August 2018. For video and 
transcript see Tim Hains, “Giuliani vs. Chuck Todd: Truth Isn’t Always Truth, Comey’s ‘Truth’ Different From 
Trump’s ‘Truth,’” Real Clear Politics (19 August, 2018), online: 
 <https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/08/19/giuliani_truth_isnt_truth.html>  
41 The Trinity Western University law school case revealed a number of lawyers who personally opposed the 
current state of the law toward religion. See, for example, the view of Joseph Arvay discussed in Chapter 5 
(“Transcript of Law Society of British Columbia Bencher Meeting,” April 11, 2014, online: 
<https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf>). 
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Law, however, is different. We expect lawyers to take the position of their clients 
regardless of the lawyer’s personal stance. If a scientist were to do in his or her field what 
lawyers do in theirs, many would say that the scientist could not be trusted or respected. The 
same cannot be said of a lawyer. Instead, a lawyer is applauded for his or her advocacy skills, 
since the law’s primary interest is to settle disputes within a civil order, not to establish truth. 
 
2.3 The Commonalities Between Revolutions 
 
Revolution: an overthrow or repudiation and the thorough replacement of an 
established government or political system by the people governed.42 Peter Calvert observed, 
“[r]evolution destroys pre-revolutionary sources, provides few contemporary ones, engenders 
strong ideological currents in all observers and endangers the lives of those who venture too 
close.”43 The concept of overthrowing the established order is not only a political phenomenon 
but an apt description of any discipline that is set in its ways but is faced with upheaval. Once it 
occurs there is a tendency to shame those who hold to the pre-revolutionary order of things.  
Albert Camus points out that humanity has two states of being: “the world of the sacred 
… and the world of rebellion.”44 The sacred is that which is accepted as the correct, the right, 
the only way to view the world. Rebellion destroys the current “sacred” for a different or a 
“new” sacred state of being. Defiance, for Camus, is heroic in that it resists oppression. 
Rebellion against the status quo is meant to bring order.45 The field of law has had its own 
historic revolutions. 
Eminent scholar of law and religion, Harold J. Berman, observed that Western legal 
tradition has been transformed by “six great revolutions”: the Russian Revolution, the French 
Revolution, the American Revolution, the English Revolution (also known as the Glorious 
Revolution), the Protestant Reformation, and the Papal Revolution.46 Each had their own 
causes and consequences on the law. Berman states that while they did not have “a perfect 
symmetry” they had “certain patterns or regularities”. His description continues: 
  
Each has marked 
a fundamental change, 
a rapid change, 
a violent change, 
a lasting change,  
in the social system as a whole. 
Each has sought legitimacy in 
a fundamental law, 
a remote past, 
an apocalyptic future. 
Each took more than one generation to establish roots. 
                                                     
42 Dictionary.com, (Random House, accessed May 2018) sub verbo “revolution”, online at 
<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/revolution>. 
43 Peter A. R. Calvert, “Revolution: The Politics of Violence” (1967) 15:1 Political Studies 1-11, at 1. 
44 Albert Camus, The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage, 1991), 21. 
45 This is ironic because rebellion may be seen as creating chaos where order once stood; and from that 
rebellious chaos, a new order is made. 
46 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 18-19. 
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Each eventually produced 
a new system of law, 
which embodied some of the major purposes of the revolution,  
and which changed the Western legal tradition, 
but which ultimately remained within that tradition.47 
There is, I maintain, a seventh revolution currently underway that is already making a 
dramatic impact on the law and on society at large. The revolution of which I speak is of a 
different character than those described by Berman. I call it the Legal Revolution Against 
Religion. Berman’s work already hinted at this seventh revolution. For example, he understood 
we were moving from the traditional symbols of community in the West, which were religious 
and legal, to a fissure or disconnect between religion and the law.48 His pioneering work in the 
field has laid the foundation for my observation, which has the vantage of the passage of time. I 
suggest that what we are experiencing today is a specific consequence of our secular age,49 
which has produced an opinion among elites that religion should no longer be treated as 
special in the law because religion creates and perpetuates harm.  
An apt illustration of the Legal Revolution Against Religion (LRAR) in Western 
democracies, at the moment, is the case of Trinity Western University’s (TWU) application for 
the accreditation of its law school. Until August 2018, TWU required its student body and 
faculty to sign a Community Covenant pledging themselves to “biblical and TWU ideals” 
wherein they “voluntarily abstain from” a number of actions including “sexual intimacy that 
violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman.”50  
That particular provision of the Covenant caused such a stir in the legal profession that 
three Canadian law societies51 decided not to accredit TWU’s law school despite the 
accreditation given by the Federation of the Law Societies of Canada.52 These law societies 
contended that TWU’s Covenant harms those of the LGBTQ community. This dissertation 
argues that despite the fact that the law was clearly on the side of TWU, the legal profession 
was willing to ignore the law that accommodated religious universities like TWU because the 
professional elite no longer accepts the special legal status of religion. In other words, the legal 
profession is in a state of rebellion against the law with respect to religion. This rebellion was 
ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions that ruled in favour of the 
legal elites.53 Constitutional religious freedom, as once understood in Canada, has been altered 
by the TWU decision. The trajectory of the past few decades against religion’s special legal 
status has reached a defining moment in Canadian law.  
The work of Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science who wrote the ground-breaking 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,54 is used to frame the Legal Revolution Against 
                                                     
47 Ibid at 19. 
48 Ibid at vi. 
49 A more fitting moniker would be “sexular age,” which I describe at some length below. 
50 Trinity Western University, “Community Covenant Agreement: Our Pledge to One Another” (accessed 16 
May 2018), online: <https://www8.twu.ca/studenthandbook/twu-community-covenant-agreement.pdf> at 
2. 
51 The Law Society of British Columbia; The Law Society of Upper Canada (name now changed to the Law 
Society of Ontario); and the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society. 
52 This is discussed in detail below. 
53 TWU 2018, supra note 14. 
54 Kuhn, Revolutions, supra note 1 at 94. 
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Religion. There are parallels between political and scientific revolutions that are helpful to 
consider in providing context for this dissertation.55  
First, a political revolution arises from a sense among the ruling political community 
that existing institutions are no longer able to adequately govern in the current environment.56 
Although revolutions are often styled as eruptions that originate within the hearts and minds of 
the common people, in reality, most revolutions arise from one group of elites who are 
dissatisfied with the rule of other elites in power, and who capture the imagination of the 
populace with the idea that life will be better under a new regime.57 However, revolutions often 
turn out differently from what elites anticipate. Unseen forces rise to push the movement in 
unexpected twists and turns. This may well be the case in the revolution against the place of 
religion in the law.  
By comparison, scientific revolution arises when scientists recognize that the current 
paradigm is no longer accurate or adequate to explain a particular natural phenomenon.  
Second, political revolutions attempt to change political institutions that prohibit such 
change.58 The only way forward is to destroy the old institution. This creates a crisis gap where 
no institution is ruling. The conservative camp demands a return to the old, while the 
progressive seeks to implement new institutions. Appeals are made to the masses either by 
persuasive means or political force. Likewise, in the scientific community, there may be several 
different groups, with each group favouring one particular paradigm as the accurate 
description of scientific fact and therefore the legitimate explanation of a particular 
phenomenon. Arguments made for the respective paradigms tend to be persuasive only to 
those within that group.59 “As in political revolutions,” says Kuhn, “so in paradigm choice—
there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community.”60 However, over time 
as more evidence gathers and as opinions coalesce, one group’s paradigm will gain favour in 
the wider community vis-à-vis the rest. The broader scientific community will ultimately 
decide which paradigm it considers as legitimate. 
The revolution against the special place of religion in the law is a hybrid between a 
political revolution and a scientific revolution. The political similarities arise from the fact that 
law, by its nature, is political. Law involves social and political movements that advocate for 
change through the state apparatus – the three branches of government: executive, legislative 
and the judicial. All three have been evident in the limiting of religion. For example, the Alberta 
                                                     
55 Ibid at 93. 
56 Ibid at 92. 
57 Will and Ariel Durant pointed out that it was the French “lords, rich, proud, and often functionless, who 
initiated the Revolution. They looked fondly back to the days before Richelieu, when their order was the 
ruling power in France. When the parlements asserted their right to annul royal edicts, the nobilities of race 
and sword joined with the nobility of the robe – the hereditary magistrates – in an attempt to subordinate the 
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59 Ibid at 94. 
60 Ibid. 
  19  
legislature decided it would not permit Hutterites to have pictureless drivers’ licenses despite 
their religious beliefs against having their personal photo taken. The SCC agreed.61   
The similarity to the scientific revolution, as we will see, is that like science the legal 
community developed a legal paradigm of how law operates. The legal paradigm formed the 
thinking for generations, or, in the case of the legal status of religion, for centuries. But like 
science, new ideas cause a rethinking of the paradigm. This work is about the changing views 
on the legal paradigm about the place of religion and the likely ramifications of this revolution. 
 
2.4 The Anatomy of a Scientific Revolution 
 
The scientific community argued for hundreds of years that its discoveries were an 
accurate description of reality. It asserted that its discoveries were universal, necessary, and 
certain.62 Scientists describe their process of discovery as the scientific method applied to data 
in an objective and consistent manner. Objectivity is paramount.63 
Therefore, logical reason, not emotion or intuitive bias, is the means of analysis and 
organization of the data. Although intuition and emotion often prompt investigation, or the 
formation of a certain hypotheses, these are then tested dispassionately.  
The ubiquitous scientific method64 consists of a multi-staged experiential process of 
deductive analysis that includes observation of a specific phenomenon, measurement, and 
experimentation to establish a theoretical hypothesis of what scientists think is reality or truth. 
Once a theory is formulated which can explain, predict, and control phenomena, it will be 
tested, yet again, with further experimentation to determine whether modification of the 
hypothesis is necessary. This method is deemed the proper objective approach for determining 
the reality of what is.65 
However, we have now come to understand that scientific truth is temporal and 
therefore not immutable. What was accepted as true years ago has subsequently been found 
inadequate. For example, Sir Isaac Newton’s law of gravity was found by Albert Einstein to have 
fallen short of the truth in that “[i]t did not explain why the gravitational force on an object was 
proportional to its inertial mass.”66 
New revelations of scientific discovery displacing an older truth in one form or another 
have become a common feature of the scientific experience. Previously, the conventional view 
was that new discoveries built upon the truth of the past rather than replacing or eradicating it. 
Thomas Kuhn claims otherwise. Kuhn recognized that the scientific community’s rejection of 
the writings of Aristotle, for example, “was a global sort of change in the way men viewed 
                                                     
61 Hutterian Brethren, supra note 5. 
62 Steven L. Goldman, Science Wars: What Scientists Know and How They Know It, Part 1 of 2 (Chantilly, VA:  
The Teaching Company, 2006), 14. 
63 John R. Searle, “Rationality and Realism, What is at stake?” (1993) 122:4 Daedalus, Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 55-83. 
64 I recognize that there is an ongoing discussion about what constitutes the “scientific method;” however, as 
Robert Nola and Howard Sankey point out, “the study of the methodology of science and the development of 
sophisticated and realistic theories of method is very much alive and well.”  See: Robert Nola & Howard 
Sankey, Theories of Scientific Method: An Introduction (Hoboken: Routledge, 2014), Epilogue. 
65 For an introductory description see Hugh G. Gauch, Jr, Scientific Method in Brief (Cambridge: U of 
Cambridge, 2012), 267-268. 
66See “Gravity as Curved Space: Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity,” U of Winnipeg (last accessed 20 
November 2015), online: <http://theory.uwinnipeg.ca/mod_tech/node60.html>. 
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nature and applied language to it, one that could not properly be described as constituted by 
additions to knowledge or by the mere piece meal [sic] correction of mistakes.”67  
However, one may observe that some continuity remains. Even with radical change, 
certain approaches, principles, or conditions endure. For example, reason and objectivity 
continue as important scientific principles. In the same way, Berman, as noted above, saw 
despite his six revolutions in law and religion, they each ultimately remained within the 
Western tradition of law.  
Kuhn’s line of thought provoked three questions: “First, to what extent are conceptual 
readjustments characteristic of science? Second, what lies behind them – what do they involve 
and why do they occur? Third, what do they imply about science as a kind of knowledge?” 68 
Scientists operate within a conceptual paradigm that explains the world. Whenever 
there is an anomaly, it is explained either as part of the paradigm or it is ignored. The paradigm 
creates a bias or a lens through which everything is viewed. Kuhn noted in his book, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that “something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception 
itself.”69 The paradigm is the accepted view of the world. It is perceived as the “correct” view 
from which flow the assumptions and presuppositions that are automatically applied to any 
new data that must be interpreted. This results in the use of subjective analysis when making 
decisions about what the data revealed.  
Scientists are not simply discovering reality as it exists. Rather, they are debating, 
within their own scientific community, the implications of observed data and coming to 
conclusions about reality within the paradigm. Different scientists (in different time periods) 
used different presuppositions. Such assumptions or axioms were the result of the scientists’ 
biases based on the paradigm that inculcated their understandings during their years of 
education and their scientific career. The paradigm was their conceptual framework which 




With the passage of time, anomalies accumulate that do not fit the paradigm. The 
normal course for scientists faced with incongruities in their scientific study is to address them 
in one of two ways: first, to see them as being part of the “dominant paradigm,” or second, to 
ignore them altogether.70 However, as anomalies increase over time, they stretch the 
paradigm’s ability to explain them. Then, inexplicably, there comes an epiphany – someone in 
the community realizes that such “anomalies” challenge the very legitimacy of the paradigm 
itself. This creates a crisis that is met with resistance from scientists who continue to rely on 
the dominant paradigm.71 
Such resistance is not negative, since it allows scientists to remain undistracted. The 
resistance also means that when there is a discovery it will lead to a “paradigm change [that] 
                                                     
67 As quoted by Jed Z. Buchwald & George E. Smith, “Thomas S. Kuhn, 1922-1996” (1997) 64:2 Philosophy of 
Science, 361 at 363. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Kuhn, Revolutions, supra note 1 at 113. 
70 Ibid at 52. 
71 Ibid at 64. 
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will penetrate existing knowledge to the core.”72 “Retooling,” in this framework, “is an 
extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it.”73  
The time of crisis is when scientists focus their attention on the anomalies. This focus 
has the effect of loosening expectations while providing incremental data necessary for the 
paradigm shift.74 Resolution is possible by either reconfiguring the paradigm or establishing a 
new paradigm that explains, predicts, and controls the anomalous findings. 
 
2.6 Eureka Moment  
 
After much debate, the crisis is solved when a scientist discovers an alternate paradigm 
that appears to offer coherence instead of contradiction. This creates tension with those who 
have invested their career in the old paradigm.  
How the new paradigm forms remains a mystery. One who is deeply immersed in the 
crisis connects the dots, “sometimes in the middle of the night.”75 Kuhn notes that scientists 
speak of “scales falling from the eyes” or a “lightning flash” enabling them to see the solution in 
a new way and for the first time.76 They experience “flashes of intuition through which a new 
paradigm is born.”77 Often, the discoverers are young scientists, new to the field. They are “little 
committed by prior practice to the traditional rules of normal science, [and] are particularly 
likely to see that those rules no longer define a playable game and to conceive another set that 
can replace them.”78 
Ultimately, “when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. … It is rather 
as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where 




When the scientific community decides that a revolution has occurred, there will be 
only one paradigm that gains prominence and authority as the old establishment coalesces 
with the new.80  
As noted above, the scientists who lead the charge for a new paradigm when going 
through the crisis are usually young or so new to the scientific field that they are less 
committed than their colleagues to the rules determined by the old paradigm.81 Charles 
                                                     
72 Ibid at 65. 
73.Ibid at 76. 
74.Ibid at 89. 
75 Ibid at 90. 
76 Ibid at 122. 
77 Ibid at 123. 
78 Ibid at 90. 
79 Ibid at 111. 
80 Kuhn describes it this way: “When, in the development of a natural science, an individual or group first 
produces a synthesis able to attract most of the next generation’s practitioners, the older schools gradually 
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Darwin, for instance, expected that his colleagues would have difficulty accepting his findings: 
“I look with confidence to the future,” he stated, “to young and rising naturalists, who will be 
able to view both sides of the question with impartiality.”82 It does take time, often a 
generation, for the old paradigm to lose its influence. 
Scientists who operated under the old paradigm throughout their entire careers are 
loath to give it up. As Kuhn notes in semi-religious tones, “the transfer of allegiance from 
paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced.”83 Despite the new 
paradigm’s ability to solve the crisis and the objective proof that it does so, it remains very 
difficult to convince members of the community to shift paradigms. Therefore, the process of 
switching allegiances is gradual. During the transition period, there is no single argument that 
is persuasive.84 
The triumphant group supporting the new paradigm within the scientific community 
gets to be on the edge of progress “and they are in an excellent position to make certain that 
future members of their community will see past history in the same way.”85 The repudiation of 
a past paradigm means that it is no longer “a fit subject for professional scrutiny” and all 
previous works based on that paradigm are of no use.86 This “drastic distortion in the 
scientist’s perception of his discipline’s past” makes the member of the scientific community a 
“victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be.”87 
 
2.8 Kuhn vs. Popper 
 
To better recognize the merits and limitations of Kuhn’s work, his views can be 
juxtaposed with the thought of Karl R. Popper, an Austrian-British philosopher and professor at 
the London School of Economics. They faced each other in a debate on July 13, 1965 as part of 
the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science.88 Both viewed science very 
differently. As Steve Fuller describes it, “Kuhn was tightly focused on science as a knowledge 
enterprise, whereas Popper invested science with symbolic import as the standard-bearer for 
critical rationality, a virtue in all walks of life.”89 
Popper challenged the positivists’ view that logic bolsters scientific authority. Deductive 
logic, in Popper’s view, is a tool to compel scientists to test the consequences of their claims of 
general knowledge in particular cases. Testing by empirical research leads to findings that 
contradict the scientist’s predictions based on that knowledge. This is Popper’s falsifiability 
                                                     
particularly enamoured by the appeal to anti-discrimination language used by TWU critics. This attraction did 
not have a corresponding appreciation for the necessity of allowing differences of opinion and practice on 
fundamental human life issues such as marriage, abortion, and end of life. The youthful exuberance lacked 
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82 Ibid at 151, quoting from Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, vol 2, 6th English ed (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1889). 
1889) at 296-96. 
83 Kuhn, Revolutions, supra note 1 at 151. 
84 Ibid at 155–56. 
85 Ibid at 166. 
86 Ibid at 167. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Steve Fuller, The Struggle for the Soul of Science: Kuhn vs Popper (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2003) at 10. 
89 Ibid at 15. 
  23  
principle.90 Popper saw his principle as a scientific ethic that could be applied elsewhere, 
including in political philosophy. The ethic led to “the open society” “whose members, like the 
citizens of classical Athens, treat openness to criticism and change as a personal ethic and a 
civic duty.”91 
Popper rejected “historicism,” which he saw as a flawed version of Plato’s thought that 
views progress toward the ideal no matter the outcome of our trials.92 The problem was 
historicism resulted in a refusal to admit error and therefore no need to change one’s course of 
action or belief.93 Popper saw Kuhn as an historicist who was therefore uncritical and 
conformist, as were the positivists in their search for “timelessly true propositions.”94 Popper 
was convinced that the critical attitude would lead to further investigation. There was no 
guarantee that the ideal would ever be attained, since scientists would change their minds 
based on the evidence. 
Kuhn, on the other hand, argued that scientific revolutions are successful “not because 
the same people are persuaded of a new way of seeing things (à la Popper) but because 
different people’s views start to count.”95 It matters not that a “stubborn old scientist” refuses 
to change her mind on a post-revolutionary paradigm because “a young politically correct 
version will come to replace her.”96 For Kuhn, the more the scientific community is invested in 
their paradigm, the more mentally inflexible they are – they cannot see the world through two 
different paradigms. They are not “bilingual”.97  
Popper thought Kuhn was giving in to crass political motivations “that combined 
qualities of the Mafia, a royal dynasty and a religious order. It lacked the sort of constitutional 
safeguards … in modern democracies that regularly force politicians to be accountable to more 
people than just themselves.”98 Scientists, according to Popper, are obligated “to falsify their 
theories, just as people should be always invited to find fault in their governments and consider 
alternatives – and not simply wait until the government can no longer hide its mistakes.”99 
As Fuller points out, Kuhn’s view has become the most favoured due to the deference 
given to science policy-makers. It is assumed that the scientific establishment is best equipped 
to determine what and whose research is preferable. This deference comes from the 
widespread public support that imbues science with “the tinge of divine inspiration that has 
traditionally legitimated royalty.”100 
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Popper took seriously the scientific ideal of reaching universal knowledge and the 
reality that scientists “are inherently flawed and biased agents.”101 This demands science be as 
democratic as possible, preventing an elitism where knowledge is only known by the few. 
Knowledge was meant to be an instrument of liberation, not power or domination.102 What 
Kuhn saw as instilling stability in the scientific world (the predominant paradigm), Popper saw 
as a problem to overcome – authoritarianism.103 For Popper truth is ‘transcendent’ above the 
community; for Kuhn truth is ‘immanent’ in the community.104 Popper was not committed to 
any view but was critical of all, whereas in Kuhn’s assessment scientists are indeed committed 
to their paradigm.  
These ideas have religious overtones, despite the fact that neither Kuhn nor Popper 
were religious.105 Fuller suggests that religious conversion is Kuhn’s model for his paradigm.106 
In Fuller’s assessment, “the entire sociology of science is reduced to the process of training 
initiates for a life of total commitment to their paradigm, by virtue of which their judgement 
will go largely unquestioned in the larger society and questioned only on technical matters 
within their own community.”107 
Popper, on the other hand, rejects any form of commitment that requires the scientist to 
limit critical assessment or any stratification of society by maintaining different degrees of 
knowledge and ignorance. Popper, being influenced by Bergson’s work, The Two Sources of 
Religion and Morality,108 discards “mythology, superstition and institutionalized dogma”.109 
Institutionalism requires a firebrand to break up the monopoly – “for every Catholicism, there 
is Protestantism; for every Hinduism, Buddhism; for every Kuhn, Popper.”110   
Popper’s commitment to truth allows scientists to have courage to stand up to any 
theory or paradigm.111 He explains the use of rationalism: 
We could then say that rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical 
arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of 
admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get 
nearer to the truth’. It is an attitude which does not lightly give up hope that by 
such means as argument and careful observation, people may reach some kind of 
agreement on most problems of importance. In short, the rationalist attitude, or, 
as I may perhaps label it, ‘the attitude of reasonableness,’ is very similar to the 
scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need co-operation, 
and that, with the help of argument, we can attain something like objectivity.112 
Popper appreciates the role that tradition has in society but he does not favour a 
‘sacrosanct’ view of tradition that supports a collectivist mindset. The individual must be free 
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to “contribute to the growth or the suppression of such traditions.”113 Rationalism must allow 
criticism and: 
is diametrically opposed to all those modern Platonic dreams of brave new worlds 
in which the growth of reason would be controlled or ‘planned’ by some superior 
reason. Reason, like science, grows by way of mutual criticism; the only 
reasonable way of ‘planning’ its growth is to develop those institutions that 
safeguard the freedom of this criticism, that is to say, the freedom of thought.114 
In the context of this study, Popper’s criticism has merit. It is reasonable that critical 
thought be given the right to question all forms of tradition and accepted ways of doing things 
to arrive at the truth. It does not mean that we will ever arrive at truth, but it is in the search 
that we are able to determine what avenues we are to follow in the quest. In the past, religion 
was given special treatment by the law for then-obvious cultural and political reasons. It is 
therefore, using Popper’s view, reasonable to question whether such special treatment ought to 
continue. It is only right and fair to ensure that our society is living up to its promises of being 
free and democratic. But it is also fair that we question the rise of the new hegemony of 
equality that has become the fashion. Just as we have a right – indeed, even an obligation – to 
question the law’s bias towards accommodating religion, so too we have a right to question 
whether equality ought to eclipse religion so that it no longer has a space in which to operate. 
We are amid a crisis as to the place of religion in the law. Prominent voices in the 
profession are of the view that religion should no longer be given special treatment. That may 
be the predominant view of many legal professionals as evidenced by the fierce opposition 
toward TWU’s special exemptions from the Charter and human rights legislation. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Canada displayed a dismissive attitude toward TWU’s Community Covenant, 
describing it as “degrading and disrespectful.”115 
 Therefore, we must ask, as Popper would urge, whether the current view of the legal 
profession is, in fact, the correct view. In other words, the spirit of inquiry demands that we 
critically analyse the assertion that religious protection is no longer needed; or that society is 
no longer willing to grant religion the special exemptions, for its quirks, that have traditionally 
been given it. We must be open to the possibility that the law societies’ opposition to TWU, and 
the dismissive attitude of the SCC, cannot stand up to scrutiny. Likewise, openness requires 
that the anti-TWU legal elites be willing to entertain the debate about whether they are right or 
wrong.   
W. K. Clifford observed: 
When an action is once done, it is right or wrong for ever; no accidental failure of its 
good or evil fruits can possibly alter that … The question of right or wrong has to do 
with the origin of his belief, not the matter of it; not what it was, but how he got it; not 
whether it turned out to be true or false, but whether he had a right to believe on such 
evidence as was before him.116 
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The rejection of TWU by the law societies and the SCC must now be analysed to 
determine if it was right or wrong based on what the law was and what was consistent with 
liberal democratic thought on religious freedom and accommodation. This study concludes that 
those decisions were wrong ab initio. The TWU expectation for tolerance was in keeping with 
the law and liberal democratic expectations of how religious minorities are to be 
accommodated. The paradigm shift that has now occurred in the legal profession must now be 
examined in the spirit of Popper (and indeed others such as J. S. Mill and W. K. Clifford).    
Consider for example, would a university law school that caters to the homosexual 
community and which does not accept heterosexuals, be permitted under constitutional and 
human rights law? A strong argument can be advanced that such a university in our pluralist 
society would be permissible.  Human rights legislation has specifically provided for such a 
possibility.117 Yet, the law societies and the SCC denied an evangelical Christian university law 
school.   
Unlike Popper, Kuhn would suggest that the current crisis will be resolved when a 
sufficient number of key personnel in the legal community concur that religion is no longer 
special and that religious institutions such as TWU must be curtailed in the expression of their 
religious beliefs and practices. Kuhn’s paradigmatic shifts tell us as much about the discoveries 
that flow from such shifts as they add to our understanding about professional culture. 
Ultimately, his work is not limited to the scientific community, but has broader implications, 
just as Kuhn concluded that the Copernican Revolution’s118 re-interpretation of the universe 
had a profound impact not only on astronomy “but it embraced conceptual changes in 
cosmology, physics, philosophy, and religion as well.” 119 This he coined the “Revolution’s 
plurality.”   
Kuhn’s revolutionary plurality extends beyond conceptual changes to other subject 
areas; his analytical method itself can be applied to different disciplines. And one of those 
disciplines is law.  
It is to that story that we now turn. 
 
                                                     
117 For example, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, ch. H.19, s. 18 states, “The rights under Part I to equal 
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119 Ibid at vii. 
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3 BEFORE THE REVOLUTION:  RELIGION’S UNIQUE PLACE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
If we apply Kuhn’s model to the law, religion’s special treatment in the law represents 
the established or “old” paradigm which is now verging on crisis.120 To understand how 
existing accommodations came to be the accepted paradigm is complex. There is no single or 
short answer. Rather, there are multiple answers or, at least, reasonable explanations that 
involve history, practical politics, and philosophy. This section will examine those explanations 
and articulate the unique place of religion in Western democracies, with particular emphasis on 
the Canadian context.  
  
3.2 The Search for Meaning and Purpose 
 
The special status of religion in the law is rooted in what it means to be human.121 The 
law, after all, reflects the society that it governs, and society is the product and producer of the 
human quest for meaning. “This world’s no blot for us,” declares poet Robert Browning, “Nor 
blank; it means intensely, and means good: / To find its meaning is my meat and drink.”122 
Indeed, ontological and epistemological questions of identity and knowledge – what do I know? 
How can I know that I know? Who am I? Where did I come from? What is my purpose? Where am I 
going? – are fundamental to human existence and coexistence.  
Recent scholarship suggests that from a very early age, human beings search for 
meaning and purpose.123 “Not only do kids look for purpose in human-made things (artifacts) 
like forks and pipes,” explains psychology professor Justin L. Barrett, “but also in natural 
objects like rocks and rivers, and plants and animals.”124 Children also can understand the 
concept of causation. According to Barrett, “[t]his tendency to easily find agents (sometimes 
without large amounts of evidence) persists into adulthood and make the discovery of gods not 
only possible but likely.”125  
There is then an inherent desire or a teleological reasoning process that helps us 
comprehend purpose, design and function.126 That is not to say “that religion in is ‘hardwired’ 
or ‘innate’ – rather that children have propensities to believe in gods because of how their 
minds naturally work.”127 
                                                     
120 However, as explained below, in the grand scheme of things, religious freedom and the protection of 
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Our search for meaning has had a profound impact on the place of religion within our 
legal framework. The historical record indicates that religion was included in the constitutions 
of liberal democracies not by chance, but by design.128 This is not to suggest that religion was a 
political invention designed to manipulate colonial populations, nor simply a calculated “means 
of pinning down and managing the ideas and practices”129 for the best interests of the West. 
Rather, religion’s special treatment in the law is the combined result of human events and 
philosophical inquiry. Religion has always had, and continues to have, a key role in assisting 
humanity in understanding the world, particularly one person’s duty toward the other in 
alleviating suffering. While it is certainly true that individuals may show compassion or 
generosity on secular moral grounds, religion has long provided the ethical and spiritual 
impetus for philanthropy and social justice, especially on a communal scale. Indeed, religion is 
a special kind of experience, incomparable with other phenomena, as recent research makes 
clear. 
 
3.3 The Tale of Two Sovereignties 
 
3.3.1 What is Religion? 
 
Western democracies specifically included religion130 as a protected head in their 
constitutions; such treatment presupposes that religion is inherently valuable. It merits 
protection. However, the state cannot protect religion unless it knows what religion is. The 
citizen cannot hold the state accountable until the boundaries of protection are clear. 
Therefore, it is imperative for a liberal democracy to articulate a definition of religion. 
However, the complexity of defining religion is daunting, especially since connotations have 
shifted considerably over time.  
For instance, in the Western context, “religion” in the law historically referred to 
Christianity – with a further distinction between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. So, for 
instance, the 1688 Bill of Rights in England guaranteed deliverance “from the Violation of their 
Rights … and from all other Attempts upon their Religion Rights and Liberties,” but explicitly 
stated that any who “shall professe the Popish Religion shall be excluded”.131 Today, of course, 
references to religion encompass a much wider array of belief systems. However, the fact 
remains that the Christian faith in particular has been highly influential on Western legal 
traditions. As Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada stated, “The Christian religion 
stands in the first rank of social, political and juristic importance.”132    
The second challenge in defining religion is identified by Slotte and Arsheim, who note: 
                                                     
128 Consider the full debate over the First Amendment in the US Constitution so aptly retold in John Witte, Jr., 
Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential Rights and Liberties (Boulder, CO: Westview 
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(Rutgers University Press, 2002), 7. 
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A key issue … is the distinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of religion; should 
religious traditions be conceptualized according to their own categories, vocabularies, 
and forms of reasoning; or should they be approached from the outside, using ‘neutral’ 
categories, not derived from any particular tradition, but rather from neighbouring 
scientific disciplines?133 
Internal and external definitions are further complicated by attempts to conform with 
what the law considers religion. This is because there are significant legal protections and 
accommodations granted to individuals if their beliefs and practices accord with generally 
applicable legal norms.  
Finally, although such bifurcation may not reflect the experiences of religious adherents 
themselves, from a legal standpoint “religion” is defined as being private in nature.134 This 
definition emphasizes the individual’s autonomy and choice. Religion has been given a broad 
scope in the law, since the law avoids interfering with the individual’s beliefs. As discussed 
below a strong argument can be made that all our rights derived from the grant of religious 
freedom. 
The law’s competence is said to be in regulating religious practice (which is thereby in 
the public realm and fair game for law’s regulation), ensuring that such practice135 comports 
with the values of “a free and democratic society.” 
The inclination to fit under religion’s tent suggests that the law might be best served in 
addressing such debates with an articulate theory of why religion is protected. Such a theory 
would make clear what is meant by the term “religion.” But is religion best served by a 
theoretical understanding of the concept, or would a more practical definition be appropriate? 
As Arnal and McMutcheon point out, “no statement about what religion is can avoid at least 
partially explaining what religion does, where it comes from, and how it works.”136 
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136 William E. Arnal & Russell T. McCutcheon, The Sacred Is the Profane: The Political Nature of “Religion” 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
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3.3.1.1  The Religion Debate 
 
The current legal revolution against the law’s special treatment of religion is occurring 
on the heels of a fierce debate about religion’s place in society and in the context of a post 9/11 
upheaval of religious extremism that has gripped the imagination of society at large. Several 
authors of considerable academic credentials suggest that religion is inherently destructive to 
individuals and society. These include Sam Harris,137 Richard Dawkins138 and Daniel 
Dennett.139  
Jonathan Haidt calls them the New Atheists who claim “to speak for science and to 
exemplify the values of science – particularly its open-mindedness and its insistence that 
claims be grounded in reason and empirical evidence, not faith and emotion.”140   
However, Haidt, a scientist in his own right as a professor of psychology, challenges 
their dismissive attitudes toward religion. Haidt takes a middle of the road approach toward 
religion, recognizing its positive contributions to society – particularly the ability to bind 
strangers together (therefore making society a cooperative venture) and eliminating the 
“freerider” problem,141 i.e. those who would take from society’s benefits without contributing. 
At the same time, Haidt is also mindful of religion’s capacity to obscure its followers’ vision, 
resulting in selfish hypocrites who put on a mere show of virtue.142 According to Haidt, 
“Morality binds and blinds.” The morality commitments of religious communities create a 
contextual framework that has the effect of establishing moral boundaries and thereby 
pressuring outliers to come into conformity with the majority.  
The New Atheists define religion, as does Brian Leiter who is discussed below, as 
irrational.143 Harris describes religion or “faith” as “belief in, and life orientation toward, 
certain historical and metaphysical propositions.” In other words, “‘an act of knowledge that 
has a low degree of evidence.’ … [Being] the majority of the faithful in every religious 
tradition.”144 He claims, “faith is what credulity becomes when it finally achieves escape 
velocity from the constraints of terrestrial discourse – constraints like reasonableness, internal 
coherence, civility, and candor.”145   
While the New Atheists may be considered “new,” their anti-religious arguments rhyme 
with the past. Consider US Justice John Paul Stevens’ reference to Clarence Darrow: “the 
distinction between the religious and the secular is a fundamental one. To quote from … 
Darrow’s argument in the Scopes case: ‘The realm of religion … is where knowledge leaves off, 
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and where faith begins….’”146 One must ask what makes Darrow an authority on religion and 
knowledge that would be sufficient for the US Supreme Court to adopt his proposition that 
religion is not knowledge? This lack of critical analysis about religion by the Court suggests a 
dismissive attitude toward religion. 
Beliefs lead to action, says Harris: “A belief is a lever that, once pulled, moves almost 
everything else in a person’s life.”147 Beliefs “define your vision of the world; they dictate your 
behaviour; they determine your emotional response to other human beings.”148 For Harris, 
religion is a form of possession – one so captivated by religion is incapable of critical thought 
and inquiry.  
Dawkins’ description of the ‘God Hypothesis’ is that “there exists a superhuman, 
supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything 
in it, including us.”149 This God, says Dawkins, “is a delusion; and, as later chapters will show, a 
pernicious delusion.”150 
These definitions highlight a belief in the supernatural that then leads to a host of 
damaging acts. Such beliefs are irrational and not subject to evidence.  
Haidt argues that there is more to religion than believing and doing – the missing 
element of the New Atheist analysis, he notes, is the notion of belonging. He insists, “You’ve got 
to look at the ways that religious beliefs work with religious practices to create a religious 
community.”151 Since religions are social facts, says Haidt, religion cannot be studied in lone 
individuals any more than a bee can be isolated from the hive.152  
Rather, one must view it as a collective phenomenon that also has individual 
dimensions. As Durkheim observed, humans are homo duplex. We exist at two levels “as an 
individual and as part of the larger society.”153 We have a “profane” realm (Haidt calls it the 
“chimp” domain) where we are concerned with day-to-day worries about wealth, health, and 
reputation. But we experience a nagging sense of something missing, something of greater 
importance.154 Most of our time (90 percent) is spent in the profane. The other realm is 
“higher” – it is the “sacred” space where the collective (Haidt calls it the “bee” domain) 
temporarily pulls us away from the profane to the spiritual. Haidt suggests that religion has a 
“hive switch” that causes us to switch back and forth. So, we are 90 percent “chimp” and 10 
percent “bee.”155   
This has implications for understanding what aspects of religion the law protects. While 
most legal theorists see the law’s protection of religious freedom as an individual (“chimp”) 
right, and indeed it is, it is also more than that – it is the right of a religious community as well. 
The Supreme Court of Canada is now becoming reacquainted with religion as a communal 
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experience156 (i.e. the “bee” nature of religion) which has lain dormant in the shadows of the 
judicial preoccupation with individual religious freedom. 
Haidt calls on scientists to broaden their study of religion beyond the emphasis on 
individuals and their supernatural beliefs to “groups and their binding practices.”157 Otherwise, 
the description of religion as solely an individual pursuit is not accurate. His recommendation 
is applicable to the legal field – the communal reality of religious freedom has long been 
overlooked and the emphasis on the individual has led to unfortunate results.158 And, it 
necessarily engages the debate over the public/private and belief/action dimensions of belief 
systems.159  
With this in mind, Haidt recommends Emile Durkheim’s definition of religion: 
[A] religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and 
practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a Church.160 
What Durkheim says next is telling: “The second element that takes its place in our 
definition is therefore no less essential than the first: demonstrating that the idea of religion is 
inseparable from the idea of a church suggests that religion must be something eminently 
collective.”161 Indeed, while religion involves an individual belief in the supernatural, it also 
involves a community of believers who share the same moral and worldview commitments 
that reinforce individual beliefs, providing a shared social context. 
For the New Atheists, religion is little more than a noxious disease.162 Their hostility is 
vividly expressed by Richard Dawkins who said, “I despise people who whose belief in religion 
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is so firm and so unshakable that they actually think it justifies killing people.”163 Haidt sums up 
the post-apocalyptic overtones of the New Atheist position, explaining that: 
If religion is a virus or a parasite that exploits a set of cognitive by-products for its 
benefit, not ours, then we ought to rid ourselves of it. Scientists, humanists, and 
the small number of others who have escaped infection and are still able to reason 
must work together to break the spell, lift the delusion, and bring about the end of 
faith.164  
There is another story, different from the New Atheist position, that is gaining ground in 
the scientific study of religion. While Scott Atran and Joe Henrich generally agree with the 
evolutionary premise described by the New Atheists, they suggest “religions are sets of cultural 
innovations that spread to the extent that they make groups more cohesive and 
cooperative.”165 What evolved was religion, not people or their genes. Religion makes 
civilization possible. However, there is a dark side to religion – the very cohesive nature of 
religious identity is also the source of conflict, especially conflicts with other groups. In a 
pluralist society, such as Canada, we have to find harmony in overarching principles. Those 
principles must be common to humanity, not just one religious (or indeed, non-religious) 
community. 
According to Ara Norenzayan, “[r]eligion appears to be both a maker and an unmaker of 
conflict.”166 While our knowledge is limited, those who study this phenomenon suggest three 
reasons why this is the case. First, the “Big Gods” concept – the idea of the omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent God who watches over the affairs of everyone (“supernatural 
monitoring”) – builds trust and cooperation among strangers who are also of the same view of 
God. At the same time, this is the source of intergroup conflict, since “social cohesion inevitably 
involves setting up boundaries between those who can be trusted and those who cannot.”167 
Those who are not following the same norms or believing in the same god are excluded 
because they cannot be trusted.  
Second, the religious practices and rituals that build social cohesion also exclude those 
who do not take part. This is referred to as the social solidarity hypothesis. The evidence for 
that is, according to Norenzayan, more convincing than the religious belief hypothesis which 
argues there is “something about religious belief itself [that] causes intergroup hostility.”168 
This is contrary to Harris’s “belief as lever” claim noted above. Norenzayan suggests that the 
religious belief hypothesis lacks scientific evidence and involves polemical debate.  
The studies suggest that “[r]eligious participation cements social ties and binds group 
solidarity. But when groups are in conflict, this solidarity translates into the willingness to 
sacrifice to defend the group against perceived enemies.”169 It is not belief alone that results in 
religious violence against outsiders, but the participation in group religious activities that make 
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the difference. Norenzayan studied Palestinian suicide bombers in the West Bank and found 
that those who attended mosques often were twice to three-and-a-half times more likely to 
support suicide attacks. The frequency of prayer was statistically unrelated.170 This supports 
the view that it is not only belief but belief and social context that may lead to violent acts.  
Third, the sacred “values” of religions make it virtually impossible to compromise. As 
Norenzayan explains, those of us in the WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic) countries are said to operate based on the rational actor paradigm that assumes 
we are motivated by self-interest and use a cost-benefit analysis as to what we support.171 Our 
public policy mechanisms make decisions based on this paradigm. However, non-WEIRD 
countries may best be described as using the devoted actor paradigm that rejects personal self-
interest but holds uncompromisingly to strong moral convictions on the issues at hand.172   
The Western frame of reference does not appreciate the sacred teachings and principles 
of the non-Western world, which is a formula for disaster in intercultural relations. Material 
incentives do not make for reconciliation. In fact, trying to convince non-Western people by 
means of material incentives risks insulting them. There must be, says Norenzayan, a 
“recognition of the other’s suffering, or appreciating their core values, even if we on this side do 
not share them” in order to transform the dynamic of conflict.173 
Norenzayan’s research provides a persuasive counterweight to the negative view of 
religion held by the New Atheists. It also gives us important clues as to why Christianity has 
had such an impact on Western law. Christianity is among the few religious movements on 
earth “that won in the cultural marketplace.”174 It has been successful in organizing the West 
into a “large, anonymous, yet cohesive and highly cooperative”175 society just as other Big God 
religions176 have done in their respective social contexts.  
The Christian religion provided the moral framework and the founding mythology that 
bound the different language and cultural groups of Western democracies together. The 
modern age, being the era that commenced in the aftermath of the Reformation, provided a 
unique conceptualization of governance that put individual liberty, autonomy and choice at its 
centre. The individual became the focal point, with the state kept at bay by means of 
constitutional documents that recognized individual primacy. Religion, having both individual 
and communal aspects, would play a major role in the realization of individual rights. 
Despite this heritage, liberal democracies have drifted from reliance on their Christian 
ideological foundations to an increasingly non-religious perspective. From all popular accounts, 
religious influence in society is in a marked decline.177 This has meant a growing socio-political 
and legal inability to comprehend the basic religio-legal axioms that we have inherited from an 
era of greater understanding between Christianity and the law.178 This was evident in the 
Canada Summer Jobs Program (CSJ) controversy of 2018.  
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The CSJ provides government summer employment funding to charities, non-profits, 
and small businesses for students. The 2018 summer application demanded applicants attest 
to the government’s position that abortion was a constitutionally protected right and that the 
employment would not violate that right nor undermine other “values underlying the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” This, despite the fact that no such positive right to abortion 
exists and, in any event, the Charter protects citizens from government action. It is nonsensical 
to demand such an attestation when private citizens and corporations are not state actors 
subject to the Charter as is the government.179 Hundreds of religious charities refused to agree 
and were denied funding despite requests for accommodation based on their religious 
convictions.  
Remarkably, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau saw no contradiction in denying funding to 
religious groups because they did not accept his party’s view on abortion; yet provided funding 
to environmental groups that opposed the government’s plan to approve the Alberta oil 
pipeline to British Columbia. In his words, “We will not remove funding from advocacy 
organizations because we as a government happen to disagree with them.”180 His justification 
for denying the religious groups was that they did not abide by the principles of the Charter.181   
The result is paradoxical. On the one hand, there is increased scientific proof backed by 
critical analysis of the important role religion plays in supporting societal cohesion: shared 
faith increases the bond between strangers while addressing the free-rider problem. On the 
other hand, there is developing within the legal and political community of Western liberal 
democracies an opinion that religion’s special status is no longer needed and can be avoided 
whenever politically expedient to do so. Instead, there is an argument that the law takes the 
place of religion itself.182  
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The argument for law as the replacement for religion presupposes that law has the 
capability to answer humanity’s struggle for cooperation and cohesion between strangers. It 
also presupposes that law and religion are interchangeable. According to the research of 
former Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, law and religion are two competing, 
absolute claims upon individual citizens.183 “There is no part of modern life,” she quotes Yale 
Professor Kahn, “to which law does not extend.” Kahn is “describing the way in which, from the 
subjective viewpoint of the individual, the rule of law exerts an authoritative claim upon all 
aspects of selfhood and experience in a liberal democratic society.”184 
Likewise, “There are no limits to the claims made by religion upon the self. Religious 
authority, grounded as it is in basic assumptions about the nature of the cosmos, impinges 
upon all aspects of the adherent’s world.”185 
There is then a dialectic – law and religion – which must seek a synthesis. In McLachlin’s 
assessment:  
…[T]he synthesis of the rule of law with seemingly contradictory religious belief 
systems has always been a matter for the courts. Case law has not been limited to the 
protection of minority interests; it has included those cases in which the sources of 
authority and content of religious conscience actually clash with the prevailing ethos of 
the rule of law. I wish to call this tension between the rule of law and the claims of 
religion a “dialectic of normative commitments.” What is good, true, and just in religion 
will not always comport with the law’s view of the matter, nor will society at large 
always properly respect conscientious adherence to alternate authorities and divergent 
normative, or ethical commitments. Where this is so, two comprehensive worldviews 
collide. It is at this point that the question of law’s treatment of religion becomes truly 
exigent. The authority of each is internally unassailable. What is more, both lay some 
claim to the whole of human experience. To which system should the subject adhere? 
How can the rule of law accommodate a worldview and ethos that asserts its own 
superior authority and unbounded scope? There seems to be no way in which to 
reconcile this clash; yet these clashes do occur in a society dedicated to protecting 
religion, and a liberal state must find some way of reconciling these competing 
commitments. … 
For society to function properly it must be able to depend on some general 
consensus with respect to the norms that should be manifested in law. The 
authority of the rule of law depends upon this. On the other hand, in Canadian 
society there is the value that we place upon multiculturalism and diversity, which 
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brings with it a commitment to freedom of religion. But the beliefs and actions 
manifested when this freedom is granted can collide with conventional legal 
norms. This clash of forces demands a resolution from the courts. The reality of 
litigation means that cases must be resolved. The dialectic must reach 
synthesis.186 
The court then is to “oversee those points in public life where there is a clash between 
religious conscience and society’s values as manifested in the rule of law.” In providing a space 
for religious expression, McLachlin maintains, the law must not compromise “core areas of our 
civil commitments.”187 
From McLachlin’s point of view, law and religion are interchangeable in the sense that 
they are both normative commitments that claim total allegiance. However, because we live in 
a liberal democracy, the law must make room for religion as long as the accommodation does 
not interfere with the “core areas of our civil commitments.” The Supreme Court of Canada 
continues to work out what precisely those “core areas” or “national values” are.188 However, 
as we will see, the Supreme Court in the TWU Law School Cases has taken the position that 
even in the private religious university setting where the Charter does not apply, those “core 
areas” or “Charter values” will take precedence over religiously inspired admissions 
requirements that students refrain from sexual relations outside of traditional marriage.189 
Jean Bethke Elshtain cautions against McLachlin’s view of the law. Elshtain points out 
that: 
where the rule of law in the West is concerned, there is a great deal about which 
the law is simply silent: the “King’s writ” does not extend to every nook and 
cranny. Indeed, a great deal of self-governing autonomy and authority is not only 
permitted but is necessary to a pluralistic, constitutional order characterized by 
limited government. In other words, the law need not be defined as total and 
comprehensive in the way the Right Honourable Chief Justice claims.190 
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Elstain’s admonition is worth serious consideration, especially in light of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s 2018 decisions on TWU. The notion that law can displace religion lacks an 
appreciation for the work of Durkheim and the emerging science of Haidt, Norenzayan and 
Atran. It also lacks an historical understanding of liberal democratic government, never mind 
that which the courts have long recognized as the role of religion in making liberal democracy 
possible to begin with.191   
Atran’s analysis of the evolutionary development of religion suggests that there is: 
…no other mode of thought and behavior [that] deals routinely and 
comprehensively with the moral and existential dilemmas that panhuman 
emotions and cognitions force on human awareness and social life, such as death 
and deception. As long as people share hope beyond reason, religion will 
persevere. For better or worse, religious belief in the supernatural seems here to 
stay. With it comes trust in deities good and bad, songs of fellowship and drums of 
war, promises to allay our worst fears and achieve our most fervent hopes, and 
heartfelt communion in costly homage to the absurd. This loss and gain persist as 
the abiding measure of humanity. No other seems able to compete for very long. 
And so spirituality looms as humankind’s provisional evolutionary destiny.192 
The suggestion, therefore, that law and religion are interchangeable is suspect. News of 
religion’s demise and law’s attempt to take its place is reminiscent of the cable Mark Twain 
sent to the press that had mistakenly announced his death. He wryly quipped, “The reports of 
my death are greatly exaggerated.”193 
 
3.3.1.2 Does It Have To Be So Complicated? 
 
The nuanced complexities of the debate over defining religion tend to create confusion. 
Yet I am not convinced that the answer to the question “What is religion?” must inevitably be so 
complicated, especially given the history, politics and philosophical primacy of liberalism in the 
West. For centuries, we have been able as a civilization to understand what we mean by 
“religion” in the law. That ability has been due in no small part to the fact that the Western 
world has been dominated by the Judeo-Christian religious story.  
Indeed, Yossi Nehushtan in his work does not define “religion” since he is of the view 
that it is impossible to do so satisfactorily.194 Nehustan decides to short circuit the “what is 
religion” debate to conclude that “religion” is that which looks like Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam since they are “the paradigms of religion.”195 
While Nehushtan’s approach may be practical, it is not complete. For example, he is 
apparently unaware of the ongoing academic debate about Islam. Some authors claim that 
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Islam is not a religion but a totalitarian ideology that should not be treated as a religion.196 
Further, Nehushtan fails to make the distinction between monotheistic religions (as in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam) and non-theistic religions (as in Buddhism, Pantheism, Hinduism, 
Nature).197   
As noted above,198 the definition of religion in Canadian jurisprudence leaves us 
uncertain as to whether a non-theist personal conviction or belief is a “religion” to be protected 
by the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada’s general description that religion “tends to 
involve belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power” connotes an openness to non-
theist religion. However, in earlier, pre-Charter jurisprudence199 the SCC was more emphatic in 
clarifying that religion was what Canadians understood to be “religion” – in other words, 
theistic faith as exemplified in the Christian belief system.200   
Broad respect for religious rights is deeply rooted in the traditional and important place 
of the Christian faith in Canadian history. Justice Rand in Saumur v. City of Quebec provides a 
brief history of this fact in Canadian law.201 From 1760, religious freedom has been recognized 
in the Canadian legal system “as a principle of fundamental character.”202 That the 
“untrammelled affirmations of religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional, 
remain as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout the Dominion is 
unquestionable.”203  
Further, Justice Rand suggested that freedom of religion was among the “original 
freedoms” that was a necessary attribute and mode of human self-expression which forms the 
primary conditions of “community life within a legal order.”204 Rand not only saw the 
importance of the religious life of the individual, but also understood the “communal” aspect of 
religion that has a powerful impact on society as reflected in the law. 
The legal imposition of distinctly Christian norms, as seen in the former Sunday 
legislation, is no longer given the same recognition in Canadian law.205 This is true, for that 
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matter, in most other Western democracies as well.206 However, there are vestiges of that 
heritage that remain in the law. In Canada, for example, Roman Catholic elementary and 
secondary schools in the Province of Ontario still retain government funding207 because of the 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867.208 Philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas continue to 
observe the pivotal role Christianity has played in laying the foundation of our current liberal 
democracy.209 
It is worth noting that Habermas’ view is restricted to Christianity and not to religion in 
general. Habermas sees Christianity as the normative force in modern self-understanding and 
more than a mere precursor or a catalyst.210 Egalitarian universalism and ideas of freedom, 
individual rights, human rights, and democracy directly flow from the Judaic ethic of justice and 
the Christian ethic of love.211 He sees no alternative, and we continue to draw on this heritage. 
For Habermas, “Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.”212 Religion, for Habermas, must 
be given a place in the public sphere with the proviso that it not be sectarian but address 
common concerns with a vocabulary that is universally understood.213  
While Christianity continues to influence cultural and legal norms, there are alternate 
schools of thought seeking to dismantle and remove all vestiges of Christian normativity. A key 
manifestation of that opposition is directed at the Christian practice of heterosexual marriage 
on the basis that it discriminates.214 It is unlikely that the current radical definition of equality 
will stop at opposing heterosexual marriage. As Professor Bruce MacDougall noted in 2003, 
“[a]s gay and lesbian unions are being legally recognized, so rules respecting other forms of 
                                                     
believers alike. The theological content of the legislation remains as a subtle and constant reminder to 
religious minorities within the country of their differences with, and alienation from, the dominant 
religious culture. Non-Christians are prohibited for religious reasons from carrying out activities which 
are otherwise lawful, moral and normal. The arm of the state requires all to remember the Lord’s Day 
of the Christians and to keep it holy. The protection of one religion and the concomitant non-protection 
of others imports disparate impact destructive of the religious freedom of the collectivity” (emphasis 
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unions, polygamous, incestuous, and so on will be re-examined.”215 MacDougall’s prescient 
voice is noteworthy as there are indeed voices calling for a re-examination of the monogamous 
definition of marriage in light of the reality of polyamorous relationships.216 Indeed, polygamy 
is already becoming an issue in European countries.217 
The considerable pressure on the Christian monogamous, heterosexual norm raises the 
question as to whether religious communities who adhere to it are still entitled to maintain 
that standard in a very revolutionary social context – the social context that informs the 
question on religion’s place in the law which this book explores.  
For the purposes of this study, therefore, given the context of liberal democracies, 
“religion” is recognizable in Canadian law as being primarily concerned with the Judeo-
Christian religion as manifested primarily in Catholic and Protestant denominations. Those 
religious groups, their theology, their religious practices, and their public influence formed the 
legal framework of English common law’s conception of “religion” and how the law related to 
religion. Rightly or wrongly, it is through that lens that our law and the justification of treating 
religion as special begins. Any new religion that must be adjudicated under the Constitution, 
such as the Canadian Charter, is analysed through the long-held view of this already 
established, Judeo-Christian understanding of religion. Given the rise of multiculturalism and 
increased immigration from non-Judeo-Christian religions, there can be no doubt that the 
constitutional rule of law will be profoundly impacted by such cultural influences in the future. 
However, to be clear, we must understand the word “religion” in our Constitution as being 
rooted primarily in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Professor Paul Cliteur notes that there are four dimensions of monotheistic religions – 
as in Christianity. They are: 
First, religion as text – “A religion is what is written about in the holy book….”218 
Second, religion as what the majority of adherents believe and do – “what the believers 
act upon.”219 
From these two dimensions, there “is no mysterious entity ‘religion per se’ distinct from 
the texts of the holy book and the behaviour of its devotees.” 220  
Third, religion as authoritative interpretation. In this view, only what God commands is 
morally right or wrong; “[t]here is no independent or ‘autonomous’ ethical good, but morality 
is ultimately founded in the will of God.”221   
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Fourth, religion as “morality touched by emotion.”222 God is the eternal power that 
“makes for righteousness”.223 God’s nature is inferred from the believer’s own moral views. 
Therefore, religion changes as do the progressive moral views of the believers that make up 
that religion.  
The fourth dimension, while insightful, does not appear to consider that within such 
religions, as Christianity, there is often a debate about the evolution of religion. The 
“progressive” Christians, for example, will be at odds with the “conservative” Christians over 
fundamental life issues such as marriage, abortion and end of life. The conservatives tend to 
maintain traditions and principles of the faith that have guided the faith for millennia. 
The law protects, to varying degrees, all four of Cliteur’s dimensions. First, as a text the 
Bible continues to be used in our legal settings as that by which a witness swears his oath of 
truth; second, the religious acts of believers are what is protected by our constitution; third, the 
morality of God’s commands in the Bible was at one time revered in Western law (particularly 
in the criminal law setting) and though diminished, it continues to have an influence; and 
fourth, constitutional law protects the individual’s understanding of her religiously moral 
obligations vis a vis the state.224  
Religion’s special treatment by the law is based on the presupposition that religion is 
valuable – or, at least, it must be respected even if it does not have a value per se. One could 
argue that it is the protection of religion in and of itself that is to be valued, and not necessarily 
religion. Thus, religion is protected for the sake of civil peace, diversity, and liberty. This may 
therefore lead to a practical reality about the protection of religion that is key here. Lawmakers, 
public policy makers, opinion leaders and society at large have held either view over the years, 
and have still concluded that religion must be given special recognition as a result. The next 
section will demystify why the law has so tenaciously protected religion as part of the liberal 
democratic legal framework. 
 
3.4 State Sovereignty & Religious Sovereignty 
 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”225   
That classical definition by Carl Schmitt is an appropriate place to start the discussion 
about sovereignty. Where does the “buck” stop? Who is the authority that has the ultimate say 
on ultimate things? These questions bedevil us.226  
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Schmitt noted that an exception to a legal norm is not contained in the norm.227 It can 
only be permitted by the sovereign – the one who has “the authority to suspend valid law.”228 
That is “unlimited authority.”229     
Said Schmitt, “[w]hether God alone is sovereign,” in the form of God’s representative on 
earth, “…or the emperor, or prince, or the people … the question is always aimed at the subject 
of sovereignty, at the application of the concept to a concrete situation.”230 The interplay 
between law and religion that is addressed by this book involves concrete realities of how the 
body politic will deal with non-conformist religious entities who claim allegiance to a sovereign 
beyond the political sovereign.  
In the case of religion, sovereignty is bifurcated into political and spiritual sovereignty. 
Indeed, Schmitt noted that: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development – in which 
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for 
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because 
of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a 
sociological consideration of these consideration of these concepts.231    
Every person is faced with two claims (or spheres) of loyalty or allegiance: state and 
religious. Both claim sole allegiance. The first claim is the state where one lives and/or has 
citizenship – it may be called “the secular claim of sovereignty.” The state did not always 
consider itself “secular” (religiously neutral).232 Rather, the state has often claimed to be divine, 
thereby having ultimate authority. The other claim of sovereignty comes from within the 
personal conscience. It is separate from the state and is referred to as the private realm. It often 
has a personal and/or communal conception of the divine or Supreme Being. This is the 
religious233 claim of sovereignty. 
Professor Dr. Iain T. Benson frames this discussion thus: “[l]aw has practical and 
theoretical limits to its proper role and function in a society, and these limits determine its 
jurisdiction or proper scope.”234 He continues with this very important point: “[t]he recognition 
of jurisdiction for law is also a recognition that errors of overreach by law pose a threat to the 
proper ordering of a society.”235 Throughout this work I maintain that the legal revolution, as 
described below, is indeed an overreach by law and is fully exposed in the SCC TWU 2018 
decisions. 
Throughout history there has been a constant struggle between the two claims of 
sovereignty.236 The state, in whatever form, has often sought to impose its authority on the 
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individual conscience. The one consistent exception to that general rule is the modern liberal 
democratic society. Even when liberal democracies have failed to protect the individual 
conscience, they did so knowingly and in exceptional circumstances, with the specific promise 
that restricted freedoms would be monitored in accordance with democratic principles and 
restored in due course.237 The fact that liberal democracies have gone to great lengths to 
explain why individual conscience had to be violated in a given situation is, in and of itself, a 
recognition of the importance of the concept.238 
Despite their differences, law and religion must cooperatively coexist in order to make 
liberal democracy work. Because both claim sole allegiance, they are required to arrive at a 
détente on the issue of sovereignty. Liberal democratic society works best when sovereignty is 
bifurcated in two spheres. One is temporal sovereignty, or the duty to follow the law of the 
land. This refers to human-made law, or “positive law,” as defined by legislatures, courts, and 
custom. The second is spiritual sovereignty, or the duty to follow the law of God. This refers to 
the non-human-made law that is defined by holy books or divine revelation, or “natural law,” as 
understood by the individual conscience. The current battles between law and religion are 
analogous to the ancient battles over sovereignty. Some two thousand years ago, it was stylized 
this way by Jesus: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God 
the things that are God’s.”239 
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For a liberal democracy to work, both law and religion must have one common 
objective: to provide the most effective means whereby the individual has the greatest amount 
of freedom to pursue happiness as he or she defines it while at the same time maintaining civil 
peace in the political community. This will be referred to as the “Liberal Democratic Project.” 
The Reformation and its aftermath provided the West its paramount ideological truth: freedom 
is of the individual.240 The individual is responsible to obey the respective sovereign demands 
of the state and his or her religious or conscientious conviction. 
The specific combination of factors that stimulated freedom in the West forms our 
cultural identity and has laid the foundation for our current system of law. Contemporary 
iconoclasts want to destroy this framework and replace it with something else. We have, yet, no 
idea whether the revolutionaries’ proposal is a better plan than the inheritance we currently 
hold.241 The traditional paradigm has given us much for which to be thankful including, but not 
limited to, the entire liberal democratic project. This book takes the position that prudence 
suggests we best be wary about hasty “improvements” which have not stood the test of time. 
Lucius Cary, 2nd Viscount Falkland’s sage counsel is apt: “Where it is not necessary to change, it 
is necessary not to change.”242   
Dutch Christian politician Abraham Kuyper argued for “a free church in a free state” 
that allowed the two entities to correspond with each other on a regular basis.243 His notion of 
“sphere sovereignty” has God over the entire “cosmos,”244 under which three areas or “spheres” 
have sovereignty to act: the state, the society and the church.   
The state is a necessity only because of humanity’s “fallen nature”. The original plan of 
God for humankind did not include the state. But it is now necessary to deal with the problem 
of evil. The basic principle of governance is that “no ruler can ever be truly an absolute 
sovereign over his people.”245 This is because ultimate sovereignty remains with God. There is, 
in Kuyper’s view, no right form of government as that depends on history, culture and 
circumstances of each locale. Whatever form of governance a state may have, it is required not 
to violate divine sovereignty in administering justice.  
Kuyper saw the sphere of society as having many groups including family, business, 
science and the arts. In turn, each of those have their own spheres of sovereignty with which 
the state has no authority to interfere. It is to work alongside them in carrying out the public 
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good. God “did not give all his power to one single institution, but he endowed each of those 
institutions with the particular power that corresponded to its nature and calling.”246 As long as 
each sphere carries out its responsibilities then there will be harmony. However, there are 
times when the failure in one means there is a requirement for another to assist. For example, 
as I understand Kuyper, if a family fails to care for a child the state will have to temporarily 
intervene for the sake of the child. It is not because the state’s sovereignty gives it sole 
authority over the child but that the family, through neglect or inability, was unable to carry out 
its sovereign responsibilities.247  
Applying Kuyper’s philosophy to the legal revolution against the accommodation of 
religious practices, the state has no sovereign authority to interfere with TWU’s religious 
practices. It can only assist in the work of the religious community if that community fails to 
properly carry out its sovereign responsibilities.248 A religious body is a unique body, different 
from other civic organizations.249   
The uniqueness of religious organisations, such as churches, denominations, and their 
constituent parts such as universities, is that they are composed of religious individuals that 
identify with a deep conscientious belief in, and an obligation to, the divine. Kuyper notes that 
the: 
conscience is the immediate contact in a person’s soul of God’s holy presence, from 
moment to moment. Withdrawn into the citadel of his conscience, a person knows that 
God’s omnipotence stands guard for him at the gate. In his conscience he is therefore 
unassailable. If government nevertheless dares to push through its abuse of force, the 
end will be a martyr’s death. And in that death government is beaten and conscience 
triumphs. Conscience is therefore the shield of the human person, the root of all civil 
liberties, the source of a nation’s happiness.250  
Kuyper’s position is shaped by the anvil of Reformation history. In his home country, 
the Netherlands, religious strife was not uncommon as the region came to terms with the 
struggle between religious conscience and the state. Kuyper was willing to put up with strange 
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oddities that may come from the state protecting individual consciences that, for the majority, 
may seem quirky. “Ten times better is a state in which a few eccentrics can make themselves a 
laughingstock for a time by abusing freedom of conscience,” said Kuyper, “than a state in which 
these eccentricities are prevented by violating conscience itself. Hence our supreme maxim, 
sacred and incontestable, reads as follows: as soon as a subject appeals to his conscience, 
government shall step back out of respect for what is holy.”251 In Kuyper’s assessment, then “it 
will never coerce. It will not impose the oath, nor compulsory military service, nor compulsory 
school attendance, nor compulsory vaccination, nor anything of the kind.”252 
This strong endorsement of conscience allows for separate organizations to be 
governed by strong religious conscience rather than by the views of the state as understood by 
the judiciary, legislators or otherwise. The state has no sovereignty in the internal workings of 
religious communities, governed as they are by conscience. 
Any disruption to the delicate balance between the two spheres of sovereignty 
ultimately results in the modern state’s attempt to dominate both. This happens because the 
state has executive power; that is, an army and a police force that it can use to enforce its 
dictates. In Western democracies, religions do not have armies.253  
While some militias have co-opted religious mantras over the years for their own 
secular purposes, as in Northern Ireland for example,254 the reality is that throughout the 
modern period, meaning post-Reformation, Western religious groups have not taken up arms 
to enforce their edicts on society.255 This crucial fact has not received much attention from 
Western critics of religion. 
This is to say, using Professor Cliteur’s second dimension of monotheistic religion: 
religion is what the majority of the believers believe and do. For example, Jitzak Rabin’s murder 
by a religiously motivated Jigal Amir is an exception in contemporary Judaism. Similarly, Scott 
Roeder’s shooting of Dr. George Tiller is an exception in contemporary Christianity. 
Christianity, as a faith community, has eradicated the use of violence as an appropriate means 
of dealing with those outside.256     
Therefore, critics of Christianity such as Leiter and Nehushtan would have to go a long 
way back, for instance to the Crusades, to make the claim that Christianity is violent despite 
                                                     
251 Ibid, at Kindle Locations 1590-1595. 
252 Ibid, at Kindle Locations 1595-1597. 
253 Perhaps the criticism of Christianity is due, in no small part, because of the fear of ISIL-like religion. 
254 John D. Brewer, David Mitchell Gerard Leavey, eds, Ex-Combatants, Religion, and Peace in Northern Ireland: 
The Role of Religion in Transitional Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), at 13 notes that “political 
and religious leaders who viewed politics as a religious battle succeeded in inspiring their followers to see the 
national cause with a similar intensity of conviction, whether or not those people shared the leaders’ religious 
beliefs.” 
255 We have come to realize, in Western religious thought, that it truly is absurd to think that violence is the 
means to advance a religious cause. Consider the pacifists groups like the Quakers and the Mennonites, or 
groups like Seventh-day Adventists with their refusal to bear arms in war. Even the mainstream Christian & 
Jewish groups eschew force. William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) makes a convincing argument on this point. The view that religion in the West is “dangerous” 
and should therefore be removed from the public is a myth, says Cavanaugh. Rather, the myth becomes a 
justification for the violence of western democracies against Muslim societies. Today’s violence of the West is 
seen as “secular, rational, peace making, and regrettably necessary to contain their violence. We find 
ourselves obliged to bomb them into liberal democracy” (at 4). 
256 Ruud Koopmans, “Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups: A Comparison of Muslims 
and Christians in Western Europe” (2015) 41:1 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 22-57. 
  48  
what some see as violence in the Christian scriptures.257 William T. Cavanaugh challenges the 
argument that religion “is necessarily more inclined toward violence than are ideologies and 
institutions that are identified as secular.”258 Cavanaugh argues that the current view that 
religion is absolutist, divisive and irrational while secular ideologies are not has the effect of 
marginalizing religious groups, and legitimizes violence against them.259 While that may seem 
oversensitive and perhaps melodramatic, it is worth noting that there can be no comparison 
between Christianity today and the modern, atheistic and anti-religious totalitarian regimes of 
Stalin, Hitler, Pot, or Mao, which murdered and brutalized millions of innocent people. 
In the West, law and religion have an unequal power relationship. The state can always 
enforce its laws, if it so chooses, at the expense of religion. However, for the most part, the 
liberal state has allowed religion to maintain its own sphere of influence with very little 
hindrance. That indifference of the state, as we already noted and will explore further below, is 
changing, particularly on the fundamental human life issues. 
Once the state takes over both spheres of sovereignty, it takes on “divine” 
characteristics, meaning that it seeks to become omniscient and omnipotent. It assumes it can 
determine for the individual what will ultimately be sovereign.260 At that point, the liberal 
democratic society that places high value on individual autonomy is in severe crisis and may, in 
fact, be over. This is the modus operandi of dictatorships. Therefore, the bifurcation of 
sovereignty forms the very foundation of liberal democratic theory and requires the 
continuation of the unique status of religion. 
To suggest that religion is not special is to deny the collective experiences of the West 
that suffered the negative consequences of those polities that refused to bifurcate sovereignty. 
Our history, the legal history of the West, demonstrates the unique character of religion in our 
law. 
 
3.5 The Three Realities of Western Experience 
 
The formation of the current paradigm of liberal democratic support of religion arises 
from that set of presumptions and interpretative principles that permitted the legal/political 
development to allow unprecedented peace and stability, leading to expansive personal and 
economic freedom. That formula is the rebuttable presumption that religious belief and 
practice should be as maximally accommodated as can be reasonably expected in the 
circumstances. This formula is the result of the three realities of the collective experience of 
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3.5.1 Historical Fight Between Church and State 
 
Western history is replete with the ebb and flow of the state demanding ultimate 
allegiance from its citizens. From the ancient Roman emperors onward, there have been 
examples of states demanding capitulation of religious sovereignty in their favour. The liberal 
democratic project gave the West a reprieve from state domination over the individual 
religious conscience.  
The use of religion as a means of cementing loyalty to the state has a long pedigree. 
Polybius, after living seventeen years in Rome, wrote in 150 BCE, “The quality in which the 
Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my judgment, the nature of its religion. 
The very thing that among other nations is an object of reproach – i.e., superstition – is that 
which maintains the cohesion of the Roman state.”261 As we will see, such misuse of religion led 
to great abuse and we would do well not to repeat it. 
Western democratic thought has been profoundly influenced by at least three majour 
civilizations – Israel, Greece and Rome. 
In the ancient Roman Empire, the two sovereignties were combined. The sovereignty of 
man and the sovereignty of the divine were united in the personhood of the emperor.262 
Emperors claimed divine titles such as Dominus et Deus Noster.263 The emperor was both the 
king of man and God of man—the ultimate authority.264 The temporal and divine authorities 
were personified in the emperor. 
The advent of the Christian religion saw sovereignty bifurcated to the temporal and the 
divine. The emperor was merely human and not a deity. Divinity existed only in the Christian 
God, expressed in the three Persons of the Godhead – that is to say, the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit. Christianity took the issue of sovereignty further to the point of the individual. The 
individual, made in the image of God, was equal with the emperor. In fact, all human beings 
were equal, as proclaimed in Galatians 3:28. Hence, “the metaphysical conception of the 
implicit transcendent worth of each and every soul established itself against impossible odds as 
the fundamental presupposition of Western law and society.”265   
However, Constantine’s conversion put in process the “syncretism of Roman and 
Christian beliefs” that “subordinated the Church to imperial rule.”266 State domination of the 
Roman Catholic Church continued until the Papal Revolution in the late 11th century when 
Pope Gregory VII led the clergy to throw “off their civil rulers and established the Roman 
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Catholic Church as an autonomous legal and political corporation within Western 
Christendom.”267 
The push for extremism as exhibited by Gregory VII leads to a form of theocracy. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum we have state dictators such as Josef Stalin who wanted the 
religious world controlled by the state.268 
Over time the ascendance of the church brought the temporal and the divine back 
together in the office of the Roman Pontiff who “claimed the supremacy of the spiritual sword 
over the temporal,” though he claimed to do so indirectly.269 Christendom combined church 
and state, with the pope presiding over the territorial kings.270  
The church developed its own system of canon law administered by its courts, 
registered citizens by baptism, taxed by tithes, conscripted through crusades, and educated the 
populace in its schools.271 In short, the church was the first modern state in the West.272 
Granted, it did not have the same freedoms we associate with a modern state, but it had a form 
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that we find familiar in today’s states. 
Of course, the church did not totally dominate the state in all situations, nor did the 
state dominate the church in all contexts. Which institution dominated was complicated by the 
personalities involved, the issues to be decided, and the territories concerned. Both clergy and 
lay – the spiritual and the secular – were ostensibly working for the salvation of embodied 
souls.273 However, corruption was rife; both spheres were caught up with avarice, nepotism, 
and abuse of power.  
The Reformation led to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) which was the costliest 
conflict in Europe until World War One began in 1914.274 Though it started as a religious 
conflict, it took on a deeper political significance. Its end led to the making of what we now 
recognize as Europe. Nation-states were born. With the state came the recognition that the way 
out of religio-political conflict was the elevation of the individual. According to historian Brad 
Gregory, “Christianity as an institutionalized worldview would be abandoned.”275 Ultimately, in 
Gregory’s view, this led to the secularization of our society.276   
The horrifying destruction of life and property brought on by that religious war 
continues to have a profound impact on Western consciousness. Hardly any anti-religious 
polemicist doesn’t take the opportunity to raise the spectre of animosity that lingered even 
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after the war ended. The Protestant-Catholic hostility remains with us still in some circles. The 
atrocities of war resulted in a diminishing of institutionalized religion and led to a “turn to a 
naturalistic science [which] was to eliminate or at least moderate this conflict.”277 
Nevertheless, the Reformation was a catalyst for greater scientific discovery with the 
hegemony of institutionalized religion at an end.278 The Reformation’s search for religious 
“truth” would also harmonize, to some extent, with the search for scientific truth. As the 
emphasis on science developed, it transferred the attributes of God to “making man or nature 
or both in some sense divine.”279 The individual again became the focus. 
Christian faith was now privatized and made subject to individual preference in 
Western nation-states. Not only would citizens believe and worship as they pleased, but they 
would be obedient to the state’s laws.280 A symbiotic relationship was established – individual 
religious freedom was granted in return for peace and stability. However, as Gregory noted, 
“obedience to laws per se cannot replace the practice of virtues regardless of how thoroughly 
early modern rulers might have succeeded in ensuring the behavioural compliance of their 
subjects.”281 
The Reformation confirmed what had been developing for some time: that the 
individual was not solely a citizen of the state but of two distinct spheres, one being the 
kingdom of God, for which the individual has a direct relationship with God;282 and the other 
being the kingdom of man as represented by the king (or the earthly authority). These concepts 
would have profound practical political implications. 
 
3.5.2 Practical Politics  
 
When confronted with an obstinate citizenry, Western states could not force religious 
belief or practice without being willing to let rivers of blood, fear, and suffering flood the 
streets.283 Nor did the state have the resources to ensure that all citizens believed and practiced 
the state religion.  
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What was a state to do with a religious person or group of persons who refused to 
follow the social and legal norms because those norms violated their religious sensibility? 
While extreme methods such as burning heretics at the stake for translating the Bible or 
drowning those who insisted on adult baptism were used during the Reformation as a means of 
keeping order, they were ultimately found ineffective for maintaining civil peace. Freedom for 
the unpopular and even the most eccentric religious views was deemed the best way 
forward.284  
Law is very much a pragmatic endeavour. As part of the liberal project, it is tasked with 
ensuring that societal rules are making peace, order, and good government possible. Allowing 
the individual the maximum amount of freedom in his or her religious pursuit, as long as it did 
not disturb the peace, provided general stability. Experience had taught liberal democracies 
that religion was to be accommodated. When the majority in society developed an orthodox 
position on views of the transcendent and codified them into law, it created a conflict with the 
religious conscience of minority and dissenting views.285 The emotive content of the ensuing 
clash of wills resulted in bloodshed.286 That experience, along with the growing philosophical 
understanding that the human heart could not be forced to believe that which it found 
repugnant, and the theological view that God did not require forced obedience to the truth, 
permitted society to adopt an accommodating stance toward religious dissenters.287 
The state could no longer be sovereign in transcendent issues. It was finite. In matters 
of conscience it had to remain silent, and it had to accept diversity. Religious warfare had run 
its course. “A yearning for peace led to a new emphasis on toleration,” Professor Alister 
McGrath explains, “and growing impatience with religious disputes.”288 By 1700 the religious 
wars were at an end and the Enlightenment289 made the case that religion had to be a private 
matter, otherwise it would be a source of conflict.290 It became evident that the search for truth 
was an ongoing project.291 It had no end; therefore, individuals and religious communities 
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would be granted the space to practice their own understanding of how to obey the Sovereign 
God as they understood Him. The state had no jurisdiction in such matters.292  
However, as Roland Bainton, a historian of Protestant history, points out, religious 
freedom “has come to depend upon a diversion of interest.”293 As long as a religious practice 
and belief is of no consequence to the state, the liberal state will not hinder its practice. 
However, the moment a religious practice or belief becomes politically salient to the affairs of 
the state, one can always expect the liberal state to interfere in its own self-interest. 
Bainton’s observation would explain the liberal state’s treatment of religious 
sensibilities on sexual equality, including marriage. When traditional heterosexual marriage 
was not considered to be of any political import, the state willingly allowed religions to carry 
on with their practices in their own institutions and among their constituency.  
There are many examples that one can give which illustrate this practical reality of 
religion that Western democracies must reckon with. An apt case is the 1990 Smith294 decision 
of the US Supreme Court that removed the state obligation to use the least restrictive means to 
carry out its policy in order to accommodate a religious practice that was adversely affected by 
a neutral, generally applicable law. In other words, if the government did not intentionally 
discriminate against religion when it passed its law then the religious had no right to claim 
accommodation on the basis that there was a substantial burden on their exercise of religion.  
The upshot of the Smith decision was that the US religious communities organized 
aggressively and sought legislative redress. They received it in the form of a Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) that was passed through Congress in 1993,295 which restored the pre-
Smith burden on government. However, the US Supreme Court ruled RFRA unconstitutional in 
so far as it applies to areas of State jurisdiction.296 While RFRA remains in effect in federally 
regulated areas, the religious community has now turned its attention to the individual states 
to pass local RFRA to address the deficiency.  
Considering the effective religious campaign for RFRA, legal academic Marci Hamilton 
noted that the religious community exerted “extraordinarily effective political pressure” that 
has led her to conclude “Religion is one of the most authoritative structures of human existence 
and holds great potential power to effect good and to effect bad.”297   
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293 Roland H. Bainton, The Travail of Religious Liberty: Nine Biographical Studies (New York: Harper, 1958), 15. 
294 Employment Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
295 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993), 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4.  
296 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
297 Marci Hamilton, “The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion” (1997-98) 20 UALR L. J. 619. Hamilton is no fan 
of RFRA and is of the view that it weakens religion and society. She is of the view that Smith properly saw 
religion as quite capable of looking after itself without the added “leg up” of forcing the state to justify an 
infringement of religious freedom. (“It is not a hothouse flower that must be carefully cultivated and shielded 
from every draft, but rather a hardy plant that can thrive even when planted in a rocky soil,” at 624). Rather 
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That is my point. Religion is powerful, given the right circumstances and, as we have 
seen in history, practical politics requires religion to be granted the space to operate in its own 
sphere. That is not to suggest that religion is “powerful” in a violent sense, though modern 
history has shown that with respect to some religious fanatics. Rather, within its sphere of 
influence, religion can motivate non-compliance with what it perceives as an unjust law, which 
can cause significant disruption to liberal democratic machinery. Given this history it remains 
to be seen what the end result will be of the recent pullback of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the area of religious freedom as exemplified by the TWU law school case. The Court, in both the 
TWU law school and the Hutterian Brethren298 cases, has allowed state actors to interfere with 
the private, internal workings of religious belief and practices in a way that was, until recently, 
an anomaly.  
The practical implications of these moves, as discussed below, are yet to be felt. If the 
history of liberal democracies is any indication, state action against religious practice has 
consistently been met with religious opposition.  
 
3.5.3 Philosophical Primacy of Liberal Thought 
 
The liberal democratic project came to be recognized as the Western state allowing the 
individual the maximum amount of freedom while, at the same time, maintaining civil peace. 
This could only be possible when the state learned its lessons from earlier collective experience 
that there are areas of personal allegiance with which it cannot interfere, the most important 
being religious conscience.  
Liberalism299 is “the philosophical tradition that undergirds the Western ideal of a 
political democracy.”300 It seeks to provide a basis for civil peace among the many varying, and 
often contradictory, ideas in society, thereby allowing for the maximum participation of 
individuals in society. Charles Larmore describes liberalism as “the hope that, despite [the] 
tendency toward disagreement about matters of ultimate significance, we can find some way of 
living together that avoids the rule of force.”301 
And in the place of those authoritarian heads it seeks to build a political system on 
individual rights. However, there is a paradox, since “the privileging of individual rights means 
that the substantive commitments of no individual can be allowed to inform the body of law, 
which must be generally applicable; applicable, that is, to every citizen no matter what his or 
her beliefs and biases may happen to be.”302 
                                                     
she is of the view that it is religion that must justify why it should be given an exemption from a neutral, 
generally applicable law.  
298 Hutterian Brethren, supra note 5. 
299 Benjamin Wiker notes that “Modern liberalism is a movement in politics and philosophy that cannot be 
given a fixed definition apart from the long history of its development.” See Benjamin Wiker, Worshipping the 
State: How Liberalism Became Our State Religion (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2013), 15. 
300  Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
51. 
301 Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism” (1990) 18 Pol. Theory 339, 357; Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 300 at 
39.  
302 Stanley Fish, “Religious Exemptions and the Liberal State: A Christmas Column,” New York Times (24 
December 2012), online: <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/religious-exemptions-and-
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Therefore, it is not surprising to see terms such as John Rawls’ use of “full autonomy” to 
distinguish his version of liberalism from the “comprehensive liberalisms” views of Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill.303 Rawls does not permit “comprehensive views” or a general 
philosophical moral doctrine of the good life into his “political liberalism,” unlike Kant and 
Mill.304 Other terms that emphasize individual rights include individualism, egalitarianism, 
universalism, and meliorism.305 Robert Sharpe adds freedom and neutrality.306 Law professors 
Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh further suggest rationalism – the favouring of reason over emotion.307 
In reality, these characteristics have a degree of overlap with the core concerns of liberal 
theory. 
As I see it, the primary focus of liberal theory is a quest to discover the rational 
explanation for the most effective relationship between the individual and the state that 
permits the greatest potential for self-realization in an atmosphere of civil peace. It is an 
explanation that trumpets neutrality, pluralism and tolerance. It is within that matrix that 
religion is to find its place in the relationship with the state.308  
Religion has thrived within the liberal state as religious freedom has allowed for a 
plurality of religious groups to establish themselves. This plurality has kept religious 
communities nimble as the many factions with their different perspectives stimulate 
“innovation, which improves the religious product offered, which in turn translates into vibrant 
and vivified religion.”309 
Liberalism, as a philosophy, has evolved over the years, keeping in tune with the 
historical events and social realities of the culture. “The core of common culture,” says Roger 
Scruton, “is religion. Tribes survive and flourish because they have gods, who fuse the many 
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304 Ibid at 78, 145, 196. 
305 John Gray, Liberalism, 2nd ed, Concepts in Social Thought (University of Minnesota Press, 1995) at  
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Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 108. 
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wills into a single will, and demand and reward the sacrifices on which social life depends.”310 
Philosophy, as Will Durant saw it, is “the synthetic interpretation of all experience rather than 
the analytic description of the mode and process of experience itself.”311 Liberalism is 
chameleon-like in that it is ever-developing and refining itself, keeping time with different 
historical and cultural realities. For example, “liberalism” in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, 
in the 19th century, is remarkably different from the philosophy of William Eskridge of the 
20th and early 21st centuries.  
Professor Brian Tierney described the evolution of “freedom of conscience” as being 
based on “the natural rights of man, guaranteed by natural law and discernable by the ‘light of 
reason’ or ‘light of nature.’”312 By the end of the seventeenth century, Tierney observes, the 
Western world had formulated “reasonably adequate theories of religious rights.”313 These 
liberal philosophical theories of religious rights provided religion and its adherents a space in 
which to operate. 
However, it is worth noting that in recent years there has been a worrisome resurgence 
of state claims to supremacy under new garb within the liberal framework. Professor Iain T. 
Benson aptly observes: 
at a time when liberalism is becoming insecure about its capacity to generate binding 
commitments from the citizenry, certain approaches seek to give law or the state divine 
status. Whether expressed as “constitutional theocracy”, “political theology”, “human 
rights or political idolatry” or “civil religion”, these moves invariably clothe forms of 
politics and law with the mystique and authority of religion. This attempt is always 
dangerous because it provides no place outside of politics or law from which to argue 
for justice since politics and law, in such an idolatrized condition, are justice. The walls 
are much harder to scale when the castle is built so high.314 
It is my contention that the removal of legal accommodation of religious practices as is 
evident in the SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions is a move that resurrects the ultimate sovereignty 
claim of the state. In essence, the state is denying any space for religious practice that supports 
traditional marriage (or other possibly contentious beliefs) within that religious community. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
Through the developments of the early modern era, religion was granted public space 
to operate within the liberal political framework. Political philosophy informed by political 
experience with religion illustrated religion’s individual and collective need for room to carry 
out the human purposes as taught by the faith. The theoretical basis for this arrangement was 
encapsulated in the idea that religious freedom was a basic birthright of every citizen, and that 
secular governments had to concede some authority to divine sovereignty. The political anvil 
played a practical and theoretical role, ensuring that religion was recognized as a deep, 
individual commitment that the state had to respect. This historical and practical reality of 
religious tolerance was then enshrined in the constitutions of Western democracies, and has 
formed the basis of the special nature of religion along with the state’s need to tolerate. It is 
that understanding that is now compromised by the legal revolution against the 
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4 THE SPECIAL PROTECTION OF RELIGION 
 
4.1 Why Protect Religion 
 
The special legal protections given to religion form the current legal paradigm on 
religion which is now being challenged. Religion, legally speaking, is special. This is evident, for 
example, when the Province of Alberta recently exempted Sikhs from having to wear a 
motorcycle helmet solely because of the Sikhs’ religious beliefs.315 As Kuhn noted, when there is 
universal acceptance of a paradigm, any anomaly is addressed by explaining it within that 
paradigm because it does not occur to anyone that the paradigm might no longer fit. Says Kuhn, 
“novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided 
by expectation.”316   
Our Western legal systems’ special treatment of religion is the current legal paradigm. It 
is now being challenged by the demands of radical individualists who are unwilling to accept 
even voluntary religious practice that they find offensive. Such demands, particularly in the 
context of sexual equality rights, flow from what I call the “Sexular Age”. This term is discussed 
at length below. But for purposes of introduction, I suggest that we are currently living in a 
Sexular Age that demands the removal of the legal status given to religion because it is deemed 
offensive. Before getting into a discussion about the Sexular Age, this chapter will review just 
how religion is given special status in the law. 
 
4.1.1 Prototypical Nature of Religious Freedom 
 
The historical, practical, and philosophical realities of the experience with religion 
allowed the West to learn important democratic truths. The peculiar nature of religion, and the 
struggle over religion, required its special protection in the law. As former Chief Justice Dickson 
noted in Big M Drug Mart, “[r]eligious belief and practice are historically prototypical and, in 
many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations and are therefore 
protected by the Charter.”317 Consider the following two examples. 
First, freedom of expression, speech, and the press were noted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Dolphin Delivery318  where the Court referenced author John Milton’s appeal to the 
British Parliament in 1664319 against requiring authors to obtain a government license before 
publishing their books. Milton argued:  
[W]ho kills a Man kills a reasonable creature, Gods Image; but hee who destroyes 
a good Booke, kills reason it selfe, kills the Image of God, as it were in the eye. 
Many a man lives a burden to the Earth; but a good Booke is the pretious life-
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<https://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/areopagitica/text.html > (last visited 7 Sept. 2018). 
  60  
blood of a master spirit, imbalm’d and treasur’d up on purpose to a life beyond 
life.320 
Milton’s point is that freedom to think and express thought is a gift from God Himself as 
His essence. Religious words and their expression are not “simply words” they are the power of 
the universe.321 When books are destroyed because they have the “wrong opinion,” the inner 
voice of the soul, that which makes us human (as it emanates from the divine), is destroyed.  
“The worst and fullest tyranny to which mankind tends to be enslaved is the tyranny 
over the mind,” observes Professor Thomas L. Pangle, “the tyranny over opinion, and above all 
the tyranny over moral opinion, opinion as to what is right and wrong.”322  
Freedom of religion demands freedom of expression because as human beings we do 
not see the world in the same way. As free thinkers we can reason on our own in the search for 
truth. That is destroyed the moment the state demands we think as it does. 
Second, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel recognized freedom of association in 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada323 as having “its roots in the protection of 
religious minority groups.”324 
Religion is the manifestation of humanity’s quest to understand the meaning and 
purpose of life. To think about such grand themes goes to who we are. Thinking and expressing 
such deep thoughts risks offending others. The revelation of one’s religious beliefs or non-
beliefs may engender approbation from some but condemnation from others. It is, by nature, 
intensely personal and yet public at the same time. Since other people have come to their own 
conclusions about the meaning of life, they may be threatened if our expressed thought 
contradicts their personal views. That is the risk we take in a free society. We risk offending 
others. Not to take that risk means we are not free. 
Western Christianity, including the Reformation, required the West’s acquiescence in 
granting religion space to freely operate. This meant some religious groups ran the risk of 
offending other religious individuals and groups who held different views. But as John S. Mill 
observed, it was religious minorities that claimed the indefeasible right to religious freedom 
against the majority. “Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care 
about,” he points out, “that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, 
except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological 
quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in 
the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. … Wherever 
the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its 
claim to be obeyed.”325 
The modern spin suggests that religion can only operate in the “private” sphere. For 
example, Richard Rorty argues, “we shall not be able to keep a democratic political community 
going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of 
religious liberty.”326 Rorty is not necessarily demanding that religion is to be cloistered, or that 
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religious people are required to hide their religion, as religion will often surface in public 
discussion and debate. To the extent that one does not want religion to dominate the state, one 
could agree with him wholeheartedly.  
However, the ability of the West to maintain a peaceful society lies in the recognition 
from the state that it cannot be sovereign in matters of individual conscience. It must allow the 
freedom of citizens to disagree and do so with vigour. Trouble ensues the moment the state 
thinks it is God and rejects the liberal democratic project.327 In the case of TWU, as will be seen 
below, because the state finds religious opposition to homosexual lifestyles repugnant it will 
enforce its morality upon that voluntary Christian community. By doing so, the state willingly 
violates their freedom of religion and rejects the historical freedom to express difference.  
The state’s opinion on this issue is so intense and absolute that even though an LGBTQ 
student can choose from many other non-religious universities that support their lifestyle, the 
state demands TWU obey its dictates or else lose accreditation. Yet, the very freedom liberal 
democracies currently enjoy owes much to the struggle of religious minorities against state 
imposition on their inalienable rights. In other words, those who call on state actors to deny 
accommodation of religious practices of individuals and religious institutions, like TWU, are in 
essence biting the hand that historically fed them. Religious freedom is the “mother” of freedom 
that arose from the crucible of the religious struggles of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
After a thorough, historical review of the rise of individual rights, Georg Jellinek 
concluded, “[t]he idea of legally establishing inalienable, inherent and sacred rights of the 
individual is not of political but religious origin. What has been held to be a work of the 
Revolution was in reality a fruit of the Reformation and its struggles. Its first apostle was not 
Lafayette but Roger Williams….”328 The Independent movement within the English Protestant 
churches developed the idea that the “full and unrestricted liberty of conscience” was not a 
right granted by any earthly power nor could it be restrained by an earthly power.329 This was 
not limited to religious freedom, “it was forced by logical necessity to carry its fundamental 
                                                     
327 Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, Not in God’s Name (New York: Schocken Books, 2015), 229-230 describes 
liberal democracy this way:  
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History, translated by Max Farrand (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1901), 77. 
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doctrines into the political sphere.”330 Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson called attention to 
this when he observed: 
Beginning, however, with the Independent faction within the Parliamentary party 
during the Commonwealth or Interregnum, many, even among those who shared the 
basic beliefs of the ascendent religion, came to voice opposition to the use of the State’s 
coercive power to secure obedience to religious precepts and to extirpate 
non-conforming beliefs. The basis of this opposition was no longer simply a conviction 
that the State was enforcing the wrong set of beliefs and practices but rather the 
perception that belief itself was not amenable to compulsion. Attempts to compel belief 
or practice denied the reality of individual conscience and dishonoured the God that had 
planted it in His creatures. It is from these antecedents that the concepts of freedom of 
religion and freedom of conscience became associated, to form, as they do in s. 2(a) of 
our Charter, the single integrated concept of “freedom of conscience and religion”.331 
The American colonialists carried the Independent movement sentiments with them 
and maintained a religious understanding that their rights came not from man but from God.  
Political realities soon led to a politicalization of the religious convictions. The colonialists 
claimed rights332 not granted merely from the British monarch but from Nature’s God that were 
indefeasible – “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”333   
The religious conviction regarding inalienable rights also led to the American 
philosophy of the separation of church and state. Professor Nicholas Miller points out that 
James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance334 was one of the foundational documents in the 
development of the doctrine and it had a strong theological framework. For example, Madison 
emphasised the inalienability of religious freedom on two fronts: first, one’s opinion depends 
on the evidence contemplated by one’s own mind and therefore one cannot follow the dictates 
of others and, second, this right toward others is a duty to the Creator.335 Miller understands 
Madison to be saying, “…in matters of religious belief, conviction, and worship, the civil 
magistrate, indeed, the entire legislature, was inferior to the individual conscience.”336 Finally, 
it is observed that Madison was of the view that to abuse religious freedom “is an offense 
against God, not against man.”337     
Professor Hans-Martien ten Napel supports the view that Christian presuppositions 
made liberal democracy possible.338 He argues that “no legitimate liberal democracy is feasible 
without there being the type of protection of religious freedom offered by the right to freedom 
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of religion or belief as it has historically developed.”339 ten Napel explains that there are three 
principles of liberal democracies which interconnect: constitutionalism, democracy, and 
religious freedom. The interconnectedness allows citizens to become “fully human.” As Koos 
Vorster observes, being fully human “means to cradle the spirituality of ones’ religion and to 
build one’s life on the foundation that the religion offers.”340 Thus, from ten Napel’s perspective, 
to be fully human includes both the individual and communal aspects of human existence, 
which are both found in freedom of religion or belief. At the very heart of being fully human is 
religious freedom. And, as we have already discussed, it is the recognition that the sovereignty 
of the state is kept in check by this freedom.341 
When the state has the pretention to enforce its morality, under the rubric of “Charter 
values”, as it did in the TWU 2018 cases, it violates the prototypical right of religious freedom. 
In the case of TWU, it was a totally unnecessary violation given the fact that attendance at TWU 
is voluntary, and there are plenty of alternative law schools for those who take offense to 
TWU’s religious practices. The fanaticism, zeal, and vindictiveness exhibited by TWU’s critics 
displayed a complete lack of tolerance. Yet religious tolerance was the historical wellspring 
which gave such modern-day TWU critics the right to voice their opposition. The irony here is 
worth noting. The consequences of this development, as discussed below, are yet to be realized. 
 
4.2 The Legal Status of Religion 
 
Religious practice is often incongruent with generally applicable law. Society has had to 
deal with this problem in a way that works. For the most part, the path forward has been that 
virtually every area of law has acquiesced, in some way, to the demands of religion and its 
practice. In this section I will review the current legal status of religion in Canadian law. What 
has occurred in Canada is not unlike similar liberal democracies. There can be no doubt that 
religion has been, and continues to be, treated by the law as special. It is accommodated in no 
small measure. 
This review highlights the complex relationship between religion and the liberal state. 
Religion manifests itself in individual and communal characteristics that have challenged the 




The protection and accommodation of religious beliefs, as it currently stands in western 
liberal democracies, is either a constitutional duty because the protection of religion is 
constitutionally enumerated, or it forms part of the “unwritten” constitution.342 Discrimination 
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  64  
based on religion is effectively outlawed. Religious freedom is often applauded as a positive 
good. However, it is the concept of whether special legal protection of religion is necessary, 
defensible and sustainable from a moral, a legal and a political perspective that is the heart of 
the current discussion.  
Using Canada as a primary example we will review the constitutional protection of 
religion. 
 
4.2.2 Pre-Charter Jurisprudence 
 
The special place of religion in Canadian constitutional law343 predates the Charter of 
1982 by 221 years. Religion was a major concern immediately after the British conquest of 
New France (Quebec) in 1759. The British granted its new Catholic colony what appears on the 
surface to be an ambiguous measure of religious freedom with the Treaty of Paris, 1763, which 
granted freedom “according to the rites of the Romish church as far as the laws of Great Britain 
permit.”344 However, as Professor Margaret Ogilvie points out, in practice, “[t]he Roman 
Catholic Church became freer from government interference under the British than had been 
the case before the Conquest and received an unprecedented degree of freedom for any 
country….”345 This freedom continued from the 1760s up to and including Confederation in 
1867. 
Even the negotiations that led to the founding of Canada in 1867 required political 
compromise concerning religion. This is evident in section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
which recognized the right of Roman Catholic schools to government funding if they were 
receiving such public funding when the province joined confederation. The province of Quebec 
became the focal point of religious freedom litigation due to the population being primarily 
Roman Catholic and the strong Catholic Church influence on society.346 A couple of early 
decisions, in the 19th Century, give a flavour of what was to come during the 1940s-1960s 
when the tenacious Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged the religious sensibilities of Quebec 
politicians and the Roman Catholic Church. Those cases in the mid 20th Century were to lay 
some groundwork for a more principled approach to religious freedom and the role of religion.  
The pre-Charter jurisprudence is built upon the reality of a populace affiliated to the 
Christian religion in its major schisms – Roman Catholicism and the Protestant derivatives – 
with Roman Catholicism being the majority in Quebec and Protestantism in the minority, and 
vice versa in the rest of the country. Indeed, the lion’s share of the case law pre- and post-
Charter has involved the Christian religion. The law was forced by historical and practical 
realities to deal with religious controversy that continues to resonate to this day.  
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These themes include the law’s role in arbitrating internal religious disputes;347 the 
state’s ability to provide public financial benefits to religious institutions;348 the regulation of 
the public expression of religious sentiment that has direct political impact;349 religious 
expression;350 state regulation of religious holy days;351 and the law’s protection against the 
abuse of state actors intentionally interfering with religious actors who are out of the 
mainstream.352  
 
4.2.2.1 Division of Powers Analysis 
 
To understand the pre-Charter jurisprudence on the protection of religion, one must 
appreciate the legal climate of the time. Canada came into being with the passage of the British 
North America Act353 in 1867 (now known as the Constitution Act, 1867). That Act of the British 
parliament created a federal state and listed the respective responsibilities of the two levels of 
government. The court of final appeal, up until 1949, was the Privy Council of the House of 
Lords in London. In 1949 that was changed to the Supreme Court of Canada.354 For the bulk of 
the first one hundred and fifteen years Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence was preoccupied 
with determining the division of legislative powers in section 91 (federal) and section 92 
(provincial) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Each case laid a brick on the legal territorial boundary 
between the two levels of government.  
Even as late as the 1950s the division of power constitutional analysis also saw religion 
through that lens. For several of the members on the bench, “religion” was a term to be parsed 
according to which level of government was responsible for the regulation of religion and 
under which “head” of the list of powers, in the Constitution Act, 1867, religion fit. Protection of 
religion, like any other legal principle, had to be decided based on the jurisdictional debate and 
struggle between the federal and provincial authorities. It was a rigid legal analysis that did not 
take the “purposive approach” that would become a hallmark of the post-Charter 
jurisprudence.  
This rigid scrutiny dominated the pre-Charter religion cases. However, by the 1940s a 
more progressive view was budding in the Supreme Court in the decisions of Justice Ivan Rand. 
He took the position that religion is a “fundamental freedom” and an “original right” that is 
longstanding and forms the foundation of society. Justice Rand was prescient in his opinions. 
His Harvard Law School education exposed him to a rich liberal understanding of rights 
protection. Rand wrote in the 1950s that the American Bill of Rights was “man’s highest 
attainment in constitutional establishment.”355 This progressive attitude was evident in his SCC 
decisions.  
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It is open to debate whether the pre-Charter Court would have moved away on its own 
accord from the ingrained textual analysis of religious freedom toward Justice Rand’s method 
of looking beyond the legal text to a more purposive approach to religious freedom. Perhaps 
the changing times of Canadian society would have forced the court to become more 
progressive. However, Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of Rights356 was a perfect 
opportunity to breathe life into its enumerated rights such as freedom of religion. But that was 
not the case. The Court remained positioned in a strict constructionist analysis that treated the 
bill as any ordinary legislative act357 rather than a quasi-constitutional document with the 
deference that is accorded to human rights legislation today.358   
Rand’s reasoning for the important constitutional role of religion is clear and 
persuasive. His position is buttressed by the evidence of the protection of religion in the 
various international, historic documents affecting Canada – Articles of Capitulation in 1760, 
the Treaty of Paris in 1763, and the Quebec Act of 1774 which was continued in the Statute of 
1851359 declaring that citizens had “the free exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession, 
and Worship.” The existence of such longstanding religious protection gives considerable 
weight to Rand’s position. 
 
4.2.2.2 Pre-Charter Limits on the Church and on the State 
 
The following is a quick survey of the pre-Charter jurisprudence on the accommodation 
of religion. This review is necessary to highlight the fact that similar themes at play today 
existed prior to the Charter. Despite the Court’s obsession with strict legislative analysis, 
religion was recognized as of sufficient importance to merit special protection in the law. Yet 
religion was not without boundaries. Nor was the state without boundaries. The courts were 
very much aware of the need to strike a balance between the interests of the state and of the 
church.  
 
4.2.2.2.1 Limits on the Church 
 
Internal Rules Must be Consistent 
 
To what extent should the law get involved in private religious disputes? When does an 
internal religious dispute become a concern for the law? How is the law to accommodate the 
religious practice of the religious officials while at the same time protecting the autonomous 
right of religious individuals? And should the law give deference to the rules of a voluntary 
community for those community members? These were among the questions that the Canadian 
courts and subsequently the British House of Lords had to deal with in the Guibord case.360  
Henriette Brown sought to have her deceased husband Joseph Guibord’s body be buried 
in a Roman Catholic cemetery in Montreal. The Church agreed to have Guibord buried in the 
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cemetery but only in the non-Catholic portion of the cemetery due to him being labelled a 
“public sinner” by the Church for his membership in the Institut Canadien.361 Burial in that area 
was, in the opinion of the Privy Council, an implication of “degradation, not to say infamy.”362 
The Institut was deemed to support ideas that were inimical to the teachings of the Church as it 
advanced such liberal democratic ideas as separation of church and state.363   
Brown sought relief by taking the Church entities to court, seeking an order of 
mandamus for her husband’s remains to be buried in the regular Catholic portion of the 
cemetery. This set up for a very interesting debate about freedom of religion. To what extent 
should the temporal courts impose on the very internal workings of the Church?  
The Privy Council (PC) held that the Roman Catholic Church did not have the same 
rights it had prior to the British conquest and can no longer be considered an established 
church. But the Church also differs from “voluntary religious societies” because its lay members 
pay “dimes” to its clergy and are subject to taxation for the maintenance of parochial 
cemeteries.364  There was a civil duty to perform the burial. The PC recognized that the law had 
no jurisdiction to interfere with the internal workings of the Church (the purely ecclesiastical) 
and its pronouncements about whether a member met the prerequisites to be receive the 
Church blessings.  
However, what the law did have jurisdiction to do was provide relief to those who were 
aggrieved by the inappropriate application of the Church’s own rules (Canon law) and 
procedures.365 The only way by which Guibord could have been refused burial in the regular 
place of the cemetery, the PC reasoned, was if he were excommunicated from the Church. 
However, he was not. The PC therefore ruled that Guibord was to be buried in the regular part 
of the cemetery, although the PC reasoned that it could not force the Church to perform the 
regular religious ceremony at the burial. 
As has been noted by one commentator, the PC decision is self-contradictory – while it 
ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to interfere with ecclesiastical affairs but civil, it then 
promptly ordered a burial in the consecrated ground of the cemetery, which is a matter of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.366 The primary issue was whether the Church’s acquiescence to 
Guibord being buried in the non-consecrated portion was sufficient to meet the “civil burial” 
legal requirement. By ruling that Guibord’s remains were to be buried in the consecrated area 
the PC created another “civil burial” (i.e. one that must include the right to the consecrated 
area). This violated the Church’s position. In the end, the Church allowed Guibord to be buried 
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in the consecrated area to appease the law but then subsequently its clergy held another 
religious service to deconsecrate the burial plot!367    
What is significant about this case, for our purposes, is that the law recognized that it 
did not have a right to interfere with the internal affairs of the Church, even if it were 
discriminatory against one who claimed to be a member of the Church. The religious 
community has autonomy to conduct its own affairs. Despite that recognition, the Privy Council 
found that the Church must follow its own rules and should have excommunicated Guibord to 
prevent his burial in the consecrated area of the cemetery.  
The issue of internal autonomy of religious communities remains a live issue in Canada 
today. For example, the SCC recently ruled that a former member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
cannot ask a court to judicially review his church’s decision to dismiss him as a member.368 
 
Religion Has No Place Interfering with the Electoral Process 
 
To what extent is the law to interfere with religious expression when that expression is 
an attempt to influence a political outcome during an election? In 1877 the Supreme Court of 
Canada was confronted with the issue of “undue clergy influence.” In 1876, Charlevoix 
Conservative MP Hector Langevin was elected as a Conservative Member of Parliament for the 
Charlevoix riding, having defeated Liberal candidate Pierre-Alexis Tremblay, who was the 
incumbent. Langevin had the support of the local Catholic bishop. In fact, pastoral letters from 
the bishops were read to congregants while they attended Sunday Mass, imploring them to 
vote for Langevin. Langevin won but the election was contested by Tremblay based on undue 
influence. The lower court upheld the election but the Supreme Court declared it void.  
Letters read to the congregants insisted, “The Church is not only independent of civil 
society, but is superior to it by her origin, by her comprehensiveness and by her end.”369 They 
warned, “The priest and the Bishop may then, in all justice, and shall, in conscience, raise their 
voice, point out the danger, and authoritatively, declare that to vote on such a side is a sin, that 
to do such an act makes liable to the censures of the Church.”370 If it is known that a candidate 
“is a Liberal, you cannot conscientiously give him your vote; you are sinning by favoring a man 
who supports principles condemned by the Church, and you assume the responsibility of the 
evil which that candidate may do in the application of the dangerous principles which he 
professes.”371   
One curé, in a one and a half hour sermon, likened Catholic Liberals as ravening wolves 
who rebelled against religion; if they were in power “… we should wade in the blood of the 
priests that all the horrors of the French revolution would be reenacted; that to prevent those 
misfortunes Liberalism must be crushed by the people and by the clergy.”372   
Justice Thashereau held: 
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I admit without the least hesitation and with the most sincere conviction the 
right of the Catholic priest as to preaching to the definition of dogmas and of all points 
of discipline; I deny that he has, in this case or in any other similar case, the right to 
point to an individual or a political party and hold them up to public indignation….373  
All are equal before that law which declares that whosoever does injury to 
another must repair it and indicates the means to be used to compel him to do so.374   
The principle which should govern in cases of the like nature is the following, to 
wit that the minister who so far forgets himself in the pulpit as to revile or defame any 
person, does not speak of religion, does not define doctrine or discipline, but puts aside 
his sacred character and is considered like any other man as satisfying his personal 
revenge, or as acting through, interest, and, in consequence, he is not held to be in the 
exercise of his spiritual functions.375 
The Church argued that since it was given religious freedom following the British 
conquest, it had the right to preach of the dangers of voting for candidates with a political 
platform that violated Church teachings such as bringing in divorce courts.376 
The SCC ruled that the federal election for the Quebec seat was void due to the undue 
influence of the Roman Catholic clerics. Justice Ritchie noted, “a clergyman has no right, in the 
pulpit or out, by threatening any damage, temporal or spiritual, to restrain the liberty of a voter 
so as to compel or frighten him into voting or abstaining from voting otherwise than as he 
freely wills. If he does in the eye of the law this is undue influence.”377 
The Guibord and Langevin cases are but examples of the fact that while religion was 
treated as special in Canadian law prior to the Charter in 1982, it had limits. The 
accommodation of religion was not open-ended. There were times when religious communities 
had to be restrained in the exercise of their religious freedom.   
 
4.2.2.2.2 Limits on the State 
 
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs) faced considerable 
opposition and persecution in Quebec where political and religious officials colluded together 
in prosecuting and harassing JWs with the clear intention of driving them out of the province. 
JWs were persona non grata. Over 1,500 were arrested.378   
While the facts of these cases revealed abuse of authority there was, nevertheless, a 
strong contingent in the Supreme Court of Canada that still saw religion as a division of powers 
issue. The consequence of such a position was to limit religious freedom and give deference to 
the action of the authorities that the JWs found offensive. Rather than dealing with the 
substantive freedom of religion the SCC was content with the legal form. This was evident in 
the case of Saumur v. Quebec.379 The JWs won the case but the majority on the SCC ruled the 
Quebec government had the power to pass legislation to take away religious freedom. 
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However, as the 1950s wore on, the SCC decided that the Quebec government and 
Premier Duplessis had stepped too far in persecuting the JWs. Justice Ivan Rand’s analysis of 
religious freedom as an “original freedom” would become universally accepted as a limit 
against a capricious state power intent on limiting religious accommodation. 
 
4.2.2.2.3 Religious Criticism Has A Place  
 
In the Boucher case380 the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the conviction of a 
Jehovah’s Witness of seditious libel for distributing a four-page tract entitled, “Quebec’s 
Burning Hate for God and Christ and Freedom Is the Same of all Canada.”381 The majority of the 
Court held there was no evidence of an intention to incite violence. The tract recited the 
experiences JWs faced during the WWII era in the Province of Quebec. For their earnest 
religious activities of distributing religious literature door to door they were assaulted and 
beaten, and their bibles and literature were torn up by mobs; their homes were searched and 
property taken by the authorities; hundreds were charged and held on exorbitant bail. The 
tract accused public officials and the Roman Catholic Church as being behind the 
prosecutions.382   
Justice Rand looked beyond the mechanical application of the law to consider the broad 
implications of freedom that this case stood for. He noted that the crime of seditious libel up 
until the 18th Century was to express contempt of political authority. It was based on a 
conception of “the governors of society as superior beings, exercising a divine mandate, by 
whom laws, institutions and administrations are given to men to be obeyed who are, in short, 
beyond criticism….”383 Any censure implied an equality with such authority and was therefore 
offensive. “But constitutional conceptions of a different order making rapid progress in the 
19th century have necessitated a modification of the legal view of public criticism,” he 
observed; so “the administrators of what we call democratic government have come to be 
looked upon as servants, bound to carry out their duties accountably to the public.”384 
Imagining political leaders as servants, accountable to the public, created a safe space 
for open debate. The chill of expressing one’s mind on the nature of things political and social 
was removed. Public dialogue on issues of the day were now not only allowed but encouraged.  
Justice Rand’s poignant description of this modern understanding forms the basis of 
why religion and its expression were protected:    
Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every 
conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of critical discussion 
on political, social and religious subjects has too deeply become the stuff of daily 
experience to suggest that mere ill-will as a product of controversy can strike 
down the latter with illegality. A superficial examination of the word shows its 
insufficiency: what is the degree necessary to criminality? Can it ever, as mere 
subjective condition, be so? Controversial fury is aroused constantly by 
differences in abstract conceptions; heresy in some fields is again a mortal sin; 
there can be fanatical puritanism in ideas as well as in mortals; but our compact of 
                                                     
380 Boucher v. the King, [1951] S.C.R. 264 [Boucher]. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Ibid at 285. 
383 Ibid at 286. 
384 Ibid. 
  71  
free society accepts and absorbs these differences and they are exercised at large 
within the frame-work of freedom and order on broader and deeper uniformities 
as bases of social stability. Similarly in discontent, affection and hostility: as 
subjective incidents of controversy, they and the ideas which arouse them are part 
of our living which ultimately serve us in stimulation, in the clarification of 
thought and, as we believe, in the search for the constitution and truth of things 
generally.385 
Rand was suspicious of “fanatical puritanism in ideas.” As a free society, Canada had the 
ability and responsibility to accept differences of opinion in the “clash of critical discussion on 
political, social and religious subjects.”  Allowing such a wide spectrum of opinion underlies our 
social stability.  
By allowing differences the law permits, in Rand’s view, sharp criticism to be vented in 
public debate. It thereby acts as a relief valve on controversial subjects. Rather than rioting in 
the streets the opinion holders can proclaim their disapproval in the spoken or written word. 
Everything short of public incitement to violence is permitted. This release of social energy is 
far more constructive than the destructive impulse that has been so evident in repressive 
countries.  
For Rand, the law recognizes that by protecting freedom in thought and speech over 
disagreement in ideas and beliefs, it serves society in a communal search for stimulating 
discussion, clarity of thought and the quest for ultimate truth. Accommodating religion, 
therefore, is a public good not to be discounted.  
 
4.2.2.2.4 Distribution of Religious Literature 
 
The Saumur case386 was a challenge to the City of Quebec’s by-law that required 
permission from the Chief of Police to allow distribution of any book, pamphlet, booklet, 
circular, or tract in its streets. Laurier Saumur, a JW, challenged the validity of the by-law. Five 
SCC justices ruled that Saumur’s rights were infringed and to the extent the by-law prevented 
the distribution of religious materials it was invalid. Therefore, the by-law remained in effect 
for other non-religious material. One of those five judges, Justice Kerwin, while agreeing that 
Saumur’s religious rights were infringed, nevertheless joined the minority in holding that the 
issue of religion fell within the provincial powers of “property and civil rights” granted in the 
Constitution Act, 1867.387 The effect of the Saumur decision was that Saumur won the case but 
religious freedom lost as the Quebec government promptly passed legislation to grant itself 
power “to outlaw any religious group that published abusive and insulting attacks on 
established religions.”388 Of course, it was then promptly applied to the Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
their religious challenge to Roman Catholic teachings.  
Justice Rand in Saumur saw freedom of religion as distinct from civil rights. On this 
point he was part of the minority view. Civil rights, he maintained (which I quoted above) are 
from positive law, “but freedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person, are 
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original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of 
human beings and the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order.” 389   
When legislation is made “in relation to” religion and its profession, it is not a local or 
private matter, Rand argued, but rather: 
the dimensions of this interest are nationwide; it is even today embodied in the highest 
level of the constitutionalism of Great Britain; it appertains to a boundless field of ideas, 
beliefs and faiths with the deepest roots and loyalties; a religious incident reverberates 
from one end of this country to the other, and there is nothing to which the ‘body politic 
of the Dominion’ is more sensitive.390 
He also wrote, as noted earlier, “The Christian religion, its practices and profession, 
exhibiting in Europe and America an organic continuity, stands in the first rank of social, 
political and juristic importance.”391 Rand does not tell us why religious freedom is “of the 
greatest constitutional significance” nor why the Christian religion “stands in the first rank.” He 
states it as if it were a given. Perhaps it was the historical fact of the Christian religion (with its 
many variants seeking influence) being the “first rank” that made religious freedom “of the 
greatest constitutional significance.”   
This is a clear recognition of what was, in all practical terms, reality – reality in the 
political and social life of a country whose laws and norms were Christian. It is to this 
overwhelming reality that Rand spoke. It is unfortunate for the JWs that his view did not 
convince Justice Kerwin. That would take more litigation. 
 
4.2.2.2.5 Religious Assembly 
 
In the case of Chaput v. Romain,392 three members of the Quebec provincial police, 
acting on orders, broke up a religious meeting of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at the home of Mr. 
Chaput. The police seized religious literature and ordered the congregation to leave. There was 
no warrant, no charges were laid, and the items seized were not returned. Chaput brought a 
legal action against the police officers for damages and the value of articles seized. It was 
dismissed at trial and at the court of appeal. The SCC held otherwise, noting that Chaput was 
entitled to the privileges of c. 175 of the Statutes of Canada, 1851, which granted “the free 
exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession and Worship, without discrimination or 
preference, so as the same be not made an excuse for acts of licentiousness, or a justification of 
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the Province.”393 
“Dans notre pays, il n’existe pas de religion d’Etat”, Justice Taschereau opined, 
observing:   
“Personne n’est tenu d’adhérer à une croyance quelconque. Toutes les religions sont sur 
un pied d’égalité, et tous les catholiques comme d’ailleurs tous les protestants, les juifs, 
ou les autres adhérents des diverses dénominations religieuses, ont la plus entière 
liberté de penser comme ils le désirent. La conscience de chacun est une affaire 
personnelle, et l’affaire de nul autre. Il serait désolant de penser qu’une majorité puisse 
imposer ses vues religieuses à une minorité. Ce serait une erreur fâcheuse de croire 
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qu’on sert son pays ou sa religion, en refusant dans une province, à une minorité, les 
mêmes droits que l’on revendique soi-même avec raison, dans une autre province.”394 
Justice Locke noted that “The appellants’ right to maintain his good name and to enjoy 
the privileges conferred upon him by the Statute of 1851 are absolute and very precious rights 
and he is entitled to recover substantial general damages.”395 
“Very precious rights,” is a curious use of term. Certainly, all rights are precious but 
what makes these rights – the right to “the free exsercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession 
and Worship, without discrimination or preference” – “very precious”? If he has any sympathy 
towards Rand’s view it remains opaque.   
 
4.2.2.2.6 Capricious Action Against Religion 
 
Roncarelli396 owned a restaurant in Montreal and as such was the holder of a licence to 
sell liquor. Roncarelli, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, provided bail for JW members who 
were charged under Quebec by-laws for distributing anti-Catholic literature. This angered 
Premier Duplessis, who ordered the Quebec Liquor Commission to cancel Roncarelli’s liquor 
license. Duplessis did not think Roncarelli “was worthy of obtaining privileges from the 
province.”397 He considered it his duty in “soul and conscience” to take away the license 
because “[t]he Sympathy which this man has shown for the Witnesses, in such an evident, 
repeated and audacious manner, is a provocation to public order, to the administration of 
justice and is definitely contrary to the aims of justice.”398 
The SCC was not sympathetic toward Premier Duplessis and held him personally liable 
for cancelling the license. The Court reasoned that while the Premier is a public official he was 
not carrying out the responsibility of his office in directing an illegal action. He had no 
authorization to interfere in the livelihood of Roncarelli because he did not agree with 
Roncarelli’s support of the Jehovah Witnesses. It was an abuse of power. The fact that he 
thought it was right does not affect the legal effect of the action. “In public regulation of this 
sort there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled ‘discretion’,” explained the Court: 
“that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the 
mind of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be capricious or 




                                                     
394 Ibid at 841, loosely translated: “In our country, there is no state religion. No one is bound to adhere to any 
belief. All religions are on an equal footing, and all Catholics, as well as all Protestants, Jews, or other 
adherents of various religious denominations, have the most complete freedom to think as they wish. The 
conscience of each is a personal matter, and the business of no one else. It would be sad to think that a 
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serves one’s country or one’s religion, by refusing in one province, to a minority, the same rights that one 
claims rightly in another province”. 
395 Ibid at 865. 
396 Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121. 
397 Ibid at 135, translated by the author. 
398 Ibid at 137. 
399 Ibid at 140. 
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4.2.2.2.7 State Endorsement of Religion 
 
Judicial acceptance of the state’s partiality to Christian norms was evident in the cases 
dealing with Sunday closing legislation. In the Henry Birks400 decision, the Supreme Court of 
Canada approached legislation requiring stores to close on religious holidays in its typical 
division of powers framework. It held that the provinces did not have the jurisdiction to 
require stores to close on religious holidays as it related to the federal “criminal law” power. It 
was a criminal law power because it was prescribing “what are in essence religious 
obligations.”401  
As explained above, even with the Canadian Bill of Rights,402 the SCC refused to reflect 
upon freedom of religion in the broad purposive sense. It was content to deal with the 
constitutional separation of powers, and the effect versus purpose of legislation as it did in the 
Robertson and Rosetanni403 decision.  
As far as the SCC was concerned, the Canadian Bill of Rights simply entrenched the 
rights as they existed before.404 The federal government’s jurisdiction to pass the Lord’s Day 
Act405 was under the constitutional criminal law power and not a matter of religious freedom. 
For the SCC, the practical result on those whose religion required them to observe a day of rest 
other than Sunday was purely secular and financial.406 
Despite his decision to uphold the Lord’s Day Act, Justice Ritichie quoted from Justice 
Rand’s Saumur decision to make the following definitive expression of religious freedom in 
Canada: 
It is apparent from these judgments that “complete liberty of religious 
thought” and “the untrammelled affirmation of ‘religious belief’ and its 
propagation, personal or institutional” were recognized by this Court as existing 
in Canada before the Canadian Bill of Rights and notwithstanding the provisions of 
the Lord’s Day Act. 
It is to be remembered that the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
recognized by the Courts of Canada before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights 
and guaranteed by that statute were the rights and freedoms of men living together in 
an organized society subject to a rational, developed and civilized system of law which 
imposed limitations on the absolute liberty of the individual.407 
Justice Cartwright, being the sole voice on the bench in the Rosetanni decision for an 
expansive view of religious freedom in the Canadian Bill of Rights saw what Justice Dickson 
would see two decades later in the Big M Drug Mart408 decision: “a law which compels a course 
of conduct, whether positive or negative, for a purely religious purpose infringes the freedom 
of religion.”409 
                                                     
400 Henry Birks, supra note 351. 
401 Per Justice Cartwright, Rosetanni, supra note 357 at 659. 
402 Bill of Rights, supra note 356. 
403 Rosetanni, supra note 357. 
404 See note 357. 
405  Lord’s Day Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 171. 
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407 Ibid at 655. 
408 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4, see para 70. 
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Despite the division-of-powers framework, it would have to be conceded that the law 
pre-Charter not only accommodated religion but enforced religious norms and sentiments as 
the Sunday closing litigation reveals. 
 
4.2.2.2.8 Conclusion  
 
The pre-Charter jurisprudence on religious freedom can be characterized as being 
overtly pragmatic within a Christian societal context. Deference was given to legislative power 
until circumstances made that posture unpalatable. This institutional resistance to expand 
protections for religious freedom continued after enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
However, there were a couple of notable exceptions: Justices Rand and Cartwright. Justice Rand 
was openly at odds with other members of the SCC in advocating an expansive understanding 
of religious freedom. His influence led to a keen sensibility of religious freedom.  
Author and lawyer William Kaplan gives us a glimpse of the kind of tension Rand faced 
when he openly disagreed with Chief Justice Rinfret in the Saumur hearing. The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses lawyer, Glen How, argued that freedom of religion meant freedom from civil laws 
that interfered with their rights to worship. Chief Justice Rinfret asked, “How can a country be 
administered if all religions took the view that they did not have to obey the law?” Someone 
could merely pretend. Rand interjected, “That is not what Mr. How is saying.”  How was trying 
to demonstrate that a breach of civil law did not necessarily constitute licentiousness. Rinfret 
ignored Rand and asked How if laws could be broken on religious grounds. Rand interjected 
again but Rinfret retorted, “I want to hear from Mr. How, not from another member of the 
bench.”410 
The pre-Charter jurisprudence lacked a cohesive understanding of why the law gave 
special treatment to the practise of religion, even a practise that was outside of the religious 
orthodoxy of the time. The deficiency may be understood as a product of an institutional blind 
spot in understanding the concept and role of rights and the protection of minorities. Canadian 
constitutional law was dominated by the concern about the division of powers and strict 
adherence to the application of the law to the case at hand, with little regard for the theoretical 
or the purposive understanding of why the law applied as it did.  
The effect of such rigidity was to maintain the status quo and not allow room for an 
expansion of civil liberties as quickly as it might have. That status quo meant that the majority 
religious groups would continue to have an appreciable advantage over minority religious 
groups in Canada. Arguably this led to the unfortunate circumstance that Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
as a religious minority, were constantly harassed by the Quebec government in the 1940s and 
1950s.  
There was a pre-Charter political reality of the influence and power of religion. 
Christianity formed the basis of the political and legal norms in Canada. But it was broader than 
that. Professor Roger O’Toole notes, “organized religion secured such profound importance in 
the new nation that it is impossible to comprehend the expansion of the Canadian state and 
economy without reference to it.”411 
                                                     
410 William Kaplan, Canadian Maverick: The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 
2009) at 129. 
411 Roger O’Toole, “Canadian Religion: Heritage and Project,” in David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die, 
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As mentioned previously, this is evident with respect to the school systems. In 1867 it 
was necessary to provide for a recognition of the place of religious schools. The Roman 
Catholics were the majority in Quebec, whereas Protestants were the majority in Ontario. The 
founding of Canada required a political compromise that guaranteed funding for the religious 
schools in each province in accordance with the practice at the time the province entered 
Confederation. Since Ontario and Quebec provided funding to religious schools at 
Confederation the Constitution Act, 1867412 required that it continue.  
However, when Manitoba joined Canada in 1870,413 the religious schools were self-
funded. After joining Canada, the Manitoba government began funding religious schools but 
then stopped the funding and created one public, non-sectarian school system. The uproar this 
created resulted in litigation. The Privy Council held that Manitoba religious bodies had no 
constitutional right to public funding414 but did have a right to appeal to Parliament for 
remedial legislation.415 Eventually a compromise was made between the federal government of 
Wilfred Laurier and the government of Manitoba that permitted Catholic education in the 
public schools and French instruction would be given where there were at least 10 French 
students.  
Could it be said that the privileging of religion in the law, such as making provisions for 
religious schools in the Constitution Act 1867, was due to some special essence of religion itself? 
Or, was something else at play?  
It is reasonable to conclude that it may not be “religion” per se, as being an individual 
spiritual pursuit, but the political realities of organized religion that have had a defining 
influence on the law. It is not simply a matter of an individual’s religious freedom; it is the fact 
that organized religion has an ability to exercise a powerful influence on the body politic.  
Canada, as a new nation, did not have an organized administrative state and by 
necessity had to rely upon religious organizations to carry out many civil duties. Institutions 
such as schools, universities, and hospitals were heavily influenced by the organized religions – 
as for the most part they ran them. “Consolidation of state, economy, and religion went hand in 
hand,” noted Professor O’Toole. “Faced by materialism, commercialism, industrialism, land 
clearance, immigration, settlement, rapid population growth, and their attendant social 
problems, organized religion responded remarkably. Whether in social reform movements, 
voluntary societies, educational ventures, charitable trusts, or the missionary effort to win the 
West for Christ, churches and denominations skilfully adapted to modernity.”416  
If there is a lesson to be had from the pre-Charter jurisprudence on the accommodation 
of religion in the law, it is that the law had to respond to the institutional religious groups and 
make way for the involvement of citizens in their respective communities. That did not mean 
there were no limits – as the Guibord and Langevin cases made clear – but there remained a 
strong bias in favour of accommodating religious beliefs even in the face of strident opposition, 
as seen in Quebec to new religious minorities. 
 
                                                     
412 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s. 93. 
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4.2.3 Post-Charter Jurisprudence 
 
4.2.3.1 Big M Drug Mart 
 
The first time the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted freedom of religion in the 
Charter was the Big M Drug Mart417 case that involved the constitutionality of the Lord’s Day 
Act.418 Chief Justice Brian Dickson outlined the analysis to define the s. 2(a) Charter right of 
conscience and religion.419 In keeping with the Court’s methodology of interpreting the Charter, 
it required a purposive approach.420 That is to say, “an analysis of the purpose of such a 
guarantee” understood “in the light of the interests it was meant to protect,”421 while keeping a 
“reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to 
articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and 
where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with 
which it is associated within the text of the Charter.”422 It is a generous approach, not a 
legalistic one, that fulfills the purpose of the protection giving the individual the full benefit of 
the right.423  The “Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must … be placed in its proper 
linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts.”424 
Dickson’s eloquent description of religious freedom was placed in the context of “[a] 
truly free society” that “can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and 
pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.”425 Religious freedom was possible in a “truly free 
society” because such a society places a high regard on freedom. And “Freedom must surely be 
founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person.”426 
I extrapolate from Dickson’s reasons that religious freedom goes to the “inherent 
dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person,” which a country like Canada protects 
because it is a “truly free society.” This “truly free society” principle is the basis of why religion 
is protected under the Charter. At least, that is how Dickson appears to have understood the 
protection. According to Dickson, “the essence” of freedom of religion: 
is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the 
right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and 
dissemination. But the concept means more than that.427 
Free societies, by definition, according to Dickson, protect religious freedom. The only 
limitations to this general principle are “such limitations as are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,” otherwise 
“no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”428 
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Dickson noted that the Charter protection of religion was not dependent on the 
definition of religious freedom in legislation prior to the Charter. He said: 
…it is certain that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not simply 
“recognize and declare” existing rights as they were circumscribed by legislation 
current at the time of the Charter’s entrenchment. The language of the Charter is 
imperative. It avoids any reference to existing or continuing rights but rather 
proclaims in the ringing terms of s. 2 that: 
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
Freedom of conscience and religion.429 
The Charter therefore must be understood to have ushered in a distinctively different 
rationale for the protection of religion than previous legislative initiatives such as the Canadian 
Bill of Rights.430 As a constitutional document – being the supreme law – the Charter’s concept 
of protecting religion has a long pedigree of political and philosophical thought. Dickson 
admitted as much when he analyzed the freedom of religion by ascertaining its purpose – “in 
the light of the interests it was meant to protect”431 in the context “of the larger objects of the 
Charter itself,” the chosen language to “articulate the right, historical origins of the concepts, 
and the meaning and purpose of other rights and freedoms associated with it in the Charter.”432 
Dickson maintains that the historical religious struggles in post-Reformation Europe are 
relevant. The relevance flows from the fact that as the religious allegiances of the monarchs 
changed, large numbers of people were “subject to laws aimed at enforcing conformity to 
religious beliefs and practices they did not share.”433 When the fortunes of the persecuted 
changed such that they took the reins of power, they switched roles and became the 
persecutors. However, it was during the Commonwealth of England (in the middle 17th 
century) that opposition arose to state power being used “to secure obedience to religious 
precepts and to extirpate non-conforming beliefs.”434  
Dickson argues that the thinking behind this opposition was not that the state was 
enforcing the wrong beliefs but that “belief itself was not amenable to compulsion. Attempts to 
compel belief or practice denied the reality of individual conscience and dishonoured the God 
that had planted it in His creatures.”435 These historical realities influenced the religious-
political philosophy that not only made religious freedom possible but our entire political 
system of self-government.436 “It is from these antecedents,” Dickson writes, “that the concepts 
of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience became associated, to form, as they do in s. 
2(a) of our Charter, the single integrated concept of ‘freedom of conscience and religion.’”437 
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432 Ibid at para 117. 
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The following pre-suppositions are made about the protection of religion: it is a) related 
to the inherent dignity of the human person, b) an inviolable right of the human person, c) 
protected by a “truly free society,” and, d) historically prototypical and the sine qua non of a 
free and democratic political system that underpins the Charter.438 Thus, religious freedom 
goes to the very core of what it means to be human and defines our socio-political relationship.  
Dickson’s concept of religious freedom does not tell us what it is about religion in and of 
itself that requires the law’s protection. Rather, Dickson’s jurisprudence centres on the concept 
of freedom – individual freedom. That is to say, each citizen has the ability to make free and 
informed decisions. While that is certainly a laudable understanding and it is, as he put it, “the 
absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-
government,”439 it does not answer our question as to why religion ought to be protected. As 
discussed elsewhere in this book, there are numerous situations where secularly motivated 
behaviour does not garner the same protection as religiously motivated behaviour does.  
If, at its pith and substance, Dickson’s argument is that we protect religious freedom 
because the liberty of each citizen to make free and informed decisions (i.e. personal 
autonomy) lies at the heart of our “truly free society,” why would that not also hold true for the 
secularly motivated behaviour? It begs the question, is freedom for the religious to practise 
their faith somehow different from the freedom of the non-religious to practise their way of 
life? It is arguable that for Dickson there is a difference. The difference is historical and 
theological. 
Historically, our progenitors of political thought which influenced our understanding of 
democracy did not protect non-religiously motivated behaviour in the same way as they did the 
religiously motivated behaviour. There always was a distinction.  
Could the special status accorded to religion be based upon a religious or philosophical 
understanding of the world that views religion as one of the most, if not the most, important 
characteristics of what it is to be human? Dickson, C.J. explains that the basis of the opposition 
to state imposition was “that belief itself was not amenable to compulsion” because compulsion 
“denied the reality of individual conscience and dishonoured the God that had planted it in His 
creatures.”440 Each individual had a conscience that was implanted by the Creator God. In other 
words, religious convictions are as fundamental to a believer’s sense of identity as race or 
gender, and therefore demand special treatment. 
This special treatment is echoed in the Supreme Court’s 2004 definition of religion. It is 
curious that a definition was not given earlier in the Court’s 1985 seminal decision in the Big M 
Drug Mart case – and that it took so long to attempt the definition, as the intervening years 
were not without opportunity.441   
The Court was content to give what it calls an “outer definition” 442 of religion. The term 
“outer definition” was not explained, but it would appear to be a definition of religion that is 
vague, allowing for greater inclusion. Religion, says the SCC, “typically involves a particular and 
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comprehensive system of faith and worship.” It involves “belief in a divine, superhuman or 
controlling power.”   
However, this definition does not consider the different dimensions of religion that are 
possible, such as those four dimensions by Professor Cliteur noted above. Nor does it address 
the homo duplex human nature observed by Durkheim, who recognizes that religion is 
experienced by the individual and the community.  
In essence, according to the SCC, “religion is about freely and deeply held personal 
convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s 
self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a 
connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.”443 It involves 
“profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, 
in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct 
and practices.”444 Canadian jurisprudence has recognized that religion has both individual and 
communitarian aspects.445 Yet, it is the individual’s right to determine what to believe and 
practise even if such is at odds with his religious community.446   
The SCC’s overly broad definition of religion fits well with the modern liberal 
democratic theory that suggests a bifurcation of religion into religious belief, being relegated to 
the private realm, and religious practise, which is considered as being in the public domain. The 
definition of religion does not allow the court to examine what the claimant believes, which 
would involve such matters as determining consistency of beliefs with religious doctrine; nor 
does it permit the law to investigate the extent of commitment the claimant has to the belief, 
which would assess the importance of the beliefs to the claimant. Both inquiries are considered 
private and not in the prerogative of the law. However, failure to do so means that the law’s 
ability to kerb excessive (perhaps even fraudulent) claims is limited. As noted above, the only 
avenue to do so is by restricting the religious practise of beliefs,447 when there is a balancing of 
rights contest with either other rights claimants who want to occupy the same space, or with 
the interests of government.  
Thus, the law reinforces the private/public distinction of religion that is so prevalent in 
modern liberal democratic theory. The boundary between the private/public is “policed by the 
logic of reasonableness: one’s expectation of privacy must be a reasonable one, and one’s 
interests and choices must be acted on in a reasonable manner, specifically in a manner that 
gives due regard to the parallel rights of others.”448 
Such a distinction is problematic because an individual’s view of what constitutes 
private and public religious belief and expression may well be very different from the 
distinctions made by a court influenced by liberal theory. When the law restricts religious 
practice under its current regime, without appreciating either what a claimant believes; or the 
extent of commitment the person has to that belief; then the law is imposing its own different 
value system on the very person it says is permitted to live and practise their religious beliefs 
as they see fit. In other words, the law is choosing what is to be a protected religious practice 
based on its own criteria that may change given the prevailing jurisprudence at the time of 
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adjudication, without considering the individual’s subjective understanding of his religious 
obligation.  
Of course, when there are competing interests, there has to be a weighing or balancing 
of interests to determine which should supersede in the circumstance.449 Such a balancing 
process will be more just when the SCC understands why religious freedom ought to be 
protected, for it would have built in that understanding a greater appreciation for the 
importance of religion to society and would recognize religion’s complexities upon the 
individual. Such an individual, in turn, when faced with a balancing contest of his competing 
rights and interests, can then be expected to have a greater assurance that justice will be 




A cursory glance at the law of liberal democracies reveals the current paradigm that 
gives a prominent role to religious accommodation. Religion has been, and continues to be, 
treated by the law as special. There are many legal examples that makes this point. Consider 
again, for example, that holy days must be accommodated in the workplace,450 but a day off to 
attend a political rally is not. Similarly, as noted above, a student in school may wear a religious 
ceremonial dagger,451 but a student wearing a hunting knife in school would not be tolerated. 
Further, an individual of the Jewish faith may erect a sukkah on his or her condominium 
balcony during his or her religious holy days, but a person would not be permitted to set up a 
small tent for non-religious purposes.452  
Religion is accommodated in a myriad of legal statutes and judicial decisions. Consider 
that human rights legislation continues to allow religious communities to discriminate in their 
hiring practices based upon their religious beliefs and practices.453 Provincial legal regimes also 
recognize religion in such matters as providing for special legislation for the ownership of 
land454 and numerous special religious exemptions, including exemptions from: 
consumption or sales tax on religious literature455 
property tax456 
regular school activities for religious observance457 
entertainment tax458  
having photographs taken for gun licenses459  
having to eat regular food in prisons460 
One of the better-known special treatments of religion is found in Canada’s charity law, 
which allows religious organizations to receive registered charitable status and the consequent 
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charitable tax donation privileges for the advancement of religion.461 Further, religious views 
on marriage were protected when the Income Tax Act was amended to shield religious charities 
from tax penalties due to exercising their religious freedom on the issue of same-sex 
marriage.462 
These examples show that Canadian law, as with the law in most Western democracies, 
is saturated with religious accommodation. That is the default position, or in other words, the 
current legal paradigm regarding religion. Not only have religious beliefs been protected, but 
religious acts based on those beliefs have also been protected. Certainly, within the confines of 
religious communities, even when their religious enterprises entered the “public sphere,” the 
law has, up until recently, been loath to interfere except in the rarest of circumstances. 
We must conclude that there is something unique about religion that created a 
willingness in Western law to be flexible in exempting religious practices from generally 
applicable legal norms.463  
This paradigm is now under fire. Challenges appear to have found traction on matters 
concerning sex. Religion has had and continues to have much to say about the morality of 
sexual relations. This work argues that our current society (which I call the “Sexular Age”) 
causes the disposition of religious teachings to be seen as not only prudish and anachronistic 
but offensive and even harmful.464 While sexuality may be arguably the primary motivator, 
other issues such as medical assistance in dying and abortion have also contributed to the anti-
religious sentiment. These, along with the extensive media attention to sexual abuse scandals 
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(2018), Being Wicked, online: Nadia Bolz Weber <http://www.nadiabolzweber.com/book/shameless>. The 
issue of religion causing harm came up in oral argument at the SCC in the November 2, 2017 hearing in Wall, 
supra note 368, where the counsel for Mr. Randy Wall stated, “the concern…that I’m trying to highlight is the 
potential for serious harm at the hands of religious organizations.  Not because they’re inherently harmful, 
not because they act maliciously, but because their scope of influence is so large.  For many individuals, their 
religion is their lodestar.  It tells them what to eat, what not to eat, when to work, when to rest, what 
occupations to pursue, what occupations not to pursue.  And it’s that potential for harm that I say the court 
should have in mind as it thinks about how to calibrate this review.” Michael A. Feder, Counsel for Randy Wall 
(Transcript of oral hearing, 2 November 2017, by StenoTran, at 88). 
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in residential schools and orphanages have made for a narrative that religion’s special legal 
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Kuhn’s conceptual framework for evaluating what takes place in a scientific revolution 
will assist in evaluating the legal revolution on the place of religion in the law. In law, as in the 
scientific context, there are established paradigms through which the law sees the world. The 
current legal paradigm has given religion a special status where there is a rebuttable 
presumption that religious beliefs and practices will be accommodated as much as possible, but 
only within reasonable limits. 
However, arguments are now being advanced that religion is not special,465 or, if it is 
special, such “distinctiveness provides reasons for not tolerating it.”466 Such arguments would 
take away the special accommodations given to religion. 
One of the galvanizing issues for those against religion’s unique treatment is the 
religious norm regarding human sexuality that defines marriage as being limited to one man 
and one woman.467 As we will discover, this religious norm is seen by many legal academics as 
not worthy of legal accommodation. The rationale is that since same-sex marriage has been 
accepted by society and in Canadian law, the “struggle” for equality of outcome must continue 
even in private, voluntary religious institutions to ensure that “discrimination” is eradicated. 
The problem is that the private, religious institution is not the state, nor is it subject to the non-
discriminatory obligations of the state. The proposed new legal position is so different from the 
current legal paradigm on religion that it is revolutionary. 
Adapting Kuhn’s personal quest to the matter of law we ask, first, to what extent are 
conceptual readjustments characteristic of law? Second, what lies behind them? What do they 
involve and why do they occur? Third, what do they imply about law as a kind of knowledge?  
 
5.2 Crisis:  The Paradigm under siege in the Literature 
 
The legal paradigm that presumes religion is special and ought to be accommodated is 
now challenged by legal academics and has erupted into a robust debate.468 An increasing 
                                                     
465 Micah Schwartzman, “What if Religion is not Special?” (2012) 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351. 
466 Nehushtan, supra note 11 at 191, emphasis added. 
467 It is worth noting that this is a worldwide religious phenomena. See Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green, 
& John Witte, Jr, eds, Sex, Marriage, and Family in World Religions (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2006). 
468 For example see: Tore Lindholm & W. Cole Durham, “Do We Need the Right to Freedom of Religion or 
Belief” (May 25, 2011) (paper presented at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Oslo, Norway); Brian 
Leiter, “Why Tolerate Religion,” (2008-09) 25 Const. Comment 1; Brian Leiter, “Foundations of Religious 
Liberty: Toleration or Respect?” (2010), 47 San Diego L. Rev. 935; Schwartzman, supra note 465; Andrew 
Koppelman, “Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?” (2006) U. Ill. L. Rev. 571; Andrew Koppelman, 
“How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion” (2010) 47 San Diego L. Rev. 961; Steven G. Gey, 
“Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment” (1990-91) 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75; E. Gregory Wallace, “Justifying Religious Freedom: The 
Western Tradition” (2009-10) 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 485; Iain T. Benson, “The Attack on Western Religions by 
Western Law: Re-Framing Pluralism, Liberalism and Diversity” (2013), 6:1 Int’l J Religious Freedom, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328825 [“Attack on Western Religions”]; Iain Benson, “Notes Towards a 
(Re)definition of the Secular” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519; Iain Benson, “Physicians and Marriage 
Commissioners: Accommodation of Differing Beliefs in a Free and Democratic Society” (2008) 66:5 Advocate 
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chorus suggests that religion, as a constitutionally protected right, is redundant; there are other 
constitutional protections religion could avail itself of, such as freedom of association and 
freedom of speech.469 In fact, other scholars are more radical still. Brian Leiter argues that there 
is no moral reason to continue to honour religion’s special legal status;470 and Yossi Nehushtan 
argues there is no place for religious accommodation in liberal democracies.471    
Academics are not alone in those views. Judges are also openly questioning the special 
status given to religion. In his dissenting judgment in Hutterian Brethren, Justice LeBel 
observed that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion has been difficult to interpret 
and apply.472 He stated, “[p]erhaps, courts will never be able to explain in a complete and 
satisfactory manner the meaning of religion for the purposes of the Charter.”473 He went on to 
opine that other Charter rights such as freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of association could have been sufficient to protect religious freedom, 
but that since freedom of religion was in the Charter it “must be given meaning and effect.”474 
Justice LeBel’s musing that religion could have been protected by other constitutional 
freedoms, with no need for a specific religious constitutional head, suggests that religious 
freedom is an unnecessary appendage rather than a foundational principle of our democratic 
state. Yet, as noted above, it was the struggle to obtain religious freedom that had a profound 
impact on the creation of our Western democratic traditions. History suggests that it was the 
                                                     
(Vancouver Bar Association) 747–52; Iain Benson, “The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: 
Challenges and Opportunities” (2007) 21 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 111; Mike Madden, “Second Among Equals? 
Understanding the Short Shrift that Freedom of Religion is Receiving in Canadian Jurisprudence” (2010) 7 L. 
& Equality 57; Jeremy Webber, “The Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion” (2006) in Avigail 
Eisenberg, ed, Diversity and Equality: The Changing Framework of Freedom in Canada  (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2006); Benjamin Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21 Can. J.L. & Juris. 245; Benjamin 
Berger, “Limits of Belief,” supra note 134; Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture,” supra note 
448; Paul Horwitz, “The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and 
Beyond” (1996) 54 U. Toronto Faculty L. Rev 1; Jonathan Chaplin, “Beyond Liberal Restraint: Defending 
Religiously-Based Arguments in Law and Public Policy” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 617; Lorenzo Zucca, “The 
Place of Religion in Constitutional Goods” (2009) 22 Can. J.L. & Juris. 205; Bryan Thomas, “Secular Law and 
Inscrutable Faith: Religious Freedom, Freedom of Conscience, and the Law’s Epistemology” (2010), online: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275351; Avihay Dorfman, “Freedom of Religion” 
(2008) 21 Can. J.L. & Juris. 279; Timothy Macklem, “Faith as a Secular Value” (2000) 45 R.D. McGill 1; Anthony 
Ellis, “What Is Special About Religion?” (2006) 25 L. & Phil. 219; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, “The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct” (1994) 61 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
(Harvard University Press, 2007); Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution (OUP, 
2011); Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 
(Basic Books, 2008); Douglas Laycock, “Liberty as Liberty” (1996) 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313; Steven D. 
Smith, “Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?” http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431556; 
Steven D. Smith, “Unprincipled Religious Freedom” (1996) 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 497; Steven D. Smith, “Is 
A Coherent Theory Of Religious Freedom Possible?” (1998) 15 Const. Comment. 73; Kent Greenawalt, “Moral 
and Religious Convictions As Categories For Special Treatment: The Exemption Strategy” 48 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1605. 
469 Mark Tushnet, “The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?” (2001-02) 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71 at 72 
[“Redundant”]. 
470 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate, supra note 12. 
471 Nehushtan, supra note 11 at 191. 
472 Hutterian Brethren, supra note 5. 
473 Ibid at para 180. 
474 Ibid. 
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accommodation of religious belief and practice that gave rise to freedom of opinion, conscience, 
expression, association, and assembly. Justice Ivan Rand475 and former Chief Justice Brian 
Dickson476 understood that historical position during their respective tenures in the Court. 
Further, as we noted above, Canadian constitutional law recognized the importance of religious 
accommodation from at least the British Conquest in 1759. 
Justice LeBel’s position that courts may not be able to completely understand religion is 
particularly salient given the academic context that is questioning the law’s treatment of 
religion. It is also germane to the legal profession’s review of the ability of religious 
organizations, such as universities, to make membership rules concerning human sexuality. 
This is exemplified in the TWU case where academics and the legal profession struggled to 
understand how religion could discriminate on the basis of sexual identity.477 The inability to 
understand religion is also shown in the dramatic difference between the BC Court of Appeal’s 
decision and the SCC’s decision. The BCCA held that the Law Society’s decision to deny TWU 
“would limit the engaged rights to freedom of religion in a significantly disproportionate 
way”,478 whereas the SCC ruled that “the limitation in this case is of minor significance because 
a mandatory covenant is … not absolutely required for the religious practice at issue” and the 
infringement meant that the “TWU religious community are not free to impose those religious 
beliefs on fellow law students, since they have an inequitable impact and can cause significant 
harm.”479 The SCC failed to recognize or appreciate the “bifurcated sovereignty” discussed 
above, nor was freedom of association adequate to serve the interests of religious adherents in 
this case. 
Indeed, the charge is that there is nothing inherent about religion that would warrant 
its special legal status. Therefore, although religion’s legal status has survived since the 
beginning of the modern nation-state, it needs to be reconsidered. A rethink is necessary to 
determine whether the status ought to remain as is or be amended to fit the new circumstance 
of our modern society.  
As we have noted above, Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions explains that as 
anomalies surface, the community does its best to explain their occurrence in keeping with the 
accepted paradigm. However, as the anomalies increase and are no longer satisfactorily 
explained, then, at the moment of crisis, it occurs to the scientists that something much more 
earth-shattering is occurring. That something is that the paradigm itself is no longer the 
appropriate vehicle to understand the world. From this we may extrapolate that a similar type 
of process is at play in other areas of human endeavour, including law, and law as it relates to 
religion. Applying Kuhn’s observation in the scientific field to the legal field, I argue that the 
                                                     
475 Rand noted, in Saumur, supra note 6: “From 1760, therefore, to the present moment religious freedom has, 
in our legal system, been recognized as a principle of fundamental character.” 
476 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4 at paras 346–47 (“Religious belief and practice are historically prototypical 
and, in many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously held beliefs and manifestations and are therefore 
protected by the Charter.”). 
477 Lawyer Jane O’Neil observed in oral hearing at the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, “What is it about 
prohibiting same-sex activity [that you would] [refuse] a degree on the basis?  That you will not allow same-
sex activity at a law school, not a church – what does that have to do with religion and what… they [are] 
associating for?” See Trinity Western University v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2015 NSSC 25 (Transcript of 
18 December 2014 hearing, by Angèle Poirier, legal transcriptionist, at 169, slightly edited).  
478 Trinity Western University v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 423, para 192 [TWU BCCA 
2016]. The BCCA also stated at para 193: “This case demonstrates that a well-intentioned majority acting in 
the name of tolerance and liberalism, can, if unchecked, impose its views on the minority in a manner that is 
in itself intolerant and illiberal.” 
479 LSBC v TWU 2018, supra note 14 at paras 87 and 103. 
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increased questioning by academics and practitioners about the law accommodating religion is 
an anomaly, similar in form to Kuhn, within the legal paradigm that understands “religion as 
special” and thereby grants it legal privileges.        
The literature reveals a dichotomy. There are vigorous arguments supporting the status 
quo on religion’s place in the law and an equally vigorous, if not more passionate, 
argumentation that religion’s status ought to be removed. From my analysis, at the heart of this 
debate is an undergirding assumption about the worth of religion. 
Religion, as we saw earlier in Haidt’s work, does benefit society. But religion also has 
intrinsic value. That is to say, it is a good in itself. The right to religious freedom therefore has a 
deontological status. It is fair to say that even if religion did not benefit society it is simply 
wrong to violate a person’s freedom of religion. Faith defines the religious person’s identity – 
who they are – and they have a right to be such without state interference.   
The arguments against religion assume that religion has no benefit to society. Whereas, 
underlying the argument supporting religion’s special status in the law is the assumption that 
religion is valuable and that it contributes to the overall good. 
 
5.2.1 Religion Is Not Special 
   
It is my observation, after reviewing a number of scholars on this subject, that a 
particular scholar’s position on whether the law ought to continue to accommodate religion, as 
it has historically, is directly related to the underlying presuppositions of the scholar about the 
importance of religion to the public good. In other words, if we assume that religion has no 
inherent value to society then it only makes logical sense that society should not protect it. Why 
protect something that is not beneficial?  
Further, I have observed that support for the continued protection of religion has 
remained fairly consistent in the legal literature until recent times.480 By and large, the 
discussion about the non-special character of religion and therefore the advocacy for the 
removal of religion’s special status is new.481 It is my observation that this demand has 
paralleled the increasing demand of sexual equality rights (SER). The SER movement has found 
its most profound legal success in the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  
For millennia, marriage and its legal norm was wrapped in a religious cloak.482 I will 
make the case that in Canada the decision to grant same-sex marriage has brought into focus 
the issue of religious accommodation in the law.483 The removal of this orthodoxy has led to the 
demand that religion must no longer be treated as special in the law.484 Or, if it is special, as 
noted above, such “distinctiveness provides reasons for not tolerating it.”485 Such arguments 
would take away the special accommodations given to religion.  
                                                     
480 Michael E. Smith, “The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution” (1983) Sup. Ct. Rev. 83. 
481 Gey, supra note 468; Abner S. Greene, “Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman” (1994) U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 535; James W. Nickel, “Who Needs Freedom of Religion?” (2005) 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 941; Tushnet, 
“Redundant,” supra note 469; Schwartzman, supra note 465.  
482 Hyde v. Hyde (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, at 133 [Hyde]. 
483 See generally Bussey, “Rights Inflation,” supra note 17; Bruce MacDougall, “Refusing to Officiate at Same-
Sex Civil Marriages” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 351; Bruce MacDougall, et al, “Conscientious Objection to Creating 
Same-Sex Unions: An International Analysis” (2012) 1:1 Can. J. Hum. Rts. 127; Bruce MacDougall & Donn 
Short, “Religion-based Claims for Impinging on Queer Citizenship” (2010) 33 Dalhousie L. J., 133. 
484 Schwartzman, supra note 465. 
485 Nehushtan, supra note 11 at 191. 
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Before analysing the specific issue of religious norms and sexuality I will review the 
scholarship challenging religion’s special legal status. The scholarship is dynamic, with an 
explosive volume of commentary. Getting lost in the thicket is a real concern. Some attempt has 
been made by others to categorize the literature,486 bringing a semblance of order to this 
robust discussion. While this is helpful to give shape to the arguments being made, there is a 
lack of common parlance that ensures scholars are not talking past themselves as they 
articulate their positions.    
My analytical approach to the literature is not to take at face value the various 
arguments for and against the concept that religion is special and therefore merits the special 
protection of the law. It is my purpose to use the “Revolution” analogy and consider through 
that lens what may in fact be happening or motivating the discussion to date. 
In summary, I have argued that up to now the law has treated religion as special in our 
constellation of constitutional law. The literature has primarily centred on whether or not 
religion ought to be treated as special and articulating the various reasons for each position. 
Brian Leiter and Yossi Nehushtan have taken the position that religion qua religion should not 
be treated as special because in the case of Leiter, there is no moral reason to do so; and in the 
case of Nehushtan, because religion is intolerant and those who follow religion are intolerant. A 
liberal society, says Nehushtan, does not have to tolerate the intolerant.  
I contend that the positions in favour of or against the special status of religion in the 
law are directly related to the authors’ respective positions on the underlying value of religion 
in a liberal democracy. My observation suggests that the literature has been moving on a 
continuum from arguments that support the presupposition that religion has worth, on one 
end, to arguments that religion has no benefit on the other end. In the middle is the so called 
“neutral” view that it matters not whether religion has or has not value but that it be treated 
equally with all the other enumerated rights in the Charter.  
My conclusion is that there is a correlation between the general apathy (if not disdain) 
amongst legal elites towards religion and the growing opinion that sees religion as the obstacle 
of other substantive rights such as sexual equality.487 A review of the literature with an eye to 
determining the presuppositions about the value of religion in a liberal democracy provides a 
                                                     
486 Ibid at 138, for example uses five categories: One, neutral approaches – that is to say it is neutral if the 
decision whether to grant an exemption is not affected by the content of a person’s conscience; Two, equal 
regard – says when an exemption is granted to a non-religious conscientious objector an exemption should be 
given to his equivalent religious objector; Three, liberal value-based approaches – take into account the 
content of a person’s conscience but not its religiosity to determine whether to grant an exemption – some 
content is more favourable than others; Four, pro-religion – the religiosity of the conscience claim is a 
relevant reason to grant the exemption; Five, anti-religion – refusal to grant the exemption if the conscience 
claim is religious. 
487 Consider the statement of the former Supreme Court law clerk, now professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, 
Christopher Bredt, in speaking to the LSUC Convocation, 2014: “So the first right at issue here, the right not to 
be discriminated against based on sexual orientation is one I strongly believe in. The second right at issue, the 
right to freedom of religion, is a right that I have to confess I personally have less affinity for, but perhaps 
because I’m not a religious person, and so for me, at the outset, the easiest approach to this issue would have 
been to simply go with my heart and take the position that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
wrong, and we should not accredit, but I’m not there yet. I’m struggling with this issue. I have to be frank with 
Convocation. I am struggling.” See Transcript, Convocation of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Public Session 
(10 April 2014), at 152-53, online (pdf): 
<https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/c/convocationtranscriptapr102014
twu.pdf>  
[LSUC Convocation].  
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more nuanced approach that will garner further insight. The conclusion of this review is that 
the criticism of religion’s status is due to the view that religion does not contribute positively to 
a liberal democracy. Despite the law’s current accommodation of religion there is a growing 
academic opinion that religious beliefs and practices hold no inherent value for a liberal 
democracy. This is due in no small part to a lack of experience with and understanding of how 
religion adds to civil society.  
The question of whether religion is special is different from determining whether 
religion has value. It is reasonable to conclude that if one values religion in a liberal democracy 
then one will likely hold the opinion that religion’s special legal status ought to remain and vice 
versa. It is clear, as shown already, that the current state of the law sees religion as special. 
However, there is a further question that must be answered – whether religion ought to 
continue to be treated as special in our current context. That question depends upon whether 
there is a reasonable argument to be made that religion retains sufficient value to society to 
justify the maintenance of the special treatment at law. 
Two recent arguments against the specialness of religion have been advanced by Yossi 
Nehushtan and Brian Leiter. We will consider them in turn.  
 
5.2.1.1 Yossi Nehushtan – Intolerant Religion Need Not Be Tolerated 
 
Nehushtan presents a forceful and a substantial discussion about the reasons why 
religion should not be tolerated by a liberal democracy, or at the very least why the state 
should be reluctant to tolerate religion.488 From my reading of Nehushtan, it would appear that 
he is adopting a line of thinking from Charles Taylor. Religion is special, Nehushtan maintains, 
but that specialness is not a reason to grant special, favourable status in the law. Rather, its 
“specialness” is reason why it should have unfavourable status in the law.489 His three main 
points are, first, “illiberal intolerance should not be tolerated in a tolerant-liberal 
democracy;”490 second, there are “unique links between religion and intolerance, and between 
holding religious beliefs and holding intolerant views” that are acted upon; 491 and third, “the 
religiosity of a legal claim is normally a reason, although not necessarily a prevailing one, to 
reject that claim.”492 
Of course, the unscrupulous use of religion is intolerant. There are many examples of 
religion being used for immoral purposes.493 However, every other right is subject to similar 
criticism. Consider for example, freedom of speech. While speech is important, we know that it 
can be abused. Speeches by Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels were anything but 
supportive of human flourishing.494 What is necessary for Nehushtan to prove is that the 
freedoms of speech, assembly, thought, press, mobility (and other rights) that come together 
under the label “freedom of religion” are more dangerous in the aggregate than if these 
freedoms were individually expressed. In other words, Nehusthan must prove that the 
                                                     
488 Nehushtan, supra note 11, at 1. 




493 Mang Hre, “Religion: A Tool of Dictators to Cleanse Ethnic Minority in Myanmar?” (2013) 1:1 IAFOR 
Journal of Ethics, Religion & Philosophy, 21-29. 
494 Haig A. Bosmajian, “The Nazi speaker’s rhetoric” (1960) 46:4 Quarterly Journal of Speech, 365-371. 
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coalescence of the composite parts of religious freedom creates a toxic mixture that must be 
avoided at all costs. As discussed below, he fails in this regard. 
 
5.2.1.2 The Principle of Tolerance 
 
To understand Nehushtan’s argument we need to appreciate his understanding of the 
principle of tolerance. A tolerant person may make an adverse judgement against another. 
Normally, this adverse judgement would give him reason to harm another, but the tolerant 
person voluntarily refrains from causing harm – he is thus tolerant.495 For example, imagine I 
support the Montreal Canadiens hockey team but when in a stadium, I see a person wearing a 
Toronto Maple Leaf’s jersey. Naturally, I judge the person as not being as important as a 
Canadiens fan. That judgement gives me a reason not to help him if he needs assistance 
carrying his French fries back to his seat. However, because I tolerate the person, I do offer my 
help. 
The primary justification for the right of tolerance is individual autonomy.496 I would 
add that it is also respect for the human person to make choices different from my own. 
However, Nehushtan states that, “in cases where the intolerant activity or the intolerant 
persons are not worthy of any respect but rather deserve condemnation and ostracizing, an 
attitude of ‘right to tolerance’ would be morally wrong.”497 Tolerance is a description of a 
behaviour with a state of mind that “may be but does not have to be justified.”498   
The concept of “harm” is “interpreted in the broadest way possible;” and the person is 
harmed if his condition is worsened, from his own perspective; harm can also occur by 
omission.499   
Nehushtan takes harm beyond what was traditionally understood in the liberal 
democratic tradition such as that described by John Stuart Mill.500 Harm, according to 
Nehushtan, can include, but is not limited to emotional, mental, psychological, physical, and 
economic areas. He suggests that harm can be expressed by condemnation, disrespect, physical 
or cultural estrangement, discrimination, avoiding his or her presence, or physically harming 
the person.501  
Nehushtan’s expansion on Mill’s notion of “harm” is bound to lead to problems of 
definition. Mill is vague on what he meant by “harm.” We intuitively accept that there have to 
be limits to individual autonomy.502 However, this harm principle has, until now, been applied 
to instances of physical harm. For example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous dictum 
reminds us that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
                                                     
495 Ibid, at 25. 
496 Ibid, at 8-9. 
497 Ibid, at 18. 
498 Ibid, at 20. 
499 Ibid, at 9. 
500 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women (Oxford: OUP, 1985) [On Liberty]. 
501 Nehushtan, supra note 11 at 10. 
502 Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson in the Big M Drug Mart decision, supra note 4 at para 95 noted, 
“Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his 
beliefs or his conscience.”  
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falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a theatre and causing a panic.”503 Holmes’ understanding of the limit 
was that circumstances created “a clear and present danger” to warrant state intervention. 
However, the identity politics movement, as described in this work, has moved the goal 
post. It has redefined “harm” in an expansive manner as Nehushtan describes.” So much so that 
mere “offense” has become akin to “harm”.504 Such a view makes it very difficult, as we have 
seen, for society to maintain any room for differences of opinion and diversity of practices on 
how people want to live their lives. The irony is that the individual seeks to be without 
restraint, including the “restraint” or “harmful speech” of someone else having a different view. 
It is “this seeming open-mindedness” which “inspires its proponents to silence those who 
offend against it. Certain opinions – namely, those that make the forbidden distinctions – 
become heretical.”505 This is very different from Mill’s notion of harm. 
In his seminal work, On Liberty, Mill was prescient in his observations that the “tyranny 
of the majority” sought compliance at the expense of minorities to be free to live their lives in 
accordance with their fundamental understandings of what it means to flourish. Two of his 
examples are particularly on point to our concerns here. First, Mill discussed the prohibition 
movement against alcohol. Mill found it obnoxious that a person would claim his “social rights” 
were violated by the “social act of another,” in this case drinking alcohol.506 The claimant states 
that strong drink destroys: 
…my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It 
invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery I am 
taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by 
surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from 
which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.  
                                                     
503 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), at 52, online:  Legal Information Institute 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/249/47>. “But the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done. …. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a 
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction 
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will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree” (citations omitted). 
504 See, for example, the Public Policy Forum’s report, “Poisoning Democracy: How Canada Can Address 
Harmful Speech Online,” which has called into question even legal speech. It states that “Co-ordinated 
harassment” is one of the common forms of “harmful speech” where “[p]eople frequently encounter 
problematic but legal forms of harassment online, including offensive speech and memes, repeated insults, 
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Mill described the situation as one where “…the absolute social right of every individual, 
that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails 
thereof in the smallest particular, violates [the claimaint’s] social right, and entitles [him] to 
demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance.” Mill thought this a “monstrous” 
principle “far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty.” Mill saw that “there is 
no violation of liberty which [this view] would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any 
freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing 
them: for, the moment an opinion which [the claimant] consider[s] noxious passes any one’s 
lips, it invades all the ‘social rights’ attributed to me.”   
Mill held that “[this] doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other’s 
moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to 
his own standard.” I suggest that Mill describes the current fixation in identity politics, where 
the individual finds offense with those who do not have the “right” opinion or practice. In this 
dissertation, the example of TWU’s admission’s policy was seen as “degrading and 
disrespectful” by those who could not abide by its terms, and by the legal profession. This, even 
though the Covenant was voluntary. In other words, the Community Covenant was to the legal 
profession what alcohol was to Mill’s prohibitionist.   
The second example Mill used in On Liberty that sheds light on the subject of this paper 
is the practice of polygamy by the Mormon religion in Utah.507 Mill was sympathetic to the 
protection of the Mormon community who “conceded to the hostile sentiments of others” and 
went to “a remote corner of the earth” to avoid further persecution. “[I]t is difficult to see,” said 
Mill, “on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under 
what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect 
freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways.” Mill rejected out of hand 
the suggestion that there be a crusade (euphemistically called a “civilizade”) against the 
Mormon people to prevent polygamy. Rather than violence, said Mill, if society is so opposed to 
polygomy then it ought to send “missionaries” to the Mormons “to preach against it.” Thus, 
Mill’s harm principle supports the majority using a deliberative process and not a violent or 
coercive process in trying to convince the other of the majority views. Mill argued that if a 
civilization succumbs to barbarianism because of its fears of the religious other and it lacks the 
moral will to stand for its truth then “the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the 
better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western 
Empire) by energetic barbarians.” 
In these two examples, Mill allows significant latitude for individuals and communities 
to live their lives without compulsion to follow the majority opinion. However, Mill’s “harm 
principle” has now moved far beyond what Mill envisioned. Nehushtan’s concept does not 
resemble Mill as much as it resembles Charles Taylor.    
Charles Taylor’s “politics of recognition” provides Nehushtan and others the rationale 
necessary to reimagnine Mill’s “harm”. Taylor maintains that “a person or group of people can 
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, 
distorted, and reduced mode of being.”508 Such logic leads us to the odd conclusion that a 
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Christian must “recognize” those who live non-Christian lives. Note, what Taylor means by 
“recognition” is unclear.509 He is vague on this point. Nevertheless, if the Christian does not 
“recognize” the LGBTQ individual, for example, then she has caused them harm. Therefore, 
under this model, TWU caused harm for its “degrading and disrespectful” policy in admitting 
only those who were willing to sign the Community Covenant. In other words, using Mill’s 
example, the person who does not like the consumption of alcohol, or does not like the practice 
of polygamy, is harmed if others believe differently. Hence the state must remove that harm 
when the alcohol-imbibing citizen refuses to stop drinking, or the Mormon congregant does not 
stop his polygamous relationships. 
One could argue that TWU is itself suffering from the non-recognition of the legal 
profession when it withholds TWU’s accreditation. In contemporary society TWU is a 
vulnerable minority. One only has to consider the opposition TWU faced from the law faculties 
and professional members, not to mention the very strident opposition in the profession’s 
governing legal bodies.   
However, identity politics suggests that TWU represents colonial and patriarchal 
repression as epitomized in the traditional marriage bond. So this repressive Christian 
university must atone for all the “degrading and disrespectful” Christian teachings that resulted 
in non-equal outcomes. In other words, TWU must be penitent for the (perceived or actual) 
sins of its Christian forefathers.  
It has to be said, as Mill insisted, that this is a monstrous position that simply cannot be 
left unchallenged. Mill’s outrage is worth repeating: “there is no violation of liberty which [this 
view] would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to 
that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them.” The reality is a queer person 
is not “harmed” in the Millian sense because of TWU’s Community Covenant. Disappointed? 
Perhaps. But not harmed as we have historically understood “harm”. But if we are to accept, as 
did the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, that “harm” is subjective, 
then yes, TWU caused harm. But, we have to ask whether we are not moving toward the 
monstrosity that Mill warned about. One is not harmed when forbidden to play tennis on a golf 
course and vice versa. The rules of the games are different. Religious institutions are not 
secular institutions. Whatever negative epithets are flung at institutions such as TWU, these 
subjective “hurts” cannot change that objective fact.    
Nehushtan is of the view that there is no limit to the harm of religion. A person who 
forbids another to smoke is intolerant to the smoker even if the reason was to protect the 
smoker from the harmful effects of smoking. It may or may not be justified depending on the 
circumstance. Intolerance is to limit the freedom of another because of a negative view of the 
person’s conduct. Finally, Nehushtan argues that harm can be caused by omission as when a 
person’s condition is worsened because I did not protect him (because of my own adverse 
judgement against him) from others who prevent him or force him to do something against his 
will; or when he needs help generally.510 
Nehushtan argues that illiberal intolerance should not be tolerated on the basis of two 
principles. First, reciprocity, that is to say, that the tolerant “should not tolerate anything that 
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denies the justification of tolerance and tolerance itself.”511 Second, proportionality, which asks 
“what nature and level of intolerance justifies a specific intolerant response and its degree.”512 
Reciprocity allows the state to protect autonomy by not tolerating those who diminish 
tolerance. This is done by diminishing the autonomy of the intolerant.513 Nehushtan accepts 
Joseph Raz’s perception of autonomy as that which allows individuals to make their own 
choices when they have an adequate range of valuable options.514 In other words, “[t]he 
autonomous person is part author of his life.”515   
The argument therefore flows: if tolerance enables autonomy and if the government’s 
duty is to ensure and promote autonomy, then government is duty-bound to ensure and 
promote tolerance. And, since intolerance harms others, and since autonomy may be infringed 
to protect autonomy, then not tolerating the intolerant in order to defend and promote 
tolerance is permissible.516   
 
5.2.1.3 The Role of The State  
 
Nehushtan suggests that if minorities such as religious groups aim their intolerance at 
the state or the powerful then any state response should be measured, as state power may be 
misused. If, however, the minority group is aiming their intolerance on their own members 
then the government has a role in ensuring that those groups not infringe on their members’ 
autonomy. A failure to eliminate this intolerance results in harm to society’s weakest because 
they are powerless and carry the burden of tolerance.517 
According to Nehushtan “an intolerant state response in these cases is less suspicious 
and no special considerations should be taken into account.”518 While the state may be accused 
of imposing its values on minority groups that will only be troubling “if the state holds or 
imposes illiberal or wrong values.”519 What remains unclear is who determines which values 
are wrong? And how? On what basis? 
Nehushtan’s criticism is a critique of the protean concept of “multiculturalism.” Canada 
has long seen itself as a “community of communities”520 but there are times, as the TWU law 
school case indicates, when the parameters of what that means are challenged. The underlying 
danger is of the intolerance of a minority within an already minority community. The high-
profile cases often involve religion. For example, consider the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
recent decision521 involving a former member of a Jehovah’s Witness congregation, Randy Wall, 
who was disfellowshipped by a Judicial Committee of elders because he was not sufficiently 
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repentant for two incidents of drunkenness, one of which included verbal abuse of his wife. He 
was “shunned,” meaning the congregation was forbidden to have any interaction with him. As a 
real estate agent, that meant he lost congregation members and other Jehovah’s Witnesses as 
clients. This led to financial hardship. Wall applied to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench for 
redress. The church argued the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, but the Court 
said it did. On appeal, the Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court. The SCC decided 
overwhelmingly (9-0) that such matters could not be judicially reviewed.     
Mr. Wall’s legal counsel urged the Court to consider “the potential for serious harm at 
the hands of religious organizations. Not because they’re inherently harmful, not because they 
act maliciously, but because their scope of influence is so large.”522 His point was that religion is 
pervasive for the religious – guiding all areas of life from what they eat or drink to what 
occupations they pursue. This should mean the Court ought to intervene and judicially review 
internal decisions. Such an argument is similar to Nehushtan’s concern that a tolerant society 
ought not to tolerate the intolerant.  
The SCC ruled, “In the end, religious groups are free to determine their own 
membership and rules; courts will not intervene in such matters save where it is necessary to 
resolve an underlying legal dispute.”523 Ironically, it also stated that the Charter does not 
“directly apply” to the case because they were private parties. However, only mere weeks later 
the same Court would rule that though TWU is not subject to the Charter it is indirectly subject 
to the Charter by means of the controversial “Charter values” doctrine, as discussed below. 
 
5.2.1.4 The Principle of Proportionality and Intolerant Religion  
 
Nehushtan points out that the principle of proportionality recognizes that there are 
different kinds and degrees of tolerance and intolerance by requiring the person who is 
responding to intolerance to do so in a manner that matches the nature and level of the original 
intolerance they faced.524   
This necessitates that the response meet three criteria: first, that there is a rational, 
logical connection between the nature of the original intolerance and the responding 
intolerance. This implies that it be effective. Second, that the response eliminate or significantly 
reduce the effect of the original intolerance in a manner that is the least damaging to human 
rights.525 Third, the response and its consequences should be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim one is trying to achieve. 
The example that Nehushtan gives to illustrate these principles is the public protest by a 
religious group that disrupts a theatre production that it finds offensive. The police response 
that arrests a few of the protesters and keeps the rest at bay from the theatre would be a 
response that is rationally connected to the nature and level of the group’s intolerance, and the 
least harmful, while being effective in allowing the play to continue. If the police violence led to 
a protestor’s death it would not be proportional.526   
Nehushtan anticipates the argument that for a liberal state to be intolerant to the 
intolerant is in fact forcing the original intolerant person to be tolerant in the liberal sense. 
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Conversely, the liberal state is being intolerant.527 Nehushtan maintains that there is no neutral 
way to decide who the original intolerant person is. By definition, tolerance discourse is “value-
based” and it should not be surprising that value-based liberalism would act in accordance to 
its “values.” If there are differences of “values” then the discourse of tolerance will not bring 
about a reconciliation.528 For the most part, the issue comes down to the justification of an 
intolerant act in a specific fact situation that becomes the subject of disagreement. Most will 
agree that there should be no intolerance, but how that is carried out will engender 
disagreement. Many of these issues can be resolved by answering whether there was an 
intention to harm and “who started it?”529 
“Who started it?” is useful only as a mechanism for shifting the burden of proof – the 
person who started the original intolerance has to justify it.530 Whether he is justified will 
depend upon whether there is an agreement on the issues of morality in the circumstance. 
However, there will be argument over who initiated the original intolerance to begin with. 
Nehushtan illustrates with the issue of homosexuality. 
“There is nothing in homosexuality as such,” Nehushtan notes, “that intends to deny the 
legitimacy of others, to condemn their way of life or to exclude it legally, socially and culturally. 
Homosexuality, as such, does not entail making adverse judgements about others.”531 However, 
he maintains, the same cannot be said about religious opposition to homosexuality. “[T]he very 
essence of religious or conservative homophobia,” says Nehushtan, “when it is expressed 
openly, promoted in the public sphere or being used as a reason for formulating legal rules, is 
making an adverse judgement about homosexuals, condemning homosexuality as immoral and 
excluding it legally, culturally or even physically.”532   
Unfortunately, Nehushtan, like many who do not agree with religious conservative 
views regarding sex, uses the controversial and demeaning term “homophobia” to chastise his 
opponents. Phobia, being a psychiatric term, suggests that the people who have objections to 
homosexuality are “sick”, or mentally deranged. That is a regrettable use of language that does 
nothing to enable a civil discourse – and it belies his argument that homosexuality does not 
entail a judgement against others. 
Applying Nehushtan’s argument to TWU, we have Christians who think that 
heterosexual marriage should be the norm for their own lives and for the institutions they 
create. For this, they are made into psychiatric patients. Their vision does not get the respect it 
deserves and is characterized as “phobic”. Strangely enough, this is all done in the name of 
“tolerance” and “respect”. Unfortunately, such “phobia discourse” has replaced honest and open 
discussion in many other contexts, e.g. “islamophobia”. 
With “phobia discourse” as the new language of identity politics, the alleged victim who 
claims to be offended, insulted, or disrespected applies this turn of phrase to hit back at the 
alleged abuser. The problem is, as Mill observed, we end up where every individual is both a 
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victim and an abuser. For instance, TWU becomes both a victim (of Chritianophobia) and an 
abuser (homophobia). Such language leaves no room for meaningful dialogue. 
Under the intention to harm and “who started it?” criteria, Nehushtan argues that any 
legislation that supports and promotes homosexuality cannot be viewed as intolerance. But 
“any homophobic response” to the legislation or homosexuality is “indeed the original 
intolerance.”533  That homophobic intolerance should not be tolerated unless one thinks it is 
justified because homosexuality is immoral or harmful.534 
Nehushtan advocates a role for government in publicly condemning non-liberal speech 
such as attacking speech against homosexuals, on the basis that it has an obligation to support 
personal autonomy. Not to condemn such speech would be considered “sustaining such 
speech.”535 
The state has a role in ensuring that the liberal ideals – autonomy, freedom and equality 
– are promoted. Here I have no problem agreeing with Nehushtan. However, where we 
disagree is how those ideals are interpreted. Autonomy, freedom and equality in the classical 
liberal sense is a far cry from the identity political framework as espoused by Nehushtan. It 
must therefore not tolerate intolerance on the basis of the harm principle and the offence 
principle. However, Nehushtan’s views, if taken literally on the issue of “not tolerating 
intolerance”, as he defines intolerance, would result in the liberal state imploding. It would lead 
to Mill’s monstrous idea of the individual demanding everyone else act according to his or her 
view. It is not practical. Liberal states cannot operate without intolerance; intolerance toward 
theft, homicide, and so on. What liberal states must be tolerant of is freedom of religion, 
because it is here where unpopular views, speech, and practices offend the majority throughout 
the liberal experiment of governance. This prototypical right has made freedom of other rights 
possible, as discussed in this work. 
Nehushtan is of the view that the harm principle “allows the state to prevent unjustified 
serious harm to individual persons or groups, or unreasonable risks of harm.” The offence 
principle “allows the prevention of an unjustified offence (as opposed to injury or harm) to 
others.”536 This prevention is different from “legal moralism” which prohibits the immoral but 
not harmful conduct.537 Yet the offence principle cannot be separated from legal moralism. 
Legal moralism is only a problem if it is used to support illiberal values and “[i]t is less 
suspicious when it is used to uphold liberal values.”538 
Because the state must make judgements about what is good and make value 
judgements that affect the lives of its citizenry, state neutrality is an impossibility.539 The reality 
is no one is seriously defending state neutrality – as in the state takes no moral positions. As 
Professor Cliteur argues, we have a great tradition in the West: it “is the tradition of critique, 
also religious critique, or moral autonomy, and of the religiously neutral or secular state.”540 All 
states are based on certain norms or political axioms, for instance that the individual has an 
inherent dignity. What the secular model tries to achieve is a state that is just and fair towards 
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all its citizens, i.e. religious citizens and non-religious citizens. And it tries to treat all religions 
alike.541  
 Nehushtan continues, “[a]t the end of the day political and legal decision-makers must 
take a stand.”542 Therefore, the multicultural, plural and neutral arguments for inclusivity and 
respect are unsustainable based on “neutral considerations” separate and apart from the 
content of the conceptions of the good. To deny an evaluation of the content of an individual’s 
values that ground their views is not showing respect to the individual since his views are 
being ignored.543 
The alternative to the neutral-liberal state is the tolerant-liberal state which still values 
diversity and pluralism but does not see them as inherently valuable.544 Such values are only 
valuable within the limits of liberalism, beyond which they may or may not be tolerated based 
on the core values of liberalism.  
Nehushtan, as noted above, does not define “religion” because he says it is impossible to 
do so satisfactorily.545 Instead, he simply sees “religion” as that which is common to Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. They are his “paradigms of religion” and he addresses his arguments to 
their common characteristics (and others that share the same traits).546 Nehushtan’s refusal to 
define religion is puzzling. The idea that religion cannot be defined is obfuscating as it fails to 
appreciate the human experience of religion. A failure to define is a failure to engage.  
 Evading the complex but necessary task of defining religion evinces a disregard for the 
objective reality of religion. The whole purpose of scholarly research is to adopt a definition 
and then assess whether the definition is useful. 
Nehushtan argues that religious people, because they are religious, “are likely to be 
more intolerant than non-religious persons, not only concerning religious or ‘religious matters’ 
but in general.”547 He asserts there are “clear and unique theoretical links between … certain 
types of religion, and intolerance.”548 He has formulated seven characteristics of religion that he 
suggests make the link between religion and intolerance.549   
They are: (1) religion perceives maintaining the unity of a distinct community and 
preserving its existence as one of its main functions; (2) religion aspires to gain formal control 
over its believers, other religious believers and heretics alike; (3) religion perceives its 
traditions, customs and symbols as sacred; (4) religion has a unique perception of the ‘truth’; 
(5) religion is ‘absolute’; (6) religion prescribes unique links between religious faith, morality 
and the law; and (7) religion is almost always composed of intolerant values and beliefs. 
Nehushtan’s list of religion’s troublesome characteristics are more indicative of 
“fundamentalist”550 elements of the religious traditions he based his definition on – namely, 
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Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. However, recent research suggests that there is a wide gap 
between Islam and the other two religions just mentioned. Ruud Koopmans’ research551 found 
that in Europe “religious fundamentalism552 is much more widespread among Muslims than 
among Christian natives.” Even “controlling for education, labour market status, age, gender, 
and marital status,” for differences between the groups it was found that “they do not at all 
explain or even diminish the difference between Muslims and Christians.” Almost half of 
European Muslims are fundamentalist while less than one in 25 native Christians are. While 
Christian young people were less likely to be fundamentalist, the same was not the case for 
young Muslims. Fundamentalism is directly related to “out-group hostility”. Almost 60 percent 
of Muslims reject homosexuals as friends and 45 percent think that Jews cannot be trusted. 
Whereas for native Christians, 13 percent reject homosexuals as friends and 9 percent think 
that Jews cannot be trusted.    
It is of interest to note that Sam Harris in his work Letter to a Christian Nation553 
excoriates Christians for their beliefs but throughout this writing he references “religious 
terrorism” today as being in the Islamic context.554 It would appear that he implicates 
Christianity along with Islamic terrorism because Christians create suffering in service to their 
“religious myths” and “imaginary God.”555 For Harris, Jainism is a much more promising 
religion because it preaches “a doctrine of utter non-violence.”556 Christians, says Harris, lack 
compassion toward pregnant teenagers; they have “abused, oppressed, enslaved, insulted, 
tormented, tortured, and killed people in the name of God for centuries, on the basis of a 
theologically defensible reading of the Bible.” Gone from Harris is any appreciation of the 
developments that have occurred in the Christian faith since the Reformation. Contemporary 
Christianity bears little resemblance to the caricature described by Nehushtan and Harris when 




Nehushtan’s position suggests that state enforcement of its own description of the good 
life is legitimate. There is no tolerance for views that are considered outside of the accepted 
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state norm.557 Nehushtan represents a claim for liberalism that has the ironic effect of being 
illiberal.  This view suggests that there is no limit on the law’s ability to interfere with the 
internal regulatory matters of religious communities. In other words, there is no safe space 
which religious communities are entitled to occupy separate and distinct from the state. This is 
the crux of the matter in the TWU law school case. But, it is prevalent in many other activities 
or organizations run by religious communities, such as seniors’ residences.558  
Nehushtan and, as we will see, Brian Leiter, rejects the collective wisdom of liberal 
democratic thought, of men like Burke, Oakeshott, and Hume, that has developed over the last 
four to five hundred years in the wake of the Reformation. Nehushtan and Leiter come from a 
Hobbesian position of power – the sovereign state will control. Theirs is a totalitarian regime 
that does not permit civil society, religious organizations in particular, to hold and practice 
views that are inconsistent with their sense of what is tolerant. Their interpretation of truth 
follows the Kuhnian view that a new paradigm is necessary that will replace the old – and with 
the new comes a shaming of those who cling to the old. They evince the position made earlier 
that a scholar’s position regarding the special treatment of religion in the law is a reflection of 
the scholar’s view of religion.559  
To be successful in their quest there needs to be a general, well-understood theory that 
is consistent in its approach and capable of being fully disseminated in the body politic. There 
is no single focus as of yet. 
To return to the revolutionary model, Popper’s correction on Kuhn would be that one 
always has to keep open the possibility that new paradigms arise; new paradigm shifts are 
possible. In this sense, Kuhn is descriptive sociology; Popper is ethics. Allowing for new 
perspectives is the essence of fundamental rights: freedom of expression makes it possible that 
people will advocate the need for new paradigm shifts. 
Nehushtan is right, of course, that every society accepts certain basic rules that are non-
negotiable. Liberal-democratic societies cannot open the door to those who have vowed to 
abolish liberal-democratic societies. That was the meaning of Popper’s no tolerance for the 
intolerant.560 But Nehusthan goes much further than Popper in that he sees intolerance 
everywhere. As will be seen, TWU does not undermine liberal-democratic society. Perhaps, if 
                                                     
557 Especially is this so if the religious person is a public office holder. See: Katie Leslie, “Fire chief suspended 
over book controversy,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (24 November 2014), online: 
<https://www.myajc.com/news/fire-chief-suspended-over-book-
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558 Paula Span, “A Retirement Community Turned Away These Married Women: According to the facility’s 
‘cohabitation policy,’ marriage is between one man and one woman, ‘as it is understood in the Bible,’” The 
New York Times (17 August 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/health/lgbt-
discrimination-retirement.html>; and Calvin Freiburger, “Lesbian couple sues Christian retirement 
community for denying housing application,” LifeSiteNews (20 August, 2018), online: 
<https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/lesbian-couple-sues-christian-retirement-community-for-denying-
housing-appl>.  
559 My point is that we all must be cognizant of our own bias because our bias leads us to search for the 
“scientific proof” of our bias. This was Popper’s view. Also Dr. Tyger Latham, noted, when describing scientific 
homophobia, “Scientific heterosexism operates in a very similar fashion to that of scientific racism in that it 
starts with a priori view - in this case the belief that homosexuality is an aberration - and then creates a body 
of empirical evidence designed to confirm the very theory it purports to scientifically prove.”  See: Tyger 
Latham, “Scientific Homophobia,” Psychology Today (19 April 2011), online: 
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/therapy-matters/201104/scientific-homophobia>. 
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TWU had the monopoly on education in Canada, Nehushtan would have a stronger argument. 
But it does not. So we have to see TWU as a small enclave where societal experiments are 
allowed – just as Mill envisioned. 
 
5.2.1.6 Brian Leiter – Why Religion Should Not Be Tolerated 
 
Leiter argues that “there is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes to 
single out religion for protection”; neither is there any moral561 or epistemic562 reason for 
“special legal solicitude” for “categorical commands” of religion that are insulated from 
evidence even if there is an “existential consolation.”563 The most consistently fair approach of 
toleration is not to allow any exemptions. Leiter maintains a sceptical stance toward tolerating 
religion because of the potential harm of religion.564 Leiter’s views are similar to Nehushtan 
and Harris. 
He rejects the notion that the state ought to be neutral. Every state stands for and enacts 
a “Vision of the Good.”565 However, as Professor Cliteur notes, the point of secularism is to find 
a Vision of the Good that is acceptable to all citizens, both religious and non-religious. 
“Secularism is the only perspective,” Cliteur maintains, “under which people of different 
religious persuasions can live together.”566 Searching for a “Vision of the Good” that does not 
take into account the entire polis – the religious and non-religious – is not taking seriously the 
whole enterprise of political philosophy to find a just state. Indeed Professor Dr. Iain T. 
Benson’s work likewise explains that “secular” must not mean “non-religious” but must be “a 
religion-inclusive view of the secular.”567 
Suppose there is religion that is not absolutist and categorical as Leiter describes. If we 
are to take Leiter literally, he suggests that such innocuous religious convictions can only be 
granted freedom as contained in the constituent parts of constitutional protection. So, the 
innocuous faith could have freedom of assembly, speech and thought but not, under Leiter’s 
view, “freedom of religion.” Granted, by this approach he is preventing ISIS from claiming 
freedom of religion for its imams to issue fatwas, but surely our free and democratic societies 
are competent to distinguish between these types of religions and recognize that freedom of 
religion is still a concept worth keeping. Leiter argues that while the US maintains “liberty and 
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equality for all” as fundamental values it nevertheless treats some things more equal than 
others. This is shown, says Leiter, in the fact that every child, in the US educational curriculum, 
must learn Darwin’s theory of evolution but does not need to know the biblical view of 
creation. Obviously the two views are not treated equally in public policy. While Leiter is 
referencing the US context there is a similar notion of some “values” being treated as more 
important than others in Canada. For example, as we will discuss below, in the TWU case the 
SCC prioritized “Charter values” over the Charter right of religious freedom.    
Toleration remains a virtue for the liberal state as it does for the individual. When a 
minority demands an exemption from laws of general applicability they are demanding 
“something like the virtue of toleration” – “that is, they are demanding the state suspend its 
pursuit of the general welfare in order to tolerate … a conscientious practice of a minority of its 
citizens that is incompatible with it.”568 
 
5.2.1.6.1 Defining Religion 
 
Leiter describes two broad classes of argument for toleration: moral and epistemic.  
The moral argument claims either a right to hold beliefs and practices requiring 
toleration (Kantian); or toleration of beliefs and practices as “essential to the realization of 
morally important goods”.569   
Of the Kantian argument, Rawls says that “[E]qual liberty of conscience is the only 
principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge. They cannot take chances 
with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to 
suppress others if it wishes.”570 Equal liberty may include religious matters of conscience but is 
not limited to them. “[T]hey know that they will have certain convictions about how they must 
act in certain circumstances – convictions rooted in reasons central to the integrity of their 
lives.”571 
The utilitarian argument asserts that religion is not singled out or favoured for special 
consideration as opposed to other important matters of conscience. The core idea is that it 
maximizes human well-being to protect liberty of conscience against infringement by the 
state.572  Why would that be so? It is argued that being able to choose what to believe and how 
to live makes for a better life. Leiter grants that this “private space argument is plausible” but 
he questions whether it can be true as people may just be hostages “to social and economic 
milieux and enjoying only the illusion of choice.”573   
Epistemic arguments emphasize the contribution that tolerance makes to knowledge. 
Leiter relies on John Stuart Mill that toleration is necessary because 1) Discovering the truth 
contributes to overall utility and 2) We can only discover the truth (or believe what is true in 
the right way) when different beliefs and practices flourish. Mill’s premise is that we should 
care about the truth because of the contribution that it makes to the morally valuable end of 
utility.574 
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Mill’s truth includes “facts” and “value” – moral truths about the best kind of lives 
available. Factual and moral truths have the following in common: We are not infallible – we 
may be wrong – therefore we ought to allow other opinions that may be true. We may have 
partial truth; by allowing other beliefs, we may discover the other parts to the whole truth. 
Even if we possess the whole truth, if we allow differing opinions we are more likely to hold 
our own truths for the right kinds of reasons and will be better able to confront other 
opinions.575  
Mill’s moral truths encompass not only beliefs but practices: “[t]he worth of different 
modes of life should be proved practically.”576 So one allows differing practices in order to 
determine which life is better.  
Leiter accepts the limits (side-constraints) on how much toleration the state must 
display toward acts of conscience as described by Rawls and Mill.577 Rawls concedes the liberty 
of conscience is to be limited only when there is a reasonable expectation that not doing so will 
damage the public order. Mill insists that power can only be exerted against a person’s will to 
prevent harm to others. The most common constraint would occur when there is a “clear and 
present danger” as would be the case of inciting a mob to violence. 
 
5.2.1.6.2 No Moral Need to Tolerate Religion 
 
Leiter argues that even if there are Rawslian or Millian reasons why religion ought to be 
tolerated, these do not constitute a moral reason for special treatment. The Rawlsian 
perspective allows the person in the original position to accept some categorical demands but 
not that they will accept distinctively “ones whose grounding is a matter of faith.”578 As to the 
epistemic arguments for toleration, it hardly seems likely that knowledge is increased from an 
acceptance of beliefs that are insulated from evidence.579 While the characteristics of religion – 
categoricity of demands conjoined with insulation from evidence – may be responsible for 
laudable acts such as resistance to Nazism and apartheid,580 they also have potential for harms 
to well-being which gives “reason to doubt whether any utilitarian argument for tolerating 
religion qua religion will succeed.”581  
Leiter observes that religion has an existential consolation function for those who are 
followers. However, that is only germane if we are able to determine that those existential 
benefits outweigh the potential harm of the categorical demands and insulation from 
evidence,582 and that such benefits could not be had by non-religious beliefs and practices. 
Otherwise, it is speculative. The reality is there are other ways of finding existential consolation 
such as meditation and therapeutic treatment.583 Leiter concludes that religious conscience 
deserves toleration not because it involves religion but because it involves conscience.584   
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Religion, for Leiter, is entitled to what he calls “minimal” respect but not entitled to 
“affirmative” respect.585 Minimal respect only requires that one honour the moral requirements 
resulting from the existence of other persons.586 So, therefore, when you respect someone’s 
feelings you are acknowledging how they feel, respectfully, but you are not doing more than 
that. An affirmative respect is to generate “prima facie obligations toward that person.”587 Here 
you value a person’s attributes such as his genius. Leiter rejects Martha Nussbaum’s argument 
that there needs to be a special respect for the human search for meaning that religious 
conscience represents. Because we are equal in our capacity for self-deception we are only 
entitled to toleration, based on minimal respect, as long as our self-deception, in following our 
religion, does not harm someone else.588  
 
5.2.1.6.3 The Tolerant Society Tolerates Non-Burdening Religious Practice 
 
Leiter suggests since there is no good moral reason for treating the nonreligious 
“unequally” in conscience claims, it may be argued that logically there is nothing wrong with 
the state extending exemptions to all claims of conscience (religious or not).589 Leiter 
recognizes that would not work for three reasons: First, it would be “constitutionalizing a right 
to civil disobedience” and would “amount to a legalization of anarchy!”590 
Leiter may have had Bentham’s “anarchical fallacies”591 in mind, where Bentham 
criticized The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. “Natural rights,” said Bentham, “is 
simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon 
stilts.”592 The point is that any person may have highly idiosyncratic opinions that he or she is 
not subject to law.593 
Second, there is the question of proof of the non-religious conscience. Religious claims, 
unlike the non-religious, “… typically provide evidential proxies for conscience that are much 
easier for courts to assess.”594 The conscience is a claim of what “one must do, no matter what – 
not as a matter of crass self-interest but because it is a kind of moral imperative central to one’s 
integrity as a person, to the meaning of one’s life.”595 The religious claim gives the courts a 
more evidentiary base for determination. Religions have texts, doctrines, commands. 
Membership depends on participation in practices, rituals, and ceremonies. There is no need to 
“peer into the depths of a man’s soul”596 to find the evidence. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the only supportable non-religious claims of 
conscience, Leiter suggests, are those that have religion-like qualities. They are “rooted in 
communal or group traditions and practices.”597 Examples include vegan and animal rights 
groups that maintain memberships. If called upon they would be able to give evidence of 
membership and beliefs in the same way religious groups could. 
The third difficulty with extending exemptions to all claims of conscience is that it 
imposes burdens on those who have no claim of exemption. For example, conscientious 
objectors to bearing arms increase the burden for others. “If general compliance with laws is 
necessary to promote the ‘general welfare’ or the ‘common good,’” says Leiter, “then selective 
exemptions from those laws is a morally objectionable injury to the general welfare.”598 They 
are called “burden-shifting exemptions.”599 Some exemptions raise no burden-shifting at all, 
such as religious garb, since there is no burden shifted to another non-religious person if the 
religious person is granted an exemption to wear religious clothing.  
In offering this example, Leiter does not address the serious issues that scholars have 
raised concerning the strategies radical Islam use to advance their cause.600 These scholars 
point out that there are two problems with religious garb. First, they argue that if officials 
within the state wear religious garb, this undermines the idea of a religiously neutral state.601 
Second, while they give more leeway for religious garb on the streets, there is concern that 
burqas and other face-covering garb make it impossible to “vivre ensemble” (live together).602   
 Leiter favours no exemptions from generally applicable laws for any claims of 
conscience, but he fears that if that were the case society would be open to “state conduct 
motivated by antireligious animus, but under the pretense of legitimate, neutral objectives.”603 
The French policy of laïcité that bans religious head coverings is his example of this problem in 
that it appears to target only those who are Muslim. However, laïcité does not target only 
Muslims, as it applies to all citizens who wear religious and ideological symbols. I would 
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suggest that accommodating religious dress is not a heavy burden for the state. There is no 
material loss or expense that the state incurs because a Muslim woman wears a hijab or a Sikh 
wears a turban. That is not to say there could not be a loss; for example, a woman who is forced 
to wear a hijab against her will is something that cannot be condoned. Nor, I would suggest, 
should the state have to suffer loss (by means of medical expense) because a Sikh man suffers 
head injuries that were preventable by wearing a helmet. In other words, religious practice 
may result in a personal loss that is not necessarily compenstatable by the state. In any event, it 
has to be approached on a case by case basis.  
 On the other hand, “[t]he state is under no moral obligation to tolerate acts of 
conscience that cause harm to other persons.”604 Because it cannot be said “that religious 
dictates of conscience in general violate the Harm Principle,” says Leiter, “a general ban on the 
expressions of such claims of conscience in the public sphere cannot be justified.”605 
Leiter does not distinguish between two dimensions of the “public sphere”. Let us call 
them the society and the state. Both are public, but there the commonality ends. The state has 
to be religiously neutral because the state is an arbiter between the different religious claims. 
No liberal democracy can be a denominational state as it would violate freedom of religion in 
pluralist, religiously diverse societies.  
France claims that a “general ban” (as per Leiter) on headscarves in the state realm 
(that is, public officials) is neutral and honest. However, there is a profound difference between 
a state-enforced religion, where all officials (state) and citizens (society) must conform to a 
particular religious tradition, versus individual public officials choosing to wear (or not wear) 
symbols that reflect their faith. The banning of religious garb for public officials rests on a 
mistaken notion that religion consists merely of superficial rituals or costumes rather than 
beliefs that shape a person’s actions, outlook, speech, and behaviour.  
For example, if one argues that state daycare workers or educators shouldn’t be able to 
wear crosses or headscarves because they influence impressionable children, such logic 
suggests that the state cannot hire any Christians or Muslims. For, even without a crucifix, a 
Christian is going to act and speak according to Biblical principles. Similarly, a Muslim 
caregiver will presumably follow halal dietary restrictions, stop to pray five times a day, and 
show reverence for her God even if she’s not wearing a hijab. Again, it seems to me the 
proportionality analysis is going to have to be played out on a case by case basis. The cost of 
accommodation for the state will be minimal (meaning no harm is caused) in some 
circumstances compared to deleterious effects on the believer where some articles of clothing 
may hold tremendous spiritual significance, as for the Sikh wearing the kirpan. Conversely, in 
other cases religious symbols can be very problematic – for example, members of eastern 
religions such as Hinduism or Jainism may want to wear a swastika but given the history of 
Europe that would be anathema in light of the historical reality of WWII. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that a state ban is different from a ban in society. 
Society ought to be the realm of diversity, where citizens have their own choices protected by 
constitutional and human rights. Here a ban would be a violation of freedom of religion. 
Accordingly, the French have no such ban.  
The inevitable complication that arises here is in the interpretation of what belongs in 
which dimension: for instance, is a primary school public in a “state” sense or a “societal” 
sense? And, what are the particular circumstances at play? However, that does not prevent the 
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state from putting its imprimatur on values and worldviews that are inconsistent with the 
claims of conscience of some of its citizens, as long as the state objective is not to suppress or 
coercively burden those claims but to seek some conception of the good.606   
According to Leiter, a state may, therefore, establish a particular religion (or non-
religious Vision of the Good) as long as it does not shut down other religious and non-religious 
claims of conscience that offer a different Vision of the Good.607 This will depend on the cultural 
context of the communities affected. For example, the Bible readings in a public school in 
Brooklyn, with its very anti-religious culture, will not be as coercive as would be the Bible 
readings in a public school in a small Texas school.608 
Leiter’s argument buttresses the state’s capacity to legislate generally applicable law 
without the worry of providing exemptions for conscience claims. The state is presumed to act 
in the best interests of the governed. He is willing to allow for exemptions of only minor 
consequence such as religious garb where there is no burden imposed on anyone or on the 
state in granting the exemption.  
 
5.2.2 Concluding thoughts on Nehushtan and Leiter 
 
Liberal democratic theory always had an awkward relationship with religious beliefs 
and practices. While there were strains of thought that saw religion as a public good there were 
also those who were wary of religion. The notion that religion or religious believers are 
intolerant is hardly new. 150 years ago, J. S. Mill stated that the odium theologicum “in a sincere 
bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling.”609 Indeed, as Mill so rightly points 
out, those religious communities that broke with Rome at the time of the Reformation “were in 
general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself.”610  
Mill notes that the religious minorities realized they could not become the majority and 
had no choice but to work with those whom they could not convert; they had to plead for 
“permission to differ.”611 “It is accordingly on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of 
the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim 
of society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted.”612  
This is, as I argue elsewhere in this dissertation, the grounding of my assertion that it 
was in the granting of religious tolerance, accommodation and the treating of religion as special 
that laid the framework for a broad understanding of other human rights. In other words, 
religious freedom is the prototypical right that blazed the trail for others.613 But even the 
realization amongst the various religious groups that they had to work together in maintaining 
freedom did not end intolerance.  
“Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about,” said Mill, 
“that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious 
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indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its 
weight to the scale.”614    
The reality is humankind is by nature intolerant “in whatever they really care about.” It 
matters not the subject. We do not have to go to church to see intolerance. Simply attend a 
soccer game wearing the opposing team’s colours and you will find out what it means to have 
the “cold shoulder treatment.” When Nehushtan suggests that intolerance is reason enough for 
the liberal society to not tolerate religion he is too narrow in his focus. The situation is much 
more complicated, as the research of Haidt and Norenzayan noted above makes clear.  
Religion may, in fact, mitigate our natural tendency to intolerance by its binding 
together of strangers as Haidt observed in his research. Further, as will be discussed below, 
Nehushtan represents the current normative thinking that there is to be no moral judgement, 
period. However, that is an intolerance – for to say there can be no moral judgement is a moral 
judgement of what is acceptable.    
Neither Leiter nor Nehushtan have applied a rigorous analysis of religion in their work 
and both have arrived at conclusions that fail to appreciate the complexity of so called 
“religious violence”. There needs to be an awakening to the importance of research to assess 
which religions or what ideologies preach intolerance and what effect they have on individuals 
and communities that perpetrate violence. The historic, economic, and cultural factors may be 
even more divisive than the religious motivations which are generally blamed. Religion is often 
used as a justification for political ends.615  
Benjamin Franklin, in his September 17, 1787 speech to the Federal Convention held in 
Philadelphia, stated:  
Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion think themselves in possession 
of all truth, and that wherever others differ from them it is so far error. Steele a 
Protestant in a Dedication tells the Pope, that the only difference between our 
Churches in their opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is, the Church of 
Rome is infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though 
many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of 
their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain french lady, who in a dispute 
with her sister, said “I don’t know how it happens, Sister but I meet with nobody 
but myself, that is always in the right—Il n’y a que moi qui a toujours raison.616 
Franklin recognized human nature to be self-righteous in judgement and therefore 
intolerant of any opinion that does not harmonize with one’s own. This common realization 
found expression in the political institutions constructed to alleviate the abuse of power that 
came because of that reality. Institutions of Western government provided what few other 
political structures permitted before – the ability of citizens to openly express and hold deep 
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differences of opinion. But it came with the cost of bloody warfare in the wake of the Protestant 
Reformation.  
The concept of religious freedom wherein the individual is free to believe and practice 
his or her own religion is very much a part of the liberal democratic emphasis on rationality,617 
individuality, and the neutrality of the state. Liberalism sees each individual person “as worthy 
as any other, that each must be treated with equal concern according to some coherent 
conception of what that means.”618 
 
5.2.2.1 Why the Legal Profession is in Revolt 
 
The literature and some case law suggest at least two major political and social 
developments that help explain why there is a call for a legal revolution on the accommodation 
and legal status of religion. First is the rise of the “Secular Age” as noted by Charles Taylor, who 
describes our current era as going “from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to 
believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
among others.”619 On the other hand, there is also the rise of intolerance in the form of religious 
fundamentalism – a phenomenon to which Charles Taylor’s writings appear blind.620 
Second, as society’s elite has become more secular, there is a hypersensitivity toward 
any religious judgement on how people ought to live their lives. The academic and societal elite 
demand religion be a private endeavour with little to no public manifestation. References to 
religion, or religious influence in the law, are seen to be a residue of the oppressive institutional 
power of the past. Further, religion is particularly offensive as it makes claims on the morality 
of sexual relations. 
There has been a shift in the evolution of the concepts of “private” and “public” so that 
enterprises that were once thought to be private, such as religious universities, have now come 
into the crosshairs of the “civic totalists”621 who demand that public sexual norms must be 
reflected within those religious institutions.  
The cause of “liberty” for these civic totalists demands that public supervision extend to 
the innermost sanctuary of private religious institutions in order to eliminate these religious 
sources of “oppression.” The irony must not be lost. The civic totalists demand public 
interference in the private religious institution but the private religious institution cannot 
publicly express its religious sexual norms. The Papal adage, “Error has no rights” appears to be 
the modus operandi. Indeed, we may have arrived at a “Sexular Age.”    
 
 
                                                     
617 However, it must be recognized that over the course of recent decades the idea that religious belief is 
rational has fallen off. Today the popular account is that religion is irrational as per Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate, 
supra note 12. We have come a long way since Martin Luther’s statement at the Diet of Worms that he needed 
to be convinced by “clear argument.” Philip Schaff, History of The Christian Church, vol 7: Modern Christianity: 
The German Reformation (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1995) 304–05. 
618 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press, 1986), 213. 
619 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007), 3. 
620 See Cliteur, “Taylor and Dummett” supra note 509 at 1. 
621 A term coined by Stephen Macedo and used by William Galston, “Religion and the Limits of Liberal 
Democracy,” in Douglas Farrow, ed, Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and 
Public Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2004) 41, at 43. 
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5.2.3 The Secular Age   
 
As noted above, coming out of the religious upheaval of the 16th and 17th centuries was 
a liberal philosophy and a liberal political theory that sought to ensure the primacy of the 
individual vis a vis the state. As philosopher Jan Narveson notes, “individual liberty is the 
fundamental and only legitimate concern of any just society”.622 That intellectual confidence is 
characteristic of liberalism, for it sees itself as a neutral, procedural process that ensures that a 
just state protects individualism to the full.  
Yet, it is more than procedural, it is a substantive philosophical position on such things 
as individual freedom, the rule of law, limited government, free market, protection of private 
property, and so on. The collective wisdom from the Enlightenment philosophies of Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant, and Hume became the classical formulation of a liberal society. Succeeding 
generations of thinkers added to the liberal canon, such as John S. Mill with his utilitarian slant 
on allowing the individual maximum freedom subject only to the harm principle – that freedom 
extends to the point at which it causes harm to others.623  
Classical liberalism contained the anti-religious sentiment of freethinkers, beginning 
with Voltaire,624 whose common core was twofold: to criticize religion, and to affirm the 
importance of freedom of thought and speech.625 It must be said that Voltaire remained a 
supporter of religion in the sense that he was of the view that we need religion “to preserve 
order among mankind.”626 That is not at all surprising considering the historical framework 
(i.e. the Reformation) from which this tradition emerged. Anytime there is a “groupthink”, that 
is, a time where unstated propositions are accepted uncritically, then whenever an outlier 
presents an idea that challenges those underlying assumptions there is bound to be a reaction 
from conservatives. Yet, liberalism was mindful that allowing the individual to speak new ideas 
was ultimately to the benefit of all of society. 
                                                     
622 Jan Nareson, The Libertarian Idea (Peterborough, Canada: Broadview Press, 2001) at 13. 
623 “The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings 
of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force 
in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for 
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical 
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be 
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading 
him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To 
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one 
else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”  John Stuart Mill, “Essays on Politics and Society Part I” in 
The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol 18, edited by John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977), online: Online Library of Liberty <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/233#Mill_0223-18_900> 
624 Cliteur, Secular Outlook, supra note 196 at 69.  
625 Ibid at 71. 
626 “Religion is instituted only to preserve order among mankind, and to render them worthy of the bounty of 
the Deity by virtue. Everything in a religion which does not tend to this object ought to be regarded as foreign 
or dangerous.” See The Works of Voltaire, vol 7 (A Philosophical Dictionary Part 5, 1764), translated by 
William F. Fleming (New York: E. R. DuMont, 1901), online: Online Library of Liberty 
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1660#Voltaire_0060-07_386>. 
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By the time of the 19th Century, J. S. Mill’s work furthered the project of secularism to 
reduce the influence of institutional religion. Professor Maurice Cowling noted that Mill’s 
liberalism was to replace Christianity with a ‘Religion of Humanity’: 
Mill’s liberalism was a dogmatic, religious one, not the soothing night-comforter 
for which it is sometimes mistaken. Mill’s object was not to free men, but to 
convert them, and convert them to a peculiarly exclusive, peculiarly insinuating 
moral doctrine. Mill wished to moralize all social activity – religion and art no less 
than politics and education – and to mark each with his own emphatic imprint.627   
Mill’s work has remained for many the touchstone exposition on liberal principles 
governing modern society that promotes a minimal state to ensure the individual lives 
unmolested from unnecessary state regulation and interference. A demarcation between the 
individual (i.e. private) interests and the state (i.e. public) interests is the significant marker. It 
laid the groundwork for today’s secular proclivity as described by Charles Taylor below. 
Freedom of speech is one of the important liberal pillars to ensure individual freedom. 
The ability to communicate public policy lies at the heart of public discourse and debate. 
Citizens must have the means to address the concerns of the age that put individual freedom at 
the centre.  
John Rawls’ hesitancy to allow “comprehensive views” (whether religious, 
philosophical, or moral) to dominate political interpretation resonates with liberal thought 
because “[c]itizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual 
understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.”628 The mischief 
that Rawls sought to avoid was that comprehensive doctrines have their own language and 
frame of reference that is understood only by those who are conversant in that doctrine. It is 
incomprehensible to those on the outside. Therefore, a religious comprehensive doctrine, when 
in the public square or “forum”, must be couched in terms everyone can understand as 
“reasonable”.629   
Rawls’ “public reason” is “the basic moral and political values that are to determine a 
constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one 
another.”630 This can only be successful if those in the “public forum”631 are able to 
communicate. That requires: 
…accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the 
methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial. … As far as 
possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the 
principles of justice … are to rest on the plain truths now widely accepted, or 
available, to citizens generally.632 
                                                     
627 Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), il. See 
also Cowling’s monumental work Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) vol 1-3. Mill’s Religion of Humanity is a product of his later work in Three Essays on 
Religion and not his On Liberty. Although Mill was enamoured by Comte’s Religion of Humanity he was not at 
all in agreement with Comte’s totalitarian approach to the concept. See C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), 146-51. 
628 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Summer 1997) 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765 at 766. 
629 Ibid, at 769. 
630 Ibid at 766. 
631 The judiciary, the government officials – especially the chief executives and legislators – and those 
candidates running for public office. 
632 Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 303 at 224-5. 
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Rawls’ willingness to allow religious views a voice in the public forum is very similar to 
Greenawalt633 and Audi,634 who recognize the discriminatory and counter-productive nature of 
silencing of religious advocates. Greenawalt argues that “citizens of extremely diverse religious 
views can build principles of political order and social justice that do not depend on particular 
religious beliefs.”635   
Rawls is of the view that religious arguments can be used in dialogue with policy 
makers, politicians, and judges but they are not to be relied upon simply because they are 
religious. That is because religious views are not accessible to everyone. Instead, such religious 
views must have a secular, non-religious basis to be conclusive.636 Paul Cliteur notes that 
secularism “is a normative or ethical creed.”637 “The secularist contends,” says Cliteur, “that the 
best way to deal with religious differences is a morally neutral vocabulary that we all share and 
a morality that is not based on religion.”638 For all intents and purposes, Western democracies 
are secular. Religious devotion has declined dramatically in recent decades. Britain, for 
example, has been declared a “post Christian country” by the former Archbishop of Canterbury 
Rowan Williams639 while the current office holder, Justin Welby, notes, “It is clear that, in the 
general sense of being founded in Christian faith, this is a Christian country. It is certainly not in 
terms of regular churchgoing, although altogether, across different denominations, some 
millions attend church services each week.”640 
“Belief in God,” says Charles Taylor, “is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives.” 641 
Taylor sees his work as defining the secularization thesis “more exactly.”642 The secularization 
                                                     
633 Kent Greenawalt, “Religious Convictions and Lawmaking” (1985) 84 Michigan Law Review, 352; Religious 
Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); “Religious Convictions and 
Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts” (1990) 39 DePaul L. Rev., 1019; “The Role of Religion in a Liberal 
Democracy: Dilemmas and Possible Resolutions” (1993b) 35 J Church State, 503 [“Role of Religion”]; Private 
Consciences and Public Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); “1996 Siebenthaler Lecture:  
Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics” (1996a) 23 N Ky L. Rev., 629; “Religious Expression in the Public 
Square – The Building Blocks for an Intermediate Position” (1996b) 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev., 1411. 
634 R. Audi & N. Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Robert Audi, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations 
of Citizenship,” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 259-308; “Religion and the Ethics of Political 
Participation” (1990) 100 Ethics, 386-97; “The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society” 
(1993) 30 San Diego Law Review, 677-702. 
635 Greenawalt, “Role of Religion”, supra note 633 at 513. 
636 For example, the Rawlsian position would be that we defend charitable status for religious organizations 
not because they are based on truth claims only known to the religious adherents but rather because of non-
religious claims that is accessible to the public such as the utilitarian economic benefits such organizations 
provide society.  
637 Cliteur, Secular Outlook, supra note 196 at 3. 
638 Ibid at 4. 
639 Williams stated that Britain is “post-Christian in the sense that habitual practice for most of the population 
is not taken for granted. A Christian nation can sound like a nation of committed believers and we are not 
that. Equally, we are not a nation of dedicated secularists. It’s a matter of defining terms. A Christian country 
as a nation of believers? No. A Christian country in the sense of still being very much saturated by this vision 
of the world and shaped by it? Yes.” See “Britain is a ‘post-Christian’ country says former Archbishop,” BBC 
News (27 April 2014), online: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-27177265>.  
640 Archbishop Justin Welby, “A Christian country?” (24 April 2014), online (blog): The Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Justin Welby <http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/blog.php/20/a-christian-country> 
641 Taylor, A Secular Age, supra note 619 at 3. 
642 Ibid at 429. 
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theory argues that modernity tends to repress religion.643 As the western world becomes more 
educated, religion will subside. At least, that was the thinking. Peter L. Berger describes it as 
the “process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of 
religious institutions and symbols.”644 It is a “secularization of consciousness” that “means that 
the modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look upon the world 
and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations.”645 For Philip R. Wood, “[a] 
society secularises when its people cease to believe in supernatural religions and when these 
religions cease to influence the government and laws of the country and to influence the 
morals, the way of living and culture of the country.”646 At stake between religion and 
government, says Wood, “is control – control of minds, control of morality and control of the 
laws.”647 Wood observes the law has moved away from religious influence in multiple areas of 
the law including family law, for example, making divorce and abortion more readily 
available.648 That’s because, in his view, religion becomes a matter of individual choice rather 
than social obligation.649 This was the conclusion that the Supreme Court of Canada came to 
when it decided the federal government had the right to redefine marriage. No longer could 
Christianity be the source of influence on “civil marriage”.650 Individual choice to live one’s life 
without worry of religious or societal approval is the touchstone – the liberal democratic 
project.  
In the Big M Drug Mart decision, Chief Justice Dickson declared:  
The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand that every 
individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her 
conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not injure his 
or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of 
their own.651  
The elimination of religion’s dominance, that is to say, the elimination of Judeo-
Christianity’s role in public policy, has been an ongoing process that has become increasingly 
evident since WWII. This has led to a crisis in the legal system. In Kuhnian terms, we are 
witnessing, indeed, we are living through, the growing crisis of the legal system’s paradigm of 
special treatment of religion that is teetering on the cliff of collapse.  
However, as the dominance of Christianity has waned in the West there is rising in its 
place a movement of categorical analysis that has used race, gender, and sexual orientation as 
its framework to criticize Western civilization. This complex development has elements of neo-
Marxist, black, feminist, and queer theory. It uses group identity rather than individual identity 
as a means of making the case that the West is oppressive against certain groups and that the 
oppressed must rise up and confront their oppressors. One area where this has become evident 
                                                     
643 Ibid. 
644 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy:  Elements of a sociological theory of religion (New York: Anchor Books, 
1967), 107. 
645 Ibid at 108. 
646 Wood, supra note 182 at 179. 
647 Ibid at 180. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid. 
650 Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at para 22: “The reference to ‘Christendom’ is telling. Hyde spoke to a 
society of shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be inseparable. This is no longer 
the case. Canada is a pluralistic society. Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution.” 
651 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4 at para 123. 
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is the issue of sexual identity as a touchstone. For that reason, I refer to this new development 
as the “Sexular Age.”   
 
5.2.4  The Sexular Age and Identity Politics  
 
There is a second development which emerges as a motivating force behind the 
revolutionary zeal to rid the law of religion’s special protection. That development is our 
increasingly “sexualized culture”652 which may be more appropriately referred to as the 
“Sexular Age”653 wherein the traditional Christian norms on sexual intimacy (i.e. heterosexual 
monogamy within a marriage) have become an affront to the liberalizing sexual norms of 
current thinking. The existence of religious prohibitions on sexual expression is a target of 
claims of dignitary harm and intolerance toward sexual minorities even though it occurs within 
voluntary religious contexts.654   
This Sexular Age, influenced as it is by post-modern thought, is combined with an 
intersectional analysis655 of identity (race, gender and sexuality) politics. Identity politics claim 
that sexual minorities are among the victims of the white privileged colonial class that has used 
religion as a means of maintaining patriarchal power structures.656 Structures that must 
ultimately be abolished. I will describe what I suggest is the Sexular Age and will then discuss 
how the intersectional analysis of identity politics, that is motivating anti-establishment 
activists on university campuses, makes it increasingly difficult to allow room for dialogue 




                                                     
652 Feona Attwood, “Sexed Up: Theorizing the Sexualization of Culture,” (2016) 9:1 Sexualities, 77-94, at 78-
79 writes: “‘sexualized culture’, a rather clumsy phrase used to indicate a number of things; a contemporary 
preoccupation with sexual values, practices and identities; the public shift to more permissive sexual 
attitudes; the proliferation of sexual texts; the emergence of new forms of sexual experience; the apparent 
breakdown of rules, categories and regulations designed to keep the obscene at bay; our fondness for 
scandals, controversies and panics around sex; all those manifestations that indicate that in our era, ‘Sex . . . 
has become the Big Story’.”   
653 Anne Hendershott, The Politics of Deviance (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 109: “Of all the 
contested terrain in the culture wars, the subject of sex has attracted the most attention – and created the 
most contentious debate. Whether it is disagreement over homosexual ‘normativity,’ the type of sex 
education in our children’s schools, or the portrayal of sex in popular culture, there seems to be an ongoing, 
often raucous conversation about sex in America. We seem, in fact, to inhabit a sexualized society.” 
654 Wilson Vincent, Dominic J. Parrott, & John L. Peterson, “Effects of Traditional Gender Role Norms and 
Religious Fundamentalism on Self-identified Heterosexual Men’s Attitudes, Anger, and Aggression Toward 
Gay Men and Lesbians” (2011) 12:4 Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 383–400, at 396, “[H]eterosexual men’s 
internalization of pertinent male gender role norms and religious fundamentalism is associated with 
aggression toward gay men and lesbians directly and indirectly via sexual prejudice and antigay anger.” 
655 Kimberlé Crenshaw has been credited with articulating the intersectional analysis in her piece, 
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U. Chi. Legal F. 139. 
656 David A. J. Richards, Fundamentalism in American Religion and Law Obama’s Challenge to Patriarchy’s 
Threat to Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also, Nathan R. Todd, et al, “Understanding 
Associations between Religious Beliefs and White Privilege Attitudes” (2015) 58:4 Sociological Perspectives, 
649–65. 
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5.2.4.1 Describing the Sexular Age 
 
The Sexular Age is highly influenced by post-modern657 rejection of the classical liberal 
society.658 Post-modernism rejects realism.659 There is no objective truth an individual may 
know or pursue. The experience of life and one’s use of reason is jettisoned in favour of social 
subjectivism. The Sexular Age philosophy argues that traditional sexual norms are the result of 
social construction and human conflict.660 Therefore, the Sexular Age is against the inherent 
power661 relationships of the capitalist patriarchy.662 The abuse of power brought about 
“traditional” family structures.663 The Sexular Age demands collective egalitarianism 
undergirded by the notion of a Marxist socialist ideology that anticipates and works toward the 
socialist/sexual revolution.  
Attwood notes that “[e]arlier conceptualizations of the binding love relationship – 
characterized by duty, family, fate or romance – are replaced by a vision of an individual love 
life as a series of effortless but intensely fragile encounters.”664 The “postmodern subject” is 
compared to a shopper that browses the shopping mall expecting “to be easily aroused and 
instantly gratified, and if we see what we like, we have it and worry about paying for it later. 
Once the novelty wears off, we discard it and move on.”665 These encounters are “investments” 
which may or may not be worth it. “This form of intimacy,” Attwood maintains, “makes us very 
                                                     
657 See Attwood, supra note 652 at 87-90. 
658 Charles Lemert, Postmodernism Is Not What You Think (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 22: 
“[P]ostmodernism is a culture that believes there is a better world than the modern one. In particular it 
disapproves of modernism’s uncritical assumption that European culture … is an authentic, self-evident, and 
true universal culture in which all the worlds people ought to believe…[it] prefers to break things up….” 
659 My description of post-modernism is taken from my analysis of Stephen R.C. Hicks’ table outlining the 
differences between modern and post-modernism found on p. 15 of his book, Explaining Postmodernism:  
Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault, expanded edition (Roscoe, Illinois: Ockham’s Razor 
Publishing, 2011). 
660 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
Foucault argues, at 5, that sexual repression was “an integral part of the bourgeois order.”  
661 Ibid at 6-7, “[W]e are conscious of defying established power, our tone of voice shows that we know we are 
being subversive, and we ardently conjure away the present and appeal to the future, whose day will be 
hastened by the contribution we believe we are making. Something that smacks of revolt, of promised 
freedom, of the coming age of a different law….” 
662 This is not a new sentiment, as “[t]he confluence of intense gender anxiety, a rethinking of sexual life that 
broke with Victorian sexual norms, and a rebellion against bourgeois society were indeed crucial elements of 
the modernist moment that affected a great many figures of the period.”  See Charles Hatten, Book Review of 
Radical Modernism and Sexuality: Freud, Reich, D. H. Lawrence & Beyond by David Seelow (2008) 17:1 Journal 
of the History of Sexuality, 166-168, at 167. 
663 Foucault, supra note 660 at 7, “What sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in terms of repression is 
doubtless this opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise bliss, to link 
together enlightenment, liberation, and manifold pleasures; to pronounce a discourse that combines the 
fervor of knowledge, the determination to change the laws, and the longing for the garden of earthly delights.”   
Chloe Taylor describes Foucault’s understanding of the heterosexual family structure as follows: “The 
family like the prison and the asylum, does not exist because it needs to or because we have become so 
enlightened as to realize that it is the ‘best’ way to deal with certain facts about human nature. Rather, it 
exists as it does as the result of power struggles in which certain people lost and whose histories of resistance 
have been forgotten.” See “Foucault and Familial Power” (2012) 27:1 Hypatia, 201 at 215. 
664 Attwood, supra note 652 at 88. 
665 Ibid. 
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free, but the liquid love we pursue is a constant source of uncertainty and insecurity.”666 While 
there may be “a sense of our own power as we browse for love, we are also uneasily aware that, 
for others, we are sexual commodities … and may not retain our value for them for every 
long.”667 
Given the human need for belonging,668 it is necessary that those participating in a 
lifestyle that creates uncertainty and insecurity669 identify with a collective that is delineated 
based on sexual identity. Ironically, such markers are increasingly becoming fragmented. For 
example, the “LGBT” acronym is now considered a relic of the 1990s and a new acronym, 
“LGBTQQIP2SAA,” is the preferred label for a more inclusive sexual community. But it does not 
stop there as more labels continuously appear.670 The concept of labelling is important to the 
Sexular Age because it is an attempt at inclusiveness when sexual minorities face exclusion 
from the wider community. This, as we will see below, is important once an intersectional 
analysis is applied to these identities and their relationship with society. Ironically, the greater 
the number of identities, the less cohesive this group appears. 
The word “sexular,” though not a recognized word by the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED),671 is defined by the online Urban Dictionary (UD).672 The top definition given to the term 
by UD is “A sexually-appealing woman from a repressed (and often religious) culture who is 
rebelious [sic], secular and fun loving.” Rebellious, secular and fun-loving is an apt description 
of our age. It highlights three overarching principles that resonate with our cultural moment. 
Having already canvassed the secular development above, I will consider the concept of 
rebellion.  
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668 Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a 
Fundamental Human Motivation” (1995) 117:3 Psychological Bulletin, 497-529. 
669 See Sandhya Ramrakha, et al, “The Relationship Between Multiple Sex Partners and Anxiety, Depression, 
and Substance Dependence Disorders: A Cohort Study” (2013) 42 Arch Sex Behav, 863–872. 
670 Bill Daley, “Why LGBT initialism keeps growing,” Chicago Tribune (2 June 2017), online: 
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Recently, Dr. Barb Perry of the University of Ontario Institute of Technology held an “LGGBDTTTIQQAAPP 
Inclusive Training” seminar for the Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Toronto. According to the poster 
advertising the event, as seen on Twitter #LGGBDTTTIQQAAPP, the acronym stands for: Lesbian, Gay, 
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sexual identities” listed in the acronym, see also Fred Litwin, “Not My Rights Movement” (December 2016), 
online: Convivium <https://www.convivium.ca/articles/not-my-rights-movement>. 
671 My online search of the OED on June 9, 2015 revealed the following result: “No exact match found for 
“sexular” in British & World English.” See Oxford Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2018) sub verbo 
“sexular”, online: English Oxford Living Dictionary 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/spellcheck/english/?q=sexular>. 
672 UD is crowdsourced but a credible indicator of language development. For example, British Medical 
Journal articles have used it as a reference source. See: Deborah Cohen, “Worrying World of Eating Disorder 
Wannabes” (2007) 335:7618 British Medical Journal, 516; and Paul Keeley, “Pimp My Slang” (2007) 
335:7633 British Medical Journal, 1295. My online search on July 26, 2017 revealed the following: “TOP 
DEFINITION – sexular: A sexually-appealing woman from a repressed (and often religious) culture who is 
rebelious [sic], secular and fun loving. She often wears form-fitting clothing. That Egyptian girl is so sexular! 
She doesn’t mind hugging and shaking hands! by cantdecide1007 October 22, 2010,” see Urban Dictionary, sub 
verbo “sexular”, online:  <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=sexular>. 
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Rebellion connotes a refusal to be bound by norms, whether they are legal or cultural, 
such as those norms founded upon religious beliefs and practices.673 It is a rejection of the idea 
that individuals must be bound by historical customs and attitudes. History, for the Sexular 
Age, has no authority to compel modern obeisance: “What is past is not dead; it is not even past. 
We cut ourselves off from it; we preferred to be strangers.”674 Such a position inevitably means 
that the lessons of history will have to be relearned in today’s age. However, given the advance 
of technology and the capability for intolerant abuse of such technology the stakes are all that 
much higher. 
Rebellion is manifested in an anti-religious (more often anti-Christian) sentiment. 
Christianity is identified with the West and seen as complicit in, if not responsible for, 
colonialism. The Judeo-Christian worldview has profoundly influenced our legal and moral 
norms. Such norms include the binary (male and female) nature of humanity. That binary 
understanding has a long theological history. At the beginning of human life on earth, which 
Christians believe was recorded in the ancient Book of Genesis,675 God created male and 
female: “So God created man in His own image; in the image of God He created him; male and 
female He created them.”676  
Further, the Bible states, “[t]herefore a man shall leave his father and mother and be 
joined to his wife, and they shall become one flesh.”677 In the Christian tradition, this biblical 
passage is widely understood to be God’s establishment of the institution of marriage. Jesus of 
Nazareth further expounded upon this foundational worldview by unequivocally stating:  
Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and 
female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be 
joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’? So then, they are no longer 
two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man 
separate.678 
Western democracies and their laws were once in accord with the Judeo-Christian 
principle of marriage as a heterosexual, monogamous relationship.679 It was “a society of 
shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be inseparable.”680 This is no 
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longer the case. The late 20th and early 21st centuries marked a turning point. No longer are 
the religious moral norms in sync with the law regarding sexuality and marriage.681 The 
advance of equality claims based on sexual orientation and the redefinition of marriage called 
into question the place of religious influence on law and public policy. 
Ironically, the Sexular Age has religious overtones. In many ways Christianity and its 
norms have been displaced by a new religion, a new religious revolution. This Age embraces 
the body and pursues “erotic justice” as “an unexpected yet delightful pathway for spiritual 
renewal and replenishment.”682 Foucault declares: 
Today it is sex that serves as a support for the ancient form – so familiar and 
important in the West – of preaching. A great sexual sermon – which has had its 
subtle theologians and its popular voices – has swept through our societies over 
the last decades; it has chastised the old order, denounced hypocrisy, and praised 
the rights of the immediate and the real; it has made people dream of a New City. 
The Fransciscans are called to mind. And we might wonder how it is possible that 
the lyricism and religiosity that long accompanied the revolutionary project have, 
in Western industrial societies, been largely carried over to sex.683 
Sex, “the immediate and the real,” with its ecstasy of pleasure, gives life meaning. 
“Jerusalem” references every metropolis of the world where pleasure is experienced without 
fear of judgement of an angry God. The worshiping masses are singing hymns, listening to 
preachers of the new faith that brings liberation to all. 
The emphasis of the Sexular Age is on the individual – individual freedom is maximized. 
So much so that even knowledge itself is an individual experience. The individual determines 
what counts as knowledge – with the innate ability to decipher the chaff from the wheat in all 
areas of life for one’s self. The individual is free from the social constraints and norms of the 
past but is expected to accept the “truths” of those in the shadows such as Derrida and 
Foucault.  
The individual is purportedly free from nature and culture. One does not have to be 
confined by natural boundaries of body, age, race, sex, or gender. The individual is the sum of 
all that is – the individual is the very source of creation – in fact, the individual is the creator of 
themselves. This rampant individualism is finding expression in the law. The communal aspect 
of religious organizations with membership rules stands as an affront to this trend. The law 
must now accommodate how the individual “feels”. Thus, in the TWU case, individual students 
“who feel they have no choice but to attend TWU’s proposed law school” can demand the 
private religious university change its rules to ensure there is no “risk of significant harm to 
LGBTQ people.”684 Roger Scruton describes it thus: “[y]our disapproval of my lifestyle is your 
problem, not mine; should you object to homosexuality, that proves only that you suffer from 
homophobia, a disorder of the soul that is also a hangover from an outmoded form of life. There 
is therefore no room now for argument about homosexuality, still less for criticism.”685 He 
notes that it has now become an act of aggression to say or even think the wrong thing. “The 
non-discrimination movement,” he explains, “is about extending to others the freedom to 
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choose their own identity; to criticize this is to constrain other people in their deepest being, in 
those ‘existential choices’ that determine who they are: it is an act of aggression and not just a 
comment.”686  
As lawyer Wood stated, “…we may be able to beat the universe. If the universe has no 
plan for us, then we have to have a plan for ourselves. If the universe has no god, we will make 
ourselves god.”687 The individual is free to forego all of the sexual moral norms of the past and 
choose for “them”selves what will and will not be their sole individual view in all sexual things 
considered. It is a rebellion against all legal and moral norms that interfere with the realization 
of the self.  
There is no greater manifestation of this hyper-individualist position then on the 
subject of “sex”. The word “sex” is a rather imperfect word in English. Unfortunately, the Anglo-
Saxon language does not have nuanced tools to distinguish between very different thoughts. 
Hence, we end up using “sex” to mean “gender,” being male or female; or to mean the physical 
and biological intercourse between a male and female that would lead, in the ordinary course 
of events, to pregnancy. In recent times, “sex” has come to mean the physical interaction that 
has as its focus the enjoyment of pleasure as an end in itself. But it is more than that. 
Sex, in all its permutations, is what defines our age. It has become the focal point not for 
the physical gratification alone but for all it represents – the rebellion, the revolution against 
the past’s power structures. The demand for recognition of the value of sexual pleasure is fast 
becoming an argument that it is a human right. The “constitutional right of sexual intimacy and 
bodily autonomy”688 requires “sex-positive law,”689 claim the legal scholars who are taking up 
the cause.  
The Sexular Age is iconoclastic. All references, all societal norms and notions of 
deviancy that would limit sex to a heterosexual union that includes the expectation for a 
lifelong commitment of one man and one woman has become anathema. Thus, the groupthink 
of the collective (ironic as that is) is becoming manifest. There is dissonance with historical 
norms. Such heterosexual norms are viewed as social constructs meant to maintain power 
relationships controlling a capitalist economy for the haves against the have-nots.   
The Sexular Age seeks to remove from all public and private space any reference to 
norms of previous generations that would in any way limit the fundamental right of the 
individual to do or be whatever they want – including but not limited to identity as male, 
female, non-sexed, or non-gendered.690 The individual is free to choose to be in mutual 
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relationships with whomever and how many they so choose, for whatever purpose, or however 
long. The ultimate right of the individual to choose for themselves whatever sexual identity 
they desire is paramount. The right to seek “freedom to experience the full range of human 
emotions, behavior and relationships, without gender defined constraints”691 is championed. 
The Sexular Age claims that individuals should not be forced into a pre-determined 
sexual identity based on biology and culture.692 Yet, at its core, it seeks to create a collective 
identity based on sexual orientation. Paradoxically, it claims to be hyper-individualistic, but it is 
also collectivistic in telling the individual what a member of a sexual minority must believe that 
membership signifies. The inherent contradiction of this approach is yet to reach its apogee. 
Already there are signs that the coalition of minorities is strained.  
Before closing this very brief introduction to “The Sexular Age,” I think it is worth 
noting just how far our liberal democracy has strayed from its historical roots. John S. Mill, who 
is best known for his “harm principle,” which is the touchstone of our society’s emphasis on 
individual freedom, saw chasity as an ideal way of living.693 Society, in his view, ought to 
discover “how to obtain the greatest amount of chasity.”694 For him it was “an essential part of 
moral training”695 for married couples to refrain from sex. “[M]y deliberate opinion,” said Mill, 
“[is] that any great improvement in human life is not to be looked for so long as the animal 
instinct of sex occupies the absurdly disproportionate place it does.”696 Put in this light, the 
Canadian legal profession’s disdain of TWU’s Community Covenant on sexual relations while in 
school would be held in a rather dim view by Mill, who remains arguably the most celebrated 
prophetic philosopher of liberal democracy.697  
 
5.2.4.2 The Right Not to Be Offended 
 
In 1993, Eden Jacobowitz, an Israeli-born student at the University of Pennsylvania, 
shouted out his dorm window “Shut up, you water buffalo!” at a group of noisy African-
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American women.698 This incident got international press because of the university’s extreme 
reaction in punishing the student for uttering an apparent racial slur. In fact, the term “water 
buffalo” is a translation of the Hebrew word, “behayma,” which is a put-down describing an 
“uncouth individual.” On May 7, 1993, the Toronto Star ran the headline, “Exactly What Race Is 
a Water Buffalo?”699 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt observe, with chagrin, that claims of a 
right not to be offended have continued to rise since this incident. And, unfortunately, 
universities have continued to privilege such claims.700  
Anti-religion activists claim a right not to be offended. Such claimants demand the 
special legal status of religion be removed because of their offense taken to the religious views 
on sexual morality. This is evident in the TWU law school case when LGBTQ groups demanded 
that the university be forced to change its admissions policy because “it hurts.”701 They 
convinced the Ontario courts of their position but not the courts in Nova Scotia or British 
Columbia. The BC Court of Appeal addressed the issue head on: 
While there is no doubt that the Covenant’s refusal to accept LGBTQ expressions of 
sexuality is deeply offensive and hurtful to the LGBTQ community, and we do not in any 
way wish to minimize that effect, there is no Charter or other legal right to be free from 
views that offend and contradict an individual’s strongly held beliefs, absent the kind of 
“hate speech” described by the SCC in Whatcott that could incite harm against others. … 
Disagreement and discomfort with the views of others is unavoidable in a free and 
democratic society.702 
As the BC Court of Appeal noted further, “the language of ‘offense and hurt’ is not 
helpful in balancing competing rights. The beliefs expressed by some Benchers and members of 
the Law Society that the evangelical Christian community’s view of marriage is ‘abhorrent’, 
‘archaic’ and ‘hypocritical’ would no doubt be deeply offensive and hurtful to members of that 
community.”703   
That view, however, was deemed unacceptable by the SCC, who claimed that more is at 
stake than simply “disagreement and discomfort” with views that some will find offensive. 
Religious freedom can be limited where its beliefs or practices injure the rights of others to 
hold their own opinions, and where it “offends the public perception that freedom of religion 
includes freedom from religion.” That, of course, presumes the Court has a very good 
understanding and knowledge of “public perception” and not simply the echo chamber that is 
the legal profession.704 University professors and administrators appear to be “circling the 
wagons” around those who claim to be offended. There is little tolerance for any questioning of 
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“the reasonableness (let alone the sincerity) of someone’s emotional state, particularly if those 
emotions are linked to one’s group identity.”705   
Lukianoff and Haidt note that “‘I’m offended’ becomes an unbeatable trump card.”706  
They suggest that “[s]chools may be training students in thinking styles that will damage their 
careers and friendships, along with their mental health.”707 
There is virtually no limit to where this perceived right of not being offended may lead. 
Consider our cultural moment where the University of Virginia President was openly chastised 
for having the temerity to quote from Thomas Jefferson, the University’s founder. The 
opposition came from the University’s professors and students who were offended that the 
founder was a slave owner.708 Gone is the critical ability to appreciate the dissonance of the 
past with today’s morality to understand Jefferson’s own ideal. His aspiration for the University 
was that “this institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here 
we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as 
reason is left free to combat it.”709 The current logic that would reject such words of Jefferson 
based on our retroactive sense of morality would presumably also reject the legitimacy of the 
American Declaration of Independence since it was written by Jefferson. 
As author Bruce Bawer observed, even though America did not live up to its creed as 
stated in the Declaration – “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness” – “it was in fact the very thing that made moral progress in America not only 
possible but inevitable.”710 
Bawer agrees with historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,711 that “[t]he most disastrous by-
product of the civil rights movement was multiculturalism, a philosophy that teaches … that 
America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups.”712 The tragic irony is that at 
the point of social and economic advancement where the ideal of America was within its grasp, 
there has been a rejection of national identity based on individual liberty and its vision of full 
equality. Today’s approach in the university humanities and among society’s elite is not the 
aspiration to an ideal of individual rights but of “group identity and culture.”713 
While Bawer and Schlesinger analyse the American context, Canada is different in that s. 
27 of the Charter has enshrined the concept of multiculturalism as a positive good for our 
liberal democracy. In other words, Canada embodies liberal democratic principles by 
promoting diverse views rather than enforcing a single state morality or culture. The irony of 
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the SCC’s recent TWU decisions is that they belie that very principle and indeed have adopted 
the idea that the state knows best. 
The groupthink approach of identity politics has rejected the liberal democratic project 
of maximizing individual freedom and instead has adopted a “cult of victimhood” that has 
cloaked itself within a Marxist ideological analysis that foments a revolution against liberal 
society. Gone, in America at least, is the Jeffersonian ideal of rationality and objective truth (“to 
follow wherever it may lead”). Instead, there is a fixation on group identity and preoccupation 
with the historical grievances of certain group identities.714 
Bawer is robust in his criticism. University students are unable to say anything fresh or 
insightful about their experiences and observations because they are “prisoners of a mind-set 
and jargon.” Bawer points out that the end result is the reduction of the “rich complexities and 
ambiguities of human life to simple formulas” such as the “oppressors and oppressed, 
capitalists and workers, Western imperialists and their non-Western victims.” When faced with 
a reality outside of their paradigm they are incapable of responding to it “other than to make 
statements that are demonstrably untrue.”715 
The postmodern thought, Bawer explains, begins with the anthropologist Franz Boas 
who argued that “no culture is superior to any other.”716 Boas’ thought was built upon by 
others such as Clifford Geertz, who doubted the universality of Western norms and 
principles.717 With no universal truths or transcendent possibilities into seeking the meaning of 
life, individual liberty is abandoned and there is nothing but the power analysis of the 
“triumvirate of isms – colonialism, imperialism, capitalism – and with a three-headed monster 
of victimhood: class, race and gender expression.” 718 The purpose of the humanities to seek the 
wisdom of Western civilization, thought and art – in essence the passing on of the cultural 
baton to the next generation – has been replaced with a self-deprecation “to unmask the West 
as a perpetrator of injustice around the globe.”719  
History professor Alan Charles Kors suggest that there are three works720 that 
undergird today’s political mentality:  Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks721; Paulo Freire’s 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed722; and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. 
Gramsci, a Sardinian Marxist, was imprisoned by Mussolini from 1926-1934 and wrote 
thirty-three notebooks while in prison. His concept of hegemony has become the basis of much 
political thought among today’s activist groups. It holds that freedom in Western capitalist 
countries is an illusion. People are kept in line by an invisible power that they internalize and 
obey unwittingly. As a result, it is a more potent power than the power of dictatorships because 
it is unseen and that, in turn, makes it harder to resist. Therefore, the path to the socialist 
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revolution in the West, according to Gramsci, is through a re-education of the populace where 
society’s current elite is replaced by a new elite. The “subaltern classes must generate their 
own ‘organic intellectuals’ capable of creating new forms of hegemony by shattering the 
universalistic claims of older worldviews.”723 
Freire, of Brazil, was at one time imprisoned for teaching illiterate laborers to read and 
write and later worked at the United Nations. His Pedagogy of the Oppressed rejects the West’s 
emphasis on individualism because it suppresses individuals’ ability to recognize their 
oppression and therefore denies them the tools to resist.724 The oppressed need to be educated 
as to their oppression and revolt against the oppressors. “Violence is initiated by those who 
oppress, who exploit, who fail others as persons,” says Freire, “not by those who are oppressed, 
exploited, and unrecognized… It is not the helpless … who initiate terror, but the violent.”725   
Freire states that the oppressed have the right to rebel and “the act of rebellion by the 
oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial violence of the 
oppressors) can initiate love.”726 Since “the violence of the oppressors prevents the oppressed 
from being fully human,” says Freire, then “the response of the latter to this violence is 
grounded in the desire to pursue the right to be human.” Oppressors are dehumanizing those 
whose rights they violate as well as themselves. When the oppressed rise up and fight back 
they not only take away the oppressors’ power but “they restore to the oppressors the 
humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression.”727 Violence for Freire is thus the means 
of liberating the oppressed and saving the oppressors from themselves. It is an act of love for 
humanity. 
Fanon, of Martinique, was a psychiatrist in Algeria during the rebellion against France. 
Fanon disdains the West’s colonizing of the non-Western countries. He calls for a revolution 
against the colonizers and predicts the liberation that follows will usher in a time where family 
and tribal conflicts will pass. “[V]iolence of the colonized,” will bind the people together against 
the violence of the colonists and the violence will be a “cleansing force. It rids the colonized of 
their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and 
restores their self-confidence.”728 In the end truth is not of the individual – “[n]obody has a 
monopoly on truth, neither the leader nor the militant. The search for truth in local situations is 
the responsibility of the community.”729 
Both Kors and Bawer argue that the ideas of Gramsci, Freire and Fanon seeded the 
political ideology of the humanities in today’s universities. But there are more than these three.  
Edward Said describes himself as a Palestinian from Cairo and served much of his 
career as an American university professor. His 1978 book Orientalism730 argues that European 
scholarship of the Orient was tainted by the cultural biases of the scholar. Any scholar builds 
upon the work of those before him or her. He says there is a “consensus: certain things, certain 
types of statement, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist correct.” This is then 
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passed on to new scholars. Orientalism is a “regularized…writing, vision, and study, dominated 
by imperatives, perspectives and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient 
is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways.”731 
“In one fell swoop,” says Bawer, Said’s book, “scrapped the credibility of distinguished 
scholars who had encyclopedic knowledge of those cultures … any criticism by a Westerner of 
any aspect of a non-Western culture was, by its very nature, illegitimate.”732 
Gramsci’s articulation of the unseen power manipulation that is evident in Western 
society was given further impetus with the concept of “intersectionality” that arose within 
Black feminist thought.  
Kimberlé Crenshaw is the co-founder of The African American Policy Forum (AAPF), the 
USA’s “leading gender and racial equity think tank.”733 In 1989 Crenshaw published an 
influential article734 that introduced the concept of “intersectionality.” Her article claimed that 
the legal categories used in discrimination law were inadequate if they could not be combined. 
For example, a black woman may face discrimination based on both her gender and her race as 
a unique combination that has separate consequences than if the grounds were “mutually 
exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”735 In other words, she is “multiply-burdened” 
by race and gender.736   
The multiply-burdened discrimination is magnified since “intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism” and if “any analysis” “does not take 
intersectionality into account [it] cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which 
Black women are subordinated.”737 Crenshaw called for a rethinking of the discrimination 
analysis to make sure it that takes into account the intersectionality of the different categories 
of discrimination.  
As she explained, a black woman has a very different experience than a white woman. 
White women, Crenshaw argues, share “many of the same cultural, economic and social 
characteristics” of white men and “ignore how their own race functions to mitigate some 
aspects of sexism and, moreover, how it often privileges them over and contributes to the 
domination of other women.”738 
For Crenshaw:  
… the failure to embrace the complexities of compoundedness is not simply a 
matter of political will, but is also due to the influence of a way of thinking about 
discrimination which structures politics so that struggles are categorized as 
singular issues. Moreover, this structure imports a descriptive and normative 
view of society that reinforces the status quo.739  
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Since Crenshaw’s piece in 1989, “intersectionality” has been applied to many axes of 
social divisions “that work together and influence each other.”740 “Intersectionality as an 
analytic tool gives people better access to the complexity of the world and of themselves,” say 
sociology professors Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge. It: 
examines how power relations are intertwined and mutually constructing. Race, class, 
gender, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, nation, religion, and age are categories of 
analysis, terms that reference important social divisions. But they are also categories 
that gain meaning from power relations of racism, sexism, heterosexism, and class 
exploitation.741 
The basic assumption of intersectionality is that categories do not stand alone but are 
“permeated by other categories … always in the process of creating and being created by 
dynamics of power.”742 This assumption is then applied to another concept, common in the 
literature, coined by Professor Collins, the “matrix of domination.”743 The matrix recognizes the 
“complexity of privilege” that manifests itself in various forms based on race, gender, class, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.744  
The matrix postulates various degrees of privilege – the middle-class, straight, white 
Anglo man has the unique status of being considered the “White Privileged” on the one end, 
with the subordinate group being the lower-class lesbian woman of colour on the other end. 
Most people fall in between these extremes and may yet have some form of privilege. For 
example, a working-class white man has vestiges of white privilege but would bristle at the 
idea of having any privilege (white, male, straight) because of his socio-economic status. The 
argument being made is that this defensive posture and blindness to privilege is a source of 
conflict “as subordinate groups try to organize against their own oppression.”745  
This analysis views white privilege and “whiteness as a social identity” being of a recent 
development from the capitalist forces and the class system of the United States in the 
nineteenth century.746 The class system and capitalist forces had the effect of pitting the poorer 
whites against the blacks during worker unrest as a mechanism to change the focus away from 
the oppression emanating from the capitalists. Through this process capitalists were able to 
maintain control and power over the poorer classes. 
The intersectional approach to public grievance for the disadvantaged groups, based on 
the different categorical identities, limits what those who are not of that group can express 
concerning any public policy matters affecting the victim group. For example, the white, 
straight, Anglo-male has no ability to express an opinion on a government policy that addresses 
the concerns of or affects the black, lesbian, woman.  
This leads to an environment of hypersensitivity. Language has come under increased 
scrutiny to such a scale that even asking an Asian American or Latino American where they are 
from is taken as an aggressive interaction (a “microaggression”) because it implies they are not 
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a true or real Americans. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt in describing that scenario state, 
“Microaggressions are small actions or word choices that seem on their face to have no 
malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of violence nonetheless.”747 
Thus, in the universities professors are expected to give “trigger warnings” alerting 
students to possible material taught by the professors that “might cause a strong emotional 
response.”748 
The aim of this movement according to Lukianoff and Haidt is to make university 
campuses “‘safe places’ where young adults are shielded from works and ideas that make some 
uncomfortable … [and] to punish anyone who interferes with that aim, even accidentally.”749 
Lukianoff and Haidt coined the term “vindictive protectiveness” to describe this attitude. No 
longer are university students learning how to think (that method of critical thinking that 
undergirded Western intellectual acumen and led to the West’s advances in science and 
technology), nor how to challenge their own presuppositions and beliefs. Instead, students are 
unable to cope with ideas and concepts different from their own. Lukianoff and Haidt warn that 
it “may be teaching students to think pathologically.”750 
Lukianoff and Haidt suggest that there are a number of possible explanations for this 
state of affairs.751 They speculate that the current generation may be suffering from the effects 
of parental hyper-protection that came as a reaction to increasing incidents of violent child 
abduction; as well as the increased political polarization resulting from the demonization of 
partisan opponents which makes compromise impossible.  
The moral judgements against the opposition in this atmosphere are reinforced by 
group identity so that any acknowledgement of merit to the other side is seen as a weakness. It 
is the “morality binds and blinds” concept referred to earlier in this book that prioritizes group 
identity over individual thought and analysis that may contradict the group. Social media, 
according to Lukianoff and Haidt, exacerbates the situation as this tech savvy generation joins 
in social movements that strengthen solidarity with the cause du jour.  
Unfortunately, this development involves a tendency for “emotional reasoning” that 
assumes that emotions reflect the reality of things – “I feel it, therefore it must be true.”752 
However, subjective feelings can never be the sole determination of reality. Lukinoff and Haidt 
observe that if emotional reasoning is left unrestrained then individuals will lash out at those 
who have done nothing wrong. To suggest that another is “offensive” is to now say they 
committed an objective wrong. While the sentiment underlying the prevention of hurtful 
speech to underprivileged groups was, as Lukianoff and Haidt note, “laudable … it quickly 
produced some absurd results.”753 Results such as the “water buffalo” incident. 
Professor Kors observes that “[w]hat we’re seeing now is a revolution of rising 
expectations. When you’re totally oppressed, small things don’t bother you. When great 
progress occurs, the remaining discriminations, however slight, become unbearable.”754 In 
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Kors’ view, university professors have not given their students “any sense of history. These 
kids don’t understand the vast difference between being black or gay or female then – and 
now.”755  
The inability to see the progress made in human rights in the West and the inability to 
live with dissonance because of identity politics makes it very difficult for groups to reconcile 
differences. Economic and social progress, as Kors’ comments suggest, has not alleviated 
discontent but has resulted in hypersensitivity toward difference. Society has become 
wealthier and the poverty line has increased compared to previous generations756 but the 
resentments based on inequality have become more pronounced.  
There is a disconnect, professor Kors points out, between what universities claim is 
being taught and what is, in fact, taught under the rubric of “public multiculturalism.” The claim 
is that it will be a study to develop “a deep appreciation of the diversity of human cultures.” 
However, universities teach that “there is one dominant culture in the West – Greek, Judeo-
Christian, and Enlightenment in its sources” that is “the enemy of authentic debate, human 
freedom and altruism everywhere. Capitalistic, sexist, racist, and Euro-centric, spreading 
ignorance and injustice, despotic power, and poverty everywhere.”757 Kors jokingly suggests, 
“[t]hat must be why people flee the West and why no one wants in.”758     
The irony of the “multiculturalists” is not lost on Kors: 
The so-called multiculturalists do not [mean], and have never meant, the 
study and the appreciation of evangelical Protestant culture, of traditionalists 
Catholic culture, of Black-American Pentecostal culture, or, indeed, the place of 
faith in Black and Hispanic American life, let alone the gender roles of Orthodox 
Jewish culture. They do not mean the study and appreciation of any 
assimilationist immigrant culture, or of White southern rural cultures.  
They also do not mean the serious study of West-African Benin culture, or 
the serious study of Confucian culture. Both requiring linguistic accomplishment 
and rigorous inquiry to achieve understanding. All they mean is the appreciation, 
the celebration, and the deep study of those intellectuals who think exactly the 
way that they do about the nature and causes of oppression wherever they are 
found, or, however non-representative those thinkers are, of the broader groups 
they allegedly represent and speak for.  
Further, their view is a humanly and a morally impoverished notion of 
diversity. Race, sex, and sexuality, as if each of these had one appropriate 
worldview and voice, but not religion, class, psychological type, taste or private 
passions and moral commitments.  
In terms of what is, in fact, a far more significant diversity on our 
campuses, students on the one hand, who affirm life, and on the other, students 
who are fearful, depressed, and fatalistic, the university is exhibiting a deep 
racialism and misogyny themselves. [They] assume that ego, strength correlates 
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to externalities and that whites, Christian men and heterosexuals have it, whereas 
blacks, women and gays do not.  
So while Christian students are asked to bear any number of affronts to 
their beliefs in the name of academic freedom, as is proper, a woman or a black on 
our campuses must be protected from the punchline of a joke? As if women and 
blacks were too weak to live with freedom or with the Bill of Rights? If you come 
to any moral conclusion from any thing I say let it be this: no one who tells you 
that you are too weak to live with freedom is your friend.759    
Kors maintains that this thinking is a rejection of “the reality of individual human 
life…. This is identity by blood. This is racialist fascism, in my view, not human decency of 
recognition of the complexity of real human life.”760    
The problem with identity as the basis of analysis is that it moves the focus away from 
the complexity of each person (made up of many factors including family history, experience, 
education, class) to a stereotype (often racist and bigoted) of the identity characteristic of the 
individual as being part of a collective identity. The fixation on identity that is currently 
manifested is more akin to tribalism. There is no allowance given to individual uniqueness that 
is not part of an expected tribe narrative. Such a fixation on the “tribe” (“all ‘people of colour’ 
are oppressed”) is itself an oppressive ideology where truth has no currency against the 
pursuit of power. “Power,” as Lord Acton quipped, “tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”761 is on point. The pursuit of power for its own sake is destructive.  
One’s identity is not the sum of who one is. Experiences of life – from family dynamics, 
childhood locale to education – are among a myriad of things that make us who we are 
individually. Our race, class, sexual orientation is part of the personal matrix, but it cannot be 
said to be the sole determiner of who we are or have any bearing on the worth of an argument 
we might make. An argument rises or falls on its own right, not the person’s identity who 
makes it. This gets us back to the Popperian view of the importance of avoiding all forms of 
authoritarianism – including that which is based on identity.  
 
5.3 Crisis Applied: The Jurisprudence 
 
“The basic nature of the common law,” Justice Ivan Rand noted, “lies in its flexible 
process of traditional reasoning upon significant social and political matter” [sic].762 Therefore, 
given the changing religio-socio-political dynamics and demographics in Canada over the last 
40 years, we may expect to see the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada evolve 
regarding the law’s definition of “religion,” and religious freedom. As will be noted below, legal 
scholars have concluded that such an evolution has occurred. I suggest that there are at least 
three dramatic changes in Canada that have led to a changing definition of religion and its 
protection: first, the country adopted the Canadian Charter of Rights as part of its Constitution, 
being the supreme law; second, the rise of non-Christian immigrant groups; and third, the 
decline of religious affiliation in the population. Such dynamics were to have a profound impact 
on the law. 
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The religious affiliations of Canadians have morphed from a dominant Christian 
(Protestant and Roman Catholic) focus to a more diverse religious affiliation. According to the 
Pew Forum Foundation, whereas 88% of Canadians identified as Christian in 1971, that 
number declined to 66% in 2011. Meanwhile the “other religion” category rose to 11% and 
those “religiously unaffiliated” rose to 24%.763  Indeed, if anything is certain it is that there has 
been a dramatic rise of the “religiously unaffiliated,” also known as the “nones.”764   
This development may help explain the willingness of young lawyers who are prepared 
to take part in the legal revolution against the law’s historic position that treated religion as 
special, as is evidenced in their opposition to TWU’s bid for a law school. More on that later. For 
now, it is important to recognize two significant points: first, the law has always been willing to 
change with the times but to do so on the basis of “traditional reasoning.” Second, the religious 
character of Canada is undergoing a dramatic change, but it is still a country whose citizens 
highly identify with the Christian religion. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the law 
would change in its definition of and understanding of religion and ultimately its treatment of 
religion in light of these developments. 
 
5.3.1 The Changing Definition and Treatment of Religion? 
 
Richard Moon suggests that there is a distinction between religious commitment that is 
protected as a matter of individual autonomy to choose one’s faith on the one hand; and 
religious identity that is a mark of one’s essence, which is protected on the basis of equality on 
the other hand.765 Moon posits that the pre-Charter and early Charter cases justified religious 
freedom on the basis of individual liberty to search for truth.  
However, the current rationale is a shift toward an equality analysis that requires the 
state not treat the practices of one religious group differently from another; nor should the 
state restrict religious practices unless it has a compelling state interest.766 “This shift in the 
courts’ understanding of the freedom’s justification,” according to Moon, “has been 
accompanied by a narrowing of the freedom’s scope or focus.”767   
Moon observes that the courts have been unevenly applying religious neutrality 
because of the complexity of religious adherence. Religion as a cultural identity can be viewed 
positively as a recognition that religion has some immutable characteristics, politically 
speaking, in the sense that a person is born and raised into a cultural community that 
inculcates a particular way of life.768   
State neutrality ensures that no one group will be at a disadvantage from another, 
thereby maintaining social stability. After all, “[i]f religious belief is central to the individual’s 
identity, then a judgment by the state that his beliefs or practices are less important or less true 
than others may be experienced as a denial of his equal worth and not simply as a rejection of 
his views and values.”769 
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The neutrality of the state requirement may also see religion from a negative view. The 
increasingly skeptical world sees religious beliefs as irrational and subject to cultural 
socialization rather than reasoned analysis of reality. On the one hand, religion as identity 
would see the state not interfering with the individual right to his or her religious practices. But 
on the other hand, since religion is irrational, the state must be protected from religion and 
religion must be private.770  
Moon’s work highlights the current dilemma of the law. The lack of consistent 
interpretation of state neutrality is due to the competing justifications of religious freedom. Is 
religion a cultural phenomenon requiring respect based on a person’s or group’s cultural 
identity subject to irrational religious presuppositions; or is it a faith commitment based on a 
rational search for truth?  
If Moon is correct in his analysis of the current state of the law in Canada, then we will 
have a serious problem going forward if the courts and the legal establishment decide that the 
appropriate definition of religion is to see it only as identity rather than the search for truth. 
The equality analysis will require, as Moon noted,771 that religion be seen as a private matter. If 
it is a private concern, then the state will have a much easier time to meet its obligation to be 
neutral.  
A private religion means that religion will have no political or public role. That is a 
straitjacket to which religion has rarely been confined. Religion has a very long history, as we 
have seen, of being conspicuous in the public. This Moon admits: “Religious belief systems, 
however, often say something about the way we should treat others and about the kind of 
society we should work to create.”772 
I take Moon’s assertion – that the post-Charter analysis of religion by the Supreme Court 
has evolved to a view of state neutrality requiring religion to be interpreted by means of 
equality principles – to imply that this is a new and more informed understanding of religion in 
the modern context. However, I suggest that the concept of state neutrality, as posited by Moon 
and discussed in recent case law by the Supreme Court,773 has its antecedents long before the 
Charter. It is found in the jurisprudence at the founding of Canada and its theoretical 
underpinnings go back to the best ideals of the Protestant Reformation. 
What is to be observed, I suggest, is not the evolution of justifications for 
accommodation of religion but the different contexts in which one justification is posited over 
another. It is true that contexts may demand different approaches in finding a resolution to the 
facts of a case but that cannot be because only one understanding of what constitutes religion 
(i.e. identity or choice) governs the outcome. For example, the Multani case, involving the 
student who wanted to wear his kirpan at school, may be characterized as a case involving 
religion as identity. The Court may view his particular religious faith as part of a recognizable 
religious community that should be respected; rather than deciding on the basis that this is a 
matter of a truth claim of the boy. Therefore, the Court was correct in admonishing any student 
who felt Multani was being unfairly favoured by the Court.  
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For the Sikh, as a religious person, the kirpan must be worn at all times, even to school. 
The public, who are not Sikh, are not able to comprehend that that religious practise is a truth 
claim. The practice is foreign to the uninformed public. But the public must continue to show 
respect to the religious practice due to the cultural reality of different religious communities 
that maintain practices different from the majority.  
The state’s neutrality is to be expected in Multani because it has no legitimate claim that 
would permit an infringement of the religious practice, especially given the fact that there was 
no evidence of a kirpan ever being used in violence on a school property in the country’s 
history. 
Moon’s observation may be explained, at least in part, by the changing demographics of 
Canada – the increase of non-Christian immigrant groups and the rise of the religious “nones”. 
However, the shift in interpretation of religion is not something that is new per se. It may be 
new in the post-Charter era because the Supreme Court of Canada has not referenced such 
concepts until recently, but the conceptual framework of equality among religious groups has a 
pedigree that goes back to before Canada’s founding and was certainly evident in the early 
Canadian jurisprudence. This is illustrated in the pre-Charter cases when the SCC had to deal 
with the struggle of accommodating Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec during the 1940s-1960s (as 
discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
5.3.2 The Crisis Conclusion 
 
If the Sexular Age is upon us, can religious communities and individuals opt out? To 
what extent? What are the consequences for failure to provide such an exemption? Is it in 
keeping with our understanding of the law? Religious practise has often received exemption 
from legal norms, as will be highlighted below. Will it receive this continued treatment in the 
Sexular Age? 
A review of the undercurrent in our cultural milieu suggests that religion is an 
oppressive force from which society must be liberated. The irony is that it is a forced liberation. 
Taylor says we have transitioned “from a society where belief in God is unchallenged 
and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and 
frequently not the easiest to embrace.”774 Belief or non-belief is a voluntary commitment one 
must make concerning ultimate realities. The voluntary nature of the secular age has at its root 
a pluralist/multicultural buffet from which to choose.  
The Sexular Age is a layer on top of Taylor’s Secular Age. However, rather than a buffet 
of choice, the Sexular Age is authoritarian. Its articulation of truth claims about what it means 
to be human and thus the public good is meant to be the new norm. Accommodation of 
religious difference has little traction because it is viewed as a capitulation to the former 
‘patriarchal’ norm. This lies at the heart of the legal community’s opposition to Trinity Western 
University’s bid for a law school. TWU’s desire to maintain a space for the religious 
commitment to monogamous heterosexual marriage is offensive to the legal community. 
However, as Justice Campbell noted, such moral disapproval does not give the state the right to 
enforce its moral opinion.775 
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The fact that sexularism is uncompromising tells us that it is extremist; it cannot allow 
space for a differing opinion. The irony, of course, is that religion has been accused of 
extremism. Indeed, there are examples of religious groups that upon entering a new territory 
are not willing to allow religious differences to remain in that space. Antique religious symbols 
are often destroyed in such communities. Former houses of worship of one religious 
community are taken over and ceremonially set aside as a sacred site of the new religious 
community.  
Sexularism operates in similar fashion. A religious community that teaches a moral 
precept at odds with sexular thought is deemed not only inappropriate but is refused the 
license to operate.  
The question now: is there space in a western liberal democracy to permit religious 
individuals, communities and their institutions to opt out of the norms, such as they are 
thought to exist, of the Sexular Age?  
Will the Sexular Age continue the liberal democratic tradition of allowing religious 
communities the right of exemption? Or, will the Sexular Age be absolutist – not willing that 
any citizen should depart from the requirement to be “free”?  
The extent to which our Sexular Age accommodates religious difference was illustrated 
in the law’s rejection of Trinity Western University’s place in legal education. It has had the 
unfortunate experience of being forced twice to defend its claim to opt out of the Sexular Age. 
TWU does not accept the hyper-individualism of our time. It does not accept the “freedom to 
experience the full range of human emotions, behavior and relationships, without gender 
defined constraints.” Instead, its religious campus is governed by orthodox Christian norms 
that include marriage as solely between one man and one woman.  
The TWU case is indicative of the struggle over religious accommodation in the 
complicated Sexular Age. On the one hand, there is a complex cultural milieu that highly prizes 
individual freedom of choice in all things, seen most dramatically in all matters sexual. This 
coincides with the court doctrine that “sexual conduct is an integral part of a person’s very 
identity. One cannot be divorced from the other.”776 On the other hand, there are religious 
communities, as exemplified by TWU, that categorically reject this Sitz im leben.  
Such communities and their individual members seek to maintain their own religious 
culture and identity separate and apart. While they must be in the world they do not want to be 
of the world. Such communities have very different comprehensive views and moral 
commitments.  
The classic liberal response has, until now, allowed people the freedom to organize 
themselves based on their ultimate moral commitments such as religion. The state could only 
interfere with those organizations in the rarest of cases such as female circumcision. However, 
with TWU we have a community where adults voluntarily comply with certain rules of the 
community. There is no obligation to study at TWU.  
The Sexular Age has changed that consensus. Indeed, religious groups such as TWU are 
viewed as having “degrading and disrespectful” policies that must be culled from the public 
square. 
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6 THE LEGAL REVOLUTION ON THE MARCH:  THE CASE OF TWU LAW SCHOOL 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Kuhn observes that there is a point during a scientific revolution when the paradigm 
crisis reaches a “Eureka Moment”: a moment when a scientist, or a small group of scientists, 
connects the dots so that a bigger picture outside of the current paradigm is seen. It’s an “Aha!” 
discovery. Things click. These scientists realize that the research anomalies point to the fact 
that the current paradigm is no longer valid. A new paradigm is necessary to explain the 
scientific phenomena under study.  
The common law is not without its own “Eureka Moments”. Such moments often occur 
as a result of a “hard case” or a “great case” that changes the way things were. These are the 
cases that “push the law” along or “nudge it” toward a new way of looking at the law. For 
example, the Carter777 case overturned the previous law against medical assistance in dying; 
and the Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage778 said the Parliament of Canada had the jurisdiction 
to redefine marriage from the heterosexual norm.  
The standard common law explanation is that the law is constant and evolves slowly 
over time, making incremental changes building upon previous precedents. The stare decisis 
principle says that the decisions made by the higher courts stand in judgement of future 
litigants in similar circumstances in the lower courts. Judges are bound to follow the legal 
principles enunciated by a higher court. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has been 
willing to take a more flexible approach on the doctrine, it nevertheless remains applicable.779 
The standard argument is that any modification of a precedent requires jurists “to show 
that incremental adaptation is not simply a cover for radical realignment and … that the 
balance between stability and change is neither ad hoc nor unpredictable.”780 It cannot be 
simply an ideological preference. 
Professor Allan C. Hutchinson argues “that the common law is more of a political, 
unruly, and open-ended process than traditional scholars are prepared or able to admit.”781 In 
his view, and one that I maintain helps explain the revolution on the legal place of religion, a 
great case is only great “as long as the lawyers and judges are prepared to treat it as one or as 
long as the broader community is not prepared to reject lawyers’ animating values.”782 Kuhn 
similarly observed that the scientific community, as a whole, had to agree that the new 
scientific paradigm was what it claimed to be. The legal community, like the scientific 
community, is driven to some extent by the social dynamic of peer pressure. What is the 
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a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence 
that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” (para 42). Where, on the other hand, the legal issue 
remains the same and arises in a similar context, the precedent still represents the law and must be followed 
by the courts (Bedford, at para 46).” 
780 Allan C. Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 125-
126. 
781 Ibid at 126. 
782 Ibid at 131. 
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acceptable opinion on a subject will be determined by the prevailing opinion within the 
profession.  
Hutchinson observes that “[o]nce the values that underpin a case no longer garner 
sufficient support or the informing context has changed substantially, a great case will fall by 
the wayside and be consigned to the ditch of errors, mistakes, and anomalies.”783 Instead, 
maintains Hutchinson, the great cases should be seen as “temporary lighthouses”:  
designed with a particular purpose in mind, constructed with available materials, and 
with a limited working life. As society moves, the need for such construction fades, and 
other, more useful devices are designed to take their place … As with celebrity, 
greatness in law is no less dependent on passing trends and shifting contexts. 
Depending on the audience, today’s star is yesterday’s wanna-be or tomorrow’s has-
been.784   
This is particularly evident in constitutional cases, says Hutchinson, where it is the 
“substantive effects, not formal attributes” of the cases that are the markers of whether they 
will be great cases.785 In essence, neither the “canonical tradition” nor the “social tradition” can 
be used “to ground constitutional interpretation” as they are so “imprecise and open that they 
can justify almost any reading.”786 “Great cases have to earn their authority in the political 
squares of legal and popular opinion,” say Hutchinson. “Once that opinion begins to shift, the 
canonical force of such cases will be affected accordingly; talk or error or mistake is a rhetorical 
device to justify a particular substantive position or a change in the law.”787 
The opposition to TWU’s law school proposal is evidence that the legal revolution on 
the status of religion is now in the crisis stage.788 There is a significant group within the legal 
profession that would deny TWU’s right to rely upon the current legal paradigm on religion.789 
For lack of a better term I will apply to them the label “the anti-TWU group.”790 This anti-TWU 
                                                     
783 Ibid. 
784 Ibid at 131-132. 
785 Ibid at 139. 
786 Ibid at 139-140. 
787 Ibid at 145. 
788 While the TWU case is Canadian, I suggest the same principles are at stake for the legal profession in every 
liberal democratic country.  
789For example, the Schulich School of Law OUTlaw Society, in its factum at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
(see The Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v. Trinity Western University, 2016 NSCA 59 [TWU NSCA 2016], Factum 
of the intervener, C.A. No. 438894), argued, at paras 29–31, that “the fact that TWU is not subject to the 
Charter is irrelevant.” In other words, the current paradigm that exempts private religious universities from 
Charter scrutiny since the Charter only applies to government means nothing. The law, therefore, is 
apparently immaterial because “Charter values” of “equality and respect for human dignity” trump. 
790 By using the term “anti-TWU group” I am not meaning it in a disparaging manner. It is descriptive. This 
group of academics and legal professionals are of the view that TWU represents the old bigotry of years gone 
by. They see TWU as not only anachronistic in its religious beliefs and practices but somehow dangerous to 
liberal democracy. This is most unfortunate as there is every indication that TWU and its graduates have been 
exemplary in providing university education and service. The Law Society of BC conducted its own 
investigation into whether TWU graduates were involved in discriminatory conduct at BC’s three public law 
schools. They came up empty. What they did find from the University of Victoria was that the 2011 gold 
medalist was a former TWU student. (See Memorandum from the Law Society of British Columbia, Policy and 
Legal Services Department, to The Benchers (31 March 2014), Subject “Follow up to Enquiries from February 
28, 2014 Benchers Meeting,” Appendix 9, online: (pdf) 
<https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/newsroom/TWU-memo1.pdf>). The fact that 
the Law Society felt that this investigation was even necessary shows, in my view, a stereotypical anti-
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group, which acts as abolitionists in that they de facto argue for the elimination of religious 
accommodation by identity politics, advocates for a new paradigm that takes away religious 
accommodation, as historically understood,791 especially when religious belief and practice are 
at odds with its own norm on human sexuality.792 This anti-religion faction has been highly 
influenced by legal academics who have advocated this position for a number of years.793 
As indicated by the decisions on TWU in the Supreme Courts of Nova Scotia794 and 
British Columbia,795 there yet remains, at least within the judiciary, some allegiance to 
religion’s special legal status as historically understood. Their decisions on TWU suggest that 
the proposal of the new paradigm is still too radical a departure from the law. However, even 
the judiciary is not unified, as evidenced by the decisions of the Ontario Divisional Court,796 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal,797 and now, the Supreme Court of Canada, against TWU. 
As this legal revolution against religion travels on the same trajectory that scientific 
revolutions have in the past, there are a number of long-term implications that need to be 





6.2.1 Trinity Western University Education Degree Accreditation 
 
To understand the TWU law school case you first need to be aware that this is not the 
first time that Trinity Western University has had to face protracted litigation over its 
                                                     
religious bias against TWU. It is reasonable to imagine the public outcry if a similar investigation was 
conducted on graduates of BC public universities. “Anti-TWU group” seems therefore appropriate but it is 
indicative of all academics and legal professionals who wish to expunge from the law any semblance of 
traditional protections given to religion in the law that TWU has been relying on in its defense. 
791 The justices of the Ontario Division Court challenged the argument that TWU’s discriminatory Covenant is 
entitled to the protection of exemptions in human rights legislation. Said the Court, “…discrimination is still 
discrimination, regardless of whether it is unlawful. The fact that, for policy reasons, a Provincial Legislature 
has chosen not to make certain acts of discrimination actionable under human rights legislation does not 
mean that those acts are any less discriminatory. The Community Covenant, by its own terms, constitutes a 
prejudicial treatment of different categories of people. It is, therefore, by its very nature, discriminatory.” See 
TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776 at para 108.  
792 Paul Bramadat, “Managing and Imagining Religion in Canada from the Top and the Bottom: 15 Years 
After,” in Benjamin L. Berger & Richard Moon, eds, Religion and The Exercise of Public Authority (Oxford: Hart, 
2016) at 67, describes the opposition to the TWU law school on the basis that “the covenant: a) discriminates 
against individuals engaged in lawful sexual activities, b) is not in keeping with the ostensibly secular 
professional standards governing other law programmes and legal societies in Canada, and c) is contrary to 
the spirit and the letter of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that protects same-sex relationships.” 
793 See, for example, Robert Wintemute, “Religion vs. Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human Rights?” (2002) 1 
J.L. & Equal. 125; MacDougall, supra notes 214, 483; MacDougall & Short, supra note 483; Elaine Craig, “The 
Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law Degree 
Program” (2013) 25 Can. J. Women & L. 148 [“Rejecting Trinity”]; Elaine Craig, “TWU Law: A Reply to 
Proponents of Approval” (2014) 37 Dalhousie L.J. 621 [“A Reply”]. 
794 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775; TWU NSCA 2016, supra note 789. 
795 Trinity Western University v. Law Society of British Columbia 2015 BCSC 2326 [2015] B.C.J. No. 2697 
[TWU BCSC 2015]; TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478. 
796 TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776; TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701.  
797 TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701.  
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admissions policies. TWU’s admissions policies, though wording has changed from time to 
time, have consistently required students to abstain from sexual relations outside of the 
traditional marriage relationship. Such criteria would normally be unacceptable as it violates 
human rights legislation. However, TWU is exempt from the B.C. human rights legislation 
because it is a religious university, and as such is free to determine and maintain its religious 
character through a faith-based code of conduct. 
 In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled798 that the British Columbia College of 
Teachers (BCCT) was wrong to deny accreditation to TWU’s education degree. The BCCT was of 
the view that TWU’s admissions policy was discriminatory against the LGBTQ community.799   
In particular, the BCCT argued that TWU graduates, after being educated in the TWU 
Christian environment, would discriminate against LGBTQ students when they became 
teachers in the public school system. The SCC rejected BCCT’s argument, saying that “TWU is 
not for everybody; it is designed to address the needs of people who share a number of 
religious convictions.”800 So “the admissions policy of TWU alone is not in itself sufficient to 
establish discrimination as it is understood in our s. 15 jurisprudence.”801 The Court recognized 
that TWU is a private institution, exempt from the British Columbia human rights legislation 
and to which the Charter does not apply.  
Further, the Court noted that the Charter equality rights are not engaged when there is a 
“voluntary adoption of a code of conduct based on a person’s own religious beliefs, in a private 
institution.”802 The 2001 SCC’s analysis made it clear: 
TWU’s Community Standards, which are limited to prescribing conduct of 
members while at TWU, are not sufficient to support the conclusion that the BCCT 
should anticipate intolerant behaviour in the public schools. Indeed, if TWU’s 
Community Standards could be sufficient in themselves to justify denying 
accreditation, it is difficult to see how the same logic would not result in the denial 
of accreditation to members of a particular church. The diversity of Canadian 
society is partly reflected in the multiple religious organizations that mark the 
societal landscape and this diversity of views should be respected. The BCCT did 
not weigh the various rights involved in its assessment of the alleged 
discriminatory practices of TWU by not taking into account the impact of its 
decision on the right to freedom of religion of the members of TWU. Accordingly, 
this Court must.803 
 
6.2.2 BCCT Arguments Reject Religion’s Status 
 
The BCCT denied TWU’s education degree accreditation because its Council believed 
“the proposed program follows discriminatory practices which are contrary to the public 
interest and public policy which the College must consider under its mandate as expressed in 
the Teaching Profession Act.”804 In its May 22, 1996 letter to TWU, the BCCT specifically 
referenced TWU’s requirement that students sign a contract of their responsibilities that 
                                                     
798 TWU 2001, supra note 26. 




803 Ibid at para 33. 
804 Ibid at para 5. 
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included their keeping traditional sexual norms.805 Later in a newsletter the BCCT referenced 
the fact that Canadian and BC human rights legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation as a segue into a statement highlighting that the Charter and human rights 
acts “express the values which represent the public interest.”806 The labelling of homosexual 
behaviour as sinful excludes gays and lesbians.  
What was said next is telling: “The Council believes and is supported by law in the belief 
that sexual orientation is no more separable from a person than colour.”807 It is then because of 
that “belief” that “Persons of homosexual orientation, like persons of colour, are entitled to 
protection and freedom from discrimination under the law.”808 
The use of the word “belief” is intriguing. The BCCT obviously recognized that science 
has yet to definitively prove809 that sexual orientation is “no more separable from a person 
than colour.”810 Therefore, it was necessary for them to state it as a “belief.”   
In essence, BCCT demanded TWU reject its belief on the matter of human sexuality 
(based on Scripture) for BCCT’s belief (based on its view of the “public interest”). When it 
comes to controversial issues, as indeed sexual orientation remains so, the best course for the 
courts is to allow these matters to play themselves out. This is referred to later in my reference 
to William Eskridge’s call for courts not to “constitutionalize” these controversial matters.  
Nowhere, in the 2001 case, was BCCT concerned about the state of the law in protecting 
TWU’s religious freedom rights. Nor was there any recognition that TWU was not subject to the 
Charter or the human rights legislation. BCCT’s sole concern was its “belief.” It did not see any 
public interest in allowing TWU its belief. BCCT had no evidence of TWU graduates 
discriminating against public school students. But lack of evidence appeared not to be a major 
concern when “belief” seems to have been the motivating factor. It is ironic therefore to hear 
                                                     
805 Ibid at para 6. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Ibid (emphasis added). 
808 Ibid. 
809 There is an increasing number of studies that suggest sexual orientation is not akin to race or “skin colour” 
as suggested by BCCT. Here are but a few studies: Sergey Gavrilets & William R Rice, “Genetic models of 
homosexuality: Generating testable predictions” (2006) 273 Proceedings of the Royal Society 3031; J Michael 
Bailey, Michael P Dunne & Nicholas G Martin, “Genetic and Environmental Influences on Sexual Orientation 
and Its Correlates in an Australian Twin Sample” (2000) 78 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, 
524, 533-534; N E Whitehead, “My Genes Made Me Do It”: Homosexuality and the Scientific Evidence, 4th 
edition (Whitehead Associates, 2016), 35-36; Lawrence S Mayer & Paul R McHugh, “Sexuality and gender: 
Findings from the Biological, Psychological and Social Sciences” (2016) 50 The New Atlantis 7, 39-41; Jacon 
Felson, “The Effect of religious Background on Sexual Orientation” (2011) 7:4 Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Research on Religion 9; Elizabeth M Weiss, et al, “A Qualitative Study of Ex-Gay and Ex-Ex-gay Experiences” 
(2010) 14:4 Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health 291, 314. J Michael Bailey, et al, “Sexual Orientation, 
Controversy and Science” (2016) 17:2 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 56. 
810 Consider the following from Mayer & McHugh’s study, supra note 809, at 34: 
The genetic influences affecting any complex behaviours – whether sexual behaviours or 
interpersonal interactions – depend in part on individuals’ life experiences as they mature. Genes 
constitute only one of the many key influences on behaviours in addition to environmental 
influences, personal choices and interpersonal experiences. The weight of evidence to date strongly 
suggests that the contribution of genetic factors [to same sex attraction] is modest. We can say with 
confidence that genes are not the sole, essential cause of sexual orientation; there is evidence that 
genes play a modest role in contributing to the development of sexual attractions and behaviours but 
little evidence to support a simplistic ‘born this way’ narrative concerning the nature of sexual 
orientation.  
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legal academics accuse TWU of being incapable of critical thought because of its religious 
beliefs. 
The BCCT attempt to limit TWU’s religious freedom was a direct challenge to the legal 
status given to religion and religious organizations. BCCT is a state actor that maintained a 
different belief on the matter of sexual orientation than TWU. Its refusal to accredit TWU’s 
education degree was an attempt to coerce a religious institution to change its religious belief. 
This pattern would be repeated by the law societies when TWU sought accreditation for its law 
degree. Rather than accept the state of the law, BCCT thought to challenge what it considered 
an unjust law. That challenge ultimately failed at the SCC but it did lay the groundwork for the 
current struggle. 
 
6.2.3 Religion’s Status Conditionally Maintained 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected BCCT’s challenge to TWU’s religious 
requirements for its students. As a result, the SCC upheld the traditional deference the law has 
given to religion and religious organizations. 
The factual context required an assessment of the “…place of private institutions in our 
society and the reconciling of competing rights and values. Freedom of religion, conscience and 
association coexist with the right to be free of discrimination based on sexual orientation.”811 
The Court highlighted812 the fact that many Canadian universities have religious affiliations; the 
Constitution made special provisions for religious public education; and the human rights 
legislation specifically made exemptions for religious institutions. The B.C. legislature also 
passed five bills in favour of TWU between 1969 and 1985. The reasonable conclusion is that it 
was not against the public interest to have post-secondary schools based on Christian 
philosophy. These references by the SCC to religion’s role in establishing universities, the 
constitutional provisions for religion in education and the exemptions found in human rights 
legislation are tacit recognition of the special place that religion had in the law. In reconciling 
the rights, the Court maintained that “the proper place to draw the line in cases like the one at 
bar is generally between belief and conduct.”813 As there was no evidence of TWU graduates 
discriminating against public school students, the BCCT was wrong in its decision and the Court 
ordered the accreditation of the TWU teacher training program. The robust dissent of Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, in an 8-1 decision, was scathing. She maintained that in this context the 
“public interest” only required an evaluation of equality considerations. Other Charter values 
such as freedom of religion “…are not germane to the public interest in ensuring that teachers 
have the requisites to foster supportive classroom environments in public schools.”814   
For Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the BCCT should have been given due deference as they 
were not a human rights tribunal and did not need to consider the human rights implications 
for teachers – their interest was that of the non-discriminatory atmosphere for students in the 
public schools. By signing the code of conduct the students of TWU, as potential teachers in the 
public-school system, were complicit in an act of discrimination. And there were consequences 
for private belief.  
                                                     
811 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 34. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Ibid at para 36. 
814 Ibid at para 60.  
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She also took umbrage with the claim of TWU that one can separate condemnation of 
the “sexual sin” of homosexual behaviour from the tolerance of the person with a homosexual 
orientation. The rubric is “Love the sinner but hate the sin.” She challenged “the idea that it is 
possible to condemn a practice so central to the identity of a protected and vulnerable minority 
without thereby discriminating against its members and affronting their human dignity and 
personhood.”815 The anti-TWU position does not consider it appropriate that religious 
communities have the ability to deprive their members of sexual pleasure.  
Despite L’Heureux- Dubé’s dissent, the SCC reiterated that equality rights cannot eclipse 
freedom of religion. There must be a proper balance as to the effects a decision would have on 
the respective interests. In the BCCT case, the “public interest” not only included the equality 
rights of the public-school students, it also included the religious freedom concerns of teachers, 
and religious institutions such as TWU.  
The Court affirmed BCCT’s role in considering the equality principles of the Charter and 
human rights law in evaluating its decisions, but reiterated that in doing so it must look at the 
whole context – the interrelationship with other rights and people affected. The Constitution is 
to be viewed from a broad perspective – s. 15 rights include not only sexual orientation but 
religion, s. 2(a) freedom of religion, s. 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 educational rights – all 
exhibit a Canadian system of support for the widest possible tolerance of a broad spectrum of 
beliefs and practices.  
Considering BCCT’s failure to respect TWU’s religious freedom it is not uncharitable to 
suggest that BCCT was willing to ride roughshod over the long-standing legal protections given 
to religion. Running through the BCCT argument and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent is the 
view that religion has no place in the “public sphere” when it comes to matters involving 
sexuality. In light of the SCC’s 2018 decisions they were ahead of their time.816 The law has now 
caught up to their revolutionary position.  
 
6.3 Crisis:  Trinity Western School of Law Accreditation 
 
6.3.1 Law School Proposal 
 
TWU’s School of Law proposal is unique in that it is geared to ensuring that the TWU 
graduate has developed practical skills for law practice.817 Most law schools are centred on the 
theoretical dimensions of law but TWU “will integrate into its curriculum the formation of 
professionalism including the nature of the profession of law, ethics and client relations” and  
will have upper year core competencies including “drafting documents, negotiation and 
advocacy.”818 
The TWU approach is to hire faculty who are serious about teaching the practical side of 
legal practice. The TWU student will also be placed in a mentorship “with a practitioner mentor 
                                                     
815 Ibid at para 69. 
816 Indeed, at the LSUC Convocation on 10 April 2014, politician and lawyer Marion Boyd quipped, “those of 
you who know Claire [L’Heureux-Dubé] know that she’s fond of saying, ‘Well, when I dissent, the law changes 
in 10 years,’” supra note 487 at 166. 
817 Trinity Western University, “Proposal for a School of Law at Trinity Western University” (June 2012), 
Submission for accreditation by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, online (pdf): Trinity Western 
University <https://www.twu.ca/sites/default/files/assets/proposal-for-a-school-of-law-at-twu.pdf> 
[“Submission for Accreditation”]. 
818 Ibid, at 10. 
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for the first year. Mentors will be asked to invite students to their law firm to help them see 
first-hand how a law practice works and the ethical and professional framework at work in law 
offices.”819 The purpose is to ensure that TWU graduates are confident and capable of 
practicing law immediately. 
“What we are wanting to focus on is to graduate practice-ready lawyers like a medical 
school that produces ready to work doctors,” said Professor Janet Epp-Buckingham in a CBC 
Radio interview.820 “Right now the law schools across Canada have a more theoretical focus 
and they count on the articling year for law students to learn the actual practise skills. What we 
want to do here is to create a law school based on Christian values that’s like a super high-
quality medical school.”821   
Buckingham explained that while most law schools have some focus on the “hard legal 
skills” like legal research, writing, advocacy, and negotiating, they do not have as much focus on 
drafting documents. “We also want to look at ‘soft skills’ like teamwork, leadership, problem 
solving, relationship building, and at a Christian law school I would also add being a reconciler. 
We want to look at lawyers who can diffuse stress and conflict rather than promote it.”822   
TWU’s proposal is also focused on several underserved areas of legal practice. First, in 
keeping with TWU’s “rich history of outreach and volunteerism within needy communities,” it 
emphasizes non-profits and charities law.823 This is a significant sector which very few 
Canadian universities address.824   
In fact, TWU would be the first and only law school in the country to offer a 
specialization in charity law. One intention is to advocate for marginalized groups such as those 
living on the streets of Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside where TWU proposes a pro-bono legal 
clinic. Second, there will be a focus on small businesses and entrepreneurs so that its graduates 
will be competent to assist in small start-up enterprises. Third, TWU’s emphasis on developing 
the practical skills of law will equip its graduates with the competencies to practice in small 
and medium size law firms. This is a needed shift from the current model of law schools 
catering to the larger urban firms.  
Finally, the proposal has a strong emphasis on ethics – TWU’s website explained: 
Leadership, integrity, and character development are central to TWU’s Christian 
identity, worldview and philosophy of education. We encourage students to see the 
practice of law as a high calling, and for that reason we will challenge them to confront, 
debate, and ponder the great questions of meaning, values, and ethics. Our hope is that 
TWU School of Law graduates will believe in and demonstrate a different perception of 
                                                     
819 Ibid, at 17. 
820 Interview of Janet Epp-Buckingham by Anna Maria Tremonti (29 March 2013), on The Current, CBC Radio, 
Toronto: “Would a law school at a private Christian University discriminate against gays and lesbians?”. 
821 Ibid. 
822 Ibid. 
823 “Submission for Accreditation,” supra note 817 at 10. 
824 Only  three Canadian law schools have a course in charity law:  University of Ottawa, “Charities and non-
Profit Organizations” (CML4122), online: <http://ottawa.courseguru.ca/cml4122-charities-and-non-profit-
organizations-300-3-cr/>; University of Victoria, “Nonprofit Sector Law” (Law 396) online: 
https://web.uvic.ca/calendar2016-05/CDs/LAW/396.html; and the University of Manitoba, “Philanthropy 
and the Law” (Law 3120) online: <http://law.robsonhall.com/current-students1/course-
descriptions/philanthropy-and-the-law/>. See also this student perspective for more courses and training in 
charity law: Benjamin Miller, “Making charity law a part of your legal education,” Canadian Lawyer Magazine 
(21 November 2016), online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/article/making-charity-law-a-part-of-
your-legal-education-3449/>. 
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professionalism than the current marketplace promotes. TWU-educated lawyers will be 
expected to be not just legal technicians, but also trusted advisors who serve clients of 
every kind.825 
Blair A. Major observes that “TWU’s proposed law school pushes away from the 
centralized and tacit knowledge of the legal profession and toward the active engagement of 
legal professionals (and law students) with the foundational discourse of the legal professional 
community.”826 In short, TWU proposed to practically implement the practice of law’s virtures 
in everyday life. It would do so by ensuring that the student body would not only learn the law 
but understand its ethical foundations in real life practical experience. 
 
6.3.2 Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
 
When TWU’s law school proposal was submitted to the Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada (FLSC) in June 2012 it created a stir among legal academics. The Canadian Council of 
Law Deans was among the first to raise opposition against TWU’s admissions policy. Dean Bill 
Flanagan, of Queen’s University (in Kingston, Ontario), wrote, “We would urge the Federation 
to investigate whether TWU’s covenant is inconsistent with federal or provincial law.” He also 
asked that the Federation “consider this covenant and its intentionally discriminatory impact 
on gay, lesbian, and bisexual students when evaluating TWU’s application to establish an 
approved common law program.”827  
Flanagan noted that this was “a matter of great concern” for the Law Deans, insisting 
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unlawful in Canada and fundamentally at 
odds with the core values of all Canadian law schools.”828  
Flanagan’s letter is worth noting because it fails to give recognition to religious 
accommodation in the law. It is particularly telling that there is no mention of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s 2001 decision, addressing TWU’s admissions policy in a similar situation. In 
the ordinary course, when providing a public good or service, discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is unlawful. However, whether an action is unlawfully discriminatory is 
contextually driven. As a private, religious university TWU has been granted a right to reaffirm 
its religious identity by the British Columbia human rights legislation.829 This was explicitly 
recognized by the SCC in 2001 when it acknowledged “that a religious institution is not 
considered to breach the [BC Human Rights Code] where it prefers adherents of its religious 
                                                     
825 “Submission for Accreditation,” supra note 817. 
826 Blair A. Major, “Trinity Western University Law: The Boundary and Ethos of the Legal Community,” Alberta 
Law Review (2017) 55:1, 167, at 196. 
827 Letter from Bill Flanagan, President of the Canadian Council of Law Deans, to J. L. Hunter and Gérald R. 
Tremblay, President, Federation of Canadian Law Societies (20 November 2012), online (pdf): Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada <http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUCouncilofCdnLawDeansNov202012.pdf> 
[Bill Flanagan Letter]. 
828 Ibid.  
829 Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s. 41 (1):   
41  (1) If a charitable, philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or social organization or 
corporation that is not operated for profit has as a primary purpose the promotion of the interests 
and welfare of an identifiable group or class of persons characterized by a physical or mental 
disability or by a common race, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
marital status, political belief, colour, ancestry or place of origin, that organization or corporation 
must not be considered to be contravening this Code because it is granting a preference to members 
of the identifiable group or class of persons. 
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constituency”.830 A decade later, there can be no doubting that the Law Deans were aware of 
TWU’s legal history, including the SCC’s declaration that TWU was not subject to the anti-
discriminatory provision of the BC human rights legislation. In other words, the BC human 
rights legislation permits religiously-based discrimination for religious institutions such as 
TWU. Therefore, TWU is compliant with the legislation. 
It is difficult to make sense of the Law Deans’ concern about illegality given TWU’s 
religious identity, past litigation, and success at the SCC in 2001 representing the current state 
of the law. The only reasonable conclusion is that the Law Deans were displeased with the 
law’s accommodation of religious communities that have, in their view, an anachronistic 
understanding of human sexuality.  
In other words, the law’s current state, in the minds of the Law Deans, is unjust. It must 
be changed. There must be a challenge – or to use Kuhn’s parlance, a revolution – against the 
law’s paradigm. 
This would explain the additional and most revealing claim in Flanagan’s letter – the 
notion that TWU’s discrimination is “fundamentally at odds with the core values of all Canadian 
law schools.” Therein lies the rub. TWU would not be congruent with the other law schools that 
do not discriminate based on sexual orientation. To further emphasize their opposition, the 
Law Deans subsequently amended their constitution to ensure that TWU’s law dean, if TWU 
were to be successful in its bid for a law school, would not be able to have a seat at the 
Canadian Council of Law Deans.831 As far as the Law Deans are concerned they have drawn a 
“line in the sand” and they are not willing to back away from it – the law be damned. 
Given that such an important and influential body as the Law Deans spoke so stridently 
against TWU, it did not take long for other members of the legal community to voice similar 
opposition.  
 
6.3.2.1 The Canadian Bar Association 
 
In a March 18, 2013 letter, the Canadian Bar Association Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Conference (SOGIC) rejected the Federation’s “perceived limitations,” arguing the FLSC 
had a duty to look beyond the academic standards of TWU’s proposal.832 It suggested that the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Doré833 required law societies to “act consistently with 
the values underlying the grant of discretion, including Charter values.”834 The letter suggests 
that the College of Teachers case is no longer relevant. One argument given is that in the 2001 
case the BCCT did not directly apply the Charter or human rights legislation but that Doré now 
requires it. Doré is therefore the preferred decision to follow, not the 2001 TWU decision.  
The CBA misread the 2001 decision. The SCC did base its decision on both the Charter 
and the human rights legislation and expected BCCT to have done so. For it stated that BCCT 
                                                     
830 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 35. 
831 Section 2.3 was added to the Council of Canadian Law Deans Constitution to read, “Membership is limited 
to Deans of Law schools which are committed to principles of equality and non-discrimination in access to, 
and in the provision of, legal education.” See “Consitution” (as amended 8 November 2013), online: 
CCLD/CDFDC <http://www.ccld-cdfdc.ca/index.php/about-us/constitution>.    
832 Letter from Amy Sakalauskas, Robert Peterson & Level Chan, Canadian Bar Association, to Gérald 
Tremblay (18 March 2013), online (pdf): Federation of the Law Societies of Canada 
http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUCdnBarAssnMarch182013.pdf [CBA Letter]. 
833 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 [Doré]. 
834 Ibid at para 24. 
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was “also required to consider issues of religious freedom” in the Charter.835 Therefore, even 
without Doré’s analysis, a similar approach was in fact followed in the 2001 ruling. 
The CBA also argued that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in 2001 was subsequently 
endorsed by the SCC. But, as noted above, it is not that simple. The SCC still maintains that 
“[g]enuine comments on sexual activity are not likely to fall into the purview of a prohibition 
against hate.”836 It is a misreading of the Whatcott case to suggest that TWU is prohibited from 
having its Community Covenant based on Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in 2001. As John B. 
Laskin noted in his letter of 2013: 
Just as in BCCT, the Supreme Court in Whatcott found the proper balance point 
between equality and freedom of religion values to be the point at which conduct linked 
to the exercise of freedom of religion resulted in actual harm. Absent evidence of actual 
harm, it held in both cases, freedom of religion values must be given effect. … lawyers in 
Canada are subject to ethical duties to treat others with respect and avoid 
discrimination. But in BCCT, the Supreme Court was acutely sensitive to the role of 
teachers as a “medium for the transmission of values.” The Court considered it “obvious 
that the pluralistic nature of society and the extent of diversity in Canada are important 
elements that must be understood by future teachers.”  
The Court nonetheless had no difficulty concluding that graduates of TWU would 
“treat homosexuals fairly and respectfully.”  
If the TWU teachers program could be relied upon to equip its graduates to be 
respectful of diversity, there appears to be no reason to conclude that its law program 
cannot do the same. It seems very unlikely that evidence could be mounted that lawyers 
educated at TWU would actually engage in harmful conduct.837 
However, the CBA suggested that the 2001 case did not analyse the human rights 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. According to SOGIC, “in light of 
evolving notions of human rights and the increased legal and societal recognition afforded to 
LGBTT individuals and their relationships” the Covenant’s compliance with human rights 
legislation is now “an open question.”838   
Finally, the CBA argued that removing or modifying the Covenant to allow LGBTQ 
students and faculty to join the campus would not threaten the beliefs or conduct of TWU’s 
community or damage its affiliation with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada.839 The CBA 
exposed a lack of understanding of the dynamics of religious communities that maintain a 
traditional view of sexuality. Having to abide by the CBA’s understanding of sexual matters 
would mean TWU would not be free to pursue its religious belief and practices.840 The CBA, like 
the BCCT in the 2001 case, showed its disdain for the religious views of TWU, apparently seeing 
                                                     
835 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 28. 
836 Whatcott, supra note 702 at para 177. 
837 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, “Special Advisory Committee On Trinity Western’s Proposed School 
of Law Final Report” (December 2013), at 6, online (pdf): http://docs.flsc.ca/SpecialAdvisoryReportFinal.pdf 
[“Special Advisory Committee Report”]. 
838 CBA Letter, supra note 832 at 4. 
839 Ibid at 5. 
840 As former Chief Justice Dickson noted, “If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a 
course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition 
and he cannot be said to be truly free,” in Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4 at para 95. 
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TWU’s application for a law school as an opportunity to challenge the current state of the law 
accommodating religion.841 
 
6.3.2.2 Other Legal Groups Against TWU 
 
Similar themes surfaced in the correspondence to the Federation from other legal 
groups such as the Legal Leaders for Diversity (LLD), a group of some 70 general counsel from 
Canadian corporations, which called upon the Federation to ensure that TWU does not violate 
“the spirit of the legal profession and Canadian law.”842 This is reminiscent of the claims made 
by the CBA, as noted above.  
Immediately one is confronted with the concept of the inconsistency between the law – 
that allows for TWU to exist and have its law school – and the “spirit” (or at least the perceived 
spirit as envisioned by these groups) of the Charter and human rights legislation that is against 
discrimination.  
The Osgoode Outlaws, along with several other student groups from around the 
country, took their cues from the same song sheet,843 and argued that since law schools 
“propagate the values of the Canadian legal system, including those set out in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” and though the Charter does not apply to TWU, nevertheless “all law 
schools should seek to uphold it.” That is a troubling position in that it would make the Charter 
applicable to private entities when it is only applicable to government actors. If successful, such 
an argument would make human rights legislation superfluous. The burden of the Charter 
would become the responsibility of the citizen, something that was never intended. Nor would 
citizens have the ability to maintain difference. For the OUTlaw students, it mattered not that 
the law gave TWU an exemption, based upon religious belief and practice, from the anti-
discrimination laws. For them, discrimination was and is unacceptable without exception. This 
has become a common theme throughout the TWU struggle, as similar arguments were made 
in Nova Scotia, Ontario and British Columbia. In short, such a position is without precedent in 
our law. Yet, as will be noted below, it does appear to have found some traction in the Ontario 
courts. 
Likewise, the University of Ottawa Outlaw group were concerned that TWU’s references 
“to the marital union of one man and one woman exclude trans* identified people, 
polyamorous relationships, other forms of nonmonogamy, unmarried same-sex couples, 
married same-sex couples, any other form of sexual expression—effectively rendering LGBTQ 
                                                     
841 After TWU lost its accreditation at the SCC, the CBA took credit that it was “ahead of the curve” in being able to 
present arguments that the Court ultimately adopted. My study would suggest that they were not as much “ahead of 
the curve” as they were part of the legal revolutionaries that refused to accept the law on religious accommodation. 
See: “CBA Was Ahead Of The Curve On TWU”, June 26, 2018, online: <https://www.cba.org/Our-
Work/cbainfluence/cbainterventions/Curve-on-TWU>.  
842 Letter from Legal Leaders for Diversity to Gérald Tremblay (16 August 2013), at 2, online (pdf): Federation 
of Law Societies of Canada 
http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWULegalLeadersforDiversityAug162013.pdf.  
843 These groups had obviously collaborated in writing virtually the same letter, with minor variations, to the 
Federation. They include the Osgoode OUTlaws, University of Alberta OUTlaws, University of Saskatchewan 
College of Law Gay/Straight Alliance, and University of Victoria Law Students. See: “Submissions to the 
Federation regarding the Proposed Accreditation of Trinity Western University’s Law Program” (last 
accessed 25 October 2018), online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <https://flsc.ca/law-
schools/submissions-to-the-federation-regarding-the-proposed-accreditation-of-trinity-western-universitys-
law-program/>. 
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families and marginalized sexualities invisible.”844 Exactly how a private religious school would 
put in danger such a kaleidoscope of sexual groupings was not explained.    
It is worthy of note that a group of ten UBC law students sent a letter supporting TWU, 
noting that “Every law school reflects a set of beliefs. As it stands, law schools have a secular 
emphasis in which religious views are in the minority, and are, in our experience, often openly 
derided.” This letter suggests that the open, inclusive, and diverse public law schools in Canada 
may not be so open for religious students. In their view “the legal profession and the 
classrooms of Canada’s law schools would benefit greatly from the expansion of legal education 
in institutions that hold non-mainstream views.”845 
Professors Roderick A. MacDonald and Thomas B. McMorrow observed that “Over the 
years, one of us has heard dozens of conservative Christians lament their sense of exclusion at 
McGill [University] and the hostility they feel from their classmates and even professors.”846 
They concluded that these religious students described their barriers to participate in law 
school life in “language very similar to the claims of silencing advanced by women, people of 
colour, and the LGBTQ communities.”847 For these authors the “decision to close ranks by the 
Canadian Council of Law Deans in opposing TWU’s proposed law school [is] evidence of how 
swiftly and definitively the movement of the herd can be. Moreover, we consider it a sign of 
how the intense pressure to conform, both within and among law schools, militates against a 
legal educational landscape reflective of the diversity of belief and aspiration of those who 
people it.”848 
The evidence of these professors suggest that indeed Christian law students are now 
ostracized by the secular law schools. They are the ones no longer “safe” in the hostile 
environment of the public law schools. The anti-TWU sentiment, being proxy for anti-Christian 
sentiment, suggests evangelical Christians would benefit from their own institutions including 
their own law school. 
 
6.3.2.3 Decision of Federation 
 
Despite the opposition, and an investigation by the special Advisory Committee,849 the 
Federation decided on December 16, 2013 to give its approval to the TWU law school.850 “The 
                                                     
844 Letter from University of Ottawa OUTlaws to Gérald R. Tremblay, et al (18 March 2013), online (pdf): 
Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
<http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUUofOttawalawstudentsOUTlawsMarch182013.pdf>. 
845 Letter from UBC JD Candidates & Graduates to Gérald R. Tremblay, et al (19 March 2013), online (pdf): 
Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
<http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUUBCJDcandidatesgraduatesMarch192013.pdf>. The letter also 
astutely notes that “Students at TWU law school would be taught the law, and will be required to uphold the 
law. To suggest otherwise does not accord with how our justice system works: judges and lawyers, regardless 
of their personal beliefs, are expected to apply the law” (at 2). 
846 Roderick A. MacDonald & Thomas B. McMorrow, “Decolonizing Law School” (2013-14) 51 Alta. L. Rev. 717, 
733 at note 54. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Ibid at 733-734. 
849 “Special Advisory Committee Report”, supra note 837. 
850 Ibid at 19: “It is the conclusion of the Special Advisory Committee that if the Approval Committee 
concludes that the TWU proposal would meet the national requirement if implemented as proposed there 
will be no public interest reason to exclude future graduates of the program from law society bar admission 
programs.”   
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Federation followed a fair, rigorous and thoughtful process”, said Federation President Marie-
Claude Bélanger-Richard, Q.C. She added, “We took into account and listened very carefully to 
all points of view that were expressed about this proposal.”851 In the end, the Federation 
accepted the current state of the law. “Public interest” did not extend to evaluating the 
admissions criteria of a law school. What mattered was the competence of the law graduates to 
take the bar licensing exams at the respective law societies.  
 
6.3.3 Law Society of British Columbia 
 
Once the FLSC gave preliminary approval to TWU’s proposed law school, that meant the 
school became an approved faculty of law for the purposes of enrolment in the Law Society of 
British Columbia’s (LSBC) admissions program. This operated as a matter of course since the 
LSBC had delegated its authority on approving new law schools to the FLS. On December 17, 
2013, the BC Minister of Advanced Education approved TWU’s proposed law program and 
authorized TWU to grant JD degrees.  
However, academics, such as Professor Elaine Craig, called for the individual law 
societies to “show more courage” and take back authority from the FLS to conduct their own 
investigation into the TWU’s proposal.852   
Accordingly, the LSBC decided to conduct its own investigation and encouraged the 
public to send in written submission as to whether it should approve TWU’s proposal. To my 
knowledge, nothing like this has ever been done for any other law school proposal. The 
invitation for a public response was emulated by other law societies. The society received 
approximately 138 submissions were in favour of TWU with some 150 opposed. Those 
submissions represented many more people as some had scores of signatures. 
 
6.3.3.1 Review of Federation’s Decision 
 
On April 11, 2014 the LSBC Benchers voted down (20-6) the motion853 that would have 
removed TWU’s faculty of law approval. In addition to the public input, the LSBC commissioned 
a number of reports and legal opinions to assist the Benchers.  
                                                     
The Approval Committee followed with its own approval, stating: “TWU’s proposed school of law will meet 
the national requirement if implemented as proposed. The proposed program is given preliminary approval.” 
See Canadian Common Law Program Approval Committee, “Report on Trinity Western University’s Proposed 
School of Law Program” (December 2013), online (pdf): Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
<http://docs.flsc.ca/ApprovalCommitteeFINAL.pdf>.  
851 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, News Release, “Federation of Law Societies of Canada Grants 
Preliminary Approval of Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law Program” (16 December 2013), online 
(pdf): <http://docs.flsc.ca/FederationNewsReleaseFIN.pdf>.  
852 Elaine Craig, “Law societies must show more courage on Trinity Western application,” The Globe and Mail 
(18 December, 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/law-societies-must-show-more-
courage-on-trinity-western-application/article16023053/> [“More Courage”].  
853 The motion read: “Pursuant to Law Society Rule 2-27(4.1), the Benchers declare that, notwithstanding the 
preliminary approval granted to Trinity Western University on December 16, 2013 by the Federation of Law 
Societies’ Canadian Common Law Program Approval Committee, the proposed Faculty of Law at Trinity 
Western is not an approved faculty of law.” See Law Society of British Columbia Bencher Meeting, Transcript 
(11 April 2014), at 7, online (pdf): <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf> 
[LSBC Bencher Transcript]. 
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The transcript of the debate reveals a very thoughtful and considered approach to the 
question at hand. Overwhelmingly, the Benchers were convinced that they had a duty to 
protect the public interest and that included upholding the law despite their personal views on 
TWU’s discriminatory admissions policy. They were persuaded by the various legal opinions 
about the applicability of TWU 2001 to the current case. This sense of duty to the law is 
remarkable, in hindsight, given what unfolded in the following months. The Benchers would go 
from the April 11 meeting confirming that the rule of law required TWU’s approval, to, a few 
months later, reversing that decision on October 31. This was remarkable. Despite their 
commitment to the law they ultimately succumbed to the popular opinion of their membership. 
Politics within the legal community ultimately won at the Law Society level. It would take the 
BC courts to re-establish the primacy of law, which was short-lived until the SCC ruled in favour 
of the Law Society. 
During the debate on the motion, Joseph Arvay, Q.C., a very well-respected and 
competent human rights lawyer, objected to what he described as “the metaphorical sign at the 
gate of the law school which says, ‘No LGBT students, faculty or staff are welcome.’”854 Since the 
Law Society is required to respect the rights and freedoms of everyone in BC it must refuse 
TWU. He noted that the Federation’s report recognized that TWU would be “an unwelcome 
place for LGBT students and faculty even if it was not a complete ban.”855 Thus, “a sign that says 
‘LGBT are not welcome’ is as bad as a sign that says ‘you cannot apply.’”856   
Mr. Arvay had no problem with a religious law school, even one with a core belief “that 
same-sex marriage and sexual intimacy that this entails being a sin.”857 Rather he opposed “that 
belief being imposed on those who do not share that belief.”858  
“We are the law,” Arvay declared later in the meeting, after listening to a number of his 
fellow benchers say they had to keep with the law even though they decried TWU’s admissions 
policy. “I am nonetheless very troubled by the very many comments to the effect that the 
community covenant is repugnant, it’s hurtful, it’s discriminatory, it’s hypocritical, it’s 
heartless, but we’re bound by the law,” said Arvay.859 He continued with resolve, “I don’t 
recognize that law, that kind of law in this country. I don’t recognize a law that is so divorced 
from justice that we are bound by it. We are the law; we are the law-making body charged with 
making a decision at hand.”860  
Arvay’s comments reiterates my point in this work – advocates for equality are so 
adamant in their position that they are willing to knock down any legal impediment that would 
deny the dominance of their definition of sexual equality. It matters not that the law provides a 
space for private religious institutions, like TWU, to believe and practice traditional marriage 
on campus.  
Even those who felt bound by the law to support TWU were strident in their criticism of 
TWU. That contemptuous attitude toward TWU ultimately led to the events that were to follow 
in BC – the referendum and the rejection of TWU’s accreditation by the same Benchers. They 
had so compromised their support of the law through their vilification of TWU that they 
                                                     
854 Ibid at 8. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid at 10. 
858 Ibid at 11. 
859 Ibid at 46.  
860 Ibid.  
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poisoned the chalice going forward. Just a few examples of this attitude should suffice in 
explaining why Mr. Arvay could say what he said. 
David Mossop, Q.C. described a sinister reality regarding the state of the BC Bar and its 
relationship to TWU. While TWU has “a great curriculum” that is not enough. “[T]o be a 
successful law school in British Columbia or in Canada, you have to have broad support within 
the legal community. You do not have that broad support. There are significant members of this 
profession who are against your approval. There is nothing the Law Society can do about 
that.”861 In other words, BC lawyers will not hire qualified TWU graduates simply because of 
opposition to the Community Covenant. The CCA will be “a millstone around your neck.”862 
Using such language to ostracize a religious minority law school for doing something that it has 
a legal right to do appears harsh.  
Elizabeth Rowbotham hardly supported the current state of the law when she found 
“…it very disturbing that people can be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation 
simply because an institution is a private institution. However, that is our law in Canada and I 
think that if it’s to be challenged, this is not the forum to do so.”863   
Cameron Ward insisted:  
In my view, making people feel unwelcome anywhere because of their personal 
characteristics is a particularly repugnant form of discrimination. As a Bencher, as a 
lawyer, and as a Canadian citizen, I feel I have the duty to oppose such discrimination, 
not to promote or to condone it. In my opinion, TWU’s community covenant is an 
anachronism, a throwback that wouldn’t be out of place in the 1960s. The Law Society 
recently invited the university to amend it, to remove its discriminatory language. TWU 
refused. The Trinity Western University is stubborn enough to stick to its principles, I’m 
stubborn enough to stick to mine. I will proudly be voting in favour of the resolution.”864 
David Crossin, Q.C., felt that, although “[TWU] chose a path that is effectively 
discriminatory, certainly hurtful, and to many highly hypocritical” he nevertheless was bound 
by the law.865 
Pinder Cheema, Q.C., likewise asserted:  
In my opinion, TWU’s perspective is antithetical to Canadian values of tolerance and 
respect that are enshrined in our Charter. I find this covenant abhorrent and 
objectionable and it saddens me greatly that TWU has persisted in this outdated, 
outmoded view. However, as has been echoed by a number of my fellow Benchers, it is 
our obligation above all else to uphold the rule of law.866 
Jamie Maclaren declared, “It is TWU’s institutional and apparently non-negotiable act, in 
other words conduct of discrimination, that is an affront to the human dignity of LGBTQ people 
                                                     
861 Ibid at 21.  
862 Ibid. He predicted, “That’s an individual thing for individual lawyers. That will be, if I could use the biblical 
example, a millstone around your neck. And over time, the pressure will come from the faculty and from the 
student bodies at the law school to change the covenant. Maybe eight to 15 years from now, you will change 
the covenant and at that time, those people in charge will say, why did we ever do this in the first place?” 
863 Ibid at 30. Note that Rowbotham ignores the deeper importance of maintaining private institutions: the 
fact that privacy is an indication of freedom. By contrast, in totalitarian regimes, there is no “private” – 
everyone must conform to the same rules.  
864 Ibid at 31-32.  
865 Ibid at 37.  
866 Ibid at 42.  
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and it diminishes their public standing, that demands our disapproval in the name of equity 
and fairness.”867 
Dean Lawton noted, “I suspect why this caused so much concern among those opposed 
to accreditation is not the pledge of celibacy, but the statement of marriage being sacred 
exclusively between a man and a woman. Were it not for the statement about marriage, I 
expect we would not be considering this matter today.”868 Dean Lawton’s view is indeed my 
point. 
Given such statements it is not surprising that Mr. Arvay said what he did. Indeed, his 
position is a common one among the anti-TWU elites. They have no problem with a religious 
law school and its beliefs if the school does not “impose” those beliefs on others who do not 
share the same convictions. Context is everything here – we are talking about a religious law 
school, not a secular law school. That is key. A religious law school, such as TWU, is not 
imposing on anyone but is saying, “If you believe as we do on these issues you are welcome to 
join us. If not, then there are other options for you.”869 TWU 2001 certainly understood this 
basic idea. Yet, Mr. Arvay and the many other anti-TWU advocates refused to accept that 
position as an answer. They argued it was not fair that those LGBT students who were offended 
by TWU’s policies would be ineligible for those law student positions. Such students, they 
maintained, would be in an unequal position and the Law Society should not give its 
imprimatur to such a school. 
There are many reasons why this position is untenable. First, a religious school does not 
cease to be a religious school because it teaches law or has its degrees recognized by the state. 
Second, state accreditation of TWU degrees is not state endorsement of TWU’s religious beliefs 
or practices. It is simply an acknowledgement that academic requirements have been met. The 
same principle applies when a church-run nursing home is licensed to operate; the state is not 
endorsing the religious motivations or the religious practices of that nursing home, merely its 
capacity to provide adequate care. Third, it is curious why in this discussion there is no 
mention of the fact that TWU offers many other academic programs, including history, 
business, education, theology and nursing. If it is wrong for the Law Society to approve TWU 
then it is also wrong for the province of British Columbia to approve other degrees for the same 
reasons. Such logic taken to its ultimate conclusion would mean that it is unacceptable to even 
have a religious school such as TWU.870 That outcome does nothing for diversity in a liberal 
                                                     
867 Ibid at 43.  
868 Ibid at 24.  
869 Despite ultimately agreeing with the law societies in TWU 2018, supra note 14, Chief Justice McLachlin 
pointed out at para 133 that “Students who do not agree with the religious practices do not need to attend 
these schools. But if they want to attend, for whatever reason, and agree to the practices required of students, 
it is difficult to speak of compulsion.” 
870 Further, it would lead to excluding individuals from the profession on the basis of one’s faith or church 
affiliation. The SCC expressed that view in TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 33: “Indeed, if TWU’s Community 
Standards could be sufficient in themselves to justify denying accreditation, it is difficult to see how the same 
logic would not result in the denial of accreditation to members of a particular church. The diversity of 
Canadian society is partly reflected in the multiple religious organizations that mark the societal landscape 
and this diversity of views should be respected.” Justice Jamie S. Campbell, of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 
was aware of this at para 17 of his decision, TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775. He also noted at para 15: “There 
is a difference between recognizing the degree and expressing approval of the moral, religious, or other 
positions of the institution. The refusal to accept the legitimacy of institutions because of a concern about the 
perception of the state endorsing their religiously informed moral positions would have a chilling effect on 
the liberty of conscience and freedom of religion. Only those institutions whose practices were not offensive 
to the state-approved moral consensus would be entitled to those considerations”. 
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democracy. It seems that the field of law is being singled out as somehow special from the other 
areas of study. That reeks of legal arrogance.  
 
6.3.3.2 Ultimate Rejection of Federation’s Approval 
 
 After the April 11, 2014 vote, some LSBC members requisitioned a Special General 
Meeting which was held on June 10, 2014 to vote on a non-binding resolution calling on the 
Benchers to declare that TWU was not an approved faculty of law. The resolution passed 3,210 
to 968.  
On September 26, 2014, the Benchers voted to hold a referendum on the issue and 
agreed that the results would be binding on the LSBC. The October 30, 2014 results were 5,591 
votes against TWU and 2,088 for. The next day, the Benchers reversed their April 11, 2014 
approval of TWU and refused to approve TWU’s JD degree. TWU went to the BC Supreme Court 
for judicial review. 
 
6.3.3.3 Judicial Review 
 
6.3.3.3.1 BC Supreme Court871 
 
Chief Justice Hinkson allowed TWU’s judicial review of the LSBC decision. The court 
held that the Benchers improperly fettered their discretion under the Legal Profession Act 
(LPA) and acted outside their authority in delegating to the LSBC’s members the question of 
whether TWU’s proposed faculty of law should be approved for the purposes of the admissions 
program. Further, the decision was made without proper consideration and balancing of the 
Charter rights at issue, and therefore could not stand.  
Unlike the Ontario Divisional Court, Hinkson was not persuaded that the circumstances 
or the jurisprudence respecting human rights had so fundamentally shifted the parameters of 
the debate as to render TWU 2001 other than dispositive of many of the issues in this case. He 
was bound by TWU 2001 to apply the correctness standard to the question of the LSBC’s 
jurisdiction to disapprove of TWU’s proposed faculty of law. 
The LSBC has the jurisdiction to use its discretion to disapprove the academic 
qualifications of a common law faculty of law in a Canadian university, so long as it follows the 
appropriate procedures and employs the correct analytical framework in doing so. 
The evidence was clear to Justice Hinkson that the Benchers permitted a non-binding 
vote of the LSBC membership to supplant their judgment. In so doing, the Benchers disabled 
their discretion under the LPA by binding themselves to a fixed blanket policy set by LSBC 
members. The Benchers thereby wrongfully fettered their discretion. 
TWU was entitled to but was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present its case 
fully and fairly to those who had the jurisdiction to determine whether the JD degrees of the 
proposed law school’s graduates would be recognized by the LSBC. 
The LSBC decision infringed TWU’s right of religious freedom. The LSBC had the 
constitutional obligation to consider and balance the religious freedom rights of TWU and the 
equality rights of the LGBT community.872 The Benchers weighed the competing Charter rights 
                                                     
871 TWU BCSC 2015, supra note 795. 
872 It is unfortunate in the TWU law school case the courts, in all three jurisdictions, did not recognize the fact 
that religion is an equality right as much as sexual orientation. Religious freedom vis a vis equality right is not 
the complete picture as there is also the issue of equality rights being plural – religion and sexual orientation. 
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of freedom of religion and equality before voting on the April Motion, but the record does not 
permit such a conclusion to be reached with respect to the Benchers’ vote of October 31, 2014. 
In light of the inappropriate fettering of its discretion by the LSBC and its failure to attempt to 
resolve the collision of the competing Charter interests in the October Referendum or the 
subsequent decision, the appropriate remedy was to quash the decision and restore the results 
of the April 11, 2014 vote. 
 
6.3.3.3.2 BC Court of Appeal873 
 
In dismissing the Law Society’s appeal, the Court ruled that the Law Society had 
authority, under the Legal Profession Act (LPA or Act), to consider factors beyond academic 
education in approving a law school. The Benchers were wrong in passing a resolution that 
regardless of the referendum results those results would be consistent with their statutory 
duties.  
When Charter values are implicated and Charter rights might be infringed as a result of 
an administrative decision, the decision maker is required to balance, or weigh, the potential 
Charter infringement against the objectives of the administrative regime. The October 31, 2014, 
declaration of the Benchers did not engage in any exploration of how the Charter values at 
issue could best be protected in view of the objectives of the Act. The Benchers conflated the 
role of the courts with their own role.  
The Court held that the Law Society did not balance the Charter rights in accordance 
with the Doré874 decision. The September 26, 2014 resolution to accept the referendum results 
was not only an improper fettering of their discretion by binding themselves to the decision of 
the majority but it abdicated their duty as an administrative decision-maker to properly 
balance the objectives of the Act and the Charter. While the TWU 2001 decision is not 
dispositive, its essential legal analysis has not changed appreciably with respect to the 
obligation to balance statutory objectives with the Charter rights affected by an administrative 
decision.  
The starting premise cannot be that equality rights advocated by the BC Law Society 
trump TWU’s religious freedom. The Charter rights must be balanced against the statutory 
objectives of the Law Society. The balancing exercise goes beyond considering the competing 
rights and choosing to give greater effect to one or the other, with either course of action being 
equally reasonable. The nature and degree of detrimental impact on the rights must be 
considered.  
In reviewing the respective impacts, the Court held that the impact on the religious 
freedom of TWU is “severe.”875 TWU graduates would not be able to practice law, nor would 
TWU be able to operate a faculty of law contrary to what the Ontario Court of Appeal assumed. 
The main function of a faculty of law is to train lawyers. On the other side of the ledger, the 
impact on sexual orientation equality rights, should TWU be accredited, would be insignificant 
in real terms.  
In the Court’s view, while in principle LGBTQ students would be discriminated against, 
there is no evidence that their access to law school and the legal profession would be 
impeded.876 The Special Committee of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada found that 
                                                     
873 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478.   
874 Doré, supra note 833.  
875 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at para 168 
876 Ibid at para 175. 
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TWU’s law school would not result in any fewer choices for LGBT students. Rather, an overall 
increase in law school places in Canada seems certain to expand the choices for all students. It 
is incontrovertible that refusing to recognize the TWU faculty will not enhance accessibility. So, 
it is the Covenant’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage that is at issue here. The Law 
Society was prepared to approve the law school if the Covenant was amended to remove the 
offensive portions. Even without that, few LGBTQ students would wish to apply.  
The Court rejected the argument that to approve the law school would be an 
endorsement of the Covenant. Such a view “is misconceived”. TWU is not seeking a public 
benefit as in the Bob Jones University Case.877 Accreditation is not a benefit but a regulatory 
requirement to conduct a lawful business. Even if the Covenant were amended and the school 
was approved TWU’s beliefs on marriage would remain. This underscores the weakness of the 
Law Society’s premise that it would be endorsing TWU’s religious beliefs by accrediting the 
school. In a diverse and pluralistic society, this argument must be treated with considerable 
caution. Licensing of religious care facilities and hospitals would also fall into question.878  
Ultimately, the Court was of the view that “state neutrality and pluralism lie at the heart 
of this case.”879 Said the Court: 
State neutrality is essential in a secular, pluralistic society. Canadian society is made up 
of diverse communities with disparate beliefs that cannot and need not be reconciled. 
While the state must adopt laws on some matters of social policy with which religious 
and other communities and individuals may disagree (such as enacting legislation 
recognizing same-sex marriage), it does so in the context of making room for diverse 
communities to hold and act on their beliefs. This approach is evident in the Civil 
Marriage Act itself, which expressly recognizes that “it is not against the public interest 
to hold and publicly express diverse views on marriage”.880 
The Court recognized that while the Covenant is deeply offensive and hurtful to the 
LGBTQ community as noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which is not to be minimized, there 
is no Charter or other legal right to be free from views that offend or contradict an individual’s 
strongly held beliefs absent hate speech.881 The Court was aware that hurtful commentary was 
also levelled at TWU: 
Indeed, it was evident in the case before us that the language of “offense and hurt” is not 
helpful in balancing competing rights. The beliefs expressed by some Benchers and 
members of the Law Society that the evangelical Christian community’s view of 
marriage is “abhorrent”, “archaic” and “hypocritical” would no doubt be deeply 
offensive and hurtful to members of that community.882 
The TWU community has a right to hold and act on its beliefs absent evidence of actual 
harm. The Law Society’s decision to not approve TWU’s faculty of law denies these evangelical 
Christians the ability to exercise the fundamental religious and associative rights of s. 2 of the 
Charter. Given the severe impact of non-approval and the minimal impacts on LGBTQ persons 
along with the fact that Charter rights are to be limited no more than is necessary, the Law 
Society’s decision was unreasonable. In conclusion the court noted: 
                                                     
877 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 [Bob Jones University]. See discussion in Chapter 6. 
878 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at para 184. 
879 Ibid at para 132. 
880 Ibid at para 185. 
881 Ibid at para 188, also quoted earlier. 
882 Ibid at para 189. 
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A society that does not admit of and accommodate differences cannot be a free and 
democratic society — one in which its citizens are free to think, to disagree, to debate 
and to challenge the accepted view without fear of reprisal. This case demonstrates that 
a well-intentioned majority acting in the name of tolerance and liberalism, can, if 
unchecked, impose its views on the minority in a manner that is in itself intolerant and 
illiberal.883 
Not surprisingly the Law Society of British Columbia appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.884 However, this decision, along with the decision of Justice Jamie S. 
Campbell of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, gave the TWU position the best results in a long 
saga of legal wrangling. It was the last appellate decision to be made. Eighteen provincial 
judges (6 each in BC, ON, and NS) heard the TWU case. Twelve of those judges ruled in TWU’s 
favour. The six who went against TWU were all in Ontario.  
The Ontario Courts885 adopted the interpretation of the Charter that was publicized by 
the law deans in their letter to the Federation and by Professor Elaine Craig. As noted above, 
Dean Bill Flanagan’s letter avowed, “Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
unlawful in Canada and fundamentally at odds with the core values of all Canadian law 
schools.”886 There was no acknowledgement of the necessary religious exemptions from 
generally applicable law. This academic thinking has resulted in what William Galston calls 
“civic totalism.”887 The law deans and other academics were willing to broker no other view of 
discrimination but their own. Five members of the BC judiciary rejected the elite view of 
constitutional law. That is sobering. Up until the BCCA’s decision, the deans and their faculty 
controlled the narrative on TWU. The BCCA ruling can be interpreted to mean that the law 
deans’ decision has been reviewed and found wanting.  
Iain T. Benson was prescient in an article published in BC’s The Advocate when he 
chided the law deans, stating, “it is wrong in principle to seek to impose one’s views on others 
under the guise of ‘liberalism’ or ‘equality,’ both of which should admit of different approaches, 
depending upon the context.” Otherwise, “without context-sensitive exceptions to general rules 
of equality or discrimination, religious differences and associational liberty would not long 
exist.” The BCCA’s view parallels Benson’s approach.888   
 
6.3.4 The Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario) 
 
The Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) went through a two-step decision making 
process. On April 10, 2014, the Benchers discussed TWU’s application and raised questions for 
TWU. TWU was then given an opportunity to respond in time for a second meeting on April 22, 
2014 when a decision was made based on all the information. The Benchers voted 28-21 
rejecting TWU’s proposed law school. TWU sought judicial review at the Ontario Divisional 
                                                     
883 Ibid at para 193. 
884 LSBC News Release, “Law Society to seek leave to appeal TWU decision to the Supreme Court of Canada,” 
(8 November 2016), online: <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=4289&t=Law-Society-to-seek-
leave-to-appeal-TWU-decision-to-the-Supreme-Court-of-Canada>. 
885 TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776; and TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701.  
886 Bill Flanagan Letter, supra note 827. 
887 Galston, supra note 621 at 46-47. 
888 Iain T. Benson, “Law Deans, Legal Coercion and the Freedoms of Association and Religion in Canada” 
(2013) 71 The Advocate, Part 5, 671-675. 
  156  
Court which was dismissed. An appeal of that decision was also dismissed at the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. TWU then appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Ontario decisions exhibit the extent to which the legal revolution against the special 
status of religion has gone. They reject the current paradigm accommodating religion. Both 
courts have made it clear that supporting the traditional, heterosexual norm of marriage is no 
longer an acceptable opinion (or practice) for religious organizations to maintain. Their refusal 
to provide religious accommodation deserves a close examination. 
 
6.3.4.1 Ontario Divisional Court889 
 
The Ontario Divisional Court dismissed TWU’s judicial review application to overturn 
the LSUC’s decision. The Divisional Court held that though the religious freedom of TWU was 
infringed, the LSUC’s decision was justified because it was reasonable to take into 
consideration the discriminatory nature of TWU’s admissions policy when deciding to accredit 
the proposed school. However, the Court did say that the LSUC “will be duty bound to properly 
consider” the individual accreditation requests of TWU graduates to ensure their religious 
rights are minimally impaired.890 
The Divisional Court appears to have adopted the view that state actors can be 
preferential for or against religious beliefs and, based on that view, can refuse to accredit 
religious institutions. This is revealed in its determination that TWU cannot compel the Law 
Society to accredit its law school “and thus lend [the Law Society’s] tacit approval to the 
institutional discrimination….”891 Otherwise, “TWU could compel the [LSUC], directly or 
indirectly, to adopt the world view that TWU espouses.”892   
That telling statement is out of place with the recent comments of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Like the BCCA the SCC said the state cannot take sides on religious matters – it must be 
neutral.893 It cannot deny a service to a citizen because it disagrees with that citizen’s 
worldview. Herein lies the heart of this case. It is a matter of competing “worldviews”. The 
Divisional Court appears to be saying that if the Law Society does not like TWU’s worldview on 
marriage (which is legally valid), then it can deny accreditation. This view runs contrary to the 
SCC’s Saguenay894 decision requiring the state to be neutral on religious beliefs. “By expressing 
no preference,” said the SCC: 
the state ensures that it preserves a neutral public space that is free of discrimination 
and in which true freedom to believe or not to believe is enjoyed by everyone equally, 
given that everyone is valued equally. I note that a neutral public space does not mean 
the homogenization of private players in that space. Neutrality is required of 
institutions and the state, not individuals (see R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 
726, at paras. 31 and 50-51). On the contrary, a neutral public space free from coercion, 
pressure and judgment on the part of public authorities in matters of spirituality is 
intended to protect every person’s freedom and dignity. The neutrality of the public 
                                                     
889 TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776. 
890 Ibid at para 128. 
891 Ibid at para 115. 
892 Ibid. 
893 Saguenay, supra note 358 at para 75. The SCC said there is a “democratic imperative” which is “the pursuit 
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space therefore helps preserve and promote the multicultural nature of Canadian 
society enshrined in s. 27 the Canadian Charter. Section 27 requires that the state’s duty 
of neutrality be interpreted not only in a manner consistent with the protective 





The Divisional Court took issue with the term “discrimination”. It noted that the belief 
system of TWU does discriminate and rejected TWU’s argument that it was not discriminating. 
TWU argued that because its admission’s policy is not unlawful it cannot be considered legally 
discriminating. Unfortunately, TWU’s position has only confused the matter. Of course, TWU is 
discriminatory and it is entitled to be. However, the Divisional Court appears to be taking the 
concept further and is openly challenging the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2001 decision that 
recognized that TWU is not for everyone.896 
The Divisional Court took umbrage at TWU’s position “To assert that that result [to 
attend TWU means to disavow one’s beliefs and, for LGBTQ, their identity] is not, at its core, 
discriminatory is to turn a blind eye to the true impact and effect of the Community 
Covenant.”897 Indignation was not only directed at TWU but at the very reasoning of TWU 2001 
that recognized TWU’s right to discriminate on its campus.  
Further, the Divisional Court was not impressed by TWU’s position that it treats 
everyone with fairness, courtesy and open-mindedness. Such “does not change the fact that 
notwithstanding TWU’s stated benevolent approach … in order for persons, who do not hold 
the beliefs that TWU espouses, to attend TWU, they must openly, and contractually, renounce 
those beliefs or, at the very least, agree not to practise them. The only other option … is to 
engage in an active deception … with dire consequences if their deception is discovered.”898 
The Divisional Court’s discomfort with the TWU Community Covenant is a discomfort 
with religious institutional rights.899 Religious institutions by their very nature establish rules 
                                                     
895 Ibid at para 74. 
896 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 25:   
“TWU is not for everybody; it is designed to address the needs of people who share a number of 
religious convictions.  That said, the admissions policy of TWU alone is not in itself sufficient to 
establish discrimination as it is understood in our s. 15 jurisprudence. It is important to note that this 
is a private institution that is exempted, in part, from the British Columbia human rights legislation 
and to which the Charter does not apply. To state that the voluntary adoption of a code of conduct 
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be inconsistent with freedom of conscience and religion, which co-exist with the right to equality.” 
897 TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776 at para 106. 
898 Ibid at para 112. 
899 The BC and NS courts appeared not to be worried about the concept of TWU having religious freedom in 
its corporate capacity. The NSSC noted, “The NSBS resolution and regulation infringe on the freedom of 
religion of TWU and its students in a way that cannot be justified. The rights, Charter values and regulatory 
objectives were reasonably balanced within a margin of appreciation” (emphasis added, see TWU NSSC 2015, 
supra note 775, at para 270). The BCCA stated, “As Justice Abella made clear in Loyola, the Charter right to 
freedom of religion recognizes and protects the ‘embedded nature of religious belief, and the deep linkages 
between this belief and its manifestation through communal institutions and traditions’, including private 
educational institutions” (TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at para 167). The SCC referred to the “communal” 
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of admission based upon religious beliefs and practises. The Court noted that “sexual conduct is 
an integral part of a person’s very identity,” but so too are the religious beliefs and actions of a 
person and the religious institution to which she belongs. The Divisional Court’s uneasiness 
with the internal administration of TWU is a challenge to the very idea of religious community 
and its institutions. The fact that the Court may find certain beliefs abhorrent gives it no right 
to deny TWU every benefit of the law including the exemption from the Charter and from 
human rights legislation. This the Court did not do. 
 
6.3.4.1.2 Why Should a Religion Run A University 
 
The Divisional Court expressed reservations about whether evangelical Christians 
should have a right to claim protection of religious freedom for religious beliefs and practises 
that are not mandatory, such as running a university. Said the Court: 
There is no evidence before us that the ability of an evangelical Christian to gain a legal 
education requires that they study at a law school that only permits the presence of 
evangelical Christian beliefs and only permits the attendance of those persons who 
commit to those beliefs. Indeed, the contrary would appear to be obvious from the fact 
that evangelical Christians have been attending secular law schools, and successfully 
becoming lawyers, for decades, if not longer.900 
That rationale runs contrary to the current paradigm of religious accommodation. First, 
the Divisional Court appears to have misunderstood TWU’s position. It is not that evangelical 
Christians are required by their religious beliefs to study law at a Christian law school. Rather, 
it is that they choose to do so, and they have that right. Second, the Divisional Court appears to 
be directly at odds with the Amselem decision901 of the Supreme Court of Canada where the 
Court stated:  
Consequently, both obligatory as well as voluntary expressions of faith should be 
protected under the Quebec (and the Canadian) Charter. It is the religious or spiritual 
essence of an action, not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its 
observance, that attracts protection. An inquiry into the mandatory nature of an alleged 
religious practice is not only inappropriate, it is plagued with difficulties.902 
                                                     
aspect of religious freedom (see LSBC v. TWU 2018, supra note 14 at para 64). See also, Kathryn Chan, 
“Identifying the Institutional Religious Freedom Claimant” (2017) 95 The Canadian Bar Review, 1. 
900 Ibid at para 78. There is a lack of historical understanding of Christian involvement in university education 
both in the running of law schools and in the study of law (see Pierre Riché, Education and Culture in The 
Barbarian West Sixth Through Eighth Centuries (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
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with its religious beliefs and when it does so it is following the very long tradition of Christian communities 
running their own law school. This is further evidenced by the multitude of Christian law schools around the 
world. 
901 Amselem, supra note 7 at para 47. 
902 Ibid. 
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“Plagued with difficulties” is an apt description of the Divisional Court reasoning. To 
limit religious freedom by suggesting, in essence, that since law schools are not required by the 
evangelical Christian community, they are therefore not something to be protected under the 
Charter, is to totally ignore the Charter right of religious freedom. However, as will be seen, SCC 
Justice Rowe accepted this view. In the end, the Divisional Court did not allow this rationale to 
deny protection under s. 2(a) of the Charter but it nevertheless reveals an underlying pre-
supposition that regards the current paradigm of religious freedom with scepticism. 
The Divisional Court’s unorthodox approach, vis a vis the current paradigm, is 
incongruent with the decisions of Justice Jamie S. Campbell903 (whom the Ontario Division 
Court snubbed as “a judge in Nova Scotia”) and the BC Court of Appeal. But this perspective 
ultimately found favour at the SCC. The Ontario decision has called into question the right of a 
religious institution to determine its own internal operations in accordance with its religious 
beliefs and practices.  
The Divisional Court held that the TWU 2001 decision is not binding because it involved 
different facts, a different statutory regime, and a fundamentally different question.904 It is 
debatable that the differences between the 2001 case and the current case were so significant. 
However, what is not different, which the BC Court of Appeal and the Federation recognized: 
Just as in BCCT, the Supreme Court in Whatcott found the proper balance point between 
equality and freedom of religion values to be the point at which conduct linked to the 
exercise of freedom of religion resulted in actual harm. Absent evidence of actual harm, 
it held in both cases, freedom of religion values must be given effect.905   
That is what the Divisional Court did not do. There was no proper analysis of the actual 
harm that the LGBT community would suffer if the Law Society of Upper Canada accredited 
TWU. The Divisional Court’s assertion that LGBT students’ “likelihood of gaining acceptance to 
any law school is decreased” if TWU were accredited because of its discriminatory policies906 
simply does not constitute as serious a consequence when compared to the failure of TWU 
gaining accreditation. TWU’s school would not exist.907 That is very harsh compared to the fact 
that prospective LGBT applicants would have no different outcome should TWU be accredited.  
Further, the Divisional Court stated that even without the LSUC accreditation, TWU 
graduates could still become members of the bars in those provinces where TWU’s law school 
has been accredited.908 That is a remarkable position because the TWU graduates would still 
have access to apply to LSUC through the National Mobility Agreement.909 The Court appears to 
be suggesting that TWU can still have its school, albeit in a limited capacity since its graduates 
would not be able to practice law right away in Ontario, and that the main effect of the LSUC’s 
                                                     
903 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775.  
904 TWU ONSC 2015, supra note 776 at para 60. 
905 John B. Laskin, “Memorandum Re: Trinity Western University School of Law Proposal – Applicability of 
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decision is to make a statement or send a message that it did not agree with TWU’s position on 
marriage. Otherwise, as the Court stated, “Condoning discrimination can be ever much as 
harmful as the act of discrimination itself.”910 They would rather be seen as supporting LGBTQ 
individuals (though it will have no effect on increasing their law school seats) rather than a 
religious belief and practice perceived as discriminatory. 
This is also evident in the Court’s reasoning that “TWU can hold and promote its beliefs 
without acting in a manner that coerces others into forsaking their true beliefs in order to have 
an equal opportunity to a legal education. It is at that point that the right to freedom of religion 
must yield.”911 This description of the limits of religious freedom is a non-sequitur. It does not 
logically follow from all of our previous understandings of religious freedom. First, it only 
makes sense if TWU is subject to the Charter as a government actor. That is because remaining 
neutral and ensuring equal opportunities for education are the responsibilities of the 
government, not a private school like TWU. TWU, being private, has the right to require its 
students to agree to abide by a Community Covenant as the basis of attending the school. 
Religious freedom does not yield in such a case. Second, the Divisional Court is taking a position 
against TWU’s beliefs on religion. That has never been the position of the law. A court may find 
a religious belief distasteful but if the belief does not result in criminal activity a court has no 
jurisdiction to deny a community a right to practice its faith. Again, religious freedom does not 
yield in such a case. 
The Divisional Court’s decision is the first decision since the Marc Hall case912 that 
outlines in distinct terms the legal revolution against the special status that the law has 
historically given to religion. In both cases the issue that has brought about this change has 
been the issue of sexuality. The traditional sexual norms that have been practiced by religious 
communities for thousands of years have become the flashpoint. It is the place where the law 
now finds itself in crisis. 
 
6.3.4.2 Ontario Court of Appeal913 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court’s decision. It agreed that the 
TWU 2001 involved different facts, a different statutory regime, and a fundamentally different 
question. And, that the regulator’s argument is different because the BCCT argued 
discrimination of the TWU graduates but the LSUC argues it is not in public interest to accredit 
a law school that prevents access through a discriminatory policy. However, TWU 2001 is still 
relevant to solve some of the issues in balancing the rights. 
The standard of review is that of reasonableness and not correctness as it was in TWU 
2001. There is no qualitative difference between decisions of Law Society discipline tribunals 
and the decision to accredit a law school. Administrative tribunals are required to take account 
of and to act consistently with Charter values as they make decisions.  There is no question of 
jurisdiction here. Adequacy of reasons is not a standalone basis for quashing a decision.   
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that LSUC’s decision was reasonable.  
The Charter right of religious freedom was engaged individually by members of the 
TWU community and collectively, though the Court did not elaborate on the extent of TWU’s 
corporate Charter right to religious freedom. The Court was of the view that LSUC cannot 
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compel TWU to do anything. Even absent accreditation TWU is free to operate its law school in 
the manner it chooses. There is no evidence that the LSUC decision would have so dramatic an 
effect as closing TWU’s law school. The decision’s interference is more than trivial as TWU 
would face an increased burden in attracting students. While freedom of religion is not 
absolute it is appropriate to adopt a broad definition of freedom of religion at this stage and 
consider impact at the second stage of the analysis.   
Statutory objectives of LSUC as contained in s. 4.1 and 4.2 of the Law Society Act914 
requires that it govern the legal profession in the public interest. In maintaining standards of 
learning, professional competence and conduct it can include the promotion of a diverse 
profession. Quality of those who practice law is based on merit and it excludes discriminatory 
classifications. The LSUC is subject to the Charter and the Human Rights Code (HRC) and it is 
appropriate for the LSUC to consider its statutory objective informed by the values found in the 
Charter and HRC. 
To assess accreditation in the public interest the LSUC was required to balance the 
statutory objectives based on merit and exclude discriminatory classifications with religious 
freedom. The LSUC decision interfered with religious freedom. The Community Covenant 
discriminates against the LGBTQ community contrary to s. 15 of the Charter and s. 6 of the 
Human Rights Code. TWU’s Community Covenant is “deeply discriminatory to the LGBTQ 
community and it hurts.”915   
The process adopted by the LSUC to consider TWU’s application was excellent. The 
record had TWU’s application and supporting material, material reports of the Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada, 3 legal opinions for guidance and 210 submissions from the 
profession and the public. It took place in two stages with TWU having opportunity to address 
Convocation for 1.5 hours; with 4.5 hours of 29 Bencher speeches. The Benchers understood 
the historic significance of their decision and engaged in a fair balancing of the conflicting 
rights. Not all Benchers engaged in the precise style of reasoning as the Doré analytical 
framework but all received and reviewed a legal opinion on the topic and heard all the 
speeches. To focus on Benchers’ speeches in minute detail misses the bigger picture of a group 
that is mostly democratically elected undertaking a democratic process. The appellants’ 
argument that the Benchers ignored their legal obligation to balance the Charter rights with the 
statutory objectives is rejected. 
Was the LSUC’s decision reasonable? The answer is ‘Yes’, indeed ‘Clearly yes’, for the 
following reasons: first, the LSUC is one of two gatekeepers to the legal profession – law schools 
and law societies. There is nothing wrong with a law society, acting in its jurisdiction, 
scrutinizing the admissions process to decide whether to accredit a law school. LSUC could pay 
heed to the fact that a homosexual student would not be tempted to apply to TWU. All law 
schools currently accredited provide equal access to all applicants. TWU would be an 
exception. Second, TWU may not be subject to HRC but the LSUC is. Third, there is an important 
distinction when a religious institution exercises its religious beliefs in a manner that 
discriminates against others. LSUC was entitled to consider the discriminatory policy against 
LGBTQ community as in the example of the US case of Bob Jones University (BJU). TWU, like 
BJU is seeking access to a public benefit – accreditation. LSUC must meet its statutory mandate 
to act in the public interest. The decision does not prevent TWU the practice of a religious belief 
itself rather it denies a public benefit because of the impact on the LGBTQ community. Fourth, 
human rights law and international treaties bind Canada. Fifth, religious neutrality does not 
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mean that the state must refuse to take positions on policy disputes that affect religion. LSUC 
was entitled to take a position and it was reasonable. While TWU may find it more difficult to 
operate its law school the LSUC decision does not prevent it from doing so.  Instead, it denies a 
public benefit that LSUC was entrusted with bestowing based on concerns in line with its 
statutory objectives. 
 
6.3.5 Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society 
 
On April 25, 2014, the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (NSBS) refused approval of TWU’s 
law school unless TWU either exempted law students from signing the Community Covenant or 
amended the Community Covenant for law students in a way that would cease to 
discriminate.916 
On July 23, 2014, the Society’s Council amended its regulations so, notwithstanding 
FLSC approval, the Council had the discretion to act in the public interest and determine 
whether a law school “unlawfully discriminates” in its law admissions or enrolment policies or 
requirements on grounds prohibited by either or both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act.917 
TWU applied to the Court for a judicial review, claiming NSBS did not have authority to 
make the decision and that it violated TWU’s religious freedom as guaranteed by the Canadian 
Charter. The hearing was held during the week of December 16-19, 2015, in Halifax. 
 
6.3.5.1.1 Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
 
On January 28, 2015 Justice Jamie Campbell exposed and soundly rejected a blind spot 
of Canada’s legal academia when he held that the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (NSBS) had no 
authority to reject Trinity Western University’s law degree.918 TWU had been described by the 
Law Society in the December hearing as a “rogue” law school. Campbell, J. objected to this 
characterization. The school could only be so considered “…in the sense that its policies are not 
consistent with the preferred moral values of the NSBS Council and doubtless many if not a 
majority of Canadians.”919 However, he noted, “The Charter is not a blueprint for moral 
conformity. Its purpose is to protect the citizen from the power of the state, not to enforce 
compliance by citizens or private institutions with the moral judgments of the state.”920  
Justice Campbell recognized that Canadians have the right to attend a religious 
university that imposes a religiously based code of conduct, even if that code excludes or 
offends others who will not or cannot comply. He observed, “Learning in an environment with 
people who promise to comply with the code is a religious practice and an expression of 
religious faith. There is nothing illegal or even rogue about that. That is a messy and 
uncomfortable fact of life in a pluralistic society.”921 To demand that right to be sacrificed for 
                                                     
916 Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, “Council votes for Option C in Trinity Western University law school 
decision,” (accessed 18 October 2018), online: <http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votes-option-c-
trinity-western-university-law-school-decision>. 
917 Human Rights Act, RS 1989, c 214 as amended by 1991, c 12; 2007, c 11; 2007, c 14, s 6. 
918 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775.  
919 Ibid at para 10. 
920 Ibid. 
921 Ibid at para 11. 
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state recognition of professional education is an infringement of religious freedom that cannot 
be justified. 
Campbell, J. was also rigorous in his assessment of the Society’s error in refusing to 
recognize the TWU law school and its degree. He rejected the position that the Community 
Covenant was “unlawful discrimination.” “It is not unlawful,” said Campbell, J. “It may be 
offensive to many but it is not unlawful. TWU is not the government. Like churches and other 
private institutions, it does not have to comply with the equality provisions of the Charter.”922 
He noted that TWU “was not in breach of any human rights legislation that applies to it.”923 
What Justice Campbell’s decision laid bare for all to see is the moral judgement against 
religion by the legal profession. It is a blind spot that sees religion and religious views as having 
absolutely no place outside of the churches, mosques, and synagogues of the nation. By 
attempting to bifurcate religious practise into a “public” and a “private” sphere, it 
misapprehends what religious beliefs and practices mean to the believer. Trinity Western’s 
application for recognition of its law school has been characterized as moving into the “public” 
sphere. As University of Victoria Law School Dean, Jeremy Webber, argued, a private institution 
cannot “escape scot-free, especially if they want to enjoy public recognition.”924 However, that 
position fails to recognize that religion permeates every aspect of a believer’s life with a long 
history of legal protection. TWU provides academic education in an institution that is Christian 
in character which, as Campbell, J. noted, is not an insignificant part of who evangelical 
Christians are. He went on, “Being Christian in character does not mean excluding those of 
other faiths but does require that everyone adhere to the code that the religion mandates. 
Going to such an institution is an expression of their religious faith. That is a sincerely held 
believe [sic] and it is not for the court or for the NSBS to tell them that it just isn’t that 
important.”925 
Given the stark contrast between Justice Campbell’s decision and the public 
pronouncements of the legal profession – particularly the legal academics – it makes one 
wonder whether the profession was taken aback by the decision. Perhaps this is the result of 
the academic assumption that religion will become less of a force as society becomes more 
secular. This secularization theory has permeated a number of fields of study including law. 
The Canadian Council of Christian Charities stated in its brief to the Nova Scotia Court that the 
decision of the NSBS “amounts to nothing less than a rejection of Canada’s religious heritage. It 
strikes a devastating blow to the very heart of religious civil society and has the effect of 
reducing the rich tapestry of Canadian society. The long-term preservation of freedom, 
diversity, integrity and Canada’s social capital requires the law to be willing to accept 
differences of belief and practise on such controversial issues as marriage.”926  
Lawyers for the NSBS took umbrage at that characterization, stating: 
Needless to say all of those words are very strong words, all of those words are very 
negative words, and all of those words are about an institution that has regulated the 
legal profession in this province for more than two hundred years. So how did it come 
                                                     
922 Ibid at para 10. 
923 Ibid. 
924 Jeremy Webber, “Opinion: Religion vs. Equality: Issue of accreditation of TWU’s Law program is 
complicated” Vancouver Sun (8 April 2014), online:  
<http://www.vancouversun.com/life/Opinion+Religion+equality/9715430/story.html>.  
925 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 230. 
926 Ibid (Brief of the Intervener, Canadian Council of Christian Charities, Hfx. No. 427840, online (pdf): 
https://www.cccc.org/documents/courtdocs/cccc_intervener_s_brief_filed_twu_v._nsbs.pdf).  
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to be that the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, a statutory entity charged with regulating 
the public interest and upholding the public interest in the practise of law – how did it 
come to be that the Society stands here today on the receiving end of a judicial review 
application where it is alleged that it has done nothing less than reduced the rich 
tapestry of Canadian society and rejected Canada’s rich religious heritage?927 
The answer, I propose, is as blunt as it is simple – professional arrogance. As legal 
professionals we all suffer from this same occupational hazard from time to time. It would be 
arrogant, said Campbell, J., to suggest that British Columbia “has a less genuine respect for 
human rights values than Nova Scotia”928 when you consider the fifty years that Trinity 
Western University has been offering degrees and has never been found in violation of the BC 
human rights legislation. Campbell, J. reiterated the fact that TWU is a private university to 
which the Charter does not apply.  
   Arrogance may also be seen in the manner in which the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society 
refused to be governed by TWU 2001. The NSBS argued that the 2001 decision was no longer 
good law or at least not applicable to the facts before it. In one sense, we might not want to be 
too harsh on the NSBS for taking that position for two reasons: first, they were buttressed by 
academic opinion that the 2001 decision did not apply;929 and second, they were evidently 
inspired by the opinion, which has been especially persuasive since the Charter, that “A good 
lawyer needs to understand and assist the evolution of the law.”930 However, as Campbell, J. 
rightly points out in his decision, the argument against the 2001 decision is simply an 
unacceptable reach. 
“On its face, the TWU v. BCCT decision is very much on point,”931 Campbell, J. held. It was 
on point because, in both cases, (1) the regulatory bodies were required to make a decision 
about accreditation acting in the public interest; (2) the central concern was about 
requirements to abstain from behaviour that restricted LGBT students; (3) there was no 
evidence that a TWU graduate would act in an intolerant or discriminatory manner. However, 
Campbell, J. recognized that the NSBS argument was “somewhat more subtle” than the 
arguments of the College of Teachers in the 2001 case. The NSBS was not saying that TWU 
graduates would be discriminatory. Rather, they were concerned that “accepting a law degree 
from the institution would amount to condoning discrimination.”932 It was a matter of public 
perception. 
Justice Campbell’s view is either that of a lone wolf crying in the judicial wilderness or a 
correct and just interpretation of the law. It is the latter realization that is bound to be 
disconcerting to all those who have publicly declared that the law of equality has advanced to 
such a degree that it eclipses the right of a religious university to set admissions criteria in 
harmony with its creed.  
Justice Campbell’s assessment is bound to raise questions about the prevailing opinion 
in the law faculties that are opposed to TWU’s Law School. Questions about one’s position can 
be an unsettling experience. However, none of us are immune to probing questions. That is 
what makes our society so great – we question, we critically analyze to determine what is right 
                                                     
927 Marjorie Hickey, Q.C., in TWU NSSC 2015, transcript supra note 477 (Oral hearing, 18 December 2014).  
928 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 245. 
929 Craig, “Rejecting Trinity,” supra note 793. 
930 Webber, supra note 924. 
931 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 193. 
932 Ibid at para 194.  
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and what isn’t, and we analyze what works and what doesn’t. No doubt, there will be a 
significant amount of questioning legal positions that have, up until now, relegated religion to 
the back row of rights talk.  
Justice Campbell’s decision has painted a bright line of demarcation between the 
current state of the law that allows for religious belief and practise and the emerging legal 
theories such as “deep equality” which suggests that accommodating religious practises such as 
traditional marriage “is a framework that continues unfair and unjust power relations that 
impede rather than promote the equality of minority groups.”933 Deep equality demands an 
“assumption of equality, rather than … the notion that one group is entitled to give and another 
to receive.”934 It is a process “owned” by ordinary people in everyday life and “is a vision of 
equality that transcends law, politics, and social policy….”935 Deep equality requires identities, 
including religious identity, to be fluid. “[R]eligious identities,” says Lori Beaman, “block our 
vision to the complexities of social life and press us into corners that trap us in identities that 
we often ourselves do not recognize, want, or know how to escape.”936 Such a concept is 
inimical to our understanding of religious freedom as discussed in this book. 
How is it that we are in such a predicament? I suggest that the legal faculty is so 
enamoured by the promise of equality that they see the law only through the “equality lens.” 
We are witnessing a “groupthink” phenomena with only one preferred interpretation of the 
Charter – all other interpretations are now deemed passé, save that which promotes equality, 
as they understand it.937 Surprisingly, even the rule of law safeguard is not enough to hold back 
the passionate opinion that equality trumps religion. But the irony goes further. Religion is also 
an equality right. Not only are the critics elevating one right over another right enumerated in 
the Charter, but they are conveniently emphasizing only one portion of that right.  
Returning to the closing submissions of the NSBS at the December hearing, the 
appropriate question is: “…how did it come to be that the Society stands here today on the 
receiving end of a judicial review application where it is alleged that it has done nothing less 
than reduced the rich tapestry of Canadian society and rejected Canada’s rich religious 
heritage?”938 While appropriate for the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society it is also appropriate for 
the law faculties and law deans across the land who opposed TWU. 
Arrogance is a problem both for the religious as well as the non-religious. It is a fact of 
our existence. Campbell, J. eloquently described the blinding light of arrogance that flows from 
the moral judgements that favour religion or equality. One moral matrix makes it possible to 
say: “Homosexual acts are a sin. That is the word of God. There is nothing to debate here.”939 
The other moral matrix makes it possible to say, “A law school that discriminates is just wrong. 
There is nothing to debate here.”940 
Tolerance is a process that engages both moral views while accepting the discomfort of 
views that may be “incomprehensible … contemptible or … detestable” to our own.941  
                                                     
933 Lori Beaman, ed, Reasonable Accommodation: Managing Diversity (Vancouver: UBC Press 2012), 220. 
934 Ibid at 212. 
935 Beaman, Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 13. 
936 Ibid at 197. 
937 What is left out in much of the analysis is the fact that religion is also an equality right under s. 15 of the 
Charter. 
938 Hickey, supra note 927.  
939 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 273. 
940 Ibid at para 272. 
941 Ibid at para 275. 
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Ironically, the legal blind spot exposed by Justice Campbell’s decision suggests that we 
need to make more room, not less, for academic enquiry that views the law from different 
lenses. Therefore, a law school such as the one proposed by Trinity Western University would 
add a fresh counterweight of critical legal analysis to the present legal orthodoxy amongst 
Canada’s current common law schools.942 The overwhelming opinion of the law faculties, at the 
court of first instance, was weighed and found wanting. Campbell’s view became the prominent 
view of the courts in BC and Nova Scotia. The Ontario judiciary thought otherwise, as we have 
seen.  
 
6.3.5.1.2 Nova Scotia Court of Appeal943 
 
The NSBS appealed Justice Jamie Campbell’s decision to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
(NSCA) which decided the matter on administrative law issues and did not address the 
constitutional issue. NSCA focused on the NSBS’s Amended Regulation that gave the Society 
power to determine whether a proposed law school “unlawfully discriminates … on grounds 
prohibited by either or both of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the Nova Scotia Human 
Rights Act.”944 In the end the Court held that the Amended Regulation is ultra vires the Legal 
Profession Act945 (LPA).  
The Court stated that there is a presumption of validity of the impugned regulation and 
that it is ultra vires only if it is irrelevant, extraneous or completely unrelated. The LPA aims to 
uphold and protect the public interest in the practice of law, allowing NSBS to enact regulations 
on education and other requirements for membership, improve administration of justice and 
pass resolutions consistent with the Act.  
In this case the NSBS resolution states that the NSBS “determines” whether the 
University “unlawfully discriminates.” If the University has a sustainable defence to a 
hypothetical challenge under the Charter or the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act (HRA) the 
University would not act “unlawfully”. The resolution directs the NSBS Council to make a free-
standing determination whether the University “unlawfully” contravened the HRA and the 
Charter.  
However, the Court noted that the Charter does not apply to TWU since it is a private 
institution. TWU’s conduct occurred in BC not Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia HRA applies to acts 
in Nova Scotia. Without expressing a supportive word in either the LPA or the HRA, the 
legislature could not have intended that the Society’s Council had autonomous jurisdiction 
concurrent with that of a human rights board of inquiry. Neither does the LPA contemplate 
Council may enact a regulation establishing itself as a court of competent jurisdiction under the 
Charter with the authority to rule that someone’s conduct in British Columbia unlawfully 
violated the Charter. On April 25, 2014, the Council did not adjudicate the “unlawfulness” of 
TWU’s conduct since that criterion did not yet exist in the regulations. After April 25, 2014, 
there was no adjudication of anything, merely the enactment of the Amended Regulation by 
                                                     
942 Pippa Feinstein & Sarah E. Hamill, “The Silencing of Queer Voices in the Litigation Over Trinity Western 
University’s Proposed Law School” (2017) 34 Windsor Y B Access Just, 156 [“Silencing of Queer Voices”]. At 
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943 TWU NSCA 2016, supra note 789.  
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Council on July 23. The Amended Regulation’s key criterion that Council “determines” that the 
University “unlawfully discriminates” is completely unrelated to the Council’s regulation-
making authority under the LPA.  
The NSBS Resolution itself was invalid because, first, it is premised entirely on the 
Amended Regulation which is ultra vires the LPA. Second, it assumed that TWU contravened 
the standard of “unlawfully discriminates” in the Amended Regulation. The Charter does not 
apply to TWU nor does the HRA apply. Therefore, the resolution is unauthorized and 
unreasonable. 
The Court respectfully declined NSBS’s invitation to redraft the regulation. The Court 
held that the NSBS does not have stand-alone authority over the public interest in the 
administration of justice. The Court agreed with Justice Campbell’s holding that NSBS has no 
authority to regulate a law school outside of Nova Scotia. Any attempt to fashion requirements 
for membership based on features of the law graduate’s institution, as opposed to the law 
degree, is ultra vires the LPA.  
The Court pointed out that the NSBS’ concern is with TWU’s Community Covenant not 
with TWU law graduates. Trinity Western’s law graduate is not Trinity Western’s alter ego to 
be punished by NSBS. The graduate is a vital stakeholder in his or her own right and must be 
protected from the unauthorized action of the Society.  
 
6.3.6 The Supreme Court of Canada 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in the TWU law school matter are given extra 
review and analysis here given their importance to the basic argument of this work: that there 
is a legal revolution against the special status of religion in the law. The SCC’s decisions have 
solidified the argument. There is now little doubt that the legal elites, offended by religious 
beliefs and practices on fundamental human life issues such as marriage, are intent on limiting 
the special status once given to religion.  
 
6.3.6.1 Intervention Decisions  
 
On November 30 and December 1, 2017, The Supreme Court of Canada held two days of 
hearings on the case. Originally, only one day was set aside for the hearing by Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin. The story of how the second day got added to the Court’s agenda is both 
telling and relevant to this work. It involved the Court’s decision on who could intervene in the 
case. An intervening party is not directly subject to the litigation and is thought not to have any 
role in supporting one litigator as against the other, but is to share its concerns with the court 
about the potential impacts the litigation will have on those who are not parties, like the 
intervener. Whether an intervener can participate is at the discretion of the Court based on 
long-established criteria.946 
On July 27, 2017, in an initial decision947 that surprised many lawyers, Justice Richard 
Wagner denied seventeen intervener applications (comprising twenty-three groups) for 
                                                     
946 See SC Rules, (SOR/2002-156) Part 8, r 42(3), Appeals and Cross-appeals, Factum on Appeal, online: 
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947 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, et al., SCC 37318; and Trinity Western 
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intervener status. The LGBTQ group applicants were denied. Several religious groups were also 
denied. Justice Wagner did not provide written reasons for his undoubtedly principled 
decision, which is the normal course for the Supreme Court on interventions. Intervention has 
always been understood as being within the complete discretion of the Court. However, one 
could infer that Justice Wagner was motivated by a desire to save time and avoid duplicate 
arguments and not by some nefarious or misguided position against any particular group. 
With only one day set for the hearing, Justice Wagner evidently decided the Court did 
not have the time to hear all twenty-six applications. It was likely the case, as can be gleaned 
from the news release of the Court,948 that Justice Wagner was initially told that there would be 
one full day hearing. Two appeals plus twenty-six intervener applications simply cannot be 
crammed into a single day. Justice Wagner’s selection could be viewed as giving priority to 
those interveners who were more education-oriented and less advocacy-oriented.  
Whatever the rationale, the Court granted intervener status to only nine groups. Seven 
of the groups were related to the legal profession in some capacity, such as the Christian Legal 
Fellowship and the Canadian Bar Association. Only two of the nine, the Association for 
Reformed Political Action (ARPA) and the National Coalition of Catholic School Trustees, were 
not associated with the legal profession. ARPA addressed its arguments on the relationship 
between the equality rights (s. 15 of the Charter) and religious freedom rights (s. 2(a) of the 
Charter). The National Coalition of Catholic School Trustees argued that there needed to be a 
proper balance with competing rights; there is no hierarchy of rights and not priviledging one 
right over another respects all rights. 
 
6.3.6.2 Groups Denied 
 
None of the various LGBTQ groups that applied were granted intervener status at the 
Court. The Court may have concluded that the two law societies (along with the granted 
interveners Canadian Bar Association, the Advocates’ Society, the Lawyers Rights Watch, the 
Criminal Lawyers’ Association, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association) were adequately 
advancing the LGBTQ groups’ arguments. Indeed, it was the opposition from the LGBTQ 
advocates that successfully persuaded the British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia law 
societies to reject the approval of TWU by the Federation of Law Societies Canada. All three 
accepted the LGBTQ arguments that TWU’s admissions policy was discriminatory and, though 
TWU would provide competent legal education to its students, that policy was sufficient reason 
to deny TWU’s Law School accreditation.  
In addition, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 
Canada, Canadian Council of Christian Charities, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops 
and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Vancouver were among the religious communities that 
were denied intervener status. 
Given the positions of TWU, and the religious interveners in the lower courts, perhaps 
the Supreme Court was of the view that there was enough on the record for the judges to mull 
over. Further, perhaps the various arguments and counter-arguments were sufficient for 
justice to be served in this matter. 
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Whatever the rationale, to grant only nine out of twenty-six applications is significant 
for two reasons. First, this was a very high profile case that garnered a lot of media attention; 
and second, “the Court typically grants more than 90 per cent of the requests to intervene.”949 
In fact, Professors Alarie and Green concluded upon an empirical study of interventions at the 
SCC that the Court “appears to be using the interventions to better understand the impacts of 
its decisions.”950 From their perspective “[t]he increase in the number of interveners” at the 
Court “seems to be a positive development.”951 One has to conclude that the restriction was 
unusual, especially since it was so quickly reversed. 
 
6.3.6.3 Second Decision – Chief Justice McLachlin – July 31, 2017952 
 
Chief Justice McLachlin “varied” Justice Wagner’s order after only four days, following a 
weekend of protests, primarily by upset members of the LGBTQ community.953 All twenty-
seven groups were allowed to file a ten-page factum and make a five-minute oral argument at 
the hearing. Because some of the groups filed jointly the total number of intervener briefs was 
to be twenty-six (twenty-seven counting the Attorney General of Ontario). Given that the 
number of participants at the hearing tripled, the Court extended the hearing to two days.  
While there was some confusion as to the first decision, from a legal standpoint it was 
even more perplexing as to why the Court changed its mind.954 To see the SCC being influenced 
by such public pressure is a first – or, at least, it is a first to observe the Court being influenced 
in such a blatantly obvious manner.955 Unlike what we saw in the lower courts of this case, the 
SCC initially did not issue reasons for its decisions on intervention. The Court’s statement to 
explain what occurred emphasized that it “does not give reasons for decision in motions for 
intervention. To do so would disproportionately burden the Court’s workload. In this instance, 
however, the concerns raised by some LGBTQ+ groups and others call for a response. … 
[S]cheduling issues informed Justice Wagner’s decision not to grant all applicants the right to 
intervene.”956   
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By the Court’s own admission, it was the “concerns raised by some LGBTQ+ groups” 
that moved the Court to action. Sean Fine of the Globe and Mail noted that Justice Wagner 
“chose nine [interveners], among which he believed the views of LGBTQ advocates were well 
represented. But when he was made aware of concerns on social media, he sought out Chief 
Justice McLachlin to see what could be done.”957 This entire event appears to be an anomaly. It 
was a historical reversal of fortunes for interveners in Charter litigation. The Court was not 
prepared, as were the courts in BC (and Nova Scotia), to adopt a “liberal approach” at first 
instance. After all, the Court had plenty of notice for those applications to enable it to have 
made an extra day available long before it faced its embarrassing weekend of regret.  
It is reasonable to assume that had there been no outcry from the LGBTQ community 
the Court would have gone on with the one-day hearing as planned. No one would have thought 
more of it. But the indignation of the activists and the reaction of the Court to that criticism 
requires us to contemplate its meaning. The Court’s response was to open the doors for all 
interveners without exception and allow all to file up to a ten-page brief and have a five-minute 
oral presentation. There appeared to be no considered thought on who should or should not be 
given the priviledge. This could have long term implications for the Court as it will have a hard 
time squaring future restrictions, if it so chooses, with the open policy it gave in the TWU case 
after the public complaints that elicited such a complete reversal.  
The role of interveners is, at least partially, to bolster public faith in the legal system. 
One could argue that in this case, the Court took public perception into serious consideration 
and acted immediately to correct it. That may be beneficial to the Court’s image. Eugene 
Meehan observes that, “having let every intervener in, the Court is now free to do whatever it 
wants, and no one can complain they were not heard.”958   
There were, no doubt, unambiguous lines of reasoning that went into Justice Wagner’s 
first decision, as noted above. However, because the Court, as a general practice, does not give 
reasons for its decisions on interventions we are left in the dark as to what those deliberations 
were. This incident may give the Court some reason to pause about the effectiveness of its 
current policy in not providing reasons. Perhaps, given time and reflection, this policy may 
evolve to the point that a future Court will give reasons for its use of discretion in granting or 
not granting interventions.  
However, for the purpose of this work, this series of events does suggest that the Court’s 
hypersensitivity to the public perception of how it handled this case was a harbinger of the 
Court’s final decisions to come: decisions that have confirmed the legal revolution against 
religion is at full throttle.  
 
6.3.6.4   Decision: Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University959 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the BCCA’s decision and ruled against TWU in a 
notably fractured 7-2 decision, with a 5-justice majority, 2 concurring opinions, and a vigorous 
dissent. Justices Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon formed the majority 
opinion while Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe each wrote their own concurring 
opinions. Justices Côté and Brown wrote a robust dissenting opinion. 
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6.3.6.4.1 Majority Decision 
 
The majority ruled that the LSBC was entitled to consider TWU’s admissions policies 
apart from the academic qualifications and competence of individual graduates. The Law 
Society benchers have an overarching objective of upholding and protecting the public interest 
in the administration of justice in reviewing admission requirements to the profession. The 
governing body of the legal profession, being a self-regulating profession, is to be given 
deference in carrying out the public interest. 
The heart of the appeal, the Majority noted, was the Covenant’s prohibition “on sexual 
intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman.”960 The 
Majority’s decision paid careful attention to the negative response of the LSBC membership to 
TWU’s application. They described the “considerable response”961 from the LSBC membership 
when the LSBC April 11, 2014 meeting upheld approval for the school, forcing a Special General 
Meeting on June 10, 2014. That meeting had a vote of 3210 to 968 against TWU. Then the 
October 2014 referendum resulted in a 5951 to 2088 vote against TWU. The Majority’s 
emphasis on the large numbers opposed to TWU is striking. While such opposition forms part 
of the facts, a case involving Charter rights is not a numbers game. Charter rights are meant to 
protect against the tyranny of the majority.962  
The Majority saw the LSBC decision as not a rejection of TWU’s graduates but a 
rejection of a law school with a mandatory covenant that violates the public interest.963 The 
LSBC’s statutory mandate as a “gatekeeper to the profession”964 requires it to broadly uphold 
and protect the public interest.965 How it carries out that mandate, as a self-regulating 
profession, is to be given deference.966 Professional regulation through licensing “is directed 
toward the protection of vulnerable interests – those of clients and third parties.”967 The 
delegation of statutory power maintains the independence of the bar, is a hallmark of a free 
and democratic society,968 and recognizes the institutional expertise to interpret public 
interest.969 
The LSBC was entitled to be concerned about the Covenant that “effectively imposes 
inequitable barriers on entry to the school.”970 It risks decreasing the diversity of the bar and 
harming LGBTQ individuals.971 Its decision to deny TWU accreditation was reasonable as 
TWU’s denial of LGBTQ students who could not sign the Covenant limited access to the legal 
profession based on personal characteristics, not merit, which is “inherently inimical to the 
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integrity of the legal profession.”972 As a public actor its overarching interest is to protect the 
“values of equality and human rights in carrying out its functions” in line with “Charter 
values.”973 Charter values are “[f]ar from controversial” but are “accepted principles of 
constitutional interpretation” and in administrative decision-making must be complied with.974 
The potential harm to the LGBTQ community is a factor for the LSBC to consider. 975 This does 
not amount to LSBC regulating law schools or being confused with a human rights tribunal.976  
As to the referendum, the Majority were of the view that as a self-governing body it was 
consistent with its authority to receive “guidance or support of the membership as a whole.”977 
Nor did it need to give formal reasons for its decision as the LSBC benchers are elected 
representatives and were alive to the issues of balancing the rights.978 This is perhaps one of 
the most troubling aspects of the decision. Peter Gall, Q.C., Counsel for the LSBC, admitted to the 
SCC in oral testimony that he agreed with the BCCA’s view the Law Society failed “to consider 
its statutory obligation to determine whether the special resolution was consistent with its 
statutory mandate.”979 In other words, the LSBC admitted it did not exercise its authority to 
ensure that there was a proportionate balance between the severe limits on TWU’s Charter 
rights and the statutory objectives governing the LSBC. Despite that failure, the Society called 
upon the SCC to do it for them. Incredibly the SCC obliged rather than sending it back to the 
LSBC for its own determination. This fact suggests that the SCC’s trust in state regulators to 
carry out a robust Doré and Loyola analysis is misplaced. And, as Côté and Brown observed, the 
Majority’s assertion that the Benchers believed their decision “would benefit from the guidance 
or support of the membership as a whole” was “pure historical revisionism.”980 A very sad 
commentary indeed on the lengths to which the Majority (acting as legal revolutionaries 
against religious accommodation) was willing to go to ensure they were “on the right side of 
history.” 
The Doré and Loyola analysis of administrative decisions that engage the Charter “are 
binding precedents of this Court.”981 The first part of the analysis asks, is freedom of religion 
engaged? It is not necessary to decide if TWU, as an institution, has a religious freedom right.982 
The test is whether the claimant sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with 
religion and if so, whether the state conduct interferes in more than a trivial or insubstantial 
manner with the claimant’s ability to act in accordance with the belief and practice.983 “It is 
clear from the record that evangelical members of TWU’s community sincerely believe that 
studying in a community defined by religious beliefs … contributes to their spiritual 
development.”984 And this right was engaged by the LSBC decision.985  
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Under the Doré and Loyola framework the administrative decision-maker is in the best 
position to weigh the Charter protections and strike the right balance with the statutory 
mandate.986 This “is not a weak or watered-down version of proportionality – rather, it is a 
robust one.”987 The decision-maker does not need to choose the option that limits the Charter 
protection the least but the option can be within a range of reasonable outcomes.988  
The LSBC limit on religious freedom is of minor989 significance because the mandatory 
covenant is not absolutely required for the religious practice of studying law in a Christian 
learning environment.990 The interference is limited because the belief is “preferred” “rather 
than necessary” for spiritual growth.991 However, on the other side, the LSBC decision 
furthered the statutory objective of maintaining equal access and diversity of the profession.992 
The Covenant “effectively closed” LGBTQ students from the school and “may discourage 
qualified candidates from gaining entry to the legal profession.”993 They would have fewer 
opportunities relative to others.994 “The public confidence in the administration of justice may 
be undermined if the LSBC is seen to approve a law school that effectively bars many LGBTQ 
people from attending.”995 TWU can determine the rules of conduct for its members but in 
balancing the rights the decision-maker can take into account that this was a case where TWU 
was enforcing its rules on others.996 To be “required by someone else’s religious beliefs to 
behave contrary to one’s sexual identity is degrading and disrespectful.”997   
In the end, the LSBC’s decision is not a serious limitation on TWU’s religious freedom as 
it “does not suppress TWU’s religious difference”.998 It means that TWU is “not free to impose 
those religious beliefs on fellow law students, since they have an inequitable impact and can 
cause significant harm.” The decision ensures equal access to the profession and prevents the 
risk of significant harm to LGBTQ who feel they have no choice but to attend TWU’s proposed 
law school,” and maintains public confidence.999   
The LSBC “decision amounted to a proportionate balancing and was reasonable.”1000 
 
6.3.6.4.2 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin 
 
In a concurring judgement with the majority, Chief Justice McLachlin agreed that 
discretionary administrative decisions that engage Charter rights are to be reviewed on the 
Doré and Loyola framework, which is less onerous than the Oakes test. However, she is 
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concerned with the proportionality test, i.e. weighing the benefit that came as a result of 
infringing the right verses the negative impact on that right. If the benefit is greater than the 
infringement, then the government action is proportional and therefore the limit is reasonable. 
The proportionality test has three elements: first, the state objective must be rationally 
connected to the decision; second, the impairment must be minimal, that is, there was no 
alternative, less-infringing decision possible; and third, the impact assessment of the decision 
must determine whether the effects of the decision are proportionate to the state objective.  
McLachlin raised four concerns:1001 first, the initial focus must be on the rights, not on 
the Charter values. Second, the Charter right must be consistently interpreted regardless of the 
state actor. In other words, a state administrator is still a state actor just as much the executive 
government. Third, the onus is on the state actor to demonstrate that the limits on the rights 
are reasonable and demonstrably justified. Fourth, use of “deference” and “reasonableness” are 
not helpful. Where an administrative decision-maker’s decision has unjustifiable and 
disproportionate impact on a Charter right it is always unreasonable.  
McLachlin agreed that TWU’s freedom of religion was infringed. She disagreed with the 
majority decision not to analyse TWU’s claims of freedom of expression and association. Such 
freedoms, she maintained, are part of freedom of religion.1002 She rejected TWU’s equality claim 
on the basis that the Law Society’s decision was not from religious prejudice but to ensure 
equal access to all prospective law students.1003   
As to the negative impact of the denial of accreditation McLachlin felt the majority was 
wrong to hold it “of a minor significance” as it interfered with religious practice, freedom of 
expression and association. “These are not minor matters,” McLachlin observed; “Canada has a 
tradition dating back at least four centuries of religious schools which are established to allow 
people to study at institutions that reflect their faith and their practices.”1004 The majority’s 
view that the impact is only interfering with the “optimal religious learning environment … is to 
deny this lengthy and passionately held tradition.”1005 “We cannot, on the one hand, 
acknowledge the deep sincerity of the belief in a religious practice and then, on the other, doubt 
that sincerity by calling the practice relatively insignificant.”1006 Further, she noted that “the 
fact that some individuals may be prepared to give up the religious practice does not make it a 
minor infringement.”1007 
McLachlin rejected the majority’s position that the mandatory Covenant be devalued 
because it compels non-believers to follow TWU’s religious practices. “There is a deep tradition 
in religious schools of welcoming non-adherents as students, provided they agree to abide by 
the norms of the community,” she observed.1008 “Students who do not agree with the religious 
practices do not need to attend these schools. But if they want to attend, for whatever reason, 
and agree to the practices required of students, it is difficult to speak of compulsion.”1009 
For McLachlin, “the most compelling law society objective is the imperative of refusing 
to condone discrimination against LGBTQ people, pursuant to the LSBC’s statutory obligation 
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to protect the public interest.”1010 Though the Charter does not apply to TWU, the mandatory 
covenant is discriminatory as it “imposes burdens on LGBTQ people on the sole basis of their 
sexual orientation.”1011 “[It] singles out LGBTQ people as less worthy of respect and dignity 
than heterosexual people, and reinforces negative stereotypes against them.”1012 LGTBQ 
students have less access to law school and the practice of law than heterosexual students.1013 
For McLachlin, the LSBC has a statutory duty to uphold the public interest to protect the 
rights and freedoms of everyone including LGBTQ people.1014 This interest is broad and 
involves more than the competence of the law graduate.  
The onus is on LSBC to show that the serious negative impacts on TWU are 
proportionate to the benefits of its decision. In the end, “[t]he LSBC cannot abide by its duty to 
combat discrimination and accredit TWU at the same time.”1015 
McLachlin, unlike the majority, did not ignore the TWU 2001 decision. That 2001 
decision was distinguishable, in McLachlin’s view, as it dealt with teachers and the possibility 
of TWU education graduates bringing discrimination into the classroom. But here the LSBC 
sought “to avoid condoning or even appearing to condone discrimination.”1016 For her “LSBC 
operates under a unique statutory mandate – a mandate that imposes a heightened duty to 
maintain equality and avoid condoning discrimination.”1017 
 
6.3.6.4.3 Justice Malcolm Rowe 
 
Justice Rowe held that the question is whether the LSBC infringed the Charter by 
withdrawing the approval of TWU’s proposed law school because of the effect of the Covenant 
on prospective students.1018 He concluded it did not. 
He agreed with the Majority that the LSBC’s statutory mandate allowed it to consider 
the effect of the Covenant on prospective students.  
He differed on the approach in assessing how the Charter rights were infringed. He 
agreed with the McLachlin, Côté and Brown that the Doré and Loyola analysis needs 
clarification. He agreed with TWU that the Doré framework leaves many unanswered 
questions.1019 He proposed three clarifications. 
First, Charter rights, not Charter values, are to be the focus of inquiry as the “reliance on 
values rather than rights has muddled the adjudication of Charter claims in the administrative 
context.”1020 The use of Charter values makes sense when the Charter is not directly implicated, 
as in developing principles of the common law, but where the Charter applies there is no need 
to have recourse to Charter values.1021 The confusion comes, says Rowe, “when Charter values 
are used as a standalone basis for the adjudication of Charter claims.” This is because the scope 
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of Charter values is undefined. In some cases, the value aligns with a right but in others it does 
not line up with Charter jurisprudence and that lack of clarity “heightens the potential for 
unpredictable reasoning.”1022  
Rowe held that the Majority’s use of the language of Charter “protections” to mean both 
rights and values “does little to clarify the role of Charter values in the adjudication of Charter 
claims.” By equating “rights and values” with “Charter protections,” “the majority undermines 
the view that rights and values are distinct in scope and function.”1023 Rowe explains: 
In cases where Charter rights are plainly at stake, courts and other decision-makers 
have a constitutional obligation to address the rights claims as such and to do so 
explicitly. An analysis based on Charter values should not eclipse or supplant the 
analysis of whether Charter rights have been infringed. Where Charter rights have been 
infringed by administrative actors, reviewing courts must determine whether the state 
meets the burden of justifying the infringement according to s. 1. This is not a matter of 
doctrinal preference. It is a constitutional obligation imposed by the Charter.1024  
Rowe noted that the initial burden is on the claimant to show that the state-actor’s 
decision infringes his or her Charter rights.1025 The court is to take a purposive approach to 
rights but not to give “undue attention to the historical meaning of rights and freedoms as 
understood when the Charter was enacted.”1026 This allows the Charter to keep pace with 
societal change. At the same time, the courts must not extend the meaning of the constitutional 
text beyond “‘the limits of reason’ so as not to ‘overshoot the actual purpose of the right or 
freedom in question’”1027 but “based on considerations that are intrinsic to the rights 
themselves.”1028  
Rowe raised concerns about the Court’s approach in cases where it “avoids delineation 
and relies instead on s. 1 to ensure that rights are exercised within proper bounds.”1029 This 
approach allows claimants to quickly discharge their proof of infringement and shift the 
burden to government to justify its actions.1030 But the problem with that is “[i]f infringements 
are too readily found on the basis of activities that fall outside of the protective scope of the 
rights then courts may well too readily find that the government has met the justificatory 
burden set out in Oakes.”1031 This “erodes the seriousness of finding Charter violations” and 
“increases the role of policy considerations,” thereby distorting “the proper relationship 
between the branches of government by unduly expanding the policy making role of the 
judiciary.”1032 It means the entire adjudication of Charter claims are dealt with by balancing 
“whereby rights and justifications are considered in a type of blended analysis.” This results in 
“an unstructured, somewhat conclusory exercise that ignores the framing of the Charter and 
departs fundamentally from the foundational Charter jurisprudence of this Court.”1033 
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Justice Rowe was troubled by the fact that in the administrative law context the 
applicant is required to demonstrate that an impugned decision should be overturned.1034 Thus 
the decision is deemed reasonable unless the claimant shows otherwise. “This would provide 
for less robust protection of Charter rights.”1035 Rowe maintains that “the justificatory burden 
must remain on the government once an infringement of rights is demonstrated.”1036 The 
Court’s desire to streamline the review of administrative decisions must not have the “effect of  
diluting the protection afforded to Charter rights.”1037 Rowe agrees that Doré and Loyola are 
binding precedents but need to be clarified.1038  
On the matter of religious freedom in s. 2(a) of the Charter, Rowe held that TWU’s claim 
does not fall within the scope of freedom of religion. The scope of the right is that it is based on 
the exercise of free will,1039 and defined by the absence of constraint.1040 The focus is on the 
choice of the believer regardless of whether the belief or practice is recognized as part of an 
official religion.1041  While there is also a communal aspect of religious freedom it “is premised 
on the personal volition of individual believers.”1042 Rowe declined to find that TWU, as an 
institution, has a right to religious freedom. Even if it did, he maintained, such rights “would not 
extend beyond those held by the individual members of the faith community.”1043 
The religious belief or practice at issue is the proscription of sexual intimacy outside 
heterosexual marriage and the imposition of this on all TWU students.1044 Rowe questions the 
Majority’s view that the claimants can have a preference for this belief as it is not required but 
is protected by the Charter; but since it is not required its infringement is of little 
consequence.1045 This is an overbroad delineation of the right leading to the infringement being 
justified too readily.1046 He prefers the view that the claimants did not advance a sincere belief 
or practice required by their religion1047 but he will assume it to be satisfied.1048 
As to whether the state interference is more than trivial or insubstantial Rowe held that 
TWU claims protection for their ability to study law in an academic environment that requires 
all students to abide by the Covenant.1049 But the school is open to non-believers and its 
attempt to coerce religious practices on those outside of its community is not protected by the 
Charter.1050 Since religious freedom is a function of personal autonomy and choice it does not 
allow individuals or communities to impose adherence on those who do not share that faith.1051 
Therefore, what the claimants seek falls outside the scope of freedom of religion.  
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The statutory authority of the LPA did not preclude the LSBC from holding a 
referendum and choosing to be bound by the results; nor was it unreasonable given the 
deference due to the LSBC to interpret its own statute.1052 However, if there was a Charter 
infringement, “I do not see how it would be possible for the LSBC to proceed by way of a 
majority vote while upholding its responsibilities under the Charter.”1053 
The LSBC decision came within a range of reasonable outcomes, which is informed by 
the mandate to regulate the legal profession in the public interest, and the deference given to 
the LSBC. It was reasonable not to accredit TWU’s law school because of the LSBC’s mandate to 
promote equal access to the profession, support diversity, and prevent harm to LGBTQ law 
students.1054   
 
6.3.6.4.4 Justice Suzanne Côté and Justice Russell Brown 
 
Côté and Brown suggest the real question is who controls the door to the public square? 
The liberal state must foster pluralism by accommodating difference but where does public life 
begin? They held that it is the public regulator who controls the door and owes that 
obligation.1055 A private denominational university, not subject to the Charter and exempt from 
human rights legislation, does not. By restricting access to the public square, as it has, the LSBC 
“profoundly interfered with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of a community of co-
religionists to insist upon certain moral commitments from those who wish to join the private 
space within which it pursues its religiously based practices.”1056 The denial of access based on 
religious grounds “merits judicial intervention, not affirmation.”1057 
TWU is not for everybody and LGBTQ students could only sign the Covenant at a 
considerable personal cost.1058 At stake is also the personal self-identity of TWU community 
members. Courts must strive to see claims from the perspectives of all sides.1059 
Constitutionally protected rights, like religious freedom, exists “to protect right-holders from 
values which a state actor deems to be ‘shared’, not to give licence to courts to defer to or 
impose those values.”1060 A court of law ought not to be concerned, as was the Majority, with 
the “public perception” of what freedom of religion entails.1061 Its responsibility is “not to 
produce social consensus, but to protect the democratic commitment to live together in 
peace.”1062  
The Doré/Loyola framework “betrays the promise of our Constitution that rights 
limitations must be demonstrably justified.”1063 The only proper purpose for the LSBC decision 
on TWU, as permitted by its governing statute, was to ensure TWU graduates met the minimum 
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competence and ethical conduct standards.1064 Even if the statute’s “public interest” mandate 
allowed for considerations other than fitness, the decision to deny TWU approval because of a 
Covenant restriction, which is protected by the provincial human rights legislation, “is a 
profound interference with religious freedom, and is contrary to the state’s duty of religious 
neutrality.”1065 Even if “public interest” were to be understood broadly, the accreditation of 
TWU would not be inconsistent with the public interest as “[t]olerance and accommodation of 
difference serve the public interest and foster pluralism.”1066 
There is nothing in the governing statute that is ambiguous such that it was necessary 
to resort to “Charter values” to determine LSBC’s public interest mandate.1067 “Public interest” 
is itself “vague and difficult to characterize.”1068 The Majority’s approach is “untethered from 
the express limits to the LSBC’s statutory authority” which was to ensure licensing applicants 
are fit to practice law.1069 There is no discretion for considerations that are improper or 
irrelevant.1070 The scope of LSBC’s mandate is “limited to regulating the legal profession, 
starting at (but not before) the licensing process.”1071 The Majority misconstrues the purpose 
underlying the LSBC’s discretionary power to approve a law school.1072 The purpose “does not 
rationally extend to guaranteeing equal access to law schools.”1073 Admissions criteria is left up 
to the law schools. The Majority’s logic would mean the LSBC would be entitled to consider the 
inequitable barrier of tuition fees in accrediting law schools to promote competence of the 
bar.1074 “The LSBC is not a roving free-floating agent of the state. It cannot take it upon itself to 
police such matters when they lie beyond its mandate.”1075 
Côté and Brown disagreed with the Majority’s approval of the LSBC Benchers’ decision 
to be bound by the results of a referendum.1076 “[T]he Benchers abdicated their duty as 
administrative decision-makers to properly balance the objectives of the LPA with the Charter 
rights implicated by their decision.”1077 The Majority was engaged in “pure historical 
revisionism to suggest that the Benchers believed their decision ‘would benefit from the 
guidance or support of the membership as a whole.’”1078  In short, “the LSBC’s decision is 
completely devoid of any reasoning.”1079 
The Majority’s justification for deferring to the LSBC despite the lack of reasons is 
“untenable” because it is never sufficient to consider the outcome alone.1080 The majority 
replaces the non-reasons of the LSBC with its own and makes the outcome the sole 
                                                     
1064 Ibid at para 267. 
1065 Ibid at para 268. 
1066 Ibid at para 269. 
1067 Ibid at  para 270. 
1068 Ibid at para 272. 
1069 Ibid at para 273. 
1070 Ibid at para 274. 
1071 Ibid at para 284. 
1072 Ibid at para 285. 
1073 Ibid at para 289. 
1074 Ibid at para 289. 
1075 Ibid at para 291. 
1076 Ibid at para 294. 
1077 Ibid. 
1078 Ibid at para 298. 
1079 Ibid at para 299. 
1080 Ibid at para 300. 
  180  
consideration.1081 Second, the Majority cannot point to any basis that the Benchers conducted 
any balancing after the referendum.1082  
Côté and Brown find the lack of rationale for insisting on a distinct Doré/Loyola 
framework for administrative decisions troubling where the Oakes test is already context-
specific,1083 and has been applied to many administrative law decisions prior to Doré.1084 The 
Majority said its Doré framework is a “robust” rather than a weak version of proportionality, 
but Côté and Brown note, “saying so does not make it so.”1085 As they note, it subverts our 
Constitution’s promise to ensure that Charter rights are subject only to reasonable limits.1086 
The Majority has effectively said that under Doré, “Charter rights are guaranteed only so far as 
they are consistent with the objectives of the enabling statute.”1087 But the Constitution has it the 
other way around: rights trump statutory objectives. 
Moreover, the Court’s silence on who bears the onus in the administrative law context is 
“a conspicuous and serious lacuna in the Doré/Loyola framework.”1088 “[T]his hardly bolsters 
the credibility of the Doré/Loyola framework.”1089 
The Majority’s reliance on “values” is troubling – “resorting to Charter values as a 
counterweight to constitutionalized and judicially defined Charter rights is a highly 
questionable practice.”1090 Charter values are “entirely the product of the idiosyncrasies of the 
judicial mind that pronounces them to be so.”1091 One judge’s understanding of “equality” might 
be a “shared value” with all or even most Canadians but another judge’s might not. Indeed, 
“One person’s values may be another person’s anathema.”1092 This is not problematic as long as 
each person agrees to the other’s right to hold and act on those values in a manner that 
maintains civic order.1093  
In Côté and Brown’s view, “Charter ‘values’, as stated by the majority, are amorphous 
and, just as importantly, undefined.”1094 They lack doctrinal structure which the courts have 
crafted for over 35 years in giving substantive meaning to Charter rights. Instead, “Charter 
values like ‘equality’, ‘justice’, and ‘dignity’ become mere rhetorical devices by which courts can 
give priority to particular moral judgments, under the guise of undefined ‘values’, over other 
values and over Charter rights themselves.”1095 For instance, equality is too nebulous a notion 
to form the basis of concrete decision-making. The Majority cannot point to a specific legal rule 
or right to ground the application of the value of equality here. It is purely abstract and could 
mean virtually anything. After all, “equality in an absolute sense is also perfectly compatible 
with a totalitarian state, being easier to impose where freedom is limited.”1096  
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Côté and Brown agree with the majority that the LSBC’s decision infringes the religious 
freedom of members of the TWU community and also agree not to determine whether TWU, 
qua institution, has a right to religious freedom.1097 They reject Justice Rowe’s narrowing of the 
scope of activity protected by the right.1098 Relying on TWU 2001, they note that the restriction 
on the freedom can be justified by evidence that there will be a detrimental impact on the 
statutory decision-maker’s ability to carry out its mandate.1099 That would mean in this case 
that the TWU graduates would be unfit to practice law. But there is no evidence here to justify 
the limit. 
Côté and Brown held that the LSBC decision “undermines the core character of a lawful 
religious institution and disrupts the vitality of the TWU community” – “it is substantially 
coercive in nature.”1100 The Covenant is protected by the BC Human Rights Code but the LSBC 
decision makes its approval contingent on TWU “manifesting its beliefs in a particular way.”1101 
This demonstrates “highly intrusive conduct by a state actor into the religious practices of the 
TWU community.”1102 
The majority failed to appreciate that the unequal access that results from the Covenant 
“is a function of accommodating religious freedom, which itself advances the public interest by 
promoting diversity in a liberal, pluralist society.”1103 It is “the state and state actors – not 
private institutions like TWU – which are constitutionally bound to accommodate difference in 
order to foster pluralism in public life.”1104  
State neutrality requires the state to refrain from espousing “values” that undermine 
what is necessary for the participation of all. “[A]ccommodating diverse beliefs and values is a 
precondition to secularism and pluralism.”1105 The view of marriage espoused by TWU was 
recognized by Parliament in the Civil Marriage Act. Legislators recognized that the public 
interest is served by promoting the accommodation of difference. So “[t]he LSBC’s decision 
repudiates this wisdom and is unworthy of this Court’s affirmation.”1106 
Côté and Brown rejected the concept that the LSBC’s approval of TWU would be 
condoning the Covenant or discrimination against LGBTQ persons. Law schools do not exercise 
a public function on behalf of LSBC. “Equating approval to condonation turns the protective 
shield of the Charter into a sword by effectively imposing Charter obligations on private 
actors,”1107 thereby excluding religious communities from the public square because they 
exercise their Charter-protected religious beliefs. 
Côté and Brown noted that both Parliament and British Columbia’s legislature 
recognized the so-called “discriminatory” (McLachlin C.J.’s Reasons, at para 138) and 
“degrading and disrespectful” (Majority reasons, at para 101) practices of TWU’s Covenant “as 
consistent with the public interest, legal and worthy of accommodation.”1108 These practices 
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cannot then be cited as a reason justifying the exclusion of a religious community from public 
recognition. The approval of TWU would not be state preference for evangelical Christianity 
but a recognition of the state’s duty “to accommodate diverse religious beliefs without 
scrutinizing their content.”1109 The only decision reflecting a proportionate balancing of the 
rights and state objectives would be to approve TWU’s law school. 
 
6.3.6.5 Decision: Trinity Western University v. The Law Society of Upper Canada1110 
 
In a 7-2 decision the Court ruled that the LSUC’s decision to deny accreditation to TWU 
was reasonable. Justices Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon formed the 
majority opinion while Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe each wrote their own 
concurring opinions. Justices Côté and Brown wrote a robust dissenting opinion. 
 
6.3.6.5.1 The Majority 
 
The Majority noted that LSUC did not deny TWU law graduates but denied TWU 
accreditation with a mandatory covenant.1111 The issues were whether the LSUC was entitled 
to review TWU’s admissions policies; whether the decision limited a Charter protection; and if 
so, whether there was a proportionate balance of the Charter protections and the statutory 
objectives.1112 
The LSUC’s mandate from the Law Society’s Act1113 (LSA) was to provide an overarching 
objective of protecting the public interest in admission to the profession that included whether 
to accredit a law school.1114 The LSA (s. 4.2) tasked the LSUC with advancing the cause of 
justice, the rule of law, access to justice, and protection of the public interest.1115 The LSUC was 
entitled to be concerned about the inequitable barriers on entry to law schools as these impose 
inequitable barriers on entry to the profession and risk decreasing diversity within the bar and 
causing harm to LGBTQ individuals.1116 This is part of its duty to uphold the public interest in 
accreditation as well as a positive public perception of the legal profession.1117 “[T]he LSUC has 
an overarching interest in protecting the vales of equality and human rights in carrying out its 
functions.”1118  
The Majority referenced its reasons in the LSBC case in noting that the LSUC did not 
need to give reasons, since “the Benchers were alive to the question of the balance to be struck 
between freedom of religion and their statutory duties.”1119 
In reviewing administrative decisions, the Doré/Loyola framework is used because it “is 
concerned with ensuring that Charter protections are upheld to the fullest extent possible given 
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the statutory objectives within a particular administrative context. In this way, Charter rights 
are no less robustly protected under an administrative law framework.”1120  
Freedom of religion is engaged for the same reasons as the LSBC case. The LSUC has 
interfered with the TWU religious community’s beliefs and practices which are more than 
trivial or insubstantial.1121 However, the LSUC’s interpretation of the public interest precluded 
it from accrediting TWU as it would not have advanced the statutory objectives.1122 Its decision 
“reasonably balanced the severity of the interference with the benefits to the statutory 
objectives” as the impact on religious freedom was minor “because a mandatory covenant is 
not absolutely required to study law in a Christian environment in which people follow certain 
religious rules of conduct, and attending a Christian law school is preferred, not necessary,” for 
TWU students.1123 On the other side of the scale its decision significantly advanced statutory 
objectives of ensuring equal access and diversity in the profession and preventing harm to 
LGBTQ people. The Majority asserted, “[t]he reality is that most LGBTQ individuals will be 
deterred from attending TWU… and those who do attend will be at risk of significant harm.”1124   
Religious freedom can be limited when it interferes with the rights of others. Hence, 
“TWU’s community members cannot impose those religious beliefs on fellow law students, 
since they have an inequitable impact and can cause significant harm.” LSUC’s decision 
“prevents concrete, not abstract harms to LGBTQ people and to the public in general.”1125 The 
decision gives effect as fully as possible to the Charter protections given the statutory mandate 
and was therefore reasonable.1126 
 
6.3.6.5.2 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin 
 
The Chief Justice concurred with the Majority and adopted her reasons of the 
companion decision. 
 
6.3.6.5.3 Justice Malcolm Rowe 
 
Justice Rowe concurred with the Majority, noting that deference is required in 
reviewing the decisions of law societies as they self-regulate in the public interest.1127 The LSUC 
did not err in denying accreditation because of the discriminatory barrier to legal education 
created by “effectively excluding LGBTQ students from studying law at TWU.”1128 
Justice Rowe adopted his reasons in the companion appeal, holding that there was no 
infringement of Charter rights.1129 The decision fell within a range of possible acceptable 
outcomes, and there was no need for formal reasons as the Court can look to the record to 
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assess the reasonableness of the decision which was evident.1130 The LSUC decision was 
reasonable. 
 
6.3.6.5.4 Justice Suzanne Côté and Justice Russell Brown 
 
This appeal and its companion appeal entail who controls the door to the public square. 
“[W]ho owes an obligation to accommodate difference in public life? We say that this obligation 
lies with the public decision-maker.”1131 TWU, being a private denominational institution, not 
subject to the Charter or to judicial review, exempt from provincial human rights legislation, 
“owes no such obligation.”1132 The only purpose of the LSUC accreditation decision was to 
ensure the TWU graduates were fit for licensing. Not to accredit TWU was “a profound 
interference with the TWU community’s freedom of religion.”1133 Even if the public interest 
were as broad as the majority said then it would not have been inconsistent with the statutory 
mandate to accredit TWU since “[i]n a liberal and pluralist society, the public interest is served, 
and not undermined, by the accommodation of difference.”1134 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the LSA set out the LSUC’s primary function and it is clear that 
“the setting of standards for the provision of legal services in Ontario is the LSUC’s primary 
function.”1135 That regulation begins “at (but not before) the licensing process – that is, starting 
at the doorway to the profession.”1136 It “is crystal clear that the provisions in By-Law 4 relating 
to the accreditation of law schools are meant only to ensure that individual applicants are fit for 
licensing” and it “is not for this Court to extend By-Law 4’s scope beyond the limits of the 
LSUC’s mandate.”1137 Nor do the LSUC’s arguments based on s.62(0.1)23 of the LSA extend 
authority over law schools – and even if it did, it would not apply to a school outside of 
Ontario.1138 
Contrary to the majority position, “‘upholding a positive public perception of the legal 
profession’ … is not a valid basis for the LSUC’s decision.”1139 The objective to ensure equal 
access to and diversity to the profession does not fall under LSUC’s duty to ensure 
competence.1140 If it were otherwise the LSUC would be obliged “to regulate law school tuition 
fees which, arguably, create inequitable barriers to the practice of law.”1141 The only defensible 
exercise of its statutory discretion for a proper purpose would have been to approve TWU.1142 
The Ontario Court of Appeal Justice MacPherson’s finding that TWU’s admission policy 
discriminates against the LGBTQ community contrary to s. 15 of the Charter “reveals the 
fundamental and serious error in the Court of Appeal’s understanding of [the] balancing 
exercise. TWU is a private institution. And, at the risk of stating trite law, private actors are not 
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subject to the Charter.”1143 “[T]he Court of Appeal’s manifestly erroneous understanding of a 
basic premise, not only of our constitutional order but of the particular balancing the court was 
called upon to exercise in this case, taints its entire assessment of the matter.”1144 
The Majority errs in stating that limits on religious freedom are often unavoidable when 
the decision-maker pursues its statutory mandate in a multicultural and democratic society. 
Such a “categorical and unelaborated statement” is rooted in the: 
fundamental misconception: that, even where the rights of others are not actually 
infringed because private actors do not owe obligations to refrain from infringing them, 
a private actor’s religious freedom will ‘unavoidab[ly]’ be limited solely on the basis 
that its exercise ‘negatively impacts’ the interests of others. But the point is this simple. 
The Charter binds state actors, like the LSUC, and only state actors. It does not bind 
private institutions, like TWU.1145 
Côté and Brown, unlike the Majority, do not see the religious interference as minor. 
Rather, the LSUC decision “disrupts the core character of the TWU community by interfering 
with its ability to determine the biblically grounded code of conduct by which community 
members will abide.”1146 When the Majority said that the LSUC did not deny graduates but 
TWU’s law school with a mandatory covenant, it is “a highly formalist description” that “belies 
the majority’s claim … that it is applying ‘substantive equality’. In substance, TWU is seeking 
accreditation of its proposed law school for the benefit of its graduates.”1147  
Finally, the “unequal access resulting from the Covenant is a function not of 
condonation of discrimination, but of accommodating religious freedom, which freedom allows 
religious communities to flourish and thereby promotes diversity and pluralism in the public 
life of our communities.”1148 
In short, “[t]he appeal should be allowed. We therefore dissent.”1149 
 
6.3.7 Analysis of SCC’s TWU Decisions 
 
6.3.7.1 The Increasing Power of Identity Politics 
 
From the moment TWU filed its application with the Federation, the political realities of 
the legal profession were exposed. As noted above, the CCLD and legal academics were 
adamant in their disdain for TWU’s Community Covenant. “Religion” and “religious freedom” 
have evidently become, within the profession, regressive concepts that are associated with 
discrimination and inequality. 
Justice Karakatsanis, during the TWU 2018 oral argument on November 30, 2017, 
complained that the BC Court of Appeal’s decision, which favoured TWU, did not look at the 
controversy “from the perspective of substantive equality, they don’t consider whether they 
have less opportunity than others for those seats.”1150 Justice Karakatsanis was willing to 
sacrifice the TWU law school because the LGBTQ population theoretically would not have the 
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exact same number of open seats as evangelical Christians. The Christian TWU school would be 
open to those Christians who could sign the Community Covenant but not to the LGBTQ 
students who could not or would not sign the Covenant. However, was the number of seats for 
entry to law school a proper comparator in determining equality in the circumstance? 
Professor Rex Ahdar points out, “We cannot know whether two things or two people are alike, 
and hence deserving of similar treatment, until we work out the criterion of likeness and like 
treatment.”1151 Neither Justice Karakatsanis nor the rest of the SCC majority established the 
criterion of likeness – for example, if the SCC is using evangelical Christians and LGBTQ people 
as the comparator groups, what might we consider like treatment? What about “substantive 
equality” among law clerks at the SCC? Or, as deans or faculty members of the law schools 
across Canada?   
Professor Alexandra V. Orlova argues that the courts have a role “to engage in 
transformational legal strategies to work towards achieving substantive equality.”1152 Courts 
are to eradicate “systemic inequality” in order to assist in changing the landscape of social, 
economic and political conditions. This will involve shaping the public’s “feelings and 
challenging existing norms” like the “hetero-normativity of the ‘public good’” to reduce “law’s 
violence.” 1153 The courts then, as envisioned by Orlova, are agents of change. They are a 
“political organ” to implement the public interest.1154 The public interest is fluid, in keeping 
with the changing norms, but also “firmly grounded in the principle of equality”.1155  
The views of Orlova and Karakatsanis regarding the TWU law school controversy are 
proof positive of my assertion that there is a paradigm shift underway in the profession against 
the legal accommodation of religious practice. The reliance upon political identity politics for 
constitutional adjudication is not to be applauded as much as it is to be feared. The rejection of 
the law of religious accommodation by the courts and academics in order to show solidarity 
with the hurt feelings of certain groups presumes that the emotional hurt is due to “social 
corruption” and that such corruption must be solved by “cultural restructuring.” Warns Dr. 
Jordan Peterson, “[o]ur society faces the increasing call to deconstruct its stabilizing traditions 
to include smaller and smaller numbers of people who do not or will not fit into the categories 
upon which even our perceptions are based. That is not a good thing”.1156 Peterson argues, 
“Each person’s private trouble cannot be solved by a social revolution, because revolutions are 
destabilizing and dangerous.”1157 However, the SCC has steered the law unequivocally into the 
murky and dangerous waters of revolutionary identity politics.  
And all political shifts can shift back given the right circumstances. Until the SCC’s TWU 
decisions, the law has, by and large,1158 been generous in its accommodation of religious 
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practices.1159 That is no longer the case. The growing consensus within the legal profession is 
that there can be no tolerance for religious views or practices that offend sexual equality 
claims. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s declaration that the TWU Covenant “hurts”1160 suggests 
that emotive language has supplanted legal principles. There no longer appears to be, in the 
legal profession, any recognition of the historical, philosophical, or practical imperatives for 
accommodating religious difference within a liberal democratic society.1161 A private religious 
community is the sole arbiter of who can and cannot be a member of its community.1162 The 
fact that non-members are required to abide by religious rules when seeking to be part of that 
community should not alter that principle.1163 Indeed, one has to question why the law 
societies are owed deference because of their mandate to self-define in the interests of the legal 
profession, but religious groups are clearly not permitted the same latitude to self-define 
according to their religious beliefs? Guests on private property do not get to change the lawful 
rules of the owner. 
However, politics – sexual identity politics – has moved the conversation to mean just 
that: non-members are demanding the privilege of entering a private religious community, 
receiving all benefits, such as a university education (despite rejecting the community’s 
principles) and nullifying those beliefs and practices they find offensive. The advocates are 
adamant that the law destroy offensive difference. Entities that refuse to acquiesce to political 
demands are deemed discriminatory and are not permitted to operate in the public square. In 
short, opponents of religious accommodation require nothing less than total compliance with 
their social values. The BCCA declared, “there is no Charter or other legal right to be free from 
views that offend and contradict an individual’s strongly held beliefs.”1164 That may change. 
Intentional or not, the political movement sweeping the legal community may make the 
currently non-existent Charter right “not to be offended” into a reality by virtue of “Charter 
values”. The fact the Charter does not have such language is immaterial in this new era. Politics 
makes all things possible just by “the vibe of the thing.”1165 The SCC has now shown itself 
sympathetic to sexual identity politics and creative in reaching what it deems the public 
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desires.1166 Recently, Chief Justice Richard Wagner referred to the long-held principle that the 
Canadian Constitution is “like a living tree, it evolves, so that we don’t necessarily keep to the 
strict definition of a word when it was drafted 150 years ago. We look at it against the 
backdrop of an evolving society with the perspectives, outlooks, moral values of that society, 
and the context in which the issue comes up at the time the Court is making its decision.”1167    
I suggest, as is evident by TWU 2018, that it is not so much Canadian society that has 
changed,1168 but the legal community which has changed in its views toward the law’s 
accommodation of religion. Consider, for example, Joseph Arvay’s comments, noted above, that 
as Benchers they were the law.1169 The SCC agreed with Arvay. 
The most obvious problem with identity politics being the basis of law is that politics 
change. The future is unknown: what is considered to be on the “right side of history” today 
may not be so tomorrow. Should a new ideology take control, different from the current sexual 
identity power dynamic, then the law will be forced to follow its new political masters. Liberal 
democratic pluralism was meant to be a check against the dramatic swings of politics by 
accommodating, as much as possible, the religious (and other) differences of its citizens. 
William Galston writes, “liberal democracies rely on cultural and moral conditions that cannot 
be taken for granted. To remain ‘liberal,’ however, these regimes must safeguard a sphere in 
which individuals and groups can act, without state interference, in ways that reflect their 
understanding of what gives meaning and value to their lives.”1170 The SCC has chosen politics 
and exclusion rather than jealously guarding a place for difference.  
 
6.3.7.2 The Diminishing Power of Law 
 
Law matters. For peace, order, and good government, it must matter. But it no longer 
appears to matter as much as the politics of the law. The rule of law has been a bedrock 
principle of liberal democratic countries.1171 However, if a court is more concerned with 
political popularity than the rule of law, then the net effect is that established law will be 
sacrificed on the altar of political correctness. Hence, in TWU 2018 the majority did not allow 
any legal rule to impede its progress towards the “right” decision of denying TWU a law school.  
 
                                                     
1166 Professor Bezanson states “the social and political climate favours extending aspects of the dissenting 
arguments of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in that [TWU 2001] case in favour of equality [in the TWU 2018 case].” 




1167 Wagner, “First News Conference,” supra note 38.  
1168 Obviously, Canadian society has been leaving Christianity in droves as noted by Clarke & Macdonald, 
supra note 31. My point is that it is the legal community, not simply society at large, whose views have 
evolved. And when I consider the opposition to TWU’s law school bid I observe that it was lawyers and legal 
academics who were vocal – not the average Canadian. 
1169 LSBC Bencher Transcript, supra note 853 at 46.  
1170 William Galston, “Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal 
Theory,” 40 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 869, 907. 
1171 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin, 2011). The Canadian Charter specifically refers to it in 
the Preamble: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule 
of law.” 
  189  
6.3.7.3 Stare Decisis 
 
 We have come a long way from what one keen observer, in the 1950s, noted was the 
SCC’s penchant to be “bound by its own previous decisions, subject to the meaningless 
‘exceptional circumstances’ qualification.”1172 In other words, it was once rare for the SCC to 
oppose its previous decision(s). In recent years, the concept has met with criticism and a call to 
the SCC to loosen stare decisis’s grip.1173 The SCC responded with a new test.1174 Yet, in TWU 
2018, not only did the SCC feel it was not bound by its TWU 2001 decision, it virtually ignored 
it. The majority did not even bother to take the time to distinguish it or apply its Bedford test. 
It is ironic, therefore, that after ignoring TWU 2001, (not to mention other occasions in 
the recent past where it overturned its own decisions1175) the SCC felt it necessary to 
repeatedly emphasize that the administrative law analyses in Doré and Loyola are binding 
precedents.1176 Justices Côté and Brown appeared taken aback by the majority’s insistence on 
that point; they observed that the majority could not even change those precedents to clarify 
who (the decision-maker or the claimant) had burden of proof in the analysis.1177 It seems that 
some cases are more binding than others. We are left not knowing why TWU 2001 was ignored 
by the majority in TWU 2018.1178 
 
6.3.7.4 Constitutional Protection Nullified by Charter Values 
 
TWU is not a state actor – it is a private religious university. TWU is to be protected 
from state actors’ decisions by Charter guarantees. Further, it is exempt from the scrutiny of 
human rights legislation in BC as was noted by TWU 2001, not to mention that the rights of 
religious communities with these beliefs and practices are referenced in the Civil Marriage 
Act,1179 and are protected from having their charitable status removed in the Income Tax 
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Act.1180 Finally, these same views were protected in the SCC’s own Same-sex Marriage 
Reference.1181 The non-discussion of these points by the majority is telling.  
So is the Majority’s refusal to address the incomprehensible Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision that TWU’s Covenant violated s. 15 of the Charter.1182 As Côté and Brown JJ observed, 
it is trite law that a private actor cannot violate the Charter.1183 Yet, the majority let the Ontario 
decision stand without a whisper of contradiction. The majority stated that the use of “Charter 
values” in constitutional interpretation is “[f]ar from controversial.”1184 However, the 
concurring and dissenting opinions belie that assertion.1185 If anything, the use of “Charter 
values” is more controversial than ever as a result of TWU 2018. Côté and Brown’s robust 
dissent criticized the doctrine which elevates “the idiosyncrasies of the judicial mind” to such 
an extent that these judicially-imposed “values” limit a constitutionally protected right.1186 A 
cursory look at the legal literature makes it indisputable that “Charter values” are 
controversial.1187 Even the Ontario Court of Appeal has recognized that “Charter values lend 
themselves to subjective application because there is no doctrinal structure to guide their 
identification or application.”1188 This “is particularly acute when Charter values are 
understood as competing with Charter rights.”1189 
For all of the reasons that the concurring judgements and the dissent raise, the 
emphasis on “Charter values” is misplaced and worrisome especially for Christian institutions 




                                                     
And s. 3.1 of the Act: “3.1 For greater certainty, no person or organization shall be deprived of any 
benefit, or be subject to any obligation or sanction, under any law of the Parliament of Canada solely 
by reason of their exercise, in respect of marriage between persons of the same sex, of the freedom of 
conscience and religion guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the 
expression of their beliefs in respect of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the exclusion of 
all others based on that guaranteed freedom.” 
1180 Income Tax Act RSC, 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (6.21): “For greater certainty, subject to subsections (6.1) and 
(6.2), a registered charity with stated purposes that include the advancement of religion shall not have its 
registration revoked or be subject to any other penalty under Part V solely because it or any of its members, 
officials, supporters or adherents exercises, in relation to marriage between persons of the same sex, the 
freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” 
1181 See Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 178, paras 58-59. 
1182 TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701, para 115. 
1183 TWU v LSUC 2018, supra note 14, para 78. 
1184 LSBC v TWU 2018, supra note 14, para 41. 
1185 Ibid, Chief Justice McLachlin, para 115; Justice Rowe, paras 166-175; dissent of Justices Côté and Brown, 
paras 307-311. 
1186 Ibid, para 308. 
1187 For example, see: Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the 
Charter”, in J. Cameron, B. Berger and S. Lawrence, eds, (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d), 561; Mark S. Harding and 
Rainer Knopff, “Constitutionalizing Everything: The Role of ‘Charter Values’” (2013) 18 Rev. Const. Stud. 141; 
Iain T. Benson, “Do ‘values’ mean anything at all? Implications for law, education and society” (2008) Journal 
for Juridical Science 33 (1): 1-22; Matthew Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian 
Constitutionalism” (2014) The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases 
Conference, 67 at 361. 
1188 Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 1943, 2017 ONCA 319, para 79. 
1189 Ibid. 
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6.3.8 Eureka Moment 
 
As we saw in Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions, there comes a point during the 
crisis stage that there is a “light bulb” moment or an epiphany. Some scientists say their “Ah 
ha!” moment came while taking a shower – a flash of insight when the scientist connects the 
dots of the issues at stake. That moment is a recognition that the paradigm itself must be 
replaced with a new understanding. The old paradigm is obsolete. A new paradigm comes to 
take its place. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on the TWU law school case is the enforcement 
of the “Eureka Moment” in the legal revolution against the special status of religion in Canadian 
law that has been brewing for some time. Indeed, one could argue that the Court’s two 
decisions have carried the law well beyond its flash of enlightenment, from speculation to 
reality: across the Rubicon of religious freedom into a new territory of secular uniformity. 
The SCC Majority had a no-holds-barred approach in its pursuit of sexual equality. The 
Majority did not let any legal rule – including centuries of religious accommodation – stop it in 
its path to arrive at the “right” decision. There simply was no way it was going to allow a 
Christian law school with the traditional teaching and practice of marriage to be accredited – to 
be a legitimate member of the legal fraternity. In time we may expect a further “Eureka 
Moment” when there will be a widespread recognition of just how disastrous this decision was. 
Consider the following.  
There are a number of obvious and daring omissions in the TWU 2018 decisions. First is 
the SCC’s absolute disregard for basic constitutional principles, as highlighted above, as well as 
its inconsistent application of stare decisis. Second, there was no appreciation whatsoever for 
religious difference on fundamental human life issues as being necessary in a liberal, 
democratic society.  
It seems clear that the SCC was anxious to reach its desired conclusion without the 
bother of legal impediments. It is my position that this lack of respect for the current law was 
founded on and facilitated by the Court’s recognition that a preponderance of legal academics, 
practitioners, and law societies had reached a Eureka Moment: religious accommodation in 
Canada, as it was understood prior to June 15, 2018, was no longer morally acceptable. The 
Majority concurred.  
I will now proceed to explain, based on my research, how this SCC decision was made 
possible within the framework of the legal revolution against the place of religion. First, the 
secularization theory that religion would decline with the advancement of education has not 
materialized, except for the societal elites. Second, the legal profession and the legal academia 
have shown that there is no room for accommodation of religious practice as the law once 
stood. Third, the SCC’s decisions have confirmed what had been fermenting within the 
profession for a while – the belief that religion should no longer to be treated as special. The 
argument will consider the SCC’s decision as it relates to public perception, public interest, and 
the accentuation of harm on the LGBTQ community versus the diminishment of effects on TWU 
within a framework that favours “Charter values” over “Charter rights”.  
  
6.3.8.1 The Legal Elite In the Secularization Theory 
 
If religion has shown anything over the millennia of human existence, it is that it has 
staying power. So much so that many have come to recognize that the secularization thesis is 
no longer persuasive. That theory suggested religion would fade as societies became more 
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educated – “where secularism gradually displaces religiosity in much the same way that 
adulthood displaces childhood.”1190 However, that thesis has failed to materialize.  
Sociologists such as Peter Berger not only recognized that the secularization theory 
does not stand up to current reality, but that despite the secularization of society, there are 
many vibrant religious communities that have successfully resisted secular influence. Indeed, 
TWU’s continued insistence on maintaining its religious identity is a testament to religion’s 
resistance. However, this fact has not yet been picked up by certain segments of society. Berger 
writes: 
There exists an international subculture composed of people with western-type 
higher education, especially in the humanity and social sciences that is indeed 
secularized. This subculture is the principle ‘carrier’ of progressive, enlightened 
beliefs and values. While its members are relatively thin on the ground, they are 
very influential, as they control the institutions that provide the ‘official’ 
definitions of reality, notably the educational system, the media of mass 
communication and the higher reaches of the legal system.1191 
“What this means,” suggests legal scholar Iain T. Benson, “is that when we are dealing 
with the law and the media we must recognize that these sectors are heavily over-represented 
by those, such as many Western journalists, judges and lawyers, who have little time for 
religion at best and actively wish to attack it at worst.”1192 
Lawyer Philip R. Wood argues that as the priest falls in esteem in the West the lawyer 
rises.1193 Wood recognizes the foundational role of religion in organizing life on the planet,1194 
but feels its retreat from a public role to a more private character in the West has left a gap. 
That gap, says Wood, will be best filled by law and lawyers. “The law is the one universal 
secular religion which practically everybody believes in,” he maintains.1195 It has “no 
burdensome rituals” like religion. There is no sacrifice; no prostrating before the law or 
uttering words of devotion or singing of hymns. Further, law has the advantage of changing 
when necessary and its content, “[i]n ideal conditions”, is derived from the “consensus and will 
of the people.”1196 While law may not offer the consolations of religion it does empower: 
and liberates us and makes it possible for us to do things in peace which otherwise we 
would never be able to do. It enables us to pursue happiness. It gives us the order and 
freedom to pursue a greater goal. We control it. The law is our servant not our master. 
The law at its best is the most important ideology we have.1197 
 
 
                                                     
1190 Andrea Paras & Janice Gross Stein, “Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life,” in Michael 
Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, eds, Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 212 
1191 Peter L. Berger, The De-Secularization of the World (Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1999), 34. 
1192 Benson, “Attack on Western Religions” supra note 468 at 11. 
1193 Wood, supra note 182. 
1194 “Religions,” said Wood, “provided an explanation of the universe and the meaning of life” by answering 
the question of creation and providing purpose to our lives, a rationale for morality, and codes for “peace with 
ourselves and with others,” supra note 182 at 1-2. 
1195 Ibid at 3. 
1196 Ibid at 4. 
1197 Ibid. 
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6.3.8.2 No Room For Religion in the Legal Inn 
 
During the TWU law school crisis a number individuals from the ranks of practicing 
lawyers;1198 the Benchers and staff of the law societies; the law school faculty members; and 
law students came to a “eureka moment.” They have decided that the law’s accommodation of 
religion as currently understood and practiced no longer fits their understanding of how the 
law ought to operate when traditional religious norms conflict with the new sexual norms. 
University of Calgary professor Alice Woolley, clearly troubled by the debate, recognized the 
pros and cons of both sides but decided against religious accommodation, confessing:  
From my own perspective the proposed TWU law school defies satisfactory resolution. I 
reject the perspective that religious belief obviously justifies this sort of discriminatory 
practice. At the same time, constraining expressions of human sexuality to 
monogamous heterosexual marriage is a mainstream religious belief. I see some weight 
to the argument that freedom of religion protects even bad religious practices. If forced 
to choose I would pick equality over religious freedom, but in doing so I would 
recognize the sacrifice of the freedom at the right’s expense, and would feel the weight 
of that loss.1199   
In short, the law of religious accommodation must be replaced. It is wrong. As LSBC 
bencher Joe Arvay stated, “I don’t recognize that law.” The Supreme Court of Canada has now 
solidified the consensus in the legal profession against religion. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive description of the Eureka Moment is contained 
in the comments of Heather Burchill, Deputy Judge Advocate for the Canadian Forces. In 
her letter of opposition against TWU to the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society she argued 
that the legal profession is “the guardian of the law in Canada. … We are bound by the 
rule of law…. Should we, as a profession, set ourselves above the law, we lose the moral 
authority to champion for it.”1200   
She contends that TWU’s Code “condemns an entire population as ‘lesser’, as 
unholy…. Trinity’s narrow interpretation of marriage is not shared by many Christians. 
More to the point, Trinity’s narrow definition of marriage is not shared by the highest 
Court in Canada, nor by our own Provincial Legislature.”1201  
This is fascinating in light of the fact that Parliament, when it passed the Civil 
Marriage Act, went to great lengths to point out that religious groups were entitled to 
have a different opinion on marriage. And, further the SCC in its Marriage Reference 
decision was unequivocal in its protection of religious communities that did not agree 
with same-sex marriage.1202 Yet Burchill insists:  
                                                     
1198 Elliot & Elliot, supra note 989. 
1199 Alice Woolley, “Equality Rights, Freedom of Religion and the Training of Canadian Lawyers” (2014) 17:3 
Legal Ethics, 437-441. 
1200 Email from Heather Burchill to René Gallant (21 January 2014) in Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, “Trinity 
Western University Submissions” (2014) at 13, online (pdf):  
<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-02-10_ExecPkg_TWU_Submissions.pdf> 
[NSBS Submissions].  
1201 Ibid. 
1202 In Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at paras 58-59, the Court stated: 
  It therefore seems clear that state compulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex 
marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of religion under s. 
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Let us not ignore that religion offers one of the few remaining pulpits from which 
Canadian community leaders can communicate and promote anti-LBGT messages 
without retribution. Thankfully, there is a separation of church and state in 
Canada. For this reason, it is contrary to the Charter to harness the resources and 
influence of our public institutions to impose exclusionary and discriminatory 
views upon others, to deprive a minority of their rights and privileges – hard 
earned and for too many, still out of grasp.1203  
Burchill has confused the legal concept of state neutrality with the American 
separation of church and state. And she clearly makes the assertion that to accredit an 
institution is to expend public resources and thereby somehow make the Charter 
applicable to a private organization. This is a dramatical reversal of how our law has 
worked until now. However, it is this revolutionary thinking that was ultimately accepted 
by the SCC. Her prescience of the SCC’s thinking is noteworthy. She continues: 
Surely the connection between religious intolerance and homophobia is not lost 
on our profession. The history of exclusion and persecution of sexual minorities is 
inextricably tied to religious expression. Let me be clear, within the confines the 
church, and outside a public institution, the faculty are entitled to express their 
beliefs and practice their religion. However, once they act for the state, or their 
degree program is accredited by it, the expression of their religious rights cannot 
be allowed to perpetuate stereotypes and discrimination. … Trinity’s application, 
if accepted by the Federation, would condone religious-based intolerance and 
discrimination by an accredited law school. This cannot be countenanced. … If 
they want to be a member of our club, they will need to play by our rules – and 
these include the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I belive [sic] that accepting 
Trinity’s application would strike a blow to the heart of our profession.1204 
Burchill’s presentation reads like a manifesto for those favouring the revolutionary 
position against the law’s historic accommodation of religious practice. By addressing 
Burchill’s outline of grievances with religion and its legal protection I will outline what the 
opposition to TWU is advocating. It will be shown that their position is not only aggressive, it 
repudiates the law’s accommodation of religion. This repudiation was, as we now know, 
accepted by the SCC in its TWU decisions. It is remarkable that Kuhn’s theory – applied to the 
legal system on the place of the law’s treatment of religion and the revolution that has occurred 




                                                     
2(a) of the Charter. It also seems apparent that, absent exceptional circumstances which we cannot at 
present foresee, such a violation could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 
The question we are asked to answer is confined to the performance of same-sex marriages by 
religious officials. However, concerns were raised about the compulsory use of sacred places for the 
celebration of such marriages and about being compelled to otherwise assist in the celebration of 
same-sex marriages. The reasoning that leads us to conclude that the guarantee of freedom of religion 
protects against the compulsory celebration of same-sex marriages, suggests that the same would hold 
for these concerns. 
1203 Burchill, supra note 1200 at 14. 
1204 Ibid at 14-15, emphasis added. 
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6.3.8.2.1 The Elitism of Law 
 
The familiar line from Shakespeare, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,”1205 
has been the inspiration of many jokes. However, contained within that slogan is a deep 
meaning about the order of society. Dick the Butcher was the wisecracking henchman who 
spoke this line in favour of Jack Cade who wanted to be king. The point was that if you want to 
radically change the present order of things you must first deal with the law that keeps all in 
order. The “guardian” of the law, as Burchill and Shakespeare noted, is the legal profession. 
Lawyers, while not held in high esteem in some sectors, are necessary. That has given the 
profession a sense of self-importance. 
As Peter Berger noted above, the secularization theory has a strong hold on the legal 
profession. While Berger notes the secularization theory has proven false, that is not how the 
legal profession sees it. For them, as is evidenced by their anti-religious attitude toward TWU, 
religion is a relic of the past and has no place in university campuses – even private religious 
campuses.1206 The emotive nature of the arguments against TWU is significant.1207 Revulsion 
and ridicule left little room for the rule of law. The legal profession was determined to ensure 
that no discrimination, as they described it, would be permitted in a law school. To the extent 
that the law differed, it would have to be changed. The law could never sanction such a law 
school.  
The legal profession was remarkably docile some twenty years ago when the British 
Columbia College of Teachers locked horns with Trinity Western University over its education 
degree. There were a few voices of opposition against TWU among the legal academics1208 but 
that was it. Perhaps that is not surprising given that the profession was not directly involved – 
it was an education degree that was contested, not a law degree. However, it does seem 
peculiar that the legal profession came out so forcefully against TWU’s law school proposal 
when there already existed a 2001 SCC decision on very similar facts. The difference between 
then and now appears to be, as suggested by the BC and Ontario benchers above, the 
acceptance of non-traditional sexual norms as evidenced by same-sex marriage.  
The 2001 decision was not popular in the legal profession and there was a sense that 
the SCC ought to revisit it. For instance, Lisa Teryl, legal counsel to the Nova Scotia Human 
Rights Commission, called on the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society not to approve TWU’s law 
                                                     
1205 William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, Act IV, Scene II, Line 73. 
1206 For instance, Patricia McFadgen of the Nova Scotia Department of Justice described TWU’s law school as 
“institutionalized humiliation of LGBT persons” and expressed her hope that “the lens of time” would show 
Trinity’s religious beliefs to be one of the “absurd relics of history” (email, 5 February 2014 in NSBS 
Submissions, supra note 1200 at 168). Similarly, lawyer Susan McGrath characterized Trinity’s admission’s 
policy as “personally abhorrent to most of us in this day and age,” in LSUC Convocation, supra note 487 at 
108. 
1207 As only one of many expressions of horror against TWU, take George Gregory’s confession that “I do not 
know whether to feel disgusted or disheartened when I think that the Law Society of British Columbia may 
permit TWU to train future lawyers while blatantly indulging its homophobic intolerance,” email to LSBC, 
February 11, 2014, in “LSBC Submissions to the Law Society” at 487. 
1208 Richard Moon, “Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Freedom in the Public Schools: A Comment on 
Trinity Western University v. B.C. College of Teachers and Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board” (2003) 8 Rev. 
Const. Stud. 228 [“A Comment”]; Macdougall, “Separation of Church and Date,” supra note 214. 
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school in order to “trigger” TWU’s judicial review of the decision leading to a Supreme Court 
review of its 2001 decision.1209 
The concept of a Christian law school that maintains a traditional definition of marriage 
evidently kindled a primordial fear in large sectors of the profession. The spectre of Christian 
lawyers entering the profession was a clear threat to the present hegemony. As Burchill noted, 
“If they want to be a member of our club, they will need to play by our rules.” This is not unlike 
the BCCT opposition. Intriguingly, if “our rules” mean the laws of the country, then TWU was in 
full compliance with the requisite rules. TWU followed the law in this respect: it was entitled to 
discriminate based on religious practices since it is exempt from BC human rights legislation 
and further, it is not subject to the Charter.1210 It applied for accreditation to the Federation of 
the Law Societies of Canada, and despite the opposition it was found not to violate the “public 
interest.”1211 
 However, if “our rules” encompass the profession’s ideological leanings, then that is a 
different matter. Given that Burchill mentions one such “rule” being that “the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms” is applicable to TWU, even though the 2001 Supreme Court of Canada clearly 
said it was not – then the professional “club” was outside of the very law it claimed to embody. 
Therefore, it would be more accurate to conclude that the expectation was not for TWU to 
follow the rules, meaning the law, but for TWU to accept what many in the legal profession 
wanted the law to be. That interpretation was not consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the 2001 case, nor with at least 12 of the 18 superior court judges who heard the TWU law 
school case.1212   
With the backing of the Supreme Court firmly in hand, this model of “pushing” or 
“nudging” the law has now become an acceptable means of “advancing the law.” However, the 
danger of this approach is that it ignores the current status of the law in order to forge ahead 
with a political (as opposed to a legal) interpretation of the law. The problem, as noted 
previously, is that politics can change very quickly. And if one political movement can alter the 
law to suit its agenda, without regard for precedent, there is little to deter another political 
movement from repeating the process. After all, the last time the SCC dealt with TWU was only 
17 years ago – anything is possible 17 years hence given the right machinations. The legal 
profession may consider itself unique; however, politics, as Dick the Butcher declared, can 
change all things. The legal profession is an elite profession with the ability to make laws that 
affects society at large. Unlike educators, the subject of the 2001 case, law graduates may 
become judges. Judges not only interpret the law, they make law.1213   
And this legal elitism made it clear that a tiny Christian university was going to have no 
place in a society that had evolved. In the words of former president of the Federation of Law 
Societies, John Campion, “It is astonishing to see, when I think of where I was when I went 
                                                     
1209 “The Nova Scotia Barristers’ leadership may also have the additional benefit of triggering a judicial review 
by TWU. A judicial review would open up the possibility of the Supreme Court of Canada revisiting its 
reasoning. The High Court could consider the issues reframed in terms of the preservation of democratic state 
values of maintaining a separation of church and state for secular activities that conflict with discriminatory 
religious beliefs.” See letter from Lisa Teryl, Legal Counsel, Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, to 
Executive Committee and Council Members, in NSBS Submissions, supra note 1200.  
1210 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 25. 
1211 “Special Advisory Committee Report,” supra note 837 at 19, para 66. 
1212 Being the judges in BC and Nova Scotia. 
1213 See Chief Justice Wagner’s assertion that the constitution evolves as society evolves, in “First News 
Conference,” supra note 38, also quoted in Chapter 6. 
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downtown with my father in 1950 compared to today. There is no comparison in terms of the 
issues of tolerance and diversity, and I don’t think we should take even a millimetre step 
backwards. We can’t do it.”1214 The law had to change. 
 
6.3.8.2.2 Legal Academy 
 
A primary source of opposition to TWU’s law school proposal was the legal academy.1215 
It was the law deans who first voiced opposition to the Federation and every common law 
faculty in the country passed resolutions condemning TWU.1216 One of the key academic voices 
against TWU has been Professor Elaine Craig of Dalhousie University (in Halifax, N.S.) who 
wrote two influential papers on the subject.1217 Her writing is worth focusing on for a number 
of reasons. First, she is an articulate and influential advocate who exhibits a passionate 
                                                     
1214 John Campion, in Transcript, Convocation of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Public Session (24 April 
2014), at 70, online (pdf): 
<https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/c/convocationtranscriptapr242014
twu.pdf>. 
1215 Those critical of TWU include: Elaine Craig, “Rejecting Trinity” and “A Reply,” supra note 793; Dianne 
Pothier, “An Argument against Accreditation of Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law School” (2014) 23 
Const. F. 1, 1-8; Sheila Tucker & Emily Snow, “Public Interest and the Trinity Western Law School Trilogy” 
(2016) 74 Advocate (Vancouver) 539-550; Feinstein & Hamill, “Silencing of Queer Voices,” supra note 942; 
Elliot & Elliot, supra note 989. 
Those sympathetic to TWU include: Dwight Newman, “On the Trinity Western University Controversy: An 
Argument for a Christian Law School in Canada” (2013) 22:3 Const. Forum 1-14 [“Argument for a Christian 
Law School”]; Thomas M. J. Bateman, “Trinity Western University’s Law School and the Associational 
Dimension of Religious Freedom: Toward Comprehensive Liberalism” (2015) 66 U.N.B.L.J. 78-116; Mark A. 
Witten, “Tracking Secularism,” supra note 566; Diana Ginn & Kevin Kindred, “Pluralism, Autonomy and 
Resistance: A Canadian Perspective on Resolving Conflicts between Freedom of Religion and LGBTQ Rights” 
(2017) 12 Religion & Hum. Rts. 1-37; Blair Major, “Translating the Conflict over Trinity Western University’s 
Proposed Law School” (2017-18) 43 Queen’s L.J. 175-21; Blair A. Major, “Trinity Western University Law: The 
Boundary and Ethos of the Legal Community” (2017-18) 55 Alta. L. Rev. 167-198. 
1216 For a sampling of the statements against TWU from the law faculties, see:  
Dalhousie University: Letter from Vaughan Black, Chair of Faculty Council, Schulich School of Law, to 
René Gallant (13 January 2014), online (pdf): 
http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-01-24_FacultyCouncil_TWU.pdf [Schulich 
Faculty Letter]; 
University of British Columbia: “Motion addressed to Law Society of BC as passed” (January 2014), 
online (pdf): <http://news.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Motion-addressed-to-Law-Society-of-BC-
as-passed1.pdf> and Simmi Puri, “BC Law asks B.C.’s Law Society to consider impact of Trinity Western’s 
‘covenant’ on LGBT community” (28 January 2014), online: UBC News <http://news.ubc.ca/2014/01/28/ubc-
law-asks-b-c-s-law-society-to-consider-impact-of-trinity-westerns-covenant-on-lgbt-community/>;  
University of Manitoba: Nick Martin, “U of M Faculty Joins Fight Against Christian Law School: Pledge 
required of students is discriminatory: dean,” Winnipeg Free Press (25 April 2014), online: 
<http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/u-of-m-faculty-joins-fight-against-christian-law-school-
256651921.html>, and Zachary Pedersen, “Manitoba Law School Calls for Action on TWU Covenant,” 
Canadian Lawyer Magazine (15 April 2014), online: 
<https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/na/manitoba-law-school-calls-for-action-on-
twu-covenant-5688/>. 
1217 Craig, “Rejecting Trinity” and “A Reply,” supra note 793. Her work was referenced by a number of groups 
and individuals against TWU including the BC Humanist Association in its letter to the FLSC (14 August 
2013), online (pdf): <http://www.docs.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUBCHumanistAssnAug142013.pdf>; and the 
CBA letter, supra note 832 at 2.  
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argument; second, her writing covers fairly well the expanse of the positions taken by 
opponents of TWU; third, her writing was quoted and referred to extensively by a number of 
anti-TWU individuals and groups. Indeed, many of her arguments resurfaced in submissions to 
the law societies and then later in court documents. Her later writing was also quoted with 
approval in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision (one of only two court decisions, prior to the 
SCC, that decided against TWU).1218 And, though her writing was not directly referenced by the 
SCC, the gist of her arguments was ultimately accepted by Canada’s highest court. 
Craig argued that the Federation should not approve programs that have discriminatory 
admissions policies “that are antithetical to fundamental legal values.” Such institutions “are 
not competent providers of legal education.”1219   
The Federation took the position that it did not have the authority to review a proposed 
law school’s hiring and admissions policies but only whether the law program was compliant 
with the national requirement. Craig said that was “insufficient”.1220 If the Federation failed in 
its duty by “not exercising its delegated authority in a manner that protects the public interest 
and reflects the academic requirements the law societies have agreed upon,” said Craig, “then 
its authority to approve new programs should be withdrawn.”1221 Otherwise, a law society 
would be found endorsing a discriminatory law school.1222 Thus, was outlined a plan of action. 
If the Federation “failed” by approving TWU then it was up to the individual law societies to 
conduct their own investigations.  
As it turned out, the Federation ultimately did “fail,” in the minds of many academics, 
including Craig, by approving TWU. For Professor Craig, that decision was “disappointing”.1223 
The Federations’ “recommendation represents a refusal to act in the interests of equality and 
justice. As lawyers, we lack the courage of the B.C. College of Teachers more than 10 years ago.” 
1224 Noting the “important moment in Canadian legal history and for the pursuit of justice” she 
queried whether the law societies would “embrace their commitment to the principles of 
equality, as did the B.C. College of Teachers” when they decided against TWU in the late 1990s 
in the TWU 2001 case. 1225 This clarion call was heeded by three law societies, The Law Society 
of Upper Canada (Ontario); The Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, and The Law Society of British 
Columbia. 
Professor Craig argued that TWU’s policies “would certainly violate human rights law 
protections” but for its exemption from such legislation as a religious institution.1226 She also 
suggested that it might be unlawful in other jurisdictions, saying this was something that law 
societies should keep in mind – they could be found to be in violation of their home human 
rights legislation by approving a discriminatory law school.1227 Craig’s argument was forcefully 
made by the law societies, including the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society before Justice Jamie S. 
Campbell.  
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1223 Craig, “More Courage,” supra note 852.  
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Justice Campbell held that it simply made no sense for the Law Society in Nova Scotia to 
be concerned about whether a law school in BC would be in violation of human rights 
legislation in Nova Scotia. “The legal authority of the NSBS cannot extended to a university 
because it is offended by those policies or considers those policies to contravene Nova Scotia 
law that in no way applies to it,” said Justice Campbell. He continued, “[t]he extent to which 
NSBS members or members of the community are outraged or suffer minority stress because of 
the law school’s policies does not amount to a grant of jurisdiction over the university.”1228 
Campbell’s arguments were rejected by the SCC, who declared that the LSUC is “entitled to 
consider whether accrediting law schools with inequitable admissions policies promotes the 
competence of the bar as a whole.”1229 
Professor Craig also used the case of Bob Jones University1230 (BJU) as a comparator to 
TWU. BJU had a policy that prohibited interracial dating among its students based on its 
religious beliefs. In 1983, the US Supreme Court refused to recognize a religious exemption for 
BJU from the Internal Revenue Service’s policy that had denied charitable status to BJU because 
of its discriminatory policy. Professor Craig, and subsequently a number of interveners and 
academics, claimed that “A religiously based anti-miscegenation policy is analogous to TWU’s 
anti-gay policy.”1231 The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that BJU was a comparable situation. 
“TWU, like Bob Jones University,” said the court, “is seeking access to a public benefit – the 
accreditation of its law school. The LSUC, in determining whether to confer that public benefit, 
must consider whether doing so would meet its statutory mandate to act in the public interest. 
And like in Bob Jones University, the LSUC’s decision not to accredit TWU does not prevent the 
practice of a religious belief itself; rather it denies a public benefit because of the impact of that 
religious belief on others – members of the LGBTQ community.”1232  
However, the British Columbia Court of Appeal firmly rejected the BJU comparison. 
“TWU is not seeking a financial public benefit [like the tax break sought in BJU] from this state 
actor,” said the court.1233 Instead, “Accreditation is not a ‘benefit’ granted in the exercise of the 
largesse of the state; it is a regulatory requirement to conduct a lawful ‘business’ which TWU 
would otherwise be free to conduct in the absence of regulation.”1234 There is a practical benefit 
to TWU from regulatory approval but that is not a funding benefit. The BC court observed, “the 
reliance on the comments of a single concurring justice in the Bob Jones case is misplaced.” 
Finally, the court did not see the BJU case “as supporting a general principle that discretionary 
decision-makers should deny public benefits to private applicants.”1235 
The SCC’s decision did not directly address the BJU case, though it was raised by the 
LSBC in its factum1236 and during oral argument by Justice Gascon1237 on the first day; and by 
legal counsel Susan Ursel, representing the Canadian Bar Association, during the hearing on the 
                                                     
1228 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 8. 
1229 TWU v LSUC 2018, supra note 14 at para 22. 
1230 Bob Jones University, supra note 877. 
1231 Craig “Rejecting Trinity,” supra note 793 at 159. 
1232 TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701 at para 138. 
1233 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at para 182. 
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1235 Ibid. 
1236 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (Factum of the Appellant, SCC 
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1237 TWU 2018, supra note 14 (Transcript of oral hearing, SCC vol 1, 30 November 2017, at 47). 
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second day.1238 Although the SCC did not explicitly mention the BJU case, it did frame TWU’s 
policy as being on par with racism, suggesting that “The Covenant singles out LGBTQ people as 
less worthy of respect and dignity than heterosexual people, and reinforces negative 
stereotypes against them.”1239 Noticeably, there was no evidence given for those assertions by 
the Court – nevertheless, the BJU analogy did appear to influence the SCC.1240    
Professor Craig also argued that the legal context has changed since 2001 as a result of 
the SCC’s decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec.1241 In Doré, the SCC held that administrative 
tribunals are not to be held to a standard of “correctness” but of “reasonableness” when making 
decisions in their area of expertise. This means, says Craig, that the 2001 TWU case would be 
decided differently today; if the SCC had used the reasonable standard test it would have 
supported the BCCT’s decision to deny TWU’s teacher training program. Thus, she argues, the 
Federation could reasonably deny TWU’s law school application because of its concerns with 
TWU’s discrimination. Craig points out that “as societal values change, what constitutes a 
reasonable balance between protecting freedom of religion and protecting against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation also changes.”1242 Craig believes that today’s 
decision makers are expected to be much more protective of gay and lesbian equality than the 
decision makers of the past.1243  
According to Craig, “Freedom of religion would not trump these equality interests as 
easily as it did when the College of Teachers case was decided.” 1244 In other words, the 
appropriate balance now, as opposed to twenty years ago, would be for religious freedom to 
yield to the overriding right of equality as defined by the rights advocates. When a religious 
entity ventures outside its walls of worship and runs institutions like universities that require 
public accreditation, it must surrender its religious beliefs and practices. There is no private 
sphere immune from public scrutiny. Craig was prescient: this analysis did persuade the SCC. 
In short, Craig argued that the evolution of societal values have reached the point where 
a religious organization has absolutely no jurisdiction to define for itself what is or is not 
acceptable behaviour on fundamental human life issues such as marriage. It is curious that the 
only issue at stake for the critics of TWU was that the school allegedly discriminates against 
those who engage in sexual activity outside of the traditional one man–one woman marriage. 
Underlying this criticism is an inability to appreciate what constitutes a diverse society that 
allows for differences of opinion (and belief) concerning acceptable sexual behaviour. Unlike 
Professor Robert Wintemute’s assertion, as noted below, that in time there will be no need for 
religious accommodation as religious institutions will “voluntarily” change their views, Craig 
speaks for those advocates who would see the use of the state as the means to ensure the 
“appropriate balance”. The SCC agreed. 
The legal opinion of constitutional lawyer John B. Laskin, commissioned by the 
Federation, disputed Craig’s assertion. Laskin held to the notion that the Supreme Court of 
Canada continued to apply the same balancing approach of competing rights that it took back 
                                                     
1238 TWU 2018, supra note 14 (Transcript of oral hearing, SCC vol 2, 1 December 2017, at 282). 
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in the TWU 2001 case.1245 The BC Court of Appeal adopted Laskin’s opinion on that point as 
their own when they balanced the two rights and found in TWU’s favour.1246 In a robust 
manner, Justice Campbell of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court likewise noted that although there 
has been widespread public acceptance of gay and lesbian rights over the last few decades, that 
did not render the 2001 case out of step with current legal thought and social values. The case 
involved not only LGBTQ rights, but also freedom of religion and conscience. Therefore, he 
concluded: 
The conversation between equality and freedom of conscience has not become old 
fashioned or irrelevant over the last 14 years, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of it 
can hardly now be seen as archaic or anachronistic. Equality rights have not jumped the 
queue to now trump religious freedom. That delineation of rights is still a relevant 
concept. Religious freedom has not been relegated to a judicial nod to the toleration of 
cultural eccentricities that don’t offend the dominant social consensus.1247 
In a review of the case law since 2001, Justice Campbell concluded that “Religious rights 
have not been marginalized or in any way required to give way to a presumption that equality 
rights will always prevail.”1248 There remains in the law significant room for religious freedom 
and religious expression, even if or where that offends secular concerns and equality rights.  
However, with the SCC’s decision, we now know that indeed religious freedom has been 
relegated to a mere judicial nod, since religious practices that are deemed offensive are no 
longer to be tolerated. The law as understood by the Courts in BC and NS and by constitutional 
expert Laskin has been dramatically altered – just as the legal academics have been demanding.  
Finally, Craig asserted that TWU’s Community Covenant would not allow the law 
program to teach the skill of critical thinking, since “Academic staff are required to teach 
students that the Bible is the ultimate, final, and authoritative guide by which all ethical 
decisions must be made.”1249 Craig maintains, “To teach that ethical issues must be perceived 
of, assessed with, and resolved by a pre-ordained, prescribed, and singularly authoritative 
religious doctrine is not to teach the skill of critical thinking about these issues.”1250 
Dwight Newman, a law professor in Saskatchewan, points out that Craig’s argument 
falls short on three accounts. First, there is scholarly literature examining the development of 
critical thinking skills among those educated in evangelical Christian environments. Newman 
observes: 
Some evidence points toward an equal or possibly even greater acquisition of critical 
thinking skills than in secular environments. Admittedly, sometimes the focus on critical 
thinking skills in Christian education is to help in the defence of claims against non-
Christian challenges, but there are also strong human developmental reasons within 
Christian traditions for a commitment to critical thinking.1251  
Second, there are ongoing scholarly conversations within the Christian community 
about the place of law in private and public life. Third, evangelical scholarly work is entirely 
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consistent with the possibility of engaging with the Bible in a variety of ways within a faith 
tradition. Newman points out:  
The fact that somebody commences with faith of some sort should not be a basis for 
excluding that individual from the realm of critical thinking—especially with all the 
disturbing parallels that this argument has to techniques of dehumanization used in the 
past with other marginalized groups to legitimate discrimination against them.1252   
Craig’s argument, notes Newman, displays a lack of engagement with the Christian 
scholarly environment. Further, other scholars suggest that there is, in fact, a lack of critical 
thinking at secular law schools.1253 
Newman succinctly describes the robust tradition of critical thinking and animated 
debate within the Christian tradition and its institutions regarding biblical interpretation and 
the applicability of faith to current moral and legal issues. This reality weakens the suggestion 
that TWU, being an inheritor of that tradition, is a place where rigid, “pre-ordained, prescribed, 
and singularly authoritative religious doctrine” is emphasized at the expense of critical 
thinking. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Professor Craig later retracted the impact of her suggestion by clarifying that she was 
not saying that all Christian institutions are incapable of providing legal education nor that the 
Christian worldview is antithetical to critical thinking. Rather, the “specific institutional 
policies” of TWU, as stated in the Community Covenant and the Statement of Faith, are 
inconsistent with the ethical duty not to discriminate and with critical thought.1254 She argued 
that there is a distinction between other Christian universities, such as the University of Notre 
Dame in the United States, and TWU. “The distinction, and it is an important one,” according to 
Craig, “is that these institutions do not impose policies that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation or mandate a statement of faith that is inconsistent with creating an institutional 
environment consistent with some aspects of the requirements that the law societies have 
arrived at in accrediting Canadian common law degrees.”1255 This distinction was accepted by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal.1256 Given the SCC’s emphasis on “TWU’s proposed law school with 
a mandatory covenant,”1257 it would appear that it too sympathized with Craig’s position. 
What is striking about the academic arguments leading up to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision is their absolute confidence that the law’s accommodation of religion as 
outlined in the TWU 2001 case and onward, including the Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, was 
fundamentally wrong. Those with a different view, including the courts, were not on the right 
side of history.1258  
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 The academics assumed that discrimination, ab initio, is wrong, even in the realm of a 
private religious university and even if it is lawful. This view was echoed in the Ontario 
Divisional Court when it proclaimed, “discrimination is still discrimination, regardless of 
whether it is unlawful.”1259 Remaking the law in the image of radical equality removes space for 
institutional religious freedom. That is an aggressive stance which met considerable headwind 
in the Nova Scotia and British Columbia courts but was embraced by the Ontario Courts and the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
What can be gleaned from this case is that the legal academic world plays a very 
important role in matters of public policy. Canadian legal scholars have been outspoken and in 
many respects antagonistic toward TWU. The antagonism was evident in the SCC’s 
decisions.1260 Additionally, these scholars have had a major influence upon all the decision 
bodies that addressed TWU’s law school proposal. Consider that but for the academic 
opposition, led by the law deans, the Federation would have dealt with the TWU application as 
it had done with the previous law school proposals. It would have considered the academic 
plan in light of the National Requirement1261 and passed the proposal without controversy. 
However, the anti-TWU opposition caused the Federation to set up a special committee to deal 
with the concerns raised about TWU’s discriminatory admissions policy. That delayed the 
accreditation process by a number of months at additional cost.  
Yet, it did not stop there. Once the Federation approved TWU the academics called on 
the law societies to have the “courage” to disregard the Federation’s decision and to 
independently review the proposal. So convinced were they in their cause that they made the 
bold claim that the accommodation of religion in this case was unjust and that the law societies 
must lead society by example to change the law. Three law societies accepted that challenge. 
The taxation on the skills, time and effort of the bureaucratic apparatus of each society had to 
be immense. It is one thing for larger societies such as Ontario and British Columbia to engage 
in litigation but for the smaller Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society it was obviously too much. The 
NSBS did not appeal its loss at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, perhaps because the cost of 
such an appeal was prohibitive.1262 
The common law faculties across Canada joined the chorus and publicly denounced 
TWU. Reading through their statements, it is evident that the current equality rights paradigm 
on the campuses of the law schools cannot comprehend a religious university legitimately 
operating a law school while holding to the traditional view of marriage as part of its 
admissions criteria. The very concept of such a school goes against everything they stand for, 
even though their conviction is in direct opposition to the law’s accommodation of religion. The 
Faculty Council of Dalhousie University called on the NSBS to “properly apply a human rights 
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lens” to refuse TWU approval. They insisted that the religious freedom issues “are outweighed 
by equality concerns regarding sexual orientation.”1263  
The equality norm has become so comprehensive in legal analysis at Canada’s law 
schools that it allows little room for religious practise. The advancement of equality rights 
under the Charter in recent years appeared to confirm their presupposition that religion must 
inevitably fade into the background. However, the TWU law school proposal totally upset the 
academic worldview. As one “disturbed” and “stunned” professor at the Schulich School of Law 
wrote, “I … was absolutely blind-sided when the [TWU] report was released.”1264 Not 
accustomed to the world of private religious universities, the academics assumed that, “Yes, 
such universities may exist, but they are really anachronisms of a bygone era. We have nothing 
to fear: they will never reach our level of expertise.” Suddenly TWU shows up and presents not 
only a law school proposal but one that is unique. A proposal that challenges the myopic, 
theoretically-focused establishment with a curriculum concentrated on practical, legal 
competence so that its graduates are ready to begin work at a law firm immediately upon 
graduation. It promises to fill an important gap in legal education – challenging the current law 
school hegemony.  
Though TWU is but a very small institution, its legitimate proposal for a law school, 
within the context of a Christian environment, was seen as a threat. A threat to the one 
worldview of equality rights. A worldview that has made no place for serious religious 
organizations that actually mean what they say. The academic world was quiet while TWU 
churned out nurses, history teachers and business graduates. However, to produce law 
graduates who might someday sit on the judicial bench or be eligible for high public offices in 
government bureaucracy – that was apparently a totally different matter. Religion, that 
nemesis of equality,1265 was about to stride in on the legal fraternity. That was a scary 
proposition for those who see equality as the highest human right. Hence, Claire L’Heureux-
Dubé’s view that a fundamental right can’t be reasonable if it’s not compatible equality.1266 The 
trump of sexual equality rights at the expense of religious freedom seems just about assured.  
 
6.3.8.3 The Redefinition of Marriage Changes Everything 
 
There is now evidence that part of the “Eureka Moment” for many is the idea that the 
redefinition of marriage has changed the dynamic so drastically that the law can no longer 
grant religious accommodation as it once did. This was evident in the oral arguments before 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal,1267 where counsel for the LGBTQ Coalition said that if the 
Law Society of British Columbia accredited TWU it would be complicit in TWU’s emphasis on 
traditional marriage which is “an unconstitutional definition of marriage.”1268 To suggest that 
heterosexual marriage is unconstitutional is curious to say the least, especially given the 
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history of marriage in the West.1269 However, it clearly expresses the extent to which advocates 
understand what has taken place in the law on marriage.  
Gavin MacKenzie, a Bencher with the Law Society of Upper Canada, explained it well 
when he said: 
I do think that it bears mention that there is probably no issue on which public attitudes 
have changed more in the last fifteen years or so than the question of public attitudes 
towards discrimination based on sexual discrimination [sic], and there have been 
intervening events that may well lead to a different legal conclusion today than was 
formed by Supreme Court of Canada in the BCCT case when it was decided. Perhaps, 
most importantly, the enactment in 2005 of the Civil Marriage Act, which recognizes the 
legitimacy of same sex marriage throughout Canada.1270 
In the minds of those opposed to TWU, the redefinition of marriage was a watershed 
moment that required the re-evaluation of religious communities that did not accept the new 
public norm. As Professor Moon insists, public commitment to sexual orientation equality (in 
public schools) “will involve nothing less than a repudiation of the religious view that 
homosexuality is sinful.”1271 
 
6.3.8.4 Is the Enemy the Christian Religion? 
 
To reiterate, the so-called “elephant in the room” in this discussion about religion is the 
Christian definition of marriage. Christian marriage, as noted in Hyde above, is characterised by 
monogomy and opposite-sex partners. The TWU 2018 cases centred around the issue of the 
heterosexual requirement of TWU’s policy. However, the arguments of the anti-TWU groups 
could as easily been applied to the other Christian requirement of marriage – monogamy. Since 
marriage was redefined in Canada, the conversation has shifted. What ought to be done to 
those religious entities which still insist on maintaining the traditional heterosexual definition? 
Again, as Burchill’s manifesto proclaims:  
Trinity’s narrow interpretation of marriage is not shared by many Christians. 
More to the point, Trinity’s narrow definition of marriage is not shared by the 
highest Court in Canada, nor by our own Provincial Legislature.1272 
However, such a position suggests that there is only one accepted framework through 
which to view sexual norms: the public (i.e. government-approved) framework. Religion, the 
academics and legal professionals maintain, must not differ from the “sexular” public. That, of 
course, means there can be no real religious freedom. One may believe something different 
only as long as those beliefs are kept “within the confines of the church” and not acted upon. 
Religion is viewed, by some TWU opponents, as being “one of the few remaining 
pulpits” left from which leaders can communicate and promote anti-LGBT messages. Hence, it 
must be dealt with, especially given the redefinition of marriage. What is particularly 
problematic for those who hold this position is not so much that religious organizations believe 
                                                     
1269 John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion and Law in the Western Tradition, 2nd 
edition (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012). 
1270 Gavin MacKenzie, LSUC Convocation, supra note 487 at 27.  
1271 Richard Moon, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Attempt to Reconcile Freedom of Religion and Sexual 
Orientation in the Public Schools,” in David Rayside & Clyde Wilcox, eds, Faith, Politics, and Sexual Diversity in 
Canada and the United States (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 321 [“Religion and Sexual Orientation in the 
Public Schools”]. 
1272 Burchill, supra note 1200 at 13. 
  206  
in traditional marriage, but that such organizations refuse, within their communities, to 
accommodate same-sex relationships.1273 It hardly seems right, according to this perspective, 
that the public must accommodate religion, but religion does not have to accommodate the 
public and its norms.  
That sentiment was expressed by Peter Rogers, counsel for NSBS. He argued that part of 
the rationale for the NS Barristers’ Society not to accept TWU law graduates was that such 
refusal would hopefully compel TWU to change its admissions policies. During oral argument 
he suggested:  
It may induce TWU to make what the Society submits is a very small adjustment to its 
process that would remove the situation where we now have a new law school coming 
in that is reserving places, in effect, for heterosexual students and increasing the 
disadvantages experienced by LGB students.1274   
The point of refusing TWU’s accreditation was to force the university to wake up to 
modern reality. We now live in a brave new world where anachronistic religious views on 
sexuality are to be eradicated. As BC Law Society Bencher David Mossop argued, while TWU 
has a legal right to maintain its community covenant, “it doesn’t mean you should do it.”1275 
“The present trend in Christian churches is to accept gay marriage,” Mossop continued, “it’s 
happened in the Anglican Church.” By implication, his message is that TWU will follow suit, 
given enough time and pressure.   
Peter Rogers’ view was that TWU only needed to make “a very small adjustment to its 
process” to fall in line with the public’s expectations: simply make the Community Covenant 
voluntary. However, what appeared to be very small in the eyes of the public was a very big 
deal to TWU in that it was willing to fight all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Law 
Society of BC asked TWU whether there could be an amendment to the Community Covenant to 
bring it more in line with the public norms. TWU responded, “TWU cannot simply disavow 
those beliefs in the hope or expectation of a positive result from the Benchers and should not 
be asked to do so.”1276 The Covenant, said TWU: 
is an expression of the religious beliefs of TWU and its community that is necessary for 
TWU to live out its purposes as a Christian university. It is critical for TWU, as a private 
religious educational community, to be able to define its important religious values 
consistent with its biblical beliefs.1277 
TWU’s response was perceived by the anti-TWU group as unreasonable stubbornness, a 
recalcitrance that should not be accommodated. What is missing from their analysis is the 
reality that just because marriage was redefined, that did not mean that religious communities 
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or organizations were required to give up their traditional views and practices on marriage. As 
noted earlier, this is evident in both the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Same-Sex 
Reference1278 and the Civil Marriage Act.1279 
If the redefinition of marriage meant that religious communities would have to change 
their beliefs and practices on marriage, then the SCC itself was wrong when it stated: 
state compulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their 
religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the 
Charter. It also seems apparent that, absent exceptional circumstances which we cannot 
at present foresee, such a violation could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.1280   
Further, the SCC noted that conferring an equality right on one does not take away 
religious freedom rights from another.1281   
 
6.3.8.5 TWU is a State Actor 
 
There is a settled opinion among those against TWU that TWU is a state actor and 
therefore subject to the state. As Burchill argued: 
Let me be clear, within the confines the church, and outside a public institution, the 
faculty are entitled to express their beliefs and practice their religion. However, once 
they act for the state, or their degree program is accredited by it, the expression of their 
religious rights cannot be allowed to perpetuate stereotypes and discrimination.1282 
The “elephant in the room,” so to speak, with the TWU case is the propriety of a 
religious community maintaining a traditional sexual norm in its operation of a “public” 
institution. While there have been other cases that dealt with the right of a religious charity to 
enforce a lifestyle and faith commitment on its employees, such as Christian Horizons,1283 the 
TWU case has gone beyond that. TWU requires not only its employees but also its students—in 
other words, its “clientele”—to adhere to its strict moral view on sexuality. 
This is not unusual. It has been the practice of many religious universities since their 
inception.1284 In 2001, the SCC recognized this practice as a part of religious freedom. The SCC 
                                                     
1278 Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at para 56. 
1279 Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33, assented to 20 July 200, Preamble, ss 3 & 3.1. 
1280 Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at para 58. 
1281 Ibid at para 46, “The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot, in itself, constitute a 
violation of the rights of another.” 
1282 Burchill, supra note 1200 at 14. 
1283 Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC 2105, 102 O.R. 3d 267 [Christian 
Horizons]. 
1284 Religious universities do not see themselves as simply peddling knowledge for knowledge’s sake but are 
concerned with educating the individual “for the purpose of illuminating the Divine,” Emily Longshore, 
Student Conduct Codes at Religious Affiliated Institutions: Fostering Growth (Master of Education Thesis, 
University of South Carolina, 2015, UMI 1589324). This is evident in many university codes such as Baylor 
University’s sexual conduct policy, BU-PP 031, wherein it is stated, “Baylor will be guided by the biblical 
understanding that human sexuality is a gift from God and that physical sexual intimacy is to be expressed in 
the context of marital fidelity,”  online: Baylor University 
<https://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php?id=39247>. See also Brigham Young University’s 
Honor Code where students are expected to “Live a chaste and virtuous life,” where it states: “the Honor Code 
requires all members of the university community to manifest a strict commitment to the law of chastity. 
Homosexual behavior is inappropriate and violates the Honor Code. Homosexual behavior includes not only 
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was able to justify TWU’s religious freedom to mean “that a homosexual student would not be 
tempted to apply for admission, and could only sign the so-called student contract at a 
considerable personal cost” because “TWU is not for everybody; it is designed to address the 
needs of people who share a number of religious convictions.”1285  
As a private institution, TWU is exempted, in part, “from the British Columbia human 
rights legislation and … the Charter does not apply.”1286 It was therefore inconceivable, at least 
within the established legal paradigm, for the SCC to require a section 15 equality rights 
analysis on the voluntary adoption of a code of conduct in a private institution. Such a position 
“would be inconsistent with freedom of conscience and religion, which co-exist with the right 
to equality.”1287 In other words, it would be against the legal paradigm of religious freedom to 
deny TWU its accreditation based on its code of conduct. 
Canadian jurisprudence once acted as a jealous mistress, ensuring that religion and 
religious freedom maintained special status. This was evident in the pre-Charter 
jurisprudence1288 and was greatly enhanced during the early years of the Charter with the 
elimination of state-imposed religious holy days1289 and with the accommodation of religious 
practice in a number of areas including the workplace,1290 the school,1291 and 
condominiums.1292 The religious paradigm worked well with the Charter. However, the 
paradigm became strained in trying to reconcile religious freedom and human sexuality 
interests. 
When the SCC recognized the constitutional protection of “sexual orientation” as an 
analogous ground1293 in section 15 of the Charter, although a welcome relief for the LGBTQ 
community, it resulted in friction between sexual orientation and religion. The drafters of the 
Charter were aware of the anticipated, widespread challenges that the addition of “sexual 
orientation” as a protected ground from discrimination was going to have. They decided not to 
include sexual orientation but drafted the language so that the courts would deal with it in due 
course.1294 
Over the ensuing years, the SCC has been navigating uncharted waters by trying to 
juggle three major constitutional principles: protection of religion, protection of sexual 
orientation, and the constitutional doctrine that there is no hierarchy of rights.1295 The growing 
consensus among legal scholars is that the SCC’s attempt to balance these interests to date has 
                                                     
sexual relations between members of the same sex, but all forms of physical intimacy that give expression to 
homosexual feelings.”  Online: BYU University Policies <https://honorcode.byu.edu/>. 
1285 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 25. 
1286 Ibid. 
1287 Ibid. 
1288 Saumur, supra note 6 at 329 (emphasis added). 
1289 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4. 
1290 Simpson‑Sears, supra note 8. 
1291 Multani, supra note 9. 
1292 Amselem, supra note 7. 
1293 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
1294 Barry L. Strayer was Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice under the Pierre E. Trudeau government that 
brought in the Charter. Strayer was instrumental in the design of the Charter. He writes, “The addition of the 
words “in particular” [of s.15] was thought to make the grounds of discrimination open-ended: it left open the 
possibility that non-enumerated grounds could also be found by the courts in the future, such as sexual 
orientation and matters on which there was no consensus in 1981.” See Barry L. Strayer, Canada’s 
Constitutional Revolution (Edmonton: U of Alberta Press, 2013), 265. 
1295 Dagenais v. Canadian. Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 877.  
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been the equivalent of trying to “square the circle.”1296 This reconciliation attempt has been 
difficult, and it would appear that the future will not be any easier. The inconsistencies of 
affirming sexual equality while at the same time respecting religious pluralism without passing 
judgment on the religious norms of sexuality appear to have come to a head in the TWU law 
school case. 
The SCC was faced with a crucial decision: whether to reject its long-held no-hierarchy 
principle and allow either equality or religion to trump the other, or to maintain the status quo 
by protecting both religious freedom and equality rights while recognizing that there will be, by 
necessity, a palpable dissonance on the views and practices of human sexuality, and that such 
differences must be respected in a plural and liberal democratic society. This book argues that 
it is the latter position that makes the most sense going forward.1297 However, in the end, the 


























                                                     
1296 Richard Moon, “Comment,” supra note 1208 at 283. 
1297 This is precisely the view expressed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in TWU BCCA 2016, supra 
note 478 at para 193: “A society that does not admit of and accommodate differences cannot be a free and 
democratic society — one in which its citizens are free to think, to disagree, to debate and to challenge the 
accepted view without fear of reprisal. This case demonstrates that a well-intentioned majority acting in the 
name of tolerance and liberalism, can, if unchecked, impose its views on the minority in a manner that is in 
itself intolerant and illiberal.” 
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7 CONSOLIDATION OR CHAOS 
 
According to Kuhn, the scientific revolution’s “Consolidation” phase is the transition 
process from the old to the new. Widely accepted, the revolutionary concepts are now in the 
process of being consolidated as the mainstream. However, there are still those who hang on to 
the old ideas and refuse to acquiesce. It may take until the old scientists die off before the 
revolutionary view becomes the new orthodoxy. 
In the matter of the legal revolution on the place of religion some may suggest that “this 
dissertation is an attempt to defend the old paradigm against the new.” A response to that 
objection is this: unlike the discovery of scientific truth, the protective place of religion in the 
law as contained in the constitutions of Western democracies is not an old idea that ought to be 
cast out because of a new and better understanding of the nature of religion that has currently 
gained fashion in the legal community. Instead, the constitutional protections granted to 
religion remain the new idea.  
As we scan the millennia of human government, the freedom granted to religion in the 
West is, indeed, novel. It was only in 1791, a mere 227 years ago, that the American Bill of 
Rights was ratified and protected religious freedom. In Canada, a formulation of religious 
freedom was granted by the British Crown 258 years ago in 1760 and elaborated in the Quebec 
Jehovah’s Witnesses cases of the 1950s and 1960s before it was enshrined in the Charter in 
1982. Religious freedom, the protection of religion in the constitution and all that it entails, is a 
very new concept in human history.  
Given the extent of the violence of the modern period, as exemplified by the 
Reformation, the protection of religion and its practices has done much to alleviate the violent 
tendencies of the grab for power.  
The Legal Revolution Against the Place of Religion, as this dissertation asserts, is a 
revolution that has failed to consider the historical importance of religion, which forms part of 
human experience. Further, it is highly influenced by current political debate concerning 
identity politics as it relates to the issue of sexuality. Given the long historical battle to obtain 
legal protection of religious practice, this dissertation suggests that it is premature to reject the 
special status of religion. The argument that religious accommodation must be removed due to 
claims of oppression is yet to be satisfactorily made, given the strides that have been made by 
sexual minorities in the march for greater equality. 
It is helpful to be reminded that there is a parallel between freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech. George Orwell noted, “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to 
tell people what they do not want to hear.”1298 In the age of ‘no-platforming’1299 speakers, 
Orwell’s adage is as revolutionary today as it was prescient when he said it.   
If freedom of religion means anything at all, it means the freedom to believe what other 
people do not want to believe. Religious freedom is only possible when mainstream society 
respects that other people have different opinions and practices. What we have seen in this 
book is that this freedom is under severe attack. The reason for this attack is that society has 
forgotten the spirit of tolerance inherent in Voltaire’s adagium, “I disapprove of what you say, 
                                                     
1298 George Orwell, “The Freedom of the Press” (8 October 1972) New York Times, SM12, online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1972/10/08/archives/the-freedom-of-the-press-orwell.html>. 
1299 In Britain, for example, the National Union of Students have a “no-platforming” policy whereby “people or 
groups on a banned list for holding racist or fascist views are not given a platform to speak on student union 
premises.” See Sarah Bell, “NUS, ‘Right to Have No Platform Policy’” (25 April 2016) BBC, online: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/education-36101423>. 
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but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” The same holds true for the religious practice 
of monogamous, heterosexual marriage as carried out in Christian communities. 
TWU’s position is a minority position. While there is a theoretical disparity of seats 
available to the LGBTQ individuals who did not want to sign the Covenant there was not a 
scincilla of evidence that that fact would have limited the chances of LGBTQ people entering the 
legal position through attending other public universities.  
 
7.1 TWU’s Change of Heart 
 
The legal revolution against the place of religion in the law will either be consolidated 
around the TWU 2018 decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, or there will be a chaotic 
battle of wills between the legal profession and the Christian community.  
On August 9, 2018, less than two months after the SCC decisions, TWU’s Board of 
Governors voted to no longer require students to sign the Community Covenant Agreement. 
Their motion read: 
In furtherance of our desire to maintain TWU as a thriving community of Christian 
believers that is inclusive of all students wishing to learn from a Christian viewpoint 
and underlying philosophy, the Community Covenant will no longer be mandatory as of 
the 2018-19 Academic year with respect to admission of students to, or continuation of 
students at, the University.1300 
President Bob Kuhn stated, “the University will actively work to determine ways in 
which our Christian identity, Mission and ministry can continue to be strengthened, 
communicated and better lived-out in the context of the TWU community – while 
simultaneously welcoming and affirming the unique value of each member of our diverse 
student body.” 1301 
He also emphasized that there is to be: 
no confusion regarding the Board of Governors’ resolution; our Mission remains the 
same. We will remain a Biblically-based, mission-focused, academically excellent 
University, fully committed to our foundational evangelical Christian principles. We will 
continue to be a Christ-centred community; one that is defined by our shared pursuit of 
seeking to glorify God by revealing His truth, compassion, reconciliation and hope to a 
world in need.1302 
It was a dramatic development given the extent to which TWU fought not once but 
twice all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. There was speculation that this was not only 
a response to the SCC ruling, but a defensive move to protect the school from being harassed by 
other professional accrediting bodies for their nursing and education degree programs.1303 
However, even with the change in policy, commentators made it clear that the concession did 
not go far enough. TWU must not only remove the requirement from the students but it must 
remove it from the faculty and staff.1304 Further, there was discussion by Professor Richard 
                                                     
1300 R. Kuhn, supra note 1277. 
1301 Ibid. 
1302 Ibid. 
1303 During an interview with an Ottawa area journalist in August 2018, the reporter suggested this as a 
possibility. I concurred that indeed that would be a plausible explanation for the turnabout.  
1304 Aline Bouwman, “Trinity Western University drops contentious covenant, but LGBTQ staff still face 
discrimination,” CBC News (16 August 2018), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-
columbia/trinity-western-university-drops-contentious-covenant-but-lgbtq-staff-still-face-discrimination-
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Moon who expressed concern that preserving the Christian status of the school would “favour 
Evangelical students and, in effect, disfavour non-Evangelicals.” Moon was concerned that 
“discriminating based on religious commitment raises similar problems as discriminating 
based on sexual orientation.”1305 As this book has pointed out, rights claims are inflationary. 
The claims of sexual equality are no different from any other rights claim. Once one win is in 
the record books, there is another to be chased.1306   
Lost in all of this speculation is the reality that TWU is a private religious institution 
designed and built by and for Christians. This is what Professor Moon and others fail to 
appreciate. As noted earlier, there is confusion between making a distinction (lawful 
discrimination) and engaging in unlawful discrimination. To make a distinction means there 
are objective differences between different objects. An institution is Christian or it is not 
Christian. Someone is a Canadian or she is not a Canadian – and the Canadian government 
discriminates in favour of Canadian citizens all the time, as with pensions. Indeed, we make 
distinctions all the time. It is part of being human. However, unlawful discrimination is 
unlawful because some distinctions are not legitimate. Distinguishing between a lawyer who 
has a diploma and one who does not is very different than distinguishing between a lawyer 
with brown skin and one with white skin. In its TWU 2001 decision, the SCC was correct in 
recognizing the right of TWU to distinguish between students who were willing to sign the 
Covenant and those who would not.  
Given the lack of understanding for TWU’s unique identity and need for distinction, and 
in light of the extraordinary leeway given by the SCC to the law societies to define their own 
“public interest” mandate, the societies could very well make the same decision (to deny 
accreditation) even without the mandatory Covenant. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that if 
TWU were to file again for a law school it would still have a bumpy ride to get it.1307 
                                                     
1.4786673>. This author made a fascinating admission in the piece noting that they attended the school with 
the mandatory covenant, stating “I chose TWU at a time when my values aligned with those described in the 
Community Covenant. I might have even found it a bit too ‘liberal.’ But I changed. As an institution of higher 
learning, I would expect TWU to encourage its students to experience such change and development and start 
to question and criticize its leaders when they see or experience discrimination within their community.” She 
continued, “But as long as TWU cannot itself call into question the Community Covenant it has held onto for 
decades, I don’t foresee any real change.” This author is emblematic of the Sexular Age – change in sexual 
identity can be made at anytime and religious institutions must “get with the program” and likewise change 
with the times. 
1305 Joseph Brean & Chris Selley, “Still seeking law school, Trinity Western drops sexual ‘covenant’ for 
students,” National Post (14 August 2018), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/still-seeking-
law-school-trinity-western-drops-sexual-covenant-for-students>.  
1306 Elaine Craig, “After the Trinity Western decision, let’s hope all law societies stand up for diversity,” Globe 
and Mail (18 June 2018), online: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-after-the-trinity-
western-decision-lets-hope-all-law-societies-stand/ stated, “While the decision’s recognition of the dignity 
and equality interests of sexual minorities in Canada is cause for celebration, its broader acknowledgment 
that to regulate in the public interest requires ensuring diversity within the profession is a rallying cry. … 
Let’s hope that the court’s TWU decision encourages law societies across the country to accept and act on 
their responsibility to protect and promote diversity within the legal profession.” Given that the Christian 
community was shut out of having their own law school one must question the commitment to “promote 
diversity within the legal profession.”  
1307 Cristin Schmitz, “Lawyers foresee bumpy road ahead if TWU renews its bid for law school accreditation,” 
The Lawyer’s Daily (17 August 2018), online: https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/7141/lawyers-
foresee-bumpy-road-ahead-if-twu-renews-its-bid-for-law-school-accreditation-  
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The continued opposition to religious universities running a law school is further 
evidence, I suggest, of the legal revolution against religion. The Canadian legal profession is 
now forced to make a choice between consolidating the revolution against religious freedom as 
it relates to sexual identity; or, face chaos in a time of indecision; or, allow for accommodation. 
The level of anti-religious sentiment exhibited during TWU’s law school application 
does suggest that the legal profession is in for a protracted time of uncertainty. In 2006, the SCC 
encouraged schools to teach that “[r]eligious tolerance is a very important value of Canadian 
society,” and that “[it is] at the very foundation of our democracy.”1308 The legal profession, as a 
whole, no longer appears to be of that view.  
Religious accommodation is seen by many in the profession as accommodating 
intolerance rather than providing space for diversity. Perhaps, as a profession, it does not fully 
grasp what it means to be religious in all spheres of life. This lack of understanding, ranging 
from apathy to outright vilification, helps explain how TWU, a private religious community, 
could have its Constitutionally protected religious freedom denied by the SCC, despite not 
being subject to the Charter, and being exempt from human rights legislation. The same court 
that protected TWU’s religious rights only seventeen years earlier has now endorsed the 
expansion of the state-actor’s “public interest” to enforce nebulous “Charter values” on TWU. 
This is nothing short of a legal miracle earning the applicable term: “revolutionary.”   
 
7.2 Law’s Religion 
 
Professor Benjamin Berger suggests that the current “commitment to legal 
multiculturalism and rights-based toleration is that law is a means of managing or adjudicating 
cultural difference but enjoys a strong form of autonomy from culture.”1309 Law as the curator 
sitting above and apart from the culture is the prevailing presupposition that makes possible 
the “conventional story” that explains the interaction of law and religion.1310 However, that 
convention preserves rather than resolves the tensions between law and religion. 
This conventional story fails, says Berger, because it does not adapt to the “fraught 
political experience of the meeting of law and religion.”1311 There is more going on “than the 
evolution of an increasingly sensitive and refined legal doctrine or the working pure of the 
concept of the secular.”1312 It also fails in not providing a satisfactory explanation for the angst, 
the dissatisfaction, and the quarrelling parties. Religious communities are increasingly feeling 
marginalized by their interaction with the law. 
In short, the conventional story is “[u]nable to account for the durability of the 
structural tensions, unable to explain the felt force of law’s rule… [and] fail[s] to capture salient 
dimensions of the social, historical, and political experience of the interaction of religion and 
the constitutional rule of law.”1313   
Berger posits a characterization of law as a cultural form: 
                                                     
1308 Multani, supra note 9. 
1309 B. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2015), at 12 [Law’s Religion]. He references Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in 
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1310 Ibid at 13. 
1311 Ibid at 15. 
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…that is, an interpretive horizon composed of sets of commitments, practices, and 
categories of thought, that both frames experience and is experienced as such. … The 
goal … is to make the culture of constitutionalism, with its symbolic, behavioural, and 
aesthetic claims, visible as an object of inquiry in the analysis of the interaction of law 
and religion.1314   
When law is viewed as “one complex cultural system among others” it levels law and 
religion so that the force of law is brought into “clear view,” generating difficult questions about 
the quality and ethics of constitutional adjudication.1315 
The interaction of law and religion, according to Berger, is not a juridical or a technical 
problem to be resolved by better laws but is “profitably understood” as a cross-cultural 
interaction that is “endlessly unstable and provocative.”1316 This approach, Berger maintains, 
will allow law to better understand itself and its relationship with religion. He adopts Paul 
Kahn’s view that “law’s claim upon us is not a product of law’s truth but of our own imagination 
– our imagining its meanings and our failure to imagine alternatives.”1317 This superfluous 
language makes it difficult to ascertain what is being argued. It appears to be a justificatory 
argument for a relativistic approach toward the meaning of law. That can be problematic given 
the citizen’s need for a concrete understanding of what her duty is in society that the law 
represents.  
If law is not a “truth,” but is of “our own imagination,” what hope is there for law to 
provide a reference point for all citizens? Law will be for the imagination of the powerful elite, 
since the average citizen’s imagination will certainly not be persuasive in and of itself. Rather 
than being a “cross-cultural interaction,” it will be one group dominating another.  
Further, to analyse the experience of law in its interaction with religion that “structures 
our understanding of space and time, self and community”1318 is equally unclear. Space and 
time are two reference points in the analysis but to what end? 
Kahn notes that law’s rule begins with the imagination of jurisdiction.1319 “Jurisdiction,” 
says Berger, “is the guiding metaphor for law’s understanding of space, serving as the 
conceptual means of ‘mapping’ authorities within the legal world.”1320 It organizes and 
interprets territorial or spatial relations. “The experience of the social space of the law is one of 
moving within multiple domains of authority. Space matters to the law since it is called upon to 
answer the question, who has authority or jurisdiction here and over what?”1321 While there 
are physical, territorial claims within geographical boundaries there are other spatial intuitions 
of the law that include the moral and the ethical. The law therefore, according to Berger, has a 
metaphysical capability to establish categories of authority that organizes social life 
referencing time and space.   
Law’s organization of space includes the private/public divide. Private space is that area 
where “the state has the weakest claim to authority. The public, by contrast is the domain of 
state power and, concomitantly, governed by the demands of public reason over personal 
                                                     
1314 Ibid at 17. 
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Ibid at 18. 
1317 Paul Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), at 39. 
1318 Ibid at 86. 
1319 Ibid at 55. 
1320 B. Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 1309 at 46. 
1321 Ibid at 46. 
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interest or preference.”1322 When law interacts with religious practice that has entered a spatial 
category imagined by the constitutional rule of law then religious freedom is subject to the 
court’s ability to reconcile that practice within that space.1323 “Religion has a claim within the 
law … because it is an autonomous and private expression of one important set of preferred 
tastes and chosen pursuits.”1324 The culture of law then “packages, organizes, and presents the 
world” thus framing experience and impacting the experience of religious communities.1325   
The Berger/Kahn characterization of law assumes religion “is quintessentially 
private.”1326 Yet all human experience has shown just the opposite. While religion is at times 
private it is also very public. The failure to account for the public nature of religion is to the 
law’s detriment and has created confusion as to when or how religion or religious institutions 
are to operate in the public square.1327 
Law, in a certain sense, also organizes time. Law takes the rules from the past and 
implements them in the present. Berger explains that “Legal time … is a compendious reception 
of all those moments in the life of the community bound by law that might serve as authority 
for the present.”1328 “[L]aw,” Berger explains further, “is not on a steady trajectory of 
progressive discovery, nor is it neatly sequenced, with the past falling away into historical fact, 
making room for the authority of the present.”1329 Thus, law is a compendium of the 
community’s life that remains authoritative in the present. 
Legal time, the time of the constitutional rule of law, says Berger, is a species of mythical 
time rather than historical time.1330 History, as seen by historians, takes facts as belonging to 
the past – they are gone forever. Mythical time, however, has its past always in the here and 
now, providing a political narrative “whose moral is its own legitimacy.”1331 The aesthetics of 
religious freedom, says Berger, is “the shaping of the boundaries of religious freedom in light of 
the history of a given community.”1332 These cultural boundaries are framed within time and 
space references.  
Berger argues that Canadian constitutional law’s imagining of religion has three 
components: religion is based within the individual; religion is valuable and deserving of 
protection because it expresses personal autonomy; and religion is a private matter centred on 
the individual’s personal choices and preferences not reason.1333 
It is uncertain that Berger has resolved what he set out to do, namely, account for the 
structural tensions and explain the felt force of law’s rule. He rightly calls out the liberal 
democratic conceit that claims to be neutral toward religion when it is not. Law is not neutral. 
It remains a very interested player in maintaining a dominant position over and against any 
religious practice that challenges the current power structure that has centred its rhetoric on 
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1325 Ibid at 51. 
1326 Ibid at 98. 
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1328 B. Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 1309 at 57. 
1329 Ibid at 58. 
1330 Ibid at 59. 
1331 Ibid at 60. 
1332 Ibid at 61. 
1333 Ibid at 99. 
  217  
the concept of individual freedom. The legal revolution that I describe in this work goes further, 
seeking to dominate religious belief.  
Berger reaffirms what several critics have observed for some time concerning religious 
freedom: to the extent a religious culture harmonizes with the law’s assumptions about the 
value and nature of religion (which Berger rightly notes has “deep sympathies” with 
Protestantism) religious practice will not be as problematic.1334 However, the moment religious 
practices are dissonant with the law’s underlying assumptions of religion, then all bets are off. 
Law will at that moment be antagonistic.  
Berger’s position is not new. It is reminiscent of Professor Roland Bainton’s 
observation, as noted above, that religious freedom “has come to depend upon a diversion of 
interest.”1335 As long as the religious concern is of a lesser importance than other issues of 
state, the liberal state will leave religions to their own devising unhindered. However, the 
moment the religious issues become politically salient to the affairs of state, one can always 
expect the liberal state to interfere in its own self-interest. 
Deep within the heart of liberal democratic theory – and the modern incarnations of it – 
is a fear of religion’s claim upon the conscience of the individual. The state has long held the 
claim that it must have sole authority – indeed it demands sole allegiance. Religion is, or at least 
can be, a check against the all-powerful state, especially when the individual is firm in her 
conviction. However, the individual is more capable to stand because she is part of a wider 
religious community that provides personal support against the state. James Davison Hunter 
points out: 
Constituted by powerful ideals, truths, and narratives, patterns of behaviour and 
relationship, social organization, and a wide range of resources, institutions are a social 
reality that are larger than the sum total of individuals who make them up. Only within 
strong communities can one find the relational means to sustain the difficulties endemic 
to life in the modern world. Only within strong institutions can one find the resources to 
resist its destructive influences and pressures.1336 
Of course, there have been many non-religious people who have stood up against 
injustice or the abuse of power. Further, it is true that states have manipulated religion for 
power. However, the list of religiously-motivated people who resisted state aggression is long 
and impressive.1337 And it is the religious motivation that is the peculiar focus of this book.  
It is no coincidence that totalitarian regimes have sought to destroy religion. Religious 
communities have consistently been targeted by states. The most brutal means have been 
commissioned against those who dare to swear allegiance to their divinity in defiance of state 
dictatorial madness. It was this madness that was condemned in the wake of the upheaval of 
the early modern period that had to suffer through the European wars of religion.  
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Christian” who could not tolerate the Jewish people being killed. “He had to protect and help these people. He 
felt, God gave him this task….”  Said Gilbert, “Those Christian values … were central to the actions of many 
thousands of rescuers” (at 435-435). 
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Berger rejects the argument that the law’s use of equality language is an appeal to 
religion as a cultural or identity-based concept. Rather, when you dig deeper as to why the law 
protects individuals from identity-based harm, the answer falls back to the focus on autonomy 
and choice.1338 The current legal imagination understands religion to be about “respect for 
choices made as an autonomous agent.”1339 This is why there is difficulty in cases dealing with 
children, the elderly, or the disabled: “if the genuineness of the choice is in question, the force 
of religion’s claim dissipates in the legal imagination.”1340 The emphasis on choice does not 
leave much room for the right of cultural identity that is often claimed by the religious.  
Berger’s explanation of law as culture suggests that law has a mesmerizing quality that 
seeks to fashion “religion in its own cultural image and likeness.”1341 Thus, law does not 
necessarily accept religion where it is but seeks to move religion along toward its own 
definition of what it would prefer religion to be – that is, to be a private affair of the individual. 
This insight is particularly helpful for this project, especially in light of TWU’s decision to 
remove the requirement that students must sign the Community Covenant Agreement upon 
admission. This mandatory agreement was the main sticking point with the SCC. After the TWU 
2018 decisions TWU succumbed to the law’s demand. Therefore, Berger’s observation that the 
law fashions religion is particularly apt.  
The argument this book makes is that there is an attempt to redefine the relationship 
between law and religion with respect to the relationship between religion and sexual equality. 
Berger’s insight allows us to better comprehend the complex machinations of law when it does 
not appreciate or respect the religious claims for deference in how it manages institutional 
codes of conduct – even when such codes have the effect of limiting those who cannot or will 
not abide by such codes to gain entrance to religious institutions. Thus, if the law accepts the 
presuppositions of the sexual equality claimants that TWU’s code is discriminatory, then the 
logical conclusion is that it violates Charter “values” (even though the Charter itself is not 
engaged). The law’s intuition, at least from Berger’s assessment, would be to force TWU into its 
likeness, demanding compliance with non-discriminatory principles. That is indeed what 
happened. 
From Berger’s argument, we may extrapolate further how law may indeed become 
susceptible to revolutionary ideas that remove an old paradigm. It would not be out of the 
realm of possibility for conceptual frameworks that are presently inimical to the legal status 
quo to become popular among legal institutions. Intellectual seeding of the legal infrastructure 
of radical ideas, once germinated, will, over time, obtain sufficient gravitas to bring about 
change – or as termed here, a legal revolution against the current state of the law. That seeding 
occurs at the law school and it helps explain why, among the current legal academy, having a 
Christian law school challenged their hegemony. 
Thus, we may see this as an apt description of the relationship between the law’s 
adoption of the sexual equality claims vis a vis the long-held claims of religious tolerance. The 
legal establishment would have to be convinced that religious tolerance that would 
discriminate on the basis of sexual identity is no longer foundational to a liberal democracy. 
The liberal democratic state’s tolerance for diversity and pluralism is evolutionary,1342 which 
                                                     
1338 B. Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 1309 at 87. 
1339 Ibid at 89. See also Justice Rowe’s opinion, TWU 2018, supra note 14 at para 251, in which the emphasis 
on “profoundly personal beliefs” and “voluntary choice” were used to deny TWU’s religious freedom as an 
institution.  
1340 B. Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 1309 at 89. 
1341 Ibid at 19. 
1342 Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54 at para 1, [2007] 3 SCR 607. 
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must make way for the deeper understanding of sexual equality as society progresses. Once the 
establishment is convinced it has obtained the greater equitable understanding and 
commitment to diversity and plurality it then has the requisite tools (professorships in law 
schools, benchers in law societies, positions in bar associations, judicial positions, federal and 
provincial cabinet positions) to move the law along toward its view of a greater fulfilment of 
the democratic project evidenced by the implementation of the sexual equality claims in the 
law. Religious claims to the contrary would now be seen as incompatible with the more 
“enlightened” understanding of equality. Berger’s insight thus allows us to see that law is itself 
a cultural force and seeks to make religion in its own image. Given that TWU made the change it 
did certainly has become more like the new legal paradigm’s view of religion – it no longer has 
the special status to demand accommodation.  
 
7.3 Religion as Nemesis  
 
When considered from a macro perspective, religious scruples about sex outside of the 
traditional institution of marriage have become but a whimper in today’s cultural milieu of 
Western democracies. Consider the fact that censorship of movies, pornography, bathhouses, 
and prostitution based upon religious norms have become virtually a non-issue.1343 In the 
truest sense, the attitude has become “live and let live.” As long as there is mutual consent on 
any sexual adventure involving more than one person, “you do your thing and I’ll do mine” 
sums up contemporary society. 
Therefore, it seems odd that such a liberal and permissive democratic society would 
have government actors who find it necessary to investigate, criticize, and demand a private 
religious university1344 put away its voluntary code of conduct requirement that its student 
body agree to abide by a traditional moral code on sex. No one is forced to attend TWU. No 
ongoing government support is given to the institution. No one suggests that the quality of 
                                                     
1343 Emile Durkheim was convinced that religion was “one of the forces that create within individuals a sense 
of obligation to adhere to society’s demands,” noted Anne Hendershott, supra note 653 at 2. However, 
Hendershott describes the fact that the concept of deviance is no longer part of our social lexicon. She claims, 
“[t]he commitment to egalitarianism, along with a growing reluctance to judge the behaviour of others, has 
made discussions of deviance obsolete” (at 3). Yet Hendershott concludes her work with the provocative 
statement, “Perhaps we will begin to recognize that a society that continues to redefine deviance as disease, 
or refuses to acknowledge and negatively sanction the deviant acts our common sense tells us are destructive, 
is a society that has lost the capacity to confront evil that has a capacity to dehumanize us all” (at 163.)  
1344 Even though TWU is private, it is also a charity. Some suggest that, because of its charitable status, TWU is 
a public actor that relies on the state and therefore should follow public norms. For an example of this type of 
reasoning, see Saul Templeton, “Re-Framing the Trinity Western University Debate: Tax, Trans and Intersex 
Issues” (last accessed 22 October 2018), online: Canadaian Bar Association, <http://www.cba-
alberta.org/Publications-Resources/Resources/Law-Matters/Law-Matters-Summer-2015-Issue/Re-Framing-
the-Trinity-Western-University-Debate>. However, the fact that a religious institution is a charity, or that it is 
issuing state recognized degrees, or that it receives other state acknowledgement does not change the 
analysis – it is still entitled to Charter protection. Otherwise, there is no end to where such an argument may 
go – for example, the state recognizes TWU’s property rights and will send in police to protect it from violence 
– is that state recognition contingent upon TWU’s acceptance of public norms on marriage? It runs into the 
absurd. Also, only a few weeks before the release of the TWU 2018 decisions the SCC released its Randy Wall 
decision (Wall, supra note 368) that reaffirmed church entities, not being state actors, are not subject to the 
Charter – see para 39. 
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education at TWU is anything but exemplary. The graduates in other disciplines, such as 
education, have not been found to discriminate against the LGBTQ community.  
The legal profession insists that TWU law school not be accredited based on the 
following rationale: first, TWU’s Covenant creates an inequality of access to legal education 
against the LGBTQ community. However, the BCCA agreed with the Federation’s finding that 
was not the case,1345 but the SCC, following the lead of the revolutionaries, found otherwise. 
Second, the religious belief regarding traditional marriage has become such a controversial 
issue that the legal community is embarrassed to have a bona fide law school that stands for 
that belief in its midst.1346 Finally, there is an inherent harm in recognition of such a law 
school.1347 Such harm may be seen as dignitary harm resulting from being offended.1348 
However, as the BCCA noted, “there is no Charter or other legal right to be free from views that 
offend and contradict an individual’s strongly held beliefs.”1349   
So offensive is the traditional marriage belief and practice of TWU that law societies are 
willing to ignore a 2001 SCC ruling that remains authoritative in the opinion of BC Chief Justice 
Hinkson.1350 The Charter does not apply, nor does the applicable human rights legislation;1351 
yet, three law societies insist that they do – or, if not, then malleable Charter values will suffice. 
In her piece “Equality’s Nemesis?”,1352 Queen’s University law professor Beverley Baines 
argues for an interventionist, three-pronged approach to deal with religion and sex equality. 
While she argues in the context of women’s equality, her contention that religion is equality’s 
nemesis is applicable to equality rights generally. Her first assertion is that there should be a 
hierarchy of rights wherein religious and cultural claims are subject to the guarantee of 
equality.1353 She stated, “no reason exists to immunize [religious societies] from the 
constitutional guarantee of sex equality.”1354 Second, she asserts that religious communities 
should operate jointly with the state in certain areas.1355 If a member of the religious 
community does not have his or her equality right accepted by the religious community, then 
he or she can appeal to the state for redress forcing the religious community to permit his or 
her right.1356 Her third argument advocates the privatization of religion. Since religious 
                                                     
1345 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at paras 171-180. 
1346 Justice Campbell suggested that perhaps the NSBS “is motivated by the question, ‘What will people think?’ 
If the NSBS allows students from a law school that discriminates against LGB people it will appear 
hypocritical in light of its strong advocacy for equality rights” in TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 225. 
1347 Consider that running throughout the litigation the law societies have argued that if they accredit TWU 
they would be seen as endorsing TWU’s discriminatory practices. The Ontario Divisional Court, in TWU ONSC 
2015, supra note 776 at para 116, stated that accreditation would be condoning discrimination which “can be 
ever much as harmful as the act of discrimination itself.” Former Chief Justice McLachlin reiterated the same 
point at para 137 of the TWU v LSBC 2018 decision, supra note 14. 
1348 Justice MacPherson of the ONCA held that the Covenant “is deeply discriminatory to the LGBTQ 
community, and it hurts,” in TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701 at para 119. 
1349 TWU BCCA 2016, supra note 478 at para 188; also, the BCCA at para 184 noted that such fear of 
endorsement makes little practical sense since “no religious faculty of any kind could be approved. Licensing 
of religious care facilities and hospitals would also fall into question.” 
1350 TWU BCSC 2015, supra note 737 at paras 78, 90. 
1351 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 25. 
1352 Supra note 19. 
1353 Ibid at 76. 
1354 Ibid at 75. 
1355 Ibid at 77. 
1356 Ibid at 77. 
  221  
communities are private by nature, they should not be given any special protections such as 
those found in the Charter.1357 Rather, religious communities should rely on the freedoms of 
expression and association. Unfortunately, this argument ignores the fact that religion is an 
enumerated ground in section 15 of the Charter and therefore has its own equality rights. 
Framing religion as equality’s nemesis seems to be a stretch, given its long sociopolitical 
history in the evolution of human rights.1358 However, the diminution of religion is beginning to 
take shape. Baines’s three-pronged approach is not too far from becoming reality. In the SCC 
case Loyola High School,1359 Justice Abella asked the counsel for the private Catholic school 
whether a religious community is exempt from having to teach a course that it says violates its 
religious freedom when that religion’s “ethical framework” contradicts what the Court 
considers “national values.”1360 
Justice Abella wrote the majority decision and referenced those values: 
…These shared values—equality, human rights and democracy—are values the 
state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting. They enhance 
the conditions for integration and points of civic solidarity by helping connect us 
despite our differences. … This is what makes pluralism work. … [a] multicultural 
multireligious society can only work … if people of all groups understand and 
tolerate each other. … Religious freedom must therefore be understood in the 
context of a secular, multicultural and democratic society with a strong interest in 
protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and ensuring the vitality of a 
common belief in human rights.1361 
Notice the national values therefore are “equality, human rights and democracy” and “a 
common belief in human rights.”  
The groundwork is now set for future decisions to elaborate on how those “values” 
interact with religious freedom. It would not be difficult to find scenarios where national values 
may be at odds with long-held and well-understood religious norms.1362 For example, consider 
the struggle that religious communities face when hiring or firing individuals who do not share 
their religious norms. Will the national values of “equality” and “human rights” force such 
communities to hire those who no longer believe and practice in accordance with the religious 
employer? While there are exemptions for religious communities in human rights legislation, 
courts have narrowed those exemptions considerably.1363 
For Justice Abella, these values enhance “integration” and “civic solidarity” by ensuring 
that we connect despite our differences.1364 There can be no doubt that a multicultural society 
needs to have means of creating a civic understanding of mutual responsibilities. Religious 
communities, by their nature, tend to be absolutist in their truth claims, as Loyola 
demonstrated.1365 However, the legal profession and the media are increasingly scrutinizing 
                                                     
1357 Ibid at 78. 
1358 John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
1359 Loyola, supra note 156.  
1360 Ibid (Transcript, 24 March 2014, by StenoTran, at 7, lines 16–22). 
1361 Ibid at para 47 (citations omitted). 
1362 Consider, for example, that Roman Catholic clergy is limited to unmarried men. 
1363 Christian Horizons, supra note 1283; Hutterian Brethren, supra note 5. 
1364 Loyola, supra note 156 at para 47. 
1365 Loyola, as a Catholic institution, “continued to assert the right to teach Catholic doctrine and ethics from a 
Catholic perspective” (Loyola, supra note 156 at para 31). 
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that idea as they become progressively intolerant of religious organizations as they operate in 
the “public sphere.”1366 
A hierarchy of rights implies a generally accepted norm as to which right is to be ranked 
above another. Such homogeneity of thought will be difficult to obtain and maintain in a 
multicultural society. However, some suggest that it ought to be tried. University of Windsor 
law professor Richard Moon writes: 
It is unrealistic to expect the individual to leave her or his religious beliefs or values 
behind when she or he enters public life. If religious values are part of public debate and 
decision-making, then the values of some individuals will lose out—for example, will 
not be included in the curriculum. If we believe that this is consistent with religious 
pluralism then we may have less sympathy for the demands of a parent, based on 
religious belief, that his or her children not be exposed to any affirmation of the value of 
same-sex relationships, or for the claim of an individual, who is opposed to the 
conception of human dignity or equality that informs the civic curriculum, to work as a 
teacher, or for the claim to accreditation of a teacher training program that affirms anti-
gay/lesbian views.1367 
According to Moon, the right of a religious parent would “lose out.” In other writings, he 
is more emphatic when, as noted earlier, he calls for “nothing less than a repudiation of the 
religious view that homosexuality is sinful.”1368 He has also argued that any religious narratives 
about the battle between good and evil that make claims that the gay lobby attempts to corrupt 
society and its children, can justify “extreme action against gays and lesbians and so ought to be 
treated as hate speech.”1369 It is one thing to make the argument that homosexuality is not 
sinful, as Professor Moon suggests, but it becomes problematic to require everyone else, by 
means of state action, to accept that view. In other words, these are matters on which 
reasonable people may disagree. As Voltaire is apocryphally purported to have opined, “I 
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”1370 Or have we 
come to the point where the legal profession is of the view that there is only one view? 
As noted earlier, in the 2001 TWU case, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote a forceful, 
dissenting opinion. “I am dismayed,” she exclaimed, “that at various points in the history of this 
case the argument has been made that one can separate condemnation of the ‘sexual sin’ of 
‘homosexual behaviour’ from intolerance of those with homosexual or bisexual orientations. 
This position alleges that one can love the sinner, but condemn the sin.”1371 
In rejecting the “love the sinner and hate the sin” view, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé agreed 
with the intervener EGALE, who argued that “[r]equiring someone not to act in accordance 
with their identity is harmful and cruel. It destroys the human spirit. Pressure to change their 
behaviour and deny their sexual identity has proved tremendously damaging to young persons 
seeking to come to terms with their sexual orientation.”1372 
                                                     
1366 Orlova, supra note 1152 at 51. 
1367 Moon, “Comment,” supra note 1208 at 283–84. 
1368 Richard Moon, “Religion and Sexual Orientation in the Public Schools,” supra note 1271 at 338. 
1369 Richard Moon, Putting Faith in Hate: When Religion Is the Source or Target of Hate Speech (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 151. 
1370 S. G. Tallentyre (pseudonym of Evelyn Beatrice Hall), The Friends of Voltaire (1906), 199. 
1371 TWU 2001, supra note 26 at para 69. 
1372 Ibid. 
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The SCC affirmed Justice L’Heureux- Dubé’s dissenting opinion on this point in the 
context of the 2013 Whatcott case.1373 The court reasoned that Mr. Whatcott’s flyer did not 
make a meaningful distinction between sexual acts and sexual orientation, and that the flyers’ 
condemnation of the sex acts was therefore hateful.1374 While the court appears to have kept 
the distinction between the condemnation of sexual acts and the condemnation of sexual 
orientation, it nevertheless chills the environment for freedom of expression on the issue 
because there is bound to be contention over the court’s interpretation. The court stated that 
“[g]enuine comments on sexual activity are not likely to fall into the purview of a prohibition 
against hate.”1375 However, confusion will naturally arise over what is “genuine.” For example, 
the court said that if “Mr. Whatcott’s message was that those who engage in sexual practices 
not leading to procreation should not be hired as teachers or that such practices should not be 
discussed as part of the school curriculum, his expression would not implicate an identifiable 
group.”1376 But the reality is that non-procreative sex acts are what a same-sex couple engages 
in. Therefore, focusing solely on non-procreative sex implicates same-sex couples. Perhaps the 
court is saying, “you can use general comments on non-procreative sex but just don’t link the 
dots to an identifiable group.” I am not sure that is sufficient to allow religious citizens the 
comfort to actively engage in such conversations when they have to maintain such a narrow 
and esoteric distinction. The chilling effect of this decision remains.  
Professor Bruce MacDougall of the University of British Columbia states, “[r]eligious 
ideology cannot be used to determine what people who are not of that religion can do or how 
they should lead their lives.”1377 The problem, of course, is that “religious ideology” in a 
pluralistic society ought to be given the same right as any other “ideology” in advancing a 
position in the public discourse. It is in the process of deliberative democracy that society is 
able to establish its norms. Even when there is a consensus, that does not mean that debate 
suddenly stops. Public debate on issues must continue if we are to remain free and democratic. 
That a particular opinion advanced in public debate is rooted in a religious worldview should 
not prevent it from being considered. 
However, for some in the legal academy, the fact that marriage has been redefined and 
religious communities had an opportunity to participate in the public debate means that all 
further discussion must cease. Religious communities must now be silent. Such a posture 
makes no room for the reality that religious communities differ and maintain the traditional 
definition of marriage within their own sphere. 
MacDougall further argues that religions should not be able to maintain their religious 
views on marriage and sexuality even within their own communities. In the footnote to the 
above statement, he says: 
In my opinion, [religious ideology] should not even be used to judge those who 
are of that religious persuasion. Even children being raised in a particular 
religious tradition should not be exposed to ideology that excludes and refuses to 
accommodate homosexuality in their education. The state has an interest in all 
education of the young and this ideal should prevail.1378 
                                                     
1373 Whatcott, supra note 702 at para 176. 
1374 Ibid at para 177. 
1375 Ibid. 
1376 Ibid. 
1377 Bruce MacDougall, “Celebration of Same-sex Marriage” (2000-01) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 235, 247–48. 
1378 Ibid at 248 n 63. 
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Suddenly the distinction between the “private” and “public” sphere becomes obsolete 
when it comes to human sexuality. There is no distinction. The public norm of human sexuality 
must prevail because “the state has an interest.” There is then no allowance for the individual 
to recognize the sovereignty of God in matters of sexuality; instead, the sovereignty of the state 
is now supreme.1379 It is a totalitarian concept that rejects any notion of accommodation of 
religious belief and practice as it affects sexual equality. MacDougall argues, “[o]nce the 
religious characterization is removed from an issue of racial or gender discrimination, the issue 
becomes much more straightforward. So it should be with homosexuality.”1380 
The problem with framing the issue this way is that it does not present the complete 
picture. From the very beginning of human experience, humanity has struggled over the issue 
of sovereignty wherein states have demanded sole allegiance at the expense of the individual 
conscience. Therefore, it is germane to the conversation to consider that liberal democracies 
replaced the absolutist state paradigm with one wherein state sovereignty made provisions for 
religious belief and practice. The special status given to religion was what made other rights 
possible—it was “prototypical,” as noted above.1381 
Virtually all of the “fundamental freedoms” had their origin in the protection of religion 
and its practice. Therefore, to suggest that religious views that do not accept nontraditional 
sexual norms are somehow a “negative animus”1382 and not worthy of protection flies in the 
face of liberal democratic history and theoretical thought. Rather, there is an anti-religious bias 
that refuses to accept the reality of religion’s legal protection on matters of sexuality. Religion 
is now seen as the nemesis that must be eliminated. 
 
7.4 The Way Forward 
 
The legal community’s revolt against the paradigm of religious accommodation has 
created a heightened sense of incompatibility between the current legal norm on sexuality and 
the traditional religious sexual norm (as exemplified in the Trinity Western University case). It 
raises two very important questions about how the law is to address this crisis.  
First, how should the law balance religious and secular interests going forward? The 
solution cannot be a zero-sum result where one is removed or restricted at the expense of the 
other. Religious communities can be expected to continue with their traditional teachings and 
practice on sexuality for some time to come. A two-thousand-year-old foundational 
understanding of human relationships does not simply disappear overnight, nor even over a 
                                                     
1379 David L. Corbett, “Freedom From Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation Under Section 15 of 
the Charter: An Historical Review and Appraisal,” in Debra M. McAllister & Adam M. Dodek, eds, The Charter at 
Twenty: Law and Practice (Toronto: Ontario Bar Association, 2002), 415. David Corbett has characterized the 
tension between religion and sexual orientation as “a struggle to protect our public policy from being infused 
with religious ideals for the purpose of denying a particular and disapproved group their equal place within 
Canadian society. … It is a conflict between the fundamental principles of our secular state – the Rule of Law, 
the principle of equality, and the primacy of the Constitution on the one hand, and a religiously based negative 
animus against homosexuality on the other.” 
1380 Bruce MacDougall, “Silence in the Classroom: Limits on Homosexual Expression and Visibility in 
Education and the Privileging of Homophobic Religious Ideology” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 41, 78. 
1381 That does not mean that religious teachings have not been distorted to support racist or misogynist 
views. Political actors, always interested in power, have been willing to use whatever means to obtain power. 
Religion is not unique in being manipulated by political actors – other ideologies, movements, etc. have been 
co-opted or perverted by ambition.   
1382 Corbett, supra note 1379 at 415. 
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generation. Further, a liberal society that seeks to impose a sexual ethic against the traditional 
religious view does strike at the very heart of religion’s status in the law.  
Second, what does society do with a voluntary community of members who establish 
internal rules of conduct? The emerging consensus on liberalism’s new moral understanding 
on sexuality will have no choice but to address whether religious communities may have space 
to continue their internal governance on sexual lifestyles that are anchored in ancient religious 
texts, opinions and religious cultures.1383  
 
7.5 Be Strategic: Don’t Rock the Boat – Nudge It 
 
Yale law professor William Eskridge suggested the way forward is to give religious 
communities time and space to get on the right side of history. He made an astute observation. 
“The double role of religion,” he says, “as both engine of prejudice and bearer of redemption” 
requires a “double strategy” that both confronts “discriminatory policies endorsed by religions” 
and accommodates “the faithful where possible.”1384 Eskridge has ably made the argument that 
religions change on moral issues. That certainly was the case in the US on the issues of slavery, 
inter-racial marriage, and civil rights. Therefore, there is every indication, in his view, that 
religious objections to sexual equality may well change, too.  
In Eskridge’s view we are traversing a period of transition from a “homosexual terror” 
to a “soon-to-be-achieved future where gay people and their families are considered 
normal.”1385  “During the transition period,” he says, “the Court not only ought to ensure that 
core religious institutions retain freedom to exclude, but also ought to allow the states ample 
room to insist on gay tolerance within public programs.”1386 Over time the religious community 
will come to an appreciation of their prejudice in the same way that Bob Jones University now 
apologizes for “conforming to the ‘segregationist ethos of American culture’ and failing to 
accurately represent the Lord” in loving others.1387   
Indeed, Eskridge aptly points out that there has already been a change in several 
American religious communities regarding sexual equality rights. The current “Maginot Line” 
for the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptists and the Church of Jesus Christ of LDS is now 
the opposition toward gay marriage. But they no longer oppose gay civil rights nor the removal 
of sodomy laws.1388 However, other communities such as the Reformed Jews, the Unitarian 
Universalist Church, the United Church of Christ, the Quakers and the US Episcopal Church have 
recognized gay marriages.1389 Meanwhile, others such as the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
                                                     
1383 Marjorie Hickey, Counsel for Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, in oral argument before Justice Jamie S. 
Campbell, was indignant at a TWU deponent’s Biblical references comparing sexual immorality to murder, 
theft, false testimony, and slander. “So that’s the language, my lord, of the Covenant. In the context of a Canada 
that now recognizes same-sex marriage and has enshrined sexual orientation as a protected right in the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that’s the language that has brought us to this intersection of freedom of 
religion, various other freedoms, and equality rights,” see TWU NSSC 2015, transcript supra note 477 (Oral 
hearing, 18 December 2014) at 55. 
1384 William N. Eskridge Jr., “Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist 
Antidiscrimination Norms” (Spring 2011) 45:3 Georgia Law Review, 657 at 664. 
1385 Ibid at 664. 
1386 Ibid. 
1387 Ibid at 683. 
1388 Ibid at 708. 
1389 Ibid. 
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America and the Presbyterian General Assembly are softening their stances.1390 Movements are 
being made toward the goal of sexual equality. 
Eskridge maintains that “religion, society, and the state are mutually constitutive – each 
influences the others, and none evolves without reference to the others.”1391 While the 
respective moral shifts in society, state, or religion may not be in lockstep they nevertheless 
“show striking synchronicity.”1392 In the past, as society changed its views on race, soon religion 
followed suit as did the state. The same phenomenon is now occurring with sexual equality. 
Religion can be both critical and redemptive as it launders “social prejudice into respectable 
discourse,”1393 thereby easing the “transition from a hysterical antihomosexual state of terror 
to one that is gay-friendly and accepting.”1394   
Eskridge encourages the gay community to “attend to organized religion, which has 
been an important barometer for society’s acceptance of gay rights,” noting that “[w]hen the 
mainline denominations uniformly condemned sexual relations as sinful sodomy reform was 
impossible but once the denominations backed away from that position then it was easy for the 
US Supreme Court to strike down anti-sodomy laws. 1395 
The US has not settled the sexual equality debate. The religious legacy against non-
traditional sexual issues still holds a “deep, primordial significance for millions of 
Americans”.1396 And until society has come to terms with this debate, Eskridge suggests the 
courts ought to lie low. “Judges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is 
closely but intensely divided, but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such primordial 
politics.”1397 For Eskridge that would mean three propositions. 
First, do not rush to constitutionalize the issue. “Neither the Court nor the political 
process should try to settle the matter one way or the other, either invalidating or firmly 
entrenching old rules.”1398 Second, interpret antidiscrimination rules to accommodate core 
religious institutions. Using his expertise in statutory interpretation, Eskridge argues that 
judges should prefer statutory resolutions to constitutional ones. Therefore, the courts should 
construe antidiscrimination legislation “to allow some leeway when normative organizations 
or relationships are in play.”1399 Third, favour narrow, as-applied constitutional rulings over 
broad facial invalidations. The point here is that if the constitution must be adjudicated it is not 
for the judges to resolve the “issues at which society is not at rest.”1400   
Like Eskridge’s position is the tongue-in-cheek, yet serious, description of the future 
envisioned by Professor Robert Wintemute. On the one hand, he states that LGBT individuals 
are to respect freedom of religion “by not asking the law to intervene to change the internal 
doctrines of religions as to who may be a religious leader, or who may enter a religious 
marriage”. At the same time, he presents a much more ambitious project of going about 
changing the internal doctrines of religion. In other words, he is an advocate for the 
incremental, inflationary approach of equality rights: 
                                                     
1390 Ibid at 708-709. 
1391 Ibid at 712. 
1392 Ibid. 
1393 Ibid at 714. 
1394 Ibid. 
1395 Ibid. 
1396 Ibid at 716. 
1397 Ibid. 
1398 Ibid at 717. 
1399 Ibid at 718. 
1400 Ibid.  
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Ultimately, as a result of the courageous efforts of LGBT and heterosexual individuals 
working from within to change internal doctrines, I believe that religious institutions will 
realize one by one that they have been wrong all these years about discrimination based 
on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity, and will voluntarily change their internal 
doctrines. They were wrong with regard to their persecution of Jews, their forced 
conversion of Indigenous peoples, and their support for slavery and apartheid, and they 
have acknowledged and learned from these mistakes. As sex, sexual orientation, and 
gender identity discrimination in religious institutions wither away, the need for an 
exemption for the religious private sphere will disappear. Although it is unlikely to occur 
within my lifetime, I look forward to the day when, for example, the first lesbian Pope 
issues her apology for the sins of the Roman Catholic Church against LGBT persons around 
the world.1401  
This position appears to be an accurate description of what the equality revolution is 
aspiring toward. It is the inevitable march of history toward eradicating traditional religious 
norm on sexuality. Like Eskridge, Wintemute advocates a non-violent approach – he is willing 
to allow the religious community space, for the time being, to continue in their current (though 
regressive) ways which will be changed in time by the “courageous efforts of LGBT and 
heterosexual individuals working from within to change internal doctrines.” 
Eskridge and Wintemute’s rational approach to accommodating religious opposition to 
changing sexual norms does appear to appreciate and respect religion but crucially it is only for 
the moment – during the transition period. Their approach presupposes that religion will 
eventually “get through” this transition period and reach a new paradigm as it has with the 
issues of race and slavery. However, both may be too optimistic in their prophetic 
interpretations of religion. 
Sexual norms were not contested in Christian circles in the same way as were slavery 
and racial relations. Eskridge’s analysis assumes that the public discussion on race and slavery 
is parallel to the sexual equality debate. This is understandable given the fact that in both cases 
there were, and are, religious arguments and communities for and against the respective 
positions. However, the current divisions within the religious communities concerning sexual 
norms are a recent development. There is no longstanding religious argument in favour of 
changing the traditional sexual norm. 
Indeed, this is a significant difference between the two situations. Slavery and race 
relations have a long, controversial history of religious debate. In the early Christian church 
slavery was a sin.1402 Although, as Eskridge points out, there was a religious minority in the US 
South that argued that slavery was somehow in keeping with the faith, that was never a 
widespread belief in Christendom. Whereas, sexual moral norms and the hermeneutical 
understandings of them within the Judeo-Christian scripture have been very consistent 
                                                     
1401 Wintemute, supra note 793 at 154, emphasis added.  
1402 See, for example, Aurelius Augustine, The City of God, vol 2, edited by Marcus Dodd (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1870), at 324, online: Project Gutenberg <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45305/45305-h/45305-
h.htm>: 
God … did not intend that His rational creature, who was made in His image, should have dominion 
over anything but the irrational creation,—not man over man, but man over the beasts… we believe, 
that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. 
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throughout the Christian era,1403 Eskridge and Wintemute’s comments to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  
However, given that TWU has, since the TWU 2018 decisions, decided to step back and 
remove the mandatory requirement that students sign the Covenant, Eskridge and 
Wintemute’s approach appears to be prescient.  
The question remains: “what if?” What if there are religious communities that do not 
comply with the state definitions of moral norms such as marriages? Will the state be 
compelled to act against those non-compliant religious groups and their institutions?  
Before I attempt to answer that question, I want to address a second option for the 
future: a no holds barred enforcement of the new sexual norms. 
 
7.6 Be Dogmatic:  No Holds Barred Enforcement of State Sexual Norms   
 
In the aftermath of the redefinition of marriage there is a growing consensus among the 
advocates of same-sex marriage that the public debate has been held – the debate is therefore 
over, and everyone must now be in alignment with the new reality. In other words, there can be 
no longer any opposition or perceived opposition to the new definition of marriage. Same-sex 
marriage advocates, such as Michelangelo Signorile, argue that mainstream media must no 
longer allow religious leaders who support traditional marriage on their talk shows.1404   
He contends that such a public campaign is not “censorship” since it is not government 
that is stepping in to prevent voices being heard. Instead, “we are asking media corporations to 
be responsible, to treat all groups equally, and to stop legitimizing defamation as rational 
debate, particularly when genuine debates on many of these issues have long since ended.”1405 
According to Signorile, “it’s about no longer agreeing to disagree; that debate has come to an 
end. … Every individual has a constitutional right to free speech – but no one has a right to 
appear on a television talk show.”1406   
Religious objections to homosexuality are seen as a threat to all groups.1407 The strategy 
is to demand “something big,” “even outlandish,” and then fight it out to walk away with what 
you can get, which is often more than what you originally sought.1408 Religious exemptions 
should not be permitted as they allow continued discrimination by the very institutions that do 
most of the discriminating.1409 
Harvard law professor Mark Tushnet’s May 6, 2016 blog piece, “Abandoning Defensive 
Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,”1410 created a stir when it was posted.1411 His 1200-word 
                                                     
1403 Robert A. J. Gagnon, The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2001); Richard M. Davidson, Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 2008). 
1404 Michelangelo Signorile, It’s Not Over: Getting beyond tolerance, defeating homophobia, & winning true 
equality (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015), 126-137. 
1405 Ibid at 137. 
1406 Ibid at 178. 
1407 Ibid at 75. 
1408 Ibid at 142. 
1409 Ibid at 143. 
1410 Tushnet, “Defensive Crouch,” supra note 30. 
1411 Randy Barnett, “Abandoning Defensive Crouch Conservative Constitutionalism,” Washington Post (12 
December 2016), online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/12/12/abandoning-defensive-crouch-conservative-
constitutionalism/?utm_term=.caa0d2e73efd; Servando Gonzalez, “Did We Lose the Culture War?” (15 July 
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essay heralded the end of “Defensive-crouch constitutionalism” that saw proponents of liberal 
positions “looking over their shoulders for retaliation by conservatives.” He called for the end 
of such posturing by presenting six points that establish the fact that the liberals have won the 
culture wars and no longer need to cater to the critical conservatives. In short, Tushnet 
advocates an aggressive stance not only to challenge legal decisions they disagree with on the 
basis that it was “wrong on the day it was decided,”1412 but to take a hard line (i.e. “You lost, live 
with it”) on the losers of the culture wars.  
After all, “trying to be nice to the losers didn’t work well after the Civil War, nor after 
Brown. (And taking a hard line seemed to work reasonably well in Germany and Japan after 
1945.).”  He does not end there:  
I should note that LGBT activists in particular seem to have settled on the hard-line 
approach, while some liberal academics defend more accommodating approaches. 
When specific battles in the culture wars were being fought, it might have made sense 
to try to be accommodating after a local victory, because other related fights were going 
on, and a hard line might have stiffened the opposition in those fights. But the war’s 
over, and we won. 
Tushnet insists there is no need to cater to swing vote judges such as Anthony 
Kennedy.1413 Just “[s]top it,” he says. It is no longer necessary.1414 
Tushnet, by his own account, received a lot of “hate mail” over that post. In a December 
20, 2016 post,1415 he responded to the criticism. He now claims that the May 6 post was 
misread “as advice to liberal judges rather than to liberal academics.” However, as law 
professor Paul Horwitz noted, “it does not read as giving advice to judges” nor is it addressed to 
a “‘we’ composed entirely of ‘liberal academics,’ or at least of liberal academics acting as actual 
academics.” Rather, “it reads as advice to a ‘we’ composed of liberals actually engaged in 
wielding power….”1416 The main concern, says Horwitz, was Tushnet’s “advocacy of an 
                                                     
2016), online: Servando Gonzalez <http://www.intelinet.org/sg_site/articles/sg_culture_war.html>; Greg 
Weiner, “Crouching Congress, Hidden Judges” (20 December 2016), online: Law and Liberty 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/12/20/crouching-congress-hidden-judges/; Ryan T. Anderson, “Absurd 
Idea: Harvard Professor Says Treat Conservative Christians Like Nazis” (9 May, 2016), online (blog): The 
National Interest <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/absurd-idea-harvard-professor-says-treat-
conservative-16110>. 
1412 In the TWU context see Richard Moon, “A Comment,” supra note 1208 at 229-230: “In TWU and 
Chamberlain, the Supreme Court tries to avoid choosing one right over another or favouring one group over 
another. The Court wants to affirm sexual orientation equality but also to respect deeply held religious 
opposition to homosexuality, or to remain neutral on such issues of fundamental value. It can do both only by 
adopting an artificially narrow view of sexual orientation equality and an implausible approach to religious 
inclusion or neutrality.”  
1413 Indeed, Tushnet suggested that liberals ought to “fuck Anthony Kennedy” – but of course he “didn’t mean 
that liberals should treat [Kennedy] with disrespect.” 
1414 He then made this curious comment, “Of course all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes President. But if 
he does, constitutional doctrine is going to be the least of our worries.” This seems to suggest that Tushnet 
was concerned that with a change in government the liberals would be in a precarious position. However, 
that implies that what is at stake is political power. That is problematic because if we are only concerned with 
power then liberal democratic society will be unstable as various factions do all they can when they have 
power to avenge perceived wrongs against the opposition. 
1415 Mark Tushnet, “Doubling Down (on ‘The Culture Wars Are Over’)” (20 December 2016), online (blog): 
Balkinization <https://balkin.blogspot.ca/2016/12/doubling-down-on-culture-wars-are-over.html>. 
1416 Paul Horwitz, “Doubling Down AND Walking Back on ‘Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal 
Constitutionalism,’” (21 December 2016), online (blog): PrawfsBlawg 
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aggressive, uncompromising consolidation and advance” on the liberal agenda.1417 Many US 
voters, said Horwitz, were against the “idea of having centralized establishment elites 
entrenching their own power and using it by hook or crook to push their victories into new 
territories on new positions and take a ‘hard line’ against those ‘losers.’”1418  
While Tushnet has toned down his rhetoric considerably in the face of the Trump 
presidency that has seen the US make a very hard turn to a conservative agenda, he remains 
defiant. Indeed, he argues that gay marriage is a reality, multicultural education is entrenched, 
and the current fight over transgender rights appears to be a “winning” issue for the liberals. 
He also pointed out, even on the issues of affirmative action and abortion, the law is not going 
to change unless Trump appoints two new judges. Tushnet’s fear has now been realized.1419 
With Trump’s appointment of two new US Supreme Court justices, the conservatives 
have a majority. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that conservative decisions will be 
reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence. However, it is unlikely that there will be a wholesale, 
reckless change to the law on “the culture war” issues because of the US reverence for legal 
precedent.1420 A more likely scenario will be a chipping away of the law’s edges, shifting toward 
the conservative view. The philosophical respect for the concept of judicial precedent is 
unlikely to see radical change in the short term. This was evident in the the US Masterpiece 
Cakeshop decision that avoided the cultural war over accommodating religious objections to 
                                                     
<http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/12/doubling-down-and-walking-back-on-abandoning-
defensive-crouch-liberal-constitutionalism.html> [“Doubling Down”]. 
1417 Tushnet references gay marriage, multicultural education, transgender rights, gay rights more generally, 
affirmative action, abortion and limiting religious accommodations to those issues. 
1418 Horwitz, “Doubling Down,” supra note 1416.  
1419 Adam Liptak, “Trump Visits Supreme Court for Neil Gorsuch’s Formal Welcome,” New York Times (15 June 
2017), online: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html; Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, “Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,” New York Times (6 October 
2018), online: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html>. 
1420 Senator Susan Colins gave a poignant summary of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s view on legal precedent 
when she addressed the US Senate outlining why she voted in favour of the maligned justice: 
“Judge Kavanaugh is the first Supreme Court nominee to express the view that precedent is 
not merely a practice and tradition, but rooted in Article III of our Constitution itself.  He believes that 
precedent ‘is not just a judicial policy … it is constitutionally dictated to pay attention and pay heed to 
rules of precedent.’ In other words, precedent isn’t a goal or an aspiration; it is a constitutional tenet 
that has to be followed except in the most extraordinary circumstances. 
The judge further explained that precedent provides stability, predictability, reliance, and 
fairness. There are, of course, rare and extraordinary times where the Supreme Court would rightly 
overturn a precedent. The most famous example was when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, correcting a “grievously wrong” decision—to use the judge’s 
term—allowing racial inequality. But, someone who believes that the importance of precedent has 
been rooted in the Constitution would follow long-established precedent except in those rare 
circumstances where a decision is ‘grievously wrong’ or ‘deeply inconsistent with the law.’ Those are 
Judge Kavanaugh’s phrases. 
As Judge Kavanaugh asserted to me, a long-established precedent is not something to be 
trimmed, narrowed, discarded, or overlooked.  Its roots in the Constitution give the concept of stare 
decisis greater weight such that precedent can’t be trimmed or narrowed simply because a judge 
might want to on a whim.  In short, his views on honoring precedent would preclude attempts to do 
by stealth that which one has committed not to do overtly.”  See Press Release, “Senator Collins 
Announces She Will Vote to Confirm Judge Kavanaugh,” (5 October 2018), online: 
<https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senator-collins-announces-she-will-vote-confirm-
judge-kavanaugh?page=4>. 
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expressive content for a gay wedding cake by dealing with state anti-religious animus.1421 
Nevertheless, a conservative US majority may provide a reprieve to the legal revolution against 
religious accommodation in the American context. However, even with that there is significant 
dissonance between the academic discussions, as I have canvassed in this book, and any 
conservative court. The US then, using Kahn’s terminology, is in the crisis stage of the paradigm 
shift. How it will play out in the coming years will be riveting and contentious.  
In the meantime, in Canada, if religious institutions such as TWU refuse to adopt the 
secularist understanding of marriage and sexual equality then it will not be surprising if similar 
opinions akin to those of Professor Tushnet gain currency – opinions that lean toward state 
coercion. Ultimately, that is where the inflationary demands of equality rights lead us (whether 
they advocate a gradual or immediate transition). It is, I maintain, where the anti-TWU side 
now stands. They have refused to accept the current state of the law that has allowed TWU to 
exist and carry out its function as a religious university granting accredited degrees and they 
have won the full support of the Supreme Court of Canada in doing so. 
Tushnet has long maintained that religion is not special.1422 Given his consistent stance 
that the “culture wars are over, and we won,” there is little doubt that his triumphal stand 
would see, if given the power, the removal of religious freedom accommodation as we know it. 
While history may not repeat itself, it often rhymes. If Tushnet’s dogmatic approach 
holds sway, then we may well encounter a time that rhymes with the religious upheavals not 
seen since the Reformation and its aftermath.1423 While this may appear speculative I think 
what we are currently observing in the United States is proving my argument. PresidentTrump 
is following a very familiar pattern of populist politicians.1424 As Richard Wolin observes, these 
politicians give simple answers to marginalized groups. The intellectual elites have so ridiculed 
and diminished the religious sentiment of the working class that when an establishment 
outsider arrives with an answer to their struggle in language they understand and he or she 
wraps rhetoric in that religious identity they are then convinced the politician speaks for them. 
The personal shortcomings of the politician are minimized as he or she is the class’s 
representative. Charles Taylor’s work reminds us that religion remains a motivating force.1425 
While religious fervour may not be what it once was, there is no guarantee that it will lie 
dormant forever. Waves of religiosity and opportunistic politicians who see through the 
groupthink of the “chattering classes” may rise at the most inopportune time for those whose 
interests prefer it to remain quiet and still. However, carrying a heavy stick against religious 
communities that refuse to accept the state’s version of the good life has never been the genius 
of the liberal democratic society. Instead, liberalism’s strength has been the tradition of 
accommodation. The ability to compromise and allow space for religious expression has given 
us a deep tradition of freedom.  
 
                                                     
1421 Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 24. 
1422 Tushnet, “Redundant,” supra note 469. 
1423 As former SCC Chief Justice Brian Dickson noted, “the origins of the demand for such [religious] freedom 
are to be found in the religious struggles in post-Reformation Europe,” Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4 at para 
118. 
1424 Richard Wolin, “How Did Trump Get Elected? Take a Look in the Mirror,” (2016) 63:14 Chronicle of 
Higher Education, online: <https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Did-Trump-Get-Elected-/238385>. 
1425 Daniel Baird, “Spiritual Exercises: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age shows why religion remains a powerful 
force” (12 April 2008), The Walrus, online: <https://thewalrus.ca/spirital-exercises/>. 
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7.7 Be Accepting: Of Differences 
 
Both Tushnet’s or Signorile’s “hard line” strategy and Eskridge and Wintemute’s vision 
of voluntary change (without state enforcement) may well be frustrated. The reason is simple. 
History does not always go the way revolutionaries expect. The Christian religion has been an 
advocate of traditional marriage for two milennia. It is unlikely that there will ever be a time 
when there does not exist, somewhere in a liberal democracy, a Christian community holding 
traditional marriage as its cultural identifier. Christians run organizations in accordance with 
traditions and principles which have endured for thousands of years. And if we are to remain a 
liberal democratic society, such organizations are entitled to protection of their beliefs and 
practices.1426  
The ramifications of the emerging legal revolution against the current legal paradigm 
regarding religion will bring disruption to law, society, and the democratic project. To what 
level of disruption remains to be seen, but it will not be an approach that encourages ongoing 
dialogue and respect between competing views on the public good. We need a deliberative 
approach that accepts dissonance as a strength, not a failure. The following suggestions 
introduce an attempt to move forward. 
 
7.7.1 Religion Matters 
 
In 1953, Justice Ivan Rand’s observation, quoted above but worth repeating, was that “a 
religious incident reverberates from one end of this country to the other, and there is nothing 
to which the ‘body politic of the Dominion’ is more sensitive.”1427 However, there is a terrible 
lack of understanding about religion today. Throughout the world, the number of conflicts with 
religious overtones are significant.1428 So much so that John Kerry, the former US Secretary of 
State, stated, “if I went back to college today, I think I would probably major in comparative 
religion because that’s how integrated [religion] is in everything that we are working on and 
deciding and thinking about in life today.”1429  
Religion matters because people believe and are willing to pay a high personal cost to 
practice their beliefs. In the past, the law made sense of this reality by seeking accommodation. 
Today is no different. There must be a willingness to engage in conversation that does not 
simply put religion in a private corner as if it has no bearing on our mutual well-being. Given 
the importance of religion to our increasingly diverse and plural society, the law must yet again 
                                                     
1426  Loyola, supra note 156, per McLachlin CJC, “The individual and collective aspects of freedom of religion 
are indissolubly intertwined. The freedom of religion of individuals cannot flourish without freedom of 
religion for the organizations through which those individuals express their religious practices and through 
which they transmit their faith,” at para 94. 
1427 Saumur, supra note 6 at 97. 
1428 Conflicts are by nature multifaceted involving politics, economics, social status and historical contexts. 
Religion is part and parcel of the mix. For a list of 25 conflicts involving religion see B. A. Robinson, “Religious 
Peace, Violence, and Genocide” (2015), online: Religious Tolerance 
<http://www.religioustolerance.org/curr_war.htm> 
1429 Secretary John Kerry announced that Shaun Casey would lead the launch of the State Department’s Office 
of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, see “Faith-Based Community Initiatives” (7 August 2013), online 
(video): C‑PAC <http://www.c-span.org/video/?314438-1/sec-state-kerry-launches-faithbased-community-
initiative>. 
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turn its mind to allowing religious individuals and their institutions to continue to operate 
without fear of state reprisal.1430 
 
7.7.2 Legal Knowledge of Religion 
 
The legal profession ought to become knowledgeable about religion and its societal 
impact. It is not helpful to characterize religion as equality’s nemesis when even a cursory 
review of history and the development of the law and public policy will show a number of 
religiously motivated individuals who sought to break down barriers of inequality. Examples of 
such include Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr.,1431 and Nellie McClung,1432 one of the 
“Famous Five” who championed women’s equality in the Persons Case.1433 
There needs to be an understanding of the historic and current place of religion in the 
law. Religion will not disappear with continued secular university education, as if education 
were some kind of cure for religion. Religion may change over time to some degree, but its 
basic principles will remain salient for a significant group in society. By maintaining religion’s 
legal status, the state can never be the sole determiner of the individual conscience.1434 By 
necessity, our society is and will be one where not every person will agree on such intimate 
issues as human sexuality. Those with whom we disagree will continue to live out their lives as 
they see fit. Maintaining an attitude of tolerance is a practical application of the Golden Rule: do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you. All human beings, religious or non-religious, 
have the right to be respected and allowed to live as their consciences dictate. No state actor, 
such as a law society, has a right to impose its view on human sexuality on another. 
Third, protection of religious freedom does not depend on whether an individual’s 
“beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by other members of the same religion, nor is such 
an inquiry appropriate for courts to make.”1435 However, courts, lawyers, and legislators need 
to be mindful of the importance which individuals attach to their beliefs. In other words, our 
law must be willing to see through the eyes of the believer—not to be “the arbiter of religious 
dogma,”1436 but to understand the sincerity of belief. Therefore, the law must ask, given the 
sincerely held belief of the claimant, what does it mean (in the case of TWU) that evangelical 
Christians have a university that maintains a synchronicity with their belief in traditional 
marriage? It is here that the law must be willing to see as TWU (and all Christians of like mind 
who have such institutions) sees. This is exactly what Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court of 
Nova Scotia did. He clearly understood that evangelical Christians have: 
[A] religious faith [that] governs every aspect of their lives. When they study law, 
whether at a Christian law school or elsewhere, they are studying law first as 
Christians. Part of their religious faith involves being in the company of other 
                                                     
1430 Of course, the current state of the law is also effective not only at accommodating sincere faith, but also 
prohibiting unlawful behaviour. Liberal democracies are well adapted to ensuring that religion does not stray 
into illegal activity. 
1431 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Trumpet of Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). 
1432 Nellie L. McClung, Clearing in the West: My Own Story (Toronto: Thomas Allen & Son, 1945). 
1433 Edwards v. Attorney General of Canada [1929] UKPC 86, [1930] AC 124 (Oct. 18, 1929) (PC) (appeal taken 
from Canada). 
1434 This is true whether the state maintains accommodation of religion or not – there will always be 
individuals and communities who acknowledge a higher sovereign than the state, be it self or God. 
1435 Amselem, supra note 7 at para 43. 
1436 Ibid at para 50. 
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Christians, not only for the purpose of worship. They gain spiritual strength from 
communing in that way. They seek out opportunities to do that. Being part of 
institutions that are defined as Christian in character is not an insignificant part of 
who they are. Being Christian in character does not mean excluding those of other 
faiths but does require that everyone adhere to the code that the religion 
mandates. Going to such an institution is an expression of their religious faith. 
That is a sincerely held believe [sic] and it is not for the court or for the NSBS to 
tell them that it just isn’t that important.1437 
 
7.7.3 State Neutrality 
 
The Western state should be neutral in matters of religion while permitting religion a 
public role. That does not mean the state does not consider the practical impact of religious 
practices, but it does emphasize the state’s reluctance to interfere with religion. Justice LeBel 
stated, “[t]he concept of neutrality allows churches and their members to play an important 
role in the public space where societal debates take place, while the state acts as an essentially 
neutral intermediary in relations between the various denominations and between those 
denominations and civil society.”1438 
This book argues that when religious communities run enterprises such as universities, 
the state has a “democratic imperative,” to use the words of Justice Gascon,1439 to ensure that it 
does not favour “certain religious groups and is hostile to others. It follows that the state may 
not, by expressing its own religious preference, promote the participation of believers to the 
exclusion of non-believers or vice versa.”1440 
 
7.7.4 Historical Recognition 
 
The Christian community has maintained the teaching and practice of traditional 
marriage for over 2,000 years. The length of time a community carries on a practice cannot, in 
and of itself, give it license to continue that practice if it violates basic human decency. 
However, the fact that such a community has practiced a religious belief for so many centuries 
does entitle that community to have, at the very least, a rebuttable presumption that it should 
be free to continue that practice. The religious practice of marriage as being between one man 
and one woman has never been held to violate human rights. Even the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights in Article 16 recognizes the right to heterosexual marriage.1441 
                                                     
1437 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 230. 
1438 Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St‑Jérôme‑Lafontaine v. Lafontaine, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, para 67. 
Also, note the Randy Wall decision where the SCC held, “In the end, religious groups are free to determine 
their own membership and rules; courts will not intervene in such matters save where it is necessary to 
resolve an underlying legal dispute,” supra note 368 at para 39. 
1439 Saguenay, supra note 358 at para 75. 
1440 Ibid. 
1441 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III) A, UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 
(1948) art 16, online: <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>: 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the 
right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
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7.6.5 Democratic Dissonance 
 
A citizen of a modern Western democracy can expect to have dissonance between his or 
her beliefs and practices and those of fellow citizens – or even those of the state. The fact that 
another believes and practices differently in matters as intimately private as sexuality must not 
put that citizen, or the religious institution with which he or she is affiliated, at a disadvantage. 
This is similar to the Supreme Court of Canada’s discussion about a public school student facing 
cognitive dissonance between the way she was raised and the way other students live their 
lives. Said the Court, it “is simply a part of living in a diverse society. It is also a part of growing 
up. Through such experiences, children come to realize that not all of their values are shared by 
others.”1442 So too must we all learn to accept that we are not all the same. The SCC continued: 
[T]he demand for tolerance cannot be interpreted as the demand to approve of 
another person’s beliefs or practices. When we ask people to be tolerant of others, 
we do not ask them to abandon their personal convictions. We merely ask them to 
respect the rights, values and ways of being of those who may not share those 
convictions. The belief that others are entitled to equal respect depends, not on 
the belief that their values are right, but on the belief that they have a claim to 
equal respect regardless of whether they are right. Learning about tolerance is 
therefore learning that other people’s entitlement to respect from us does not 
depend on whether their views accord with our own.1443 
 
7.7.5 Maintaining Accommodation 
 
When an institution such as TWU is private, peaceable, non-commercial, and presents 
no “grave and impending public danger,”1444 and there is no evidence of abuse of private 
power,1445 then the law ought to continue its indifference toward that institution’s peculiar 
discrimination to maintain an ambiance that respects its religious sensibilities. The choice 
comes down to whether we are a free and democratic society that allows for difference and the 
expression of that difference, or whether we will require sameness in all areas. Entities such as 
TWU depend upon the ability to discriminate for their very existence.1446 The fact that TWU felt 
compelled to change its mandatory Covenant for students does not change the analysis. First, 
the Covenant remains in effect for faculty and staff, thereby keeping the same Christian 
ambiance. Second, while TWU has loosened its position as a result of state coercion we must 
ask ourselves if having a state dictate to religious communities in this manner is really the kind 
of democracy we want. The implication of this one move may well lead to further impositions 
in the future. Third, the fact that TWU modified its admissions policy does not take away from 
the fact that there are many other religious institutions that will continue to resist the state.1447   
                                                     
society and the State. 
1442 Chamberlain, supra note 441 at para 65. 
1443 Ibid at para 66. 
1444 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945). 
1445 John D. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012), 184. 
1446 Ibid. 
1447 For example, the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada intervened in the TWU 2018 litigation and 
operates Burman University in Lacombe, Alberta. 
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Christopher J. Eberle observes, “[s]ince freedom of religion underwrites pluralism, and 
since pluralism enhances the vitality of religion, members of religious groups have a deep and 
abiding interest in affirming a political culture that values freedom of religion and a 
constitutional order that enshrines it.”1448 Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson of the SCC 
observed that the emphasis on individual conscience and individual judgement “lies at the 
heart of our democratic political tradition.” Each citizen’s ability to “make free and informed 
decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our 
system of self-government”.1449  
Therefore, limiting religious accommodation is taking away the religious individual’s 
incentive to maintain support of the political system itself. This is not to be taken lightly, as the 
health of our democratic project depends upon each citizen’s support.   
 
                                                     
1448 Eberle, supra note 309 at 44. 
1449 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 4 at para 122. 





This study began with five questions: What characteristic(s) of religion, if any, justifies 
the law’s special protection of religious practice? What other historical, practical or 
philosophical factors justify the law’s special protection of religious practice? Do those 
characteristics and/or factors justify religion maintaining its legal status? What may we 
reasonably expect the consequences to be should the special status of religion be removed? 
What is the attitude of the legal profession to the accommodation of religion? 
 
8.2 The Legal Accommodation of Religious Practice 
 
This dissertation posits that religion has a special status in the law of liberal democratic 
countries, based on the incontrovertible evidence that religion, and more particularly the 
Christian religion, has formed the basis of western states and societies. Under the Christian 
banner we have developed science, democracy and the rule of law.  
Religious freedom has been recognized as a foundational right and principle that was 
instrumental in creating the modern liberal democratic state with its emphasis on individual 
civil liberties.1450 Given that we do not know whether other civil liberties can survive without 
being undergirded by freedom of religion, it behooves us to be very wary toward the legal 
revolution taking place against religion. The historical, practical, and philosophical realities of 
liberal democracies justify maintaining religion’s special treatment in Canadian law.  
 
8.3 Justification of Maintaining Religious Accommodation in the Law 
 
Emanating from this study, one can draw together the overarching strands of 
justification for the law maintaining religious accommodation even in cases involving sexual 
equality claims. As a minimum, religious practices involving fundamental human life issues, 
such as marriage, are to be accommodated in liberal democracies. When they are, freedom in 
general is advanced for the religious and non-religious alike. 
 
8.3.1 The Historical and Practical Argument 
 
As discussed in this work, the historical reality can be summed up with the concept of 
sovereignty. The one who decides the exception, as Schmitt argued, is sovereign.1451 
Throughout human history there has been a battle between the state on the one hand, 
personified at times by a supreme (divine) ruler or a popular legislature; and the individual on 
the other. I have briefly discussed how, to one degree or another, the state has tended to 
demand sole allegiance. The individual in his or her own right (or as associated together within 
a religious community) has resisted such a demand in the name of personal and collective 
religious freedom. Historically, this obstinency was met with state violence. However, by 1700, 
nearly two centuries after the Reformation began, and following the devastating Thirty Years 
                                                     
1450 For the role of Christianity and freedom see Timothy Samuel Shah & Allen D. Hertzke, Christianity and 
Freedom: Volume 1: Historical Perspectives and Volume 2: Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016).  
1451 Supra note 225. 
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War, Euope realized that, for a number of reasons – pragmatic rationalism and theological 
understandings – religious practices had to be tolerated in order to maintain peace. If we have 
learned anything from history, it is that religious persecution does not foster well-being. 
 
8.3.2 The Philosophical Arguments 
 
The resulting stability confirmed that the modern state could not continue to murder 
people simply because they did not share the same beliefs as the majority. Enlightenment 
philosophers, reflecting on a post-Reformation society, paved the way for classical liberalism. 
Political ideologies expressed by such thinkers as Kant, Mill, and others, advocated for 
maximum individual freedom that nevertheless respected religious difference and pluralism 
within liberal democracy. These arguments are briefly summarized below. 
 
8.3.2.1 The Argument from Tolerance 
 
As we have seen, liberal democratic thought recognized that the polity must be neutral 
in matters of religion. The state works best, i.e. allows greater freedom, when it is agnostic. 
Permitting “the other” to speak and act even though it may be offensive is the high-water mark 
of liberalism. Citizens are not afraid of dissonance with their views on how life ought to be 
lived. Rather, they are secure knowing that, if they accept differences of belief and practice, 
then they, in turn, will have their own differences respected and not suppressed. There is a 
reciprocity of trust. Trust that as I give you the benefit of the doubt you will do the same for me. 
And, through ongoing dialogue, we will grow to appreciate and respect each other. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, identity politics have rammed a dagger into this conception of 
liberal democratic thought. This is evident in the TWU 2018 case, where suppression of 
diversity regarding sexual norms became the modus operandi, rather than tolerance. Failure to 
suppress difference is, in the elite view, intolerance – Voltaire and his famous epigram be 
damned.1452 TWU was deemed intolerant for being the evangelical Christian university that it 
is. TWU did not engage in suppression of any group – including those who could not sign its 
community covenant – it simply wanted the right to continue to maintain a different standard 
(a distinction or a lawful discrimination) than the prevailing sexual norms outside its religious 
community. But that was, apparently, too much to ask.  
 
8.3.2.2 The Argument from Pluralism 
 
Multiculturalism is protected in s. 27 of the Charter.1453 The pluralist nature of Canada 
is, to use the words of Rodney Stark, “the natural state of the religious economy. … To the 
extent that religious freedom exists, there will be many organized faiths, each specializing in 
certain segments of the market. Moreover, this market will be dynamic, with a constant influx 
of new organizations and the frequent demise of others.”1454 In other words, there must be 
                                                     
1452 “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,” supra note 1370.  
1453 “Today, we may rightly say that, in s. 27 of the Charter, Canada accepts the importance of multiculturalism 
in its social life. In s. 27, Canada signals its acceptance that it’s changing through every day of its history.”  R. v. 
N.S., [2012] 3 SCR 726, 2012 SCC 72, para 72. 
1454 Stark & Bainbridge, supra note 309. While Stark was speaking about the United States, I am of the view 
that his comments are applicable to Canada as well.  
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freedom for the rise and fall of organisations in accordance with the voluntary preferences of 
the citizenry without state interference to prefer one over others. 
Isaiah Berlin observed that pluralism is “the conception that there are many different 
ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each 
other and sympathizing and deriving light from each other”.1455 Different cultures are capable 
of communicating because what makes us human is the common bond and acts as a bridge. 
“We are free to criticise,” says Berlin, “the values of other cultures, to condemn them, but we 
cannot pretend not to understand them at all, or to regard them simply as subjective, the 
products of creatures in different circumstances with different tasts from our own, which do 
not speak to us at all.”1456 In Berlin’s understanding, “civilisations clash;” there are bound to be 
incompatibilities. “We can discuss each other’s point of view, we can try to reach common 
ground,” he argues, “but in the end what you pursue may not be reconcilable with the ends to 
which I find that I have dedicated my life.”1457 Berlin’s analysis is clear that there can be no 
“perfect world” in which “all good things can be harmonised”.1458 We live on the earth where 
we believe and act and it is here that not all can coexist in a perfect whole.   
If we are to be serious about pluralism, we must live with dissonance. Each cultural 
entity needs to be given the space to grow and flourish without state interference. Included 
would be the evangelical Christians who want to open their own law school in accordance with 
their beliefs and practices. The fact that different groups and individuals are able to disagree 
with their respective beliefs and practices and still live in peace is indicative of a free society. 
However, demanding state actors prevent the operation of that school because its religious 
opinions are unpopular does not bode well for the long-term stability of society as a whole. 
   
8.3.2.3 The Argument from Liberalism 
 
The liberal democratic project is to maximise the freedom of the individual while 
ensuring civil peace. Or, as J. S. Mill so aptly stated, “…that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”1459 
Nor is it acceptable to do so for the person’s own good, to make him happier, or because people 
are of the view it is wise or right.  
Mill’s harm principle has formed the basis of liberal thinking since the 19th century. 
But, as this study has shown, it is complicated when applied to specific facts such as TWU 2018. 
Yet, it is fair to say, that Mill’s thinking would permit TWU to have its law school even though it 
has a Community Covenant that offends certain groups of people. I take Mill’s writing to be 
appreciative of different points of view on how to live one’s life. He is conscious of the tyranny 
of the majority’s opinion that does not suffer any opposing view.  
Currently the thinking of the “majority”, at least within the legal profession, is that any 
fettering of the sexual impulse by a religious community’s rules is unacceptable. Any such 
religious opinion and practice in a “public” enterprise, that is to say a publicly regulated entity, 
                                                     
1455 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Girous, 
1998), 9.  
1456 Ibid. 
1457 Ibid at 10. 
1458 Ibid at 11. 
1459 Mill, On Liberty, supra note 500 at 1. 
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must accept the legal profession’s view of the public interest and not “discriminate” against the 
sexual minority – even if that “discrimination” is lawful in a private religious setting. As Justice 
Karakatsanis and the SCC majority made clear, “substantive equality” of sexual minorities is a 
must. There can be no differences or perceived differences of treatment of sexual minorities 
between evangelical Christian institutions such as TWU and public universities. The 
presupposition is that the views and practices of TWU on marriage are wrong and must not be 
permitted. Herein lies the problem. Just because the majority of the legal profession is of that 
view does not give it the right to demand all institutions accept the same view and practice. It is 
not “self-protection,” as required by Mill’s harm principle, to demand state interference against 
those with whom you disagree – however much they offend – if what they are doing is living 
lawfully. That is not “self-protection,” nor is it “substantive equality.” It is totalitarian.   
 
8.3.2.4 The Argument from Identity Politics 
 
We have seen that contemporary identity politics is based on the idea that every group 
has the right to develop its own identity. TWU frequently and repeatedly expressed its desire to 
develop a law school that was consistent with its Christian identity.1460 In an era that is 
sensitive to one’s personal identity and cultural grouping, it is ironic that TWU was not 
permitted to advance in the logical next step in the evolution of the university. Denying TWU 
that right violates its core identity and the identity of its individual community members. South 
African Justice Albie Sachs observed: 
For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their 
activities.  It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their 
sense of themselves, their community and their universe. For millions … religion 
provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and 
growth. Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human 
dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights.1461  
Throughout the TWU 2018 debates among the law societies and academics, the TWU 
2001 dissent of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was seen as being “on the right side of history”1462 
when she described TWU’s Community Covenant as an affront to the human dignity and 
personhood of LGBTQ people. This proved to be a prescient vision of the SCC’s TWU 2018 
comment that TWU’s policy was “degrading and disrespectful.”  
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s criticism of TWU Community Covenant can also be turned 
around to call into question the zeal with which the legal profession attacked the religious 
beliefs and practices of TWU. In other words, the arguments of identity politics used by 
L’Heureux-Dubé and today’s legal profession can also be used to condemn and call out the 
animosity against TWU. Denigration of their Christian beliefs and practices is an affront to the 
human dignity and personhood of the university community. Professor Richard Moon, though 
unsympathetic to TWU’s position,1463 admitted, “[i]f religion is an aspect of the individual’s 
identity, then when the state treats his or her religious practices or beliefs as less important or 
                                                     
1460 “Submission for Accreditation,” supra note 817. 
1461 Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education [2000] 4 SA 757 (Constitutional Court), 36. 
1462 L’Heureux-Dubé J. in TWU 2001, supra note 26, in dissent at para 69, wherein she challenged “the idea 
that it is possible to condemn a practice so central to the identity of a protected and vulnerable minority 
without thereby discriminating against its members and affronting their human dignity and personhood.” 
1463 See Richard Moon, “A Comment”, supra note 1208. 
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less true than the practices of others, or when it marginalizes her or his religious community in 
some way, it is not simply rejecting the individual’s views and values, it is denying her or his 
equal worth.”1464 Though Professor Moon would not agree with my characterisation, it is my 
position that denying TWU accreditation cannot be anything other than marginalization of the 
religious community.   
It seems then that we have two views of affronting human dignity and personhood in 
this case. It could be argued, using L’Heureux-Dubé’s analysis, that in 2001 the SCC affronted 
the LGBTQ community but in 2018, I argue the SCC affronted the TWU community. The 
difference between 2018 and 2001 is that the legal profession (ultimately vindicated by the 
SCC), decided that the law outlining the accommodation of TWU’s identity could no longer be 
supported politically. In other words, a revolution has occurred in the law in 2018. As noted 
already, given that identity politics is now playing a majour role in religious freedom 
accommodation, one can reasonably expect that, given the right circumstances, a change in 
future politics may call for yet another reversal of this affront to the human dignity and 
personhood of the religious community. However, the ultimate goal, I suggest, should not be 
raw political power on either side. We have to be cognizant of the fact that social structures and 
institutions have an inherent rationality due to the fact that they have survived a long process 
of societal evolution. This reality was observed by Edmund Burke when he commented on the 
French Revolution, and by Abraham Kuyper in his sphere sovereignty analysis. Both were 
aware that the issue is not simply power. It goes much deeper to concepts that we are yet to 
fully understand. Hence, we ought to strive for a solution that supports the equal worth of all 
players in civic society. That is a far better approach than that taken by the SCC in its 
condemnation of TWU’s position as “degrading and disrespectful.” Such a zero-sum game is not 
in our mutual long-term benefit.      
 
8.4 The Legal Status of Religion Ought to be Maintained 
 
Law, in a certain sense, represents the collective wisdom of our forebearers. Their 
wisdom gives us a head start in living a meaningful and purposeful life in a very complex world. 
We are not able to know all there is that we do not know. That is why our legal heritage is so 
significant. Society without law is blind. It does not know where it is going. “Where there is no 
vision, the people perish.”1465 The law is our collective vision. The law gives us our societal 
boundaries. Being fallible we are driven by forces that we do not understand despite our 
technological advances. Professor Dr. Jordan Peterson observes:  
We have learned to live together and organize our complex societies slowly and 
incrementally, over vast stretches of time, and we do not understand with sufficient 
exactitude why what we are doing works. Thus, altering our ways of social being 
carelessly in the name of some ideological shibboleth (diversity springs to mind) is 
likely to produce far more trouble than good, given the suffering that even small 
revolutions generally produce.1466   
The grand historical arch gave us religious protection in the West. This work has 
highlighted the various ways in which the law has treated religion as special. Accommodation 
                                                     
1464 Richard Moon, “Freedom of Religion Under the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality” (2012), 
45 U.B.C. L. Rev. 497, at 507. Despite this articulation of the problem, Professor Moon makes it clear, as we 
have seen in this dissertation, that he in no way supports TWU’s position.  
1465 Proverbs 29:18, KJV. 
1466 J. Peterson, supra note 265, at 118-119. 
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of religious practice became the norm. Exemptions for religious holidays, religious symbolic 
dress, refusal to have photographs taken, employment standards for hiring and firing 
employees, and admittance to religious communities in churches and schools were, and still 
are, commonplace.  
However, in recent decades there has been a steady stream of academic and popular 
discussion that has challenged the legal status of religion. While the secularization thesis, that 
confidently proclaimed the end of religion as the populace became more educated, has not 
materialized, there has been in its stead a continuous assault on religion, Christianity in 
particular. The rise of identity politics has ushered in a Sexular Age emphasizing radical 
individualism that eschews any societal conceptualization of personal sexual norms. Such 
radicalism manifests into an absolute demand for inclusion in what were once considered 
private religious institutions. The legal profession’s opposition toward Trinity Western 
University’s School of Law proposal is representative of the zeitgeist. The law’s accommodation 
of religious practices that were evident in TWU 2001 could no longer apply in TWU 2018. 
Times have changed. 
The SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions represents what I have referred to as the legal 
revolution against the law’s accommodation of religion. Rather than follow its own 2001 
precedent, the SCC majority simply ignored it without any explanation. The law is no longer 
willing to stand against the zeitgeist in favour of the law’s liberal democratic wisdom of 
accommodation. 
As time marches on we are bound to re-learn why it was that religious freedom was 
considered by former Chief Justice Brian Dickson as the the “prototypical” right. It will, as I 
have already discussed, come at a cost. Far better to have taken the cautious approach and in 
humility seek to understand why we were given what we were. 
 
8.5 Attitude of the Legal Profession Toward Religious Accommodation 
 
 Using Kuhn’s model as a framework for analysis allows us to recognize the 
revolutionary shift underway in the legal community. Religion’s critics were of the view that 
the law’s accommodation of religious institutions, such as TWU, which continue to uphold 
traditional marriage even in a context where same-sex marriage is legal, was inadequate. The 
judiciary and the legal profession, it might be said, were embarrassed by the law’s protection of 
religious communities with “degrading and disrespectful” views and practices according to the 
elites. As Justice Campbell pointed out, the law societies were more concerned with “What 
would people think?”1467  
The growing academic literature against Christian institutions, as highlighted in this 
work, has sought to ensure that the legal fraternity is on “the right side of history.” The strident 
opposition of the legal profession was exhibited in the letters, the testimony to the Federation 
of Canadian Law Societies and to the law societies in British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova 
Scotia. The condescending attittudes expressed in the decisions of both the Ontario Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Canada are indicative of a judiciary that has rejected any semblance of 
respect for the sincerely held beliefs of religious communities that hold to and practice, in all 
respects, traditional, monogamous heterosexual marriage. Professor Faisal Bhabha warned 
that the denial of TWU’s law school “would be like saying ‘evangelical Christians are not 
                                                     
1467 TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 255. “[W]hat matters is the anti-equality message that would be 
conveyed,” asserted Dianne Pothier, supra note 1215, at 6. 
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welcome’ in the legal profession.”1468 Remember in TWU 2001 the SCC stated “TWU is not for 
everybody; it is designed to address the needs of people who share a number of religious 
convictions.”1469 Denying accreditation to the law school said, in effect, “TWU is not for anyone.” 
The 2001 case also recognized that the same logic that denied accreditation of the education 
degree because of the Community Standards could be applied to denying teachers who were 
members of a particular church with the same views.1470 But, there should be respect, said the 
2001 SCC, for a “diversity of views.”1471 Since the legal profession has no room for TWU then 
what is to prevent the profession from turning on those legal practitioners who hold the same 
views as TWU?  Already the Law Society of Ontario is seeking to impose a “diversity” policy.1472 
Those lawyers with divergent opinions from the Law Society of Ontario are put on notice. The 
concerns of the SCC in TWU 2001 about the education profession are soon to be realized in the 
legal profession. 
 
8.6 Consequences of Removing the Special Status of Religion 
 
The Legal Revolution has already destroyed TWU’s law school proposal. TWU would 
have made a significant contribution to the legal profession with “practice ready”1473 graduates. 
Instead of accreditation, TWU faced yet another attack because of its religious beliefs. Even 
though, after the SCC decision, TWU no longer made the Covenant obligatory for the student 
body, the legal community continued to say that that concession was not good enough. Such 
inflationary demands suggest the anti-TWU critics will not be satisfied until TWU no longer 
maintains its religious identity. Hardly a position that supports diversity. As Professor Benson 
notes, “[e]quality is not homogeneity and requires a respect for diversity.”1474   
TWU’s subsequent decision to make the Covenant voluntary was no doubt a pre-
emptive attempt to hold off the onslaught of the now emboldened academic regulators of its 
other degrees such as education, nursing and accounting.    
The SCC TWU 2018 decisions crossed the fast-moving Rubiconian waters of identity 
politics. No longer is the court neutral on the matters of sexual politics and religious freedom. It 
has decided that the internal religious practices that expect conformity with traditional 
marriage are no longer worthy of state respect but are “degrading and disrespectful.” Sexual 
identity politics demands “diversity” be interpreted as everyone (religious and non-religious 
individuals and institutions) accepting its view of what “equality” means. In essence, “diversity” 
is Orwellian doublespeak. There is no diversity. “National values” have become totalitarian. 
State divinity has resurfaced.  
                                                     
1468 Faisal Bhabha, “Hanging in the Balance: The Rights of Religious Minorities,” in Dwight Newman, ed, 
Religious Freedom and Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016), 265 at 283. 
1469 TWU 2001, supra note 26, at para 25. 
1470 Ibid at para 33. 
1471 Ibid. 
1472 For the policy see: https://lso.ca/about-lso/initiatives/edi/human-rights-and-diversity-policy; for 
opinion against the policy see: Marty Gobin, “The Law Society’s diversity policy doesn’t include diverse 
views,” (9 April 2018) Ottawa Citizen, online: <https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/gobin-the-
law-societys-diversity-policy-doesnt-include-diverse-views>; Ryan Alford, “An arm of the state should not be 
forcing lawyers to declare their values,” (25 November 2017) CBC News, online: 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/law-society-statement-1.4418125.  
1473 Janet Epp-Buckingham described this in her 2013 interview on the CBC Radio program “The Current,” 
supra note 820. 
1474 Benson, “Foreword,” supra note 234 at xxvi.   
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Public/Private Sphere.  
When it comes to human sexuality, there is no longer a public or private sphere. Sexual 
identity politics has breached the ramparts of religious institutions just as Wintemute and 
Eskeridge expected it would. Religious beliefs, especially the practice of heterosexual 
normativity, are deemed harmful by academic and judicial opinion as expressed in the SCC TWU 
2018 decisions. The claim is that religious communities have no right to maintain their own 
distinctive nature when operating in “public.”1475 The premise of the argument is that religion, 
religious individuals, and religious communities have no business bringing their religious 
beliefs and practices into the so-called public sphere. Religion should only be confined to “the 
context of actual religious worship and observance.”1476 Otherwise, any person could, on the 
basis of genuinely held belief, “demand an exemption from non-discrimination norms in the 
provision of services to the public.”1477 If religious communities are involved in “public” 
enterprises, they must either yield to public norms or vacate the public field. 
This argument requires a definition of “public” that describes the provision of any 
services or endeavors outside of “actual religious worship and observance.”1478 Thus, religion is 
limited to a very narrow “private sphere,” while the “public sphere” expands into much broader 
territory “where the rights of others ought not to be affected by religious beliefs.”1479 In essence, 
this argument demands that religion be confined to the four walls of a church, mosque, or 
temple. Any involvement of religion outside of the church is to be curtailed. This was the 
approach taken by the Ontario courts in their rulings against TWU. There is no guarantee it will 
stop there. For if religious beliefs and practices are by definition harmful, why would the state 
stop at the doors of the church? The logic now unleashed by the SCC is that the state must be 
able to enter the very sanctuary. Consider that state regulators decide whether to grant 
registered charitable status to churches. Should Canada Revenue Agency also deny such status 
for similar reasons as the law societies denied TWU accreditation?   
The argument that religion should be given no public space in which to operate is an 
attempt to re-imagine religion as a “harmful” force rather than a positive force that has 
contributed to the well-being of liberal democratic societies. To eliminate all opposition to 
modern sexual equality norms requires a concerted effort to destroy the legitimacy of religion 
and religious institutions in the public eye.That is because religious faith on sexual norms 
remains persistent. Some academics suggest that religious institutions could discriminate 
against those with deviant sexual norms “only in the specific contexts where those tenets are 
actually being instilled.”1480 Such arguments are intolerant of difference and use the law “as the 
means of forcing one set of beliefs to be dominant.”1481 
MacDougall and Short argue that it is alarmist to suggest that accepting sexual 
orientation equality claims will result in interference with religious worship on the issue of 
marriage.1482 However, if it is improper to be involved in a public enterprise and follow one’s 
religious convictions on human sexuality, then should it not follow that it is improper for clergy, 
                                                     
1475 MacDougall & Short, supra note 483 at 138. 
1476.Ibid at 134. 
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1478 Ibid.  
1479 Ibid at 138. 
1480.Ibid at 140. 
1481 Benson, “Attack on Western Religions” supra note 468 at 113. 
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performing a public function of marrying people, to refuse to perform a marriage based on 
religious scruples? In other words, the SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions are inconsistent with its 
holding in the Marriage Reference that clergy are protected from having to perform their public 
function of marrying people if it interferes with their religious beliefs.1483 I suggest that the 
refusal to allow marriage commissioners in Saskatchewan1484 an exemption from performing 
marriages to which they are morally opposed is not much different in principle than the 
ministers of religion or clergy who were given that right in the Same‑sex Marriage Reference. 
Both the clergy and marriage commissioners are acting as public officials. Both are refusing to 
perform on the basis of religious grounds. The only difference is that one is employed by the 
church and the other by the state. Professor Richard Moon characterizes the marriage 
commissioners as making a political statement against the rights of other and suggests, 
“…freedom of religion does not support the accommodation of religious views about the rights 
and freedoms of others.”1485 I disagree. At issue is not the view of marriage commissioners’ 
opinions of the rights of others. Rather, it is their being forced to act against their will, in 
violation of their religious beliefs, in the same way as the clergy refused to act against their will. 
In any event, there remains a dissonance between how the law treats clergy and marriage 
commissioners.1486  
 
The Loss of Religious Freedom.  
 Without an opportunity to practice one’s beliefs, how meaningful is religious freedom? 
Religious communities, such as TWU, and their constituent members do not hold religious 
views lightly. Such beliefs are their very identity. The SCC’s ruling, which effectively bans them 
from operating their university in accordance with their religious belief on marriage, is not 
simply rebuking the belief but also the institution and the individuals. The religious community 
is no longer truly free. The fact that TWU changed its position subsequent to the SCC’s decisions 
does not alter that fact. The SCC’s denial is to deny the right of religious communities to 
establish their own institutions based on their religious beliefs.  
In fact, respect for religious freedom as it accommodates religious practice is necessary 
for the practical implementation of liberal democratic theoretical ideals of justice and equality. 
                                                     
1483 Same‑Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at para 58.  
1484 Three cases in Saskatchewan have ruled that marriage commissioners opposed to performing same-sex 
weddings cannot be accommodated. They are: Nichols v. Dept of Justice, Government of Saskatchewan (25 
October 2006, Sask HRT); Nichols v. MJ and the Sask HRC 2009 SKQB 299; Re Marriage Commissioners 
Appointed Under The Marriage Act 2011 SKCA 3. 
1485 Richard Moon, “Conscientious Objections by Civil Servants: The Case of Marriage Commissioners and 
Same-Sex Civil Marriages,” in Benjamin L. Berger & Richard Moon, eds, Religion and The Exercise of Public 
Authority (Oxford: Hart, 2016) at 165. Also see Richard J. Moon, “Conscientious Objection in Canada: 
Pragmatic Accommodation and Principled Adjudication” (2018) 7 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 274–
295. 
1486 Professor Moon suggests the difference is that marriage commissioners are state actors and their 
opposition cannot be protected as religious freedom under s. 2(a) of the Charter because their opposition is 
really not about religion but a political position about the rights of others in the public sphere (see 163). I 
take Prof. Moon’s position to be that once a person, like a marriage commissioner, takes a public role then 
personal conscience can no longer be protected under the Charter. While I do not have the space to 
adequately rebut that position it appears to suggest that those with religious conscientious positions against 
public norms need not apply to public offices. That, in my respectful view, cannot be positive for the long-
term health of a democratic society, especially when there are ample ways to accommodate public officials 
without having to cause any substantive harm to anyone’s sexual equality rights. 
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This is because religious freedom is a prototypical right, which helped forge the path for the 
legal recognition of other rights such as freedom of assembly,1487 freedom of speech, and the 
right to a fair trial beyond a reasonable doubt.1488 The tenacity with which human beings 
adhere to their religious beliefs, convictions, and practices has resulted in liberal democratic 
societies acknowledging the absolute necessity to provide religious accommodation. Such 
accommodation forms part of the “democratic project” that may be defined as maximizing 
individual freedom while at the same time maintaining civil peace. 
The SCC has now given license to public authorities to enquire into the beliefs and 
practices of religious communities and pass judgement. Those beliefs and practices deemed not 
in harmony with government sanction will result in the denial of government regulatory 
approval for the religious entity under review. This could impact licenses, grants of money, 
building permits, accreditation of schools (elementary, secondary, and post-secondary), and 
special exemptions. Should the SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions embolden other state regulators then 
Canada as a free and democratic society is in peril. 
 
State Supremacy Over Individual Conscience.  
The loss of an individual’s ability to follow his or her conscience is the point at which the 
state becomes the sole sovereign. As noted above, throughout Western civilization there has 
been tension between the state claiming the sole allegiance of its subjects and the claim of an 
individual conscience to follow his or her duty to divine sovereignty. The discussion in Chapter 
3 on the Reformation also showed that the bifurcation of sovereignty allowed for religious (and 
other) freedom as we know it today. Religious freedom was the prototypical right in modern 
states that blazed the trail for other basic human rights. The reduction of religious freedom by 
the rise of state supremacy over the individual conscience is, if history is any indication, a 
troubling development. 
State supremacy over individual conscience presupposes that the state has the power to 
force the will of society on the individual. The individual, and by extension fellow believers in a 
religious community, will either be denied the right to follow his or her conscience or be 
punished by the state for paying homage to divinity as he or she feels is their responsibility. The 
state would then be determining who will be sovereign in an individual’s life. This approach 
takes on the characteristics of those ancient Roman emperors who demanded allegiance as 
both God and king to their citizens. 
 
Religious Charities Will Close.  
Other Christian universities across the country with similar policies or positions as 
TWU regarding marriage can be expected to either fall in line with the new political and legal 
reality of sexual identity politics or face similar retribution for being “on the wrong side of 
history.” Our legal system will undertake a systematic recalibration as religion’s protection and 
special status is removed from the law. Should such institutions be forced to comply with 
government dictates, then we as a society lose more of our diversity. The anti-religious critics 
                                                     
1487 Inazu, supra note 1445 at 164. Inazu notes that in the United States it was the work of William Penn and 
Roger Williams that ensured dissenting religious groups could exercise their freedom in opposition to 
majoritarian norms.  
1488 James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven: 
Yale Univerity Press, 2008). Whitman presents the history of the concept of reasonable doubt, which was of 
theological origin meant to protect the souls of jurors. A person who experienced doubt yet convicted an 
innocent defendant was committing a mortal sin. As long as their doubts were not reasonable they were safe. 
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would suggest diversity which is “harmful” is not worth having. However, as pointed out 
throughout this work, the definition of “harm” is driven by identity politics ideology.   
It is the religious character of these institutions that establishes the very root of who 
and what they are as “a living faith tradition.”1489 TWU’s claim to operate with its Community 
Covenant “is a claim simply to live out the educational dimension of that Christian community’s 
life,” as Professor Dwight Newman so aptly put it. He continues, “The TWU claim is not a claim 
to isolationism but a claim to manifest religious belief in community, well within the core of 
religious freedom.”1490 If the religious organization cannot be what it was set up to be, it will 
cease to exist. Religious communities have no interest in cloning public institutions. An example 
of what we may expect can be found in the Massachuetts Roman Catholic child adoption agency 
which was denied its religious freedom.1491 It mattered not to the political identity ideologues 
that the Catholic adoption agency provided the lion’s share of special-needs children with 
adoptive homes.1492 The equality argument was such a potent force that it demanded full 
compliance with no opportunity for compromise. Massachusetts sacrificed “one value 
judgment, the right of homosexuals to adopt, for another, the role of religion in determining a 
child’s best interests.”1493 Offended feelings over sexual identity took precedence over the very 
practical reality of special-needs children in want of homes. The SCC adoption of identity 
politics meant that those offended by TWU’s views on marriage were accommodated rather 
than those holding religious freedom rights.   
The SCC’s TWU 2018 decisions mean we must relearn the wisdom of the past. Religious 
accommodation evolved slowly; it is now being rapidly destroyed. Our collective memory of the 
religious struggle for equality is dim. When political expediency during WWII demanded 
Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry be incarcerated and then later deported, the religious 
communities rose up in fierce opposition to such “false, cruel, un-British and above all, un-
Christian”1494 plans. Scholars Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein observed, “it is only a 
slight exaggeration to say ‘no religion, no humanitarianism.’”1495 The number of religious-based 
entities in humanitarian work is on the rise globally.1496 It is ironic that while the rest of the 
world benefits from faith-based humanitarian charities, the West is being denied such services 
because the legal revolution cannot accept religious agencies operating within a structure that 
supports traditional sexual ethics.  
This is not to belittle the obvious pain that members of the LGBTQ community have 
experienced within religious communities, as is evidenced by a number of LGBTQ advocates in 
the TWU law school case.1497 However, the point remains that religious communities, despite all 
                                                     
1489 Dwight Newman, “Ties That Bind:  Religious Freedom and Communities,” in Newman, ed, Religious 
Freedom and Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016), 18. 
1490 Ibid. 
1491 Matthew W. Clark, “The Gospel According to the State: An Analysis of Massachusetts Adoption Laws and 
the Closing of Catholic Charities Adoption Services” (2007-08) 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 871, 873, 895. 
1492 Ibid at 896. 
1493 Ibid. 
1494 Stephanie Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest: Defending North American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, 
1942-49 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 80. 
1495 Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, eds, Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 4. 
1496 Paras & Stein, supra note 1190 at 212. 
1497 See the evidence of Professor Elaine Craig before the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, wherein she stated, 
“In my first year of law school, I came out to my family. My parents rejected me, disowned me, because of 
their belief that homosexuality is disgusting and perverted, vile and shameful, you might say”, in “Meeting Of 
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of their shortcomings, are contributors to the social good and they ought not to be diminished, 
denied equal treatment, or maligned because they maintain traditional sexual norms within 
their own communities even though they are engaged in what is now perceived as “public” 
endeavours. As lawyer and LGBTQ rights advocate Kevin Kindred stated, “What troubles me the 
most when I try to come to terms with questions like this [accreditation of TWU Law School] is 
the fear that sometimes the arguments for equality for gays and lesbians are used as a sword 
and are used in order to attack the valued place that religious dissenters and religious 
minorities ought to occupy in Canadian culture.”1498 Kindred was not suggesting that there 
could be no opposition to TWU but that the opposition should be “moral and theological” not 
“with state-imposed negative consequences.”1499 
 
The Removal of Benefits and Accommodations.  
Religion has been accommodated in a myriad of ways in Canadian law. The removal of 
religious freedom from its protected status will lead to the removal of the law’s rebuttable 
presumption that religion is to be accommodated. A hierarchical regime where equality rights 
trump religion will mean that where there is a conflict, perhaps even only a perceived conflict, 
between religion and equality, the result will be the diminution of the perceived “religious 
privilege.” 
 
Clergy Accommodation.  
The first religious areas to face challenges will be where religion conflicts with equality. 
One cannot make an exhaustive list, but certainly the most obvious would be the removal of the 
accommodation given to clergy who cannot marry a couple because of religious scruples. In 
Marriage Reference, the SCC stated: 
[S]tate compulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex marriages contrary to 
their religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of religion under s. 
2(a) of the Charter. It also seems apparent that, absent exceptional circumstances 
which we cannot at present foresee, such a violation could not be justified under s. 1 
of the Charter.1500 
At first blush, this holding appears to be immovable. However, it is immovable only in 
the current legal paradigm that treats religion as special and worthy of constitutional 
protection. Once religion has been determined to be the nemesis of equality, religion will be 
seen in a very different light. Allowing the clergy a marriage exemption is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the new paradigm. In the new paradigm, the state act of granting authority to 
clergy to perform a public action would be legitimizing the religious beliefs underlying the 
clergy’s refusal to marry. In the same way, the Law Society would be condoning and accepting 
the worldview of TWU by allowing TWU graduates to practice law in its jurisdiction. 
 
Charitable Status for Advancement of Religion.  
As noted above throughout the TWU 2018 litigation, the law societies and/or their allies 
                                                     
The Executive Committee of the Council of the Society” (13 February 2014), at 13, online (pdf):  
<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-02-13_NSBSTrinityWesternU.pdf>.) 
1498 Ibid at 150.  
1499 Unless, of course, “TWU’s views are expressed in such a way as to encourage hatred or violence or are 
translated into action which breaches the applicable human rights law,” see Ginn & Kindred, supra note 1215 
at 5. 
1500 Same‑Sex Marriage, supra note 178 at para 58. 
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have argued that the case of Bob Jones University1501 in the United States is applicable. It is 
curious that the SCC did not use BJU in its TWU 2018 decisions but the Ontario Court of Appeal 
did.1502 For reasons I have argued elsewhere, this analogy fails.  
However, to be consistent, the legal revolution would also have to argue that TWU’s 
charitable tax status should be removed because TWU had discriminated against sexual 
equality by supporting traditional marriage, and such discrimination is contrary to public 
policy and not a public benefit.1503  
We may expect further demands from the legal revolutionaries that Parliament repeal 
those applicable sections of the Civil Marriage Act and the Income Tax Act which protect 
religious charities that maintain beliefs and practices on traditional marriage – and/or that the 
SCC rule those applicable sections as unconstitutional in light of the TWU 2018 decisions.  
 
8.7 Final Remarks 
 
The Trinity Western University case has galvanized a significant group of academics and 
practitioners in the legal profession challenging religion’s special status in the law. This study 
likens this phenomenon to a revolution, using Thomas S. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions 
to analyze this development. Legal revolutions were contrasted from scientific revolutions in 
their goals, methodology, and perspectives. These differences are based in the varying values 
and desired outcomes of each discipline.  
It is concluded that the legal revolution against religious accommodation is due to the 
law’s inability to answer critics of religion who favour sexual equality rights. There is on 
display a “rights inflation” phenomenon where the demands of equality rights have come to 
eclipse the legal norm of religious accommodation even in the private sphere. What was once 
considered private, such as running religious universities, is now viewed as public because of 
the state’s regulation of such institutions. This is a new phenomenon which threatens every 
publicly regulated religious enterprise.   
The law, like other fields of human endeavour, is swept up in our cultural moment that I 
have called “The Sexular Age.” The Sexular Age concept has been only lightly introduced in this 
work and is in need of further development. But, at a minimum, it is the result of rampant 
individualism (associated with identity politics) that has captured the imagination of our time, 
wherein the individual is free to be whatever, whomever, they so desire. This Sexular Age has 
meant that religious communities, such as Trinity Western University, are at odds with the 
culture. There is a demand, arising within the legal fraternity, that the law must no longer grant 
legal accommodation to religious communities that refuse to accept the Sexular Age. Religion 
has become, in the minds of the sexularists, an anachronism that must be forced to change by 
law – so that all may be “free” to pursue their self-identity without any hindrance – even the 
hindrance of a private religious institution that one can only join voluntarily. Lost are the legal 
distinctions between private and public, religious and non-religious, the role of religion and the 
role of state, accommodation of difference and imposition of the majority. 
Further, it is contended that the present legal revolution to strip religion of its favored 
legal status in favour of sexual equality puts liberal democratic ideals and ultimately the free 
and democratic society in a precarious position. 
                                                     
1501 Bob Jones University, supra note 877.  
1502 The Ontario Court of Appeal accepted the BJU analogy; TWU ONCA 2016, supra note 701 at para 136-138. 
1503 Templeton, supra note 1344. 
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As traditional legal and moral norms are obscured by non-traditional norms, tension 
has increased between the conservative and progressive factions of society. This is particularly 
pronounced around sexual equality claims. Sexual equality advocates are challenging the right 
of religious institutions, such as universities, to maintain sexual prohibitions, based on their 
faith, on their campus operations.  
It matters not, for these advocates, that the religious institution is privately funded and 
religious – indeed, “the fact that TWU feels that it is a Christian based institution is irrelevant to 
the discussion.”1504 The rationale is that the entity is involved in a “public” sphere activity and 
must abide by public norms or else cease functioning. This radical concept has been around 
since at least the time of the French Revolution but is one that liberalism ultimately rejected as 
being too radical and incompatible with a free and democratic society. However, it is now being 
given new life in the struggle between religion and sexual equality.  
It is revolutionary from the current state of the law. This development will alter the 
very framework of how religious entities operate in Canadian society and will lead to a 
diminished public role of religious communities in public service enterprises. Transitioning to 
an era of reduced religious tolerance has an unknown outcome for the democratic project that 
has historically sought to increase the maximum amount of individual freedom while 
simultaneously maintaining civil peace.  
There is a need among legal practitioners, academics, and the judiciary alike for a 
deeper appreciation of religion and its role in democracies. This study argues that religion has 
had a unique role in buffering the state tendency to demand ultimate allegiance at the expense 
of individual conscience.1505 Through exploring Trinity Western University’s law school 
proposal and the opposition to it by the legal profession, this study illustrates and 
demonstrates the practical application of its contention that opposition to religious tolerance 
on matters of traditional sexuality, within the legal profession, is revolutionary and, if 
successful, foreshadows significant challenges to democratic values and principles both 
institutionally and individually. Institutionally, constraint is now possible as other religious 
institutions will be, in all likelihood, denied government approval to operate in the public 
sphere for failing to abide by the government’s interpretation of the Charter and its moral 
judgements as a “blueprint for moral conformity”. Evangelical Christians, as individuals, will 
face future challenges in other contexts similar to their loss of the freedom to attend a law 
school within the ambiance of a like-minded Christian setting.1506    
TWU was forced to defend itself twice over the last two decades when it sought to offer 
a new degree program. TWU 2001 involved the education degree; TWU 2018, the law degree. 
                                                     
1504 Email from Peter Leslie (4 February 2014), in NSBS Submissions, supra note 1200 at 142. 
1505 A similar sentiment was echoed by President Trump in his inaugural address: “At the bedrock of our 
politics will be a total allegiance to the United States of America, and through our loyalty to our country, we 
will rediscover our loyalty to each other” (emphasis added), see “The Inaugural Address” (20 January 2017), 
online: The White House <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/>. 
1506 As Justice Campbell so aptly put it in TWU NSSC 2015, supra note 775 at para 11:   
People have the right to attend a private religious university that imposes a religiously based code of 
conduct. That is the case even if the effect of that code is to exclude others or offend others who will 
not or cannot comply with the code of conduct. Learning in an environment with people who promise 
to comply with the code is a religious practice and an expression of religious faith. There is nothing 
illegal or even rogue about that. That is a messy and uncomfortable fact of life in a pluralistic society. 
Requiring a person to give up that right in order to get his or her professional education recognized is 
an infringement of religious freedom. 
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Even though TWU ought to have been protected by the Charter (as it was in TWU 2001), in 
TWU 2018 its protection was denied because the law societies were given the deference to 
apply their statutory objectives by means of “Charter values.” The net effect was a denial of the 
Charter right. As Côté and Brown JJ noted, s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides for the 
primacy of the Constitution, meaning “that rights trump statutory objectives and decisions 
taken thereunder”,1507 not the other way around. Yet neither the Charter, nor human rights 
legislation, nor even a SCC decision (TWU 2001) were sufficient to safeguard TWU’s religious 
freedom. 
TWU’s experience stands as a troubling development going forward for those religious 
organisations that are involved in government-regulated industries. The SCC has made it 
abundantly clear that state actors will be given deference in carrying out their statutory 
mandates while balancing Charter rights.  However, as noted above, even when state actors do 
not carry out such balancing, as LSBC admitted, the SCC was willing to do it for them to ensure 
the “right” decision was made. The ability of these state actors to self-define their “public 
interest”, as did the law societies, will mean a further expansion of government into the private 
sphere. What was once private has now become public.  
It is reasonable to expect state actors in other fields to be emboldened to expand their 
authority and only provide a cursory glance at the Charter rights engaged by their “reasonable” 
decisions. Even if they were to be predisposed to favour religious accommodation, they will not 
be able, in all likelihood, to withstand the loud outcry from political activists who would accuse 
them of “condoning” discrimination. One only has to consider the myriad government actors 
that must give approval for religious organisations to operate. One of those is the Canada 
Revenue Agency which is tasked with registering charities to allow them to issue charitable 
donor receipts. During the TWU 2018 hearings the Canadian Bar Association lawyer admitted 
that government authorities would likely be justified in denying tax exempt status so that they 
do not condone discrimination.1508  
TWU 2018 illustrates the paradigm shift that has occurred in the legal profession 
against the law’s accommodation of religious practice. We now await the unfolding 
consequences of this shift as religious sensibilities are increasingly labelled “degrading and 
disrespectful” by a Court moved to develop its own “Charter values”. These diminish Charter 
rights in the guise of diversity that denies the very freedom and pluralism it claims to be 
implementing.  
TWU’s concession to remove the mandatory code of conduct was an unforeseen 
development after it had fought so long to maintain its right to have a mandatory Community 
Covenant. There is much to consider about that development. It raises questions about the 
extent to which society will want to sanction the state’s use of power to force a religious 
community into compliance with state dictates even when the religious community has done 
nothing unlawful. However, that is a discussion that other scholars will want to broach in the 
near future. 
Nevertheless, TWU’s move to change ought to be seen as a good faith move that should 
reassure the legal profession that though it is a Christian law school it is not inherently 
dogmatic nor unreasonable. Rather, it is pragmatic and respectful of the law, seeking to do all 
                                                     
1507 LSBC v TWU 2018, supra note 14, para 305. 
1508 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 and Trinity Western University v. 
The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33 (Transcript of oral hearing, SCC vol 2, 1 December 2017, at 
282-283). 
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that it can to reach a compromise that keeps its faith intact while, at the same time, meeting the 
equality concerns raised by the TWU 2018 litigation. 
For its part, the legal profession must now take leadership and recognize that under its 
expanded “public interest” mandate, religious minorities must also be protected, even if they 
have beliefs and practices that no longer comply with changing sexual mores. They are still due 
the respect and dignity that the Charter gives them. Despite disagreements, we must seek to get 
along. Fundamental human life issues such as marriage, abortion, and end of life will forever be 
part of the bubbling caldron of public debate. That should not deter us from living together in 
and with our differences, respecting the right of others to peaceably hold and practice a 
different way of life.    
If TWU applies again for a law school, it would appear that the revolutionary spirit 
within the profession would continue and seek to expunge religious accommodation from the 
law. However, it is open for the profession to consider, upon further reflection on the anti-
religious sentiment exhibited by its members, whether there is still any role for it to protect 
and promote a plural, multicultural society that tolerates difference – including the ability of a 
Christian university to have a Christian law school – all in the “public interest”.  
What can we expect in the future? 
If my analysis of the legal revolution against the place of religion is correct, that is to 
say, that it follows similar developments to what Kuhn noted in the scientific community, then 
the revolutionaries, being in charge of legal education, will ensure that all budding lawyers will 
see the law of religious accommodation in the same way as the revolutionaries do. Kuhn noted 
that in the scientific revolution the revolutionaries “are in an excellent position to make certain 
that future members of their community will see past history in the same way.”1509 The 
repudiation of a past paradigm means that it is no longer “a fit subject for professional 
scrutiny” and all previous works based on that paradigm are of no use.1510 This “drastic 
distortion in the scientist’s perception of his discipline’s past” makes the member of the 
scientific community a “victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be.”1511 
The powers that be in the legal profession have reinterpreted the law of religious 
accommodation to mean that any private religious organization, regulated by government, that 
does not accommodate sexual identity will not be accommodated by the state. The main 
justifications for this new paradigm, as adopted by the SCC, are: a) that government must not 
be seen to condone a religious belief and/or practice that violates the cardinal rule of our 
Sexular Age – the individual is free to do or be whatever “they” want; b) the government must 
not be part of limiting the ability of the public to access any of its regulated programs, even 
those operated by religious communities. 
The legal academy has the power to ensure that all new lawyers will be taught, not the 
old paradigm of religious accommodation based on the intellectual, political, religious, and 
philosophical history of liberal democratic society, but on the new understandings of the 
Sexular Age that emphasises identity politics. 
The legal profession has now obtained from the SCC the increased authorization to re-
define their public interest mandate in accordance with the internal political realities of the 
profession. The irony is that the “public interest” is, in the circumstance, more aligned with the 
internal interests of the professional members than it is aligned with the public – that is, the 
average Canadian citizen who is not a lawyer. 
                                                     
1509 Kuhn, Revolutions, supra note 1 at 166. 
1510 Ibid at 167. 
1511 Ibid. 
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In the end, the SCC in its TWU 2018 decisions has created a large echo chamber wherein 
the legal profession has entered a world apart from the Canadian public. It is the interests of 
the lawyers, the legal governing bodies, and the judiciary that have now adopted a new 
paradigm. The law of religious accommodation has been fundamentally altered. The respect for 
religion, the granting of special status to religion, has been taken away. As we move forward it 
is my prediction, based upon my study in this field, and the assistance of Kuhn’s work, that all 
legal vestiges that held religion as “special” will be systematically removed. However, this study 
has also revealed that history is clear: religion has a remarkable ability to revive and become a 
societal force that has to be reckoned with. Perhaps TWU 2018 is the low point of the 
accommodation of religion in Canadian law; perhaps it is not, and there is less accommodation 
on the horizon. What is for certain is that the debate about religion being special is far from 
over. Professor Frank S. Ravitch rightly bemoans the fact that the struggle between religion and 
sexual equality is taking a dark turn. As both sides dig in their heels there are, he observes, two 
authoritarian groups – one on each side of the debate that attempts “to silence and shame those 
who do not agree with them – or those who simply seek open discourse.”1512 “It is easy,” he 
notes, “to destroy bridges and much harder to build them.”1513 Well said. 
We are, it would seem, at a place described by Churchill: “Now this is not the end. It is 
not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”1514 
 
 
                                                     
1512 Frank S. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge: Religious Freedom, Sexual Freedom, and the Future of America, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 203. 
1513 Ibid at 204. 
1514 Winston Churchill, “The End of the Beginning,” The Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House (10 
November 1942), online: The Churchill Society, London <http://www.churchill-society-
london.org.uk/EndoBegn.html>. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The Legal Revolution Against the Acccommodation of Religion: 
The Secular Age v. The Sexular Age 
 
The blast of cannons, the slice of the guillotine, the march of rebel soldiers: these are the 
popular images of revolution. Yet revolts may occur just as decisively in the pages of an 
academic journal, or in the comments of a courthouse or law faculty. 
Recognizing the parallels between politics and science, Thomas S. Kuhn asserts that 
paradigmatic shifts within scientific studies are as disruptive as the violent overthrow of one 
political regime by another. His work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), examines 
the transition from one established paradigm to another through the accumulation of 
anomalies which build to a crisis. Eventually, the inadequacy of the old paradigm is revealed 
and resolved through a “Eureka” moment which offers an entirely new way of understanding 
and interpreting the world. The revolution is complete with the repudiation of the old and the 
consolidation of a new worldview. 
Applying Kuhn’s model to the legal profession presents a unique and original analysis of 
the relationship between religion and the law – a special relationship which now appears to be 
verging on crisis. 
Freedom to practice religion has long been part of the legal paradigm in liberal 
democracies. However, historic accommodations are threatened by the new “Sexular Age,” in 
which asymmetrical equality claims seek to vanquish all other human rights that would occupy 
similar public space. Moreover, they assault the private domain which liberal democracies have 
traditionally given to the practice of religion. The tensions between the old paradigm and the 
anomalous demands of equality rights are effectively illustrated in the Trinity Western 
University (TWU) Law School case: a seeming crisis point in the revolution.  
Chapter one of this dissertation asks what is required of the law if religious tolerance is 
indeed at the “very foundation of our democracy” (see Multani v. Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoy, 2006). Should liberal democracies continue to insist that religion be 
given special constitutional treatment in the current context? If so, why? And finally, what 
would be the possible consequences should the legal revolution succeed in overthrowing 
religion’s special status? 
After an analysis of Kuhn’s model of revolutions in chapter two, chapters three and four 
delve into the meaning or function of religion (with reference to scholars as diverse as Haidt, 
Leiter, Nehushtan, Norenzayan, or Dworkin), and into the historical and philosophical rationale 
for protecting religious freedom in the West. Chapter five then turns to an analysis of the rise of 
secularism and the concurrent repudiation of religious traditions, particularly regarding 
sexuality. The advance of equality claims based on sexual orientation and the redefinition of 
marriage call into question the place of religious influence on law and public policy. 
This is evident in the opposition to TWU’s law school proposal, examined in chapters six 
and seven. Objections, which would deny TWU’s right to rely upon the current legal paradigm 
regarding religion, represent a “Eureka” moment for many in the legal profession. These critics 
have concluded that the law’s accommodation of religion no longer fits their understanding of 
how the law should operate when religious and sexual minorities come into conflict.  
The revolt over the TWU case has created a heightened sense of incompatibility 
between the legal system and religion. Going forward, how should the law balance religious 
and secular interests? And how should society respond to a voluntary community of members 
with internal rules of conduct? Given the importance of religion in our diverse and plural 
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society, will religious communities continue to have space in which to operate without fear of 
state reprisal?  
The conclusion considers several possibilities for the future (including a skeptical 
response to William Eskridge’s prediction that religious groups will gradually align with 
secular society on matters of sexuality), before positing seven suggestions that accept 
dissonance as strength, not failure. These include the assertion that religion matters, and that 
religion is not the nemesis of equality rights. When an institution such as TWU is private, 
peaceable, non-commercial, and there is no evidence of abuse of private power, then the law 
ought to maintain its indifference. 
The ramifications go well beyond the accreditation of the TWU law school. To remove 
religious accommodations is to destroy what the SCC in Mouvement laïque québécois v. 
Saguenay (City), 2015, termed “the pursuit of an ideal: a free and democratic society. This 
pursuit requires the state to encourage everyone to participate freely in public life regardless of 
their beliefs.” Historically, liberal democratic societies have achieved unprecedented peace and 
stability leading to expansive personal freedoms. Denying those freedoms would not merely 
restrict a particular institution or community, but would limit our very capacity to maintain 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
De juridische revolutie tegen de accommodatie van godsdienst:  
de seculiere tijd versus de seksuliere tijd 
 
De rook van kanonnen, de slag van de guillotine, marcherende rebellenstrijders: dit zijn 
de beelden die revolutie oproept. Revoltes kunnen echter evenzo daadkrachtig plaatsvinden in 
de pagina’s van een academisch blad of in de commentaren van een rechtbank of 
rechtenfaculteit. 
Zich terdege bewust van de paralellen tussen de politiek en de wetenschap stelt Thomas 
S. Kuhn dat paradigmatische verschuivingen binnen wetenschappelijke studies net zo 
ontwrichtend zijn als de gewelddadige afzetting van het ene politieke regime door het andere. 
Zijn werk De structuur van wetenschappelijke revoluties (1970) verkent de overgang van een 
gevestigd naar een nieuw paradigma door middel van de opstapeling van anomalieën die tot 
een crisis leiden. Uiteindelijk komen de tekortkomingen van het oude paradigma aan het licht 
en worden ze verholpen door een eurekamoment: een geheel nieuwe manier om de wereld te 
begrijpen en interpreteren. De revolutie is compleet met de verwerping van het oude 
wereldbeeld en de consolidatie van een nieuwe zienswijze.  
Het toepassen van Kuhn’s model resulteert in een unieke en originele analyse van de 
relatie tussen godsdienst en de wet; een bijzondere relatie die nu in een crisis lijkt te geraken.  
De vrijheid om een geloof te belijden maakt sinds jaar en dag deel uit van het juridisch 
paradigma in liberale democratieën. Historische accommodaties worden echter bedreigd door 
de nieuwe “Seksuliere Tijd,” waarin asymmetrische gelijkheidsclaims tot doel hebben alle 
andere mensenrechten die vergelijkbare publieke ruimte innemen, weg te vagen. Bovendien 
vallen ze het private domein aan dat liberale democratieën traditioneel hebben gegeven aan 
het praktiseren van godsdienst. De spanningen tussen het oude paradigma en de anomale eisen 
van gelijkheidsrechten zijn goed geïllustreerd in de zaak van de beoogde rechtenfaculteit van 
Trinity Western University (TWU): naar alle waarschijnlijkheid een crisispunt in de revolutie.  
In het eerste hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie wordt gevraagd wat er wettelijk nodig is als 
verdraagzaamheid voor godsdienst inderdaad aan het “fundament van onze democratie” ligt 
(zie Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoy, 2006). Moeten liberale democratieën 
erop blijven staan dat godsdienst speciale constitutionele behandeling krijgt in de huidige 
context? Zo ja: waarom? En wat zijn de mogelijke implicaties als de juridische revolutie erin 
slaagt om de speciale status van godsdienst omver te werpen?  
Na een analyse van Kuhn’s model van revoluties in hoofdstuk twee gaan hoofdstukken 
drie en vier in op de betekenis of functie van godsdienst (verwijzend naar een keur aan 
geleerden, van Haidt, Leiter en Nehushtan tot Norenzayan en Dworkin) en op de historische en 
filosofische onderbouwing voor het beschermen van godsdienstvrijheid in het Westen. 
Hoofdstuk vijf richt zich vervolgens op een analyse van de opkomst van het secularisme en de 
gelijktijdige verwerping van religieuze tradities, deels met betrekking tot seksualiteit. De 
opmars van gelijkheidsclaims gebaseerd op seksuele geaardheid en de herdefiniëring van het 
huwelijk trekken de plaats van religieuze invloed op de wet en overheidsbeleid in twijfel.  
Dit is evident in het verzet tegen het voorstel voor een rechtenfaculteit van TWU 
hetgeen besproken wordt in hoofdstukken zes en zeven. De gemaakte bezwaren, die TWU het 
recht ontzeggen om zich te verlaten op het huidige juridische paradigma ten aanzien van 
godsdienst, zijn een eurekamoment voor velen in de juridische wereld. Deze critici hebben 
geconcludeerd dat de accommodatie die de wet biedt aan godsdienst niet langer voldoet aan 
  258  
hun begrip van hoe de wet zou moeten functioneren wanneer religieuze en seksuele 
minderheden met elkaar in conflict komen.  
De opstand in de TWU-zaak heeft een versterkt gevoel van onverenigbaarheid tussen 
het rechtssysteem en religie bewerkstelligd. Hoe moet de wet religieuze en seculiere belangen 
in de toekomst in balans houden? En hoe zou de maatschappij moeten reageren op een 
vrijwillige gemeenschap die interne gedragsregels hanteert? Zullen religieuze 
gemeenschappen, gezien het belang van godsdienst in onze diverse en pluralistische 
samenleving, ook in de toekomst ruimte hebben om te bestaan zonder bang te hoeven zijn voor 
staatsrepresailles?  
De conclusie neemt verschillende mogelijkheden voor de toekomst onder de loep 
(waaronder een sceptisch antwoord op de voorspelling van William Eskridge dat religieuze 
groeperingen zich langzaam zullen aanpassen aan de seculiere samenleving als het gaat om 
seksualiteitskwesties), waarna het zeven suggesties doet die dissonantie voorstellen als kracht, 
niet als defect. Deze bevatten de stelling dat religieuze kwesties en godsdienst geen vijanden 
zijn van gelijkheidsrechten. Als een instituut zoals TWU privaat, vredig en niet-commercieel is - 
en als er geen bewijs is van misbruik van private macht - zou de wet haar onverschilligheid 
moeten bewaren.  
De gevolgen strekken veel verder dan de accreditatie van de rechtenfaculteit van TWU. 
Het afschaffen van religieuze accommodaties is het vernietigen van wat het Canadese 
Hooggerechtshof, in de zaak Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) uit 2015, omschreef 
als ‘…het nastreven van een ideaal: een vrije en democratische samenleving. Dit vereist dat de 
staat iedereen aanmoedigt om vrijelijk in het publieke leven deel te nemen, ongeacht hun 
geloof.” Historisch gezien hebben liberale democratieën ongekende vrede en stabiliteit 
bewerkstelligd wat tot ruime persoonlijke vrijheden heeft geleid. Het ontnemen van deze 
vrijheden zou niet alleen een bepaald instituut of een bepaalde gemeenschap beperken; het zou 
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